土地流转:弱转入土地意愿的博弈分析
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摘要
[目的]我国土地制度的施行使得农户拥有较多小块土地,家庭农场实现连片规模经营的前提是获得规模连片土地,家庭农场与农户进行土地流转协商时,农户将土地流转给家庭农场的意愿如何值得探讨。因此本文研究目的是对家庭农场实现规模连片生产提出建议,期望家庭农场实现规模化经营。[方法]博弈分析法。[结果]家庭农场存在从农户手中转入土地困难,转入土地意愿不强的现象,家庭农场弱转入土地意愿的根源在于土地租金过低、农户转出土地净利润过低、实际转入土地意愿过低。[结论]由此文章提出了3点建议:(1)尝试"确权不确地,确地不确人"的确权政策(2)创建农村土地经营权流转信息平台,建立农村土地流转交易所(3)工商资本下乡租田的做法需谨慎。
Affected by the existing land system, farmers have many small plots of land in China. However, the premise of connected scale management in family farms is to acquire a large amount of land that connects each other. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss farmers′ willingness to transfer land to family farms when they negotiate on land transfer. The purpose of this study is to provide suggestions for realizing connected scale production in family farms, with a view to helping achieve scale management in family farms. Using game theory analysis, this study found that family farms met such challenges as difficulty in acquiring land from farmers and insufficient willingness of farmers to transfer land. And the root causes of the challenges were excessively low land rent, excessively low net profit that farmers got from transferring land, and excessively low willingness to transfer land in reality. Finally, this study puts forward three suggestions as follows. Firstly, a new policy for ownership affirmation can be implemented, namely farmers have the rights to own rural collective land rather than a specific plot of land, and rural collective land shall be uniformly operated by rural collective economic organizations. Secondly, the government can create an information platform for transferring the rights of operating rural land and establish an exchange for rural land transfer. Thirdly, the government should hold a prudential attitude towards introducing industrial and commercial capital into rural land leasing.
Affected by the existing land system, farmers have many small plots of land in China. However, the premise of connected scale management in family farms is to acquire a large amount of land that connects each other. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss farmers′ willingness to transfer land to family farms when they negotiate on land transfer. The purpose of this study is to provide suggestions for realizing connected scale production in family farms, with a view to helping achieve scale management in family farms. Using game theory analysis, this study found that family farms met such challenges as difficulty in acquiring land from farmers and insufficient willingness of farmers to transfer land. And the root causes of the challenges were excessively low land rent, excessively low net profit that farmers got from transferring land, and excessively low willingness to transfer land in reality. Finally, this study puts forward three suggestions as follows. Firstly, a new policy for ownership affirmation can be implemented, namely farmers have the rights to own rural collective land rather than a specific plot of land, and rural collective land shall be uniformly operated by rural collective economic organizations. Secondly, the government can create an information platform for transferring the rights of operating rural land and establish an exchange for rural land transfer. Thirdly, the government should hold a prudential attitude towards introducing industrial and commercial capital into rural land leasing.
引文
[1] 刘灵辉.农地自由流转下家庭农场土地适度规模化研究.西北农林科技大学学报,2015,15(2):153-160.
[2] 洪名勇,关海霞.农户土地流转行为及影响因素分析.经济问题,2012(8):72-77.
[3] 陈昱,陈银蓉,马文博.基于Logistic模型的水库移民安置区居民土地流转意愿分析——四川、湖南、湖北移民安置区的调查.资源科学,2011,33(6):1178-1185.
[4] 滕鹏,宋戈,黄善林,等.农户认知视角下农地流转意愿影响因素研究——以湖北省京山县为例.中国农业资源与区划,2017,38(1):89-95.
[5] 李景刚,高艳梅,臧俊梅.农户风险意识对土地流转决策行为的影响.农业技术经济,2014(11):21-30.
[6] 薛凤蕊,乔光华,侯安宏.农区与半农半牧区土地流转意愿比较分析——以内蒙古鄂尔多斯市为例.农业技术经济,2010(2):24-30.
[7] 罗迈钦.我国农地流转瓶颈及其破解——基于湖南省225792农户家庭土地流转情况的调查分析.求索,2014(6):77-80.
[8] 王恒.“三权分置”背景下农村土地流转交易机制与制度探讨——评《农村土地流转交易机制与制度研究》.探索,2017(5):193.
[9] 罗必良.合约短期化与空合约假说——基于农地租约的经验证据.财经问题研究,2017(1):10-21.
[10] 张西现.农地流转现状及制约因素分析——以云南省为例.中国农业资源与区划,2016,37(3):101-105.
[11] 卫春江,张少楠.我国农村土地流转中利益主体的进化博弈分析.经济经纬,2017,34(2):49-55.
[12] 黎东升,刘小乐.我国农村土地流转创新机制研究——基于政府干预信息披露的博弈分析.农村经济,2016(2):34-38.
[13] 周娟,姜权权.家庭农场的土地流转特征及其优势——基于湖北黄陂某村的个案研究.华中科技大学学报,2015,29(2):132-140.
[14] 王建.新型经营主体何以“毁约退地”.农村.农业.农民,2016(11):13-14.
[15] Kahneman D,Choices,Values,and Frames.American Psychologist,1984,39(4):341-350.
[16] Thaler R.Mrntal accounting matters.Journal of behavior decision making,1999(12):183-205.
[17] Tverky A,Kahneman D.The framing of decision and the psychology of choice.Science,1981,211:453-458.
[18] 高宇,林倩倩,邵周岳.我国农村土地流转价格问题与对策建议.价格月刊,2017(10):76-80.
[19] 陈奕山,钟甫宁,纪月清.为什么土地流转中存在零租金?——人情租视角的实证分析.中国农村观察,2017(4):43-56.
[2] 洪名勇,关海霞.农户土地流转行为及影响因素分析.经济问题,2012(8):72-77.
[3] 陈昱,陈银蓉,马文博.基于Logistic模型的水库移民安置区居民土地流转意愿分析——四川、湖南、湖北移民安置区的调查.资源科学,2011,33(6):1178-1185.
[4] 滕鹏,宋戈,黄善林,等.农户认知视角下农地流转意愿影响因素研究——以湖北省京山县为例.中国农业资源与区划,2017,38(1):89-95.
[5] 李景刚,高艳梅,臧俊梅.农户风险意识对土地流转决策行为的影响.农业技术经济,2014(11):21-30.
[6] 薛凤蕊,乔光华,侯安宏.农区与半农半牧区土地流转意愿比较分析——以内蒙古鄂尔多斯市为例.农业技术经济,2010(2):24-30.
[7] 罗迈钦.我国农地流转瓶颈及其破解——基于湖南省225792农户家庭土地流转情况的调查分析.求索,2014(6):77-80.
[8] 王恒.“三权分置”背景下农村土地流转交易机制与制度探讨——评《农村土地流转交易机制与制度研究》.探索,2017(5):193.
[9] 罗必良.合约短期化与空合约假说——基于农地租约的经验证据.财经问题研究,2017(1):10-21.
[10] 张西现.农地流转现状及制约因素分析——以云南省为例.中国农业资源与区划,2016,37(3):101-105.
[11] 卫春江,张少楠.我国农村土地流转中利益主体的进化博弈分析.经济经纬,2017,34(2):49-55.
[12] 黎东升,刘小乐.我国农村土地流转创新机制研究——基于政府干预信息披露的博弈分析.农村经济,2016(2):34-38.
[13] 周娟,姜权权.家庭农场的土地流转特征及其优势——基于湖北黄陂某村的个案研究.华中科技大学学报,2015,29(2):132-140.
[14] 王建.新型经营主体何以“毁约退地”.农村.农业.农民,2016(11):13-14.
[15] Kahneman D,Choices,Values,and Frames.American Psychologist,1984,39(4):341-350.
[16] Thaler R.Mrntal accounting matters.Journal of behavior decision making,1999(12):183-205.
[17] Tverky A,Kahneman D.The framing of decision and the psychology of choice.Science,1981,211:453-458.
[18] 高宇,林倩倩,邵周岳.我国农村土地流转价格问题与对策建议.价格月刊,2017(10):76-80.
[19] 陈奕山,钟甫宁,纪月清.为什么土地流转中存在零租金?——人情租视角的实证分析.中国农村观察,2017(4):43-56.