基于博弈论的中国体育彩票竞争行为研究
|
摘要
基于国家探索发展体育彩票的现实背景,通过分析中国彩票市场的特征,构建博弈模型,求解竞争均衡,揭示体育彩票竞争行为的内在机理,分析体育彩票销量逐步追平福利彩票的原因。首先,根据我国彩票市场的返奖率和市场营销活动不断增加的现实情况,建立双寡头的价格竞争模型。结果发现,在静态博弈中,体育彩票和福利彩票的最优策略为实际价格等于成本;在无限次动态博弈中,如果商家目光长远或者存在政府管制,体育彩票和福利彩票会存在某种默契,将实际价格维持在比较高的水平。其次,引入销售网点数量因素和消费者偏好因素,建立空间竞争模型,发现实体销售网点数量增加是体育彩票销量增长的重要原因,现阶段我国体育彩票和福利彩票的竞争处于销售网点基本相同的均衡状态。同时,模型均衡求解的结果还表明,目前争议很大的"互联网售彩"会对实体彩票销售网点产生巨大冲击。
Based on the realistic background of the country's exploration of sports lottery's development,this study analyzes the characteristics of China's lottery market,constructs a game model,solves the competition equilibrium,reveals the internal mechanism of sports lottery competition behavior,and analyzes the reasons why sports lottery sales gradually equalize the welfare lottery.First of all,a duopoly price competition model is established based on the reality that the return rate of China's lottery market and marketing activities were increasing.It is found that in the static game,the optimal strategy of sports lottery and welfare lottery is that the real price is equal to the cost.In the infinite dynamic game,if the merchant has long-term gaze or a government regulation is present,there will be some tacit agreement between the sports lottery and the welfare lottery and the real prices will be maintained in a relatively high level.Secondly,a spatial competition model is established by introducing the sales network number factors and consumer preference factors.It is found that the increase of the number of physical sales outlets is an important reason for the growth of sports lottery sales.At this stage,the competition between China's sports lottery and welfare lottery is basically the same at the sales outlets.status.At the same time,the results of the model equilibrium solution also show that the current controversial"Internet sale"will have a huge impact on the physical lottery sales outlets.
Based on the realistic background of the country's exploration of sports lottery's development,this study analyzes the characteristics of China's lottery market,constructs a game model,solves the competition equilibrium,reveals the internal mechanism of sports lottery competition behavior,and analyzes the reasons why sports lottery sales gradually equalize the welfare lottery.First of all,a duopoly price competition model is established based on the reality that the return rate of China's lottery market and marketing activities were increasing.It is found that in the static game,the optimal strategy of sports lottery and welfare lottery is that the real price is equal to the cost.In the infinite dynamic game,if the merchant has long-term gaze or a government regulation is present,there will be some tacit agreement between the sports lottery and the welfare lottery and the real prices will be maintained in a relatively high level.Secondly,a spatial competition model is established by introducing the sales network number factors and consumer preference factors.It is found that the increase of the number of physical sales outlets is an important reason for the growth of sports lottery sales.At this stage,the competition between China's sports lottery and welfare lottery is basically the same at the sales outlets.status.At the same time,the results of the model equilibrium solution also show that the current controversial"Internet sale"will have a huge impact on the physical lottery sales outlets.
引文
[1]国家体育总局.体育产业发展“十三五”规划[EB/OL].http://www.sport.gov.cn/n319/n4833/c733613/content.html.
[2]中共中央,国务院.关于支持海南全面深化改革开放的指导意见[Z].2018-4-11.
[3]张亚维.博彩行为一个理论框架及经济学分析[D].苏州:苏州大学,2006:3.
[4]李刚.中国彩票业现状的实证分析及未来发展对策的研究[D].上海:复旦大学,2006:26-28.
[5] Cournot A A.Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses par Augustin Cournot[M].chez L.Hachette,1838.
[6] Bertrand J.Theorie Mathematique de la Richesse Sociale[J].Journal des Savants,1883:499-508.
[7] Chamberlin E.Theory of Monopolistic Competition[J].Southern Economic Journal,1948,24(2):215.
[8] Dixit A K,Stiglitz J E.Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity[J].The American Economic Review,1977,67(3):297-308.
[9] Hotelling H.Stability in Competition[J].The Economic Journal,1929,39(153):41-57.
[10]Spence M.Product Selection,Fixed Costs and Monopolistic Competition[J].Review of Economic Studies,1976,43(2):217-235.
[11]D’Aspremont C,Gabszewicz J,Thisse J F.On Hotelling’s “Stability in Competition”[J].Econometrica,1979,47(5):1145-1150.
[12]Salop S C.Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1979,10(1):141-156.
[13]Takatoshi T,Thisse T.Asymmetric Equilibria in Spatial Competition[J].International of Industrial Organization,1995,13(2):213-227.
[14]Gal E.First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information[J].Review of Economic Studies,1987,54(54):279-292.
[15]Milgrom P,Roberts J.Informational Asymmetrie,Strategic Behavior and Industrial Organization[J].American Economic Review,1987,77(15):184-193.
[16]Perez L,Humphreys B.The“Who and Why”of Lottery:Empirical Highlights from the Seminal Economic Literature[J].Journal of Economic Surveys,2013,27(5):915-940.
[17]Coon M,Whieldon G.Elasticity of Demand and Optimal Prize Distribution for Instant Lottery Games[J].Atlantic Economic Journal,2016,44(4):457-469.
[18]Forrest D,Gulley O D.New Price,New Hope?An Examination of the Effects of Doubling the Ticket Price in UK Lotto[J].Journal of Gambling Studies,2017(3):1-15.
[19]朱彤,余晖.彩票市场的竞争性质与我国彩票监管的重构[J].中国工业经济,2004,193(4):35-42.
[20]郭均鹏,李汶华,刘雅琳.我国彩票市场的价格体系与供需分析[J].管理学报,2009,6(1):97-101.
[21]章新蓉,孙回回,陈煦江.彩票行业的市场竞争及其经济后果[J].江西财经大学学报,2012,82(4):21-28.
[22]Yuan J,Gao J.Is Lottery Demand Driven by Effective Price?Evidence from the China Lottery Industry[J].Ssrn Electronic Journal,2012.
[23]王长斌.跨过不正当竞争的藩篱看有奖销售——基于彩票角度的分析[J].中国流通经济,2015(11):110-115.
[24]刘圣文.中国彩票业发展困境及对策研究[J].山东社会科学,2015,240(8):168-172.
[25]陈刚,郭弓,张荻.体育彩票网站之间的虚拟竞合关系研究[J].首都体育学院学报,2016,28(1):23-27.
[26]刘圣文.中国体育彩票奖金分布策略研究[D].济南:山东大学,2017.
[27]刘圣文.体育彩票销量影响因素研究——以山东省为例[J].武汉体育学院学报,2016,50(3):29-34.
[28]刘圣文.我国竞猜型体育彩票销量影响因素研究[J].首都体育学院学报,2018,30(6):489-494.
(1)一般来说,除非国家爆发超过50%的持续性的恶性通货膨胀,现实中贴现因子都在0.5到1之间。
(1)a和b的取值是0到l/2,而不是0到l,是由我国实际情况决定的,一方取值为l意味着另一方被完全挤出彩票市场,这种情况在现实中不可能出现,所以规定取值为0到l/2。
(1)返奖率为73%,是所有彩票品种里最高的。
[2]中共中央,国务院.关于支持海南全面深化改革开放的指导意见[Z].2018-4-11.
[3]张亚维.博彩行为一个理论框架及经济学分析[D].苏州:苏州大学,2006:3.
[4]李刚.中国彩票业现状的实证分析及未来发展对策的研究[D].上海:复旦大学,2006:26-28.
[5] Cournot A A.Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses par Augustin Cournot[M].chez L.Hachette,1838.
[6] Bertrand J.Theorie Mathematique de la Richesse Sociale[J].Journal des Savants,1883:499-508.
[7] Chamberlin E.Theory of Monopolistic Competition[J].Southern Economic Journal,1948,24(2):215.
[8] Dixit A K,Stiglitz J E.Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity[J].The American Economic Review,1977,67(3):297-308.
[9] Hotelling H.Stability in Competition[J].The Economic Journal,1929,39(153):41-57.
[10]Spence M.Product Selection,Fixed Costs and Monopolistic Competition[J].Review of Economic Studies,1976,43(2):217-235.
[11]D’Aspremont C,Gabszewicz J,Thisse J F.On Hotelling’s “Stability in Competition”[J].Econometrica,1979,47(5):1145-1150.
[12]Salop S C.Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1979,10(1):141-156.
[13]Takatoshi T,Thisse T.Asymmetric Equilibria in Spatial Competition[J].International of Industrial Organization,1995,13(2):213-227.
[14]Gal E.First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information[J].Review of Economic Studies,1987,54(54):279-292.
[15]Milgrom P,Roberts J.Informational Asymmetrie,Strategic Behavior and Industrial Organization[J].American Economic Review,1987,77(15):184-193.
[16]Perez L,Humphreys B.The“Who and Why”of Lottery:Empirical Highlights from the Seminal Economic Literature[J].Journal of Economic Surveys,2013,27(5):915-940.
[17]Coon M,Whieldon G.Elasticity of Demand and Optimal Prize Distribution for Instant Lottery Games[J].Atlantic Economic Journal,2016,44(4):457-469.
[18]Forrest D,Gulley O D.New Price,New Hope?An Examination of the Effects of Doubling the Ticket Price in UK Lotto[J].Journal of Gambling Studies,2017(3):1-15.
[19]朱彤,余晖.彩票市场的竞争性质与我国彩票监管的重构[J].中国工业经济,2004,193(4):35-42.
[20]郭均鹏,李汶华,刘雅琳.我国彩票市场的价格体系与供需分析[J].管理学报,2009,6(1):97-101.
[21]章新蓉,孙回回,陈煦江.彩票行业的市场竞争及其经济后果[J].江西财经大学学报,2012,82(4):21-28.
[22]Yuan J,Gao J.Is Lottery Demand Driven by Effective Price?Evidence from the China Lottery Industry[J].Ssrn Electronic Journal,2012.
[23]王长斌.跨过不正当竞争的藩篱看有奖销售——基于彩票角度的分析[J].中国流通经济,2015(11):110-115.
[24]刘圣文.中国彩票业发展困境及对策研究[J].山东社会科学,2015,240(8):168-172.
[25]陈刚,郭弓,张荻.体育彩票网站之间的虚拟竞合关系研究[J].首都体育学院学报,2016,28(1):23-27.
[26]刘圣文.中国体育彩票奖金分布策略研究[D].济南:山东大学,2017.
[27]刘圣文.体育彩票销量影响因素研究——以山东省为例[J].武汉体育学院学报,2016,50(3):29-34.
[28]刘圣文.我国竞猜型体育彩票销量影响因素研究[J].首都体育学院学报,2018,30(6):489-494.
(1)一般来说,除非国家爆发超过50%的持续性的恶性通货膨胀,现实中贴现因子都在0.5到1之间。
(1)a和b的取值是0到l/2,而不是0到l,是由我国实际情况决定的,一方取值为l意味着另一方被完全挤出彩票市场,这种情况在现实中不可能出现,所以规定取值为0到l/2。
(1)返奖率为73%,是所有彩票品种里最高的。