信贷渠道在产业结构调整中的有效性分析——以产能过剩行业为例
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摘要
利用2001—2015年我国上市公司财务报表数据,从实证研究的结果来看,我国现有信贷渠道能够正确引导资金流向非产能过剩行业。但在货币宽松进程中,资金更多地流向了国企而非民企,即国企"加了杠杆"而民营企业却"去了杠杆"。此外,流向产能非过剩行业的资金更多的是流向了高杠杆企业,这进一步推高了那些杠杆率本来就过高的企业。诚然,较高的杠杆率能够撬动更大的资源,在经济繁荣周期中,企业利用杠杆率能够扩大生产,创造出更多的社会价值,但若经济转入萧条周期,外部需求的减少将使得高杠杆企业面临巨大的风险。笔者认为,在未来信贷调控中,要结合供给侧结构性改革与信贷政策,加强宏观调控,实施差别化信贷政策。
Based on the financial statement data of superior companies in China from 2001 to 2015,the empirical results show that the existing credit channels can correctly guide the flow of funds to non-overcapacity industries. However,in the process of monetary easing,more money flew to state-owned enterprises rather than private ones,that is,state-owned enterprises"increased leverage"while private enterprises"reduced leverage". In addition,more money flows to non-excess capacity industries is to highly leveraged enterprises,which further increases the leverage of the already high-leveraged enterprises. Admittedly,higher leverage can get more resources. During the economic boom,enterprises can use leverage to expand production and create more social value. But if the economy turns into a depression,the reduction of external demand will put highly leveraged enterprises at enormous risks. This paper suggests that we should combine supply-side structural reform,strengthen macro-control and implement differential credit policy in the future.
Based on the financial statement data of superior companies in China from 2001 to 2015,the empirical results show that the existing credit channels can correctly guide the flow of funds to non-overcapacity industries. However,in the process of monetary easing,more money flew to state-owned enterprises rather than private ones,that is,state-owned enterprises"increased leverage"while private enterprises"reduced leverage". In addition,more money flows to non-excess capacity industries is to highly leveraged enterprises,which further increases the leverage of the already high-leveraged enterprises. Admittedly,higher leverage can get more resources. During the economic boom,enterprises can use leverage to expand production and create more social value. But if the economy turns into a depression,the reduction of external demand will put highly leveraged enterprises at enormous risks. This paper suggests that we should combine supply-side structural reform,strengthen macro-control and implement differential credit policy in the future.
引文
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[24]周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究,2004(6):33-40.
[25]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7):36-50.
[26]程俊杰.中国转型时期产业政策与产能过剩——基于制造业面板数据的实证研究[J].财经研究,2015a,41(8):131-144.
[27]程俊杰,刘志彪.产能过剩、要素扭曲与经济波动——来自制造业的经验证据[J].经济学家,2015b(11):59-69.
[28]聂辉华,江艇,张雨潇,等.我国僵尸企业的现状、原因与对策[J].宏观经济管理,2016(9):63-68.
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[30] Woodford M. Financial Intermediation and Macroeconomic Analysis[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,2010,24(4):21-44.
[31] Bernanke B S,Gertler M. Inside the Black Box:the Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,1995,9(4):27-48.
[32] Hackbarth D,Miao J,Morellec E. Capital Structure,Credit Risk,and Macroeconomic Conditions[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,82(3):519-550.
[33] Cook D O,Tang T. Macroeconomic Conditions and Capital Structure Adjustment Speed[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2010,16(1):73-87.
[34] Mokhova N,Zinecker M. Macroeconomic Factors and Corporate Capital Structure[J]. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences,2014(110):530-540.
[35]王朋朋.货币政策信贷渠道有效性研究[D].成都:西南财经大学,2013.
[36]钟春平,潘黎.“产能过剩”的误区——产能利用率及产能过剩的进展、争议及现实判断[J].经济学动态,2014(3):35-47.
[37]修宗峰,黄健柏.市场化改革、过度投资与企业产能过剩——基于我国制造业上市公司的经验证据[J].经济管理,2013(7):1-12.
[38]韩国高,高铁梅,王立国,等.中国制造业产能过剩的测度、波动及成因研究[J].经济研究,2011(12):18-31.
[39]陈德球,刘经纬,董志勇.社会破产成本、企业债务违约与信贷资金配置效率[J].金融研究,2013(11):68-81.
[2] Chamberlin E. Review of the Theory of the Price[J]. American Economic Review,1947,37(3):18-414,
[3] Kamien M I,Schwartz N L. Uncertain Entry and Excess Capacity[J]. The American Economic Review,1972,62(5):918-927.
[4] Kirkley J,Paul C J M,Squires D. Capacity and Capacity Utilization in Common-pool Resource Industries[J]. Environmental and Resource Economics,2002,22(1/2):71-97.
[5]卢锋.标本兼治产能过剩[J].中国改革,2010(5):88-91.
[6]周劲,付保宗.产能过剩的内涵、评价体系及在我国工业领域的表现特征[J].经济学动态,2011(10):58-64.
[7]冯俏彬,贾康.“政府价格信号”分析:我国体制性产能过剩的形成机理及其化解之道[J].财政研究,2014(4):2-9.
[8] Kornai J. The Principles of Privatization in Eastern Europe[J]. De Economist,1992,140(2):153-176.
[9] Kornai J. Economics of Shortage[M]. North Holland,1980.
[10] Pindyck R S. Sunk Costs and Real Options in Antitrust[R]. National Bureau of Economic Research,2005.
[11]张维迎.控制权损失的不可补偿性与国有企业兼并中的产权障碍[J].经济研究,1998(7):21-22.
[12]杨培鸿.重复建设的政治经济学分析:一个基于委托代理框架的模型[J].经济学(季刊),2006,5(1):467-478.
[13]周业樑,盛文军.转轨时期我国产能过剩的成因解析及政策选择[J].金融研究,2007(2a):183-190.
[14]陶忠元.开放经济条件下中国产能过剩的生成机理:多维视角的理论诠释[J].经济经纬,2011(4):20-24.
[15]林毅夫.潮涌现象与发展中国家宏观经济理论的重新构建[J].经济研究,2007(1):126-131.
[16]林毅夫,巫和懋,邢亦青.“潮涌现象”与产能过剩的形成机制[J].经济研究,2010(10):118-118.
[17]吕政,曹建海.竞争总是效率的吗?——兼论过度竞争的理论基础[J].中国社会科学,2000(6):4-14.
[18]徐朝阳,周念利.市场结构内生变迁与产能过剩治理[J].经济研究,2015(2):75-87.
[19]刘西顺.产能过剩、企业共生与信贷配给[J].金融研究,2006(3):170-177.
[20]时磊.资本市场扭曲与产能过剩:微观企业的证据[J].财贸研究,2013,24(5):1-8.
[21]江飞涛,耿强,吕大国,等.地区竞争、体制扭曲与产能过剩的形成机理[J].中国工业经济,2012(6):44-56.
[22]王文甫,明娟,岳超云.企业规模、地方政府干预与产能过剩[J].管理世界,2014(10):17-36.
[23]范林凯,李晓萍,应珊珊.渐进式改革背景下产能过剩的现实基础与形成机理[J].中国工业经济,2015(1):19-31.
[24]周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究,2004(6):33-40.
[25]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7):36-50.
[26]程俊杰.中国转型时期产业政策与产能过剩——基于制造业面板数据的实证研究[J].财经研究,2015a,41(8):131-144.
[27]程俊杰,刘志彪.产能过剩、要素扭曲与经济波动——来自制造业的经验证据[J].经济学家,2015b(11):59-69.
[28]聂辉华,江艇,张雨潇,等.我国僵尸企业的现状、原因与对策[J].宏观经济管理,2016(9):63-68.
[29] Bernanke B S,Blinder A S. Credit,Money,and Aggregate Demand[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing,1988,78(2):435-439.
[30] Woodford M. Financial Intermediation and Macroeconomic Analysis[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,2010,24(4):21-44.
[31] Bernanke B S,Gertler M. Inside the Black Box:the Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,1995,9(4):27-48.
[32] Hackbarth D,Miao J,Morellec E. Capital Structure,Credit Risk,and Macroeconomic Conditions[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,82(3):519-550.
[33] Cook D O,Tang T. Macroeconomic Conditions and Capital Structure Adjustment Speed[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2010,16(1):73-87.
[34] Mokhova N,Zinecker M. Macroeconomic Factors and Corporate Capital Structure[J]. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences,2014(110):530-540.
[35]王朋朋.货币政策信贷渠道有效性研究[D].成都:西南财经大学,2013.
[36]钟春平,潘黎.“产能过剩”的误区——产能利用率及产能过剩的进展、争议及现实判断[J].经济学动态,2014(3):35-47.
[37]修宗峰,黄健柏.市场化改革、过度投资与企业产能过剩——基于我国制造业上市公司的经验证据[J].经济管理,2013(7):1-12.
[38]韩国高,高铁梅,王立国,等.中国制造业产能过剩的测度、波动及成因研究[J].经济研究,2011(12):18-31.
[39]陈德球,刘经纬,董志勇.社会破产成本、企业债务违约与信贷资金配置效率[J].金融研究,2013(11):68-81.