研发支出、溢出池与专利申请——基于中国工业上市企业的经验研究
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摘要
本文匹配了2006—2015年中国上市企业数据库和中国专利数据库,以A股上市工业企业为研究对象,考察企业发明专利申请行为的决定因素及其影响机制。分析表明:由于外部激励对内部激励的挤出效应,企业专利申请与其研发支出呈U形关系,而非简单的线性关系;由其他企业研发支出按各种权重加总形成的溢出池对企业专利的影响为负,即"技术机会"效应占优于"知识溢出"效应;企业自身研发支出与溢出池的交互效应为负,说明企业在专利申请方面是战略替代的。
It aimed to study the determinants of patenting behavior by matching Chinese listed companies with SIPO patent database from 2006 to 2015. The results show that: extrinsic incentive crowding out intrinsic incentives,corporate patenting has a U relationship with its observable R&D expenditure; technology opportunity effect dominates knowledge spillover effect and the spillover pool which is constructed by other companies' R&D expenditure has a negative effect on the corporate patent application; companies are strategic substitutes in terms of patenting competition, since the interaction between corporate's own R&D expenditure and other companies' R&D spillover pool on corporate patenting is negative.
It aimed to study the determinants of patenting behavior by matching Chinese listed companies with SIPO patent database from 2006 to 2015. The results show that: extrinsic incentive crowding out intrinsic incentives,corporate patenting has a U relationship with its observable R&D expenditure; technology opportunity effect dominates knowledge spillover effect and the spillover pool which is constructed by other companies' R&D expenditure has a negative effect on the corporate patent application; companies are strategic substitutes in terms of patenting competition, since the interaction between corporate's own R&D expenditure and other companies' R&D spillover pool on corporate patenting is negative.
引文
[1]ROMER P.Increasing returns and long run growth[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(5):1002-1037.
[2]AGHION P,HOWITT P.A model of growth through creative destruction[J].Econometrica,1992,60(2):323-351.
[3]文豪.市场特征、知识产权与技术创新:基于产业差异的分析[J].管理世界,2009(9):172-173.
[4]SCHUMPETER J A.A theory of economic development[M].Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1934.
[5]李汇东,唐跃军,左晶晶.用自己的钱还是用别人的钱创新?---基于中国上市公司融资结构与公司创新的研究[J].金融研究,2013(2):170-183.
[6]ARROW K J.Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention[M]//ROWLEY C K.Readings in industrial economics.London:Palgrav,1972:219-220.
[7]GILBERT R J,NEWBERY D M G.Preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly[J].American Economic Review,2001,74(3):514-526.
[8]SCHERER F M.Research and development resource allocation under rivalry[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1967,81(3):359-394.
[9]MANSFIELD E.Industrial research and technological innovation:an econometric analysis[J].Economica,1968,38(149):676.
[10]SCHWARTZ N,LOU N.Market structure and innovation[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1982.
[11]LEE E Y,CIN B C.The effect of risk-sharing government subsidy on corporate R&D investment:empirical evidence from Korea[J].Technological Forecasting&Social Change,2010,77(6):881-890.
[12]白俊红.中国的政府R&D资助有效吗?来自大中型工业企业的经验证据[J].经济学(季刊),2011,10(4):1375-1400.
[13]李杰,王兴棠,李捷瑜.研发补贴政策、中间品贸易自由化与企业研发投入[J].世界经济,2018(8):129-148.
[14]BRONZINI R,IACHINI E.Are incentives for R&D effective?Evidence from a regression discontinuity approach[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2014(4):100-134.
[15]WOLFF G B,REINTHALER V.The effectiveness of subsidies revisited:accounting for wage and employment effects in business R&D[J].Research Policy,2008,37(8):1403-1412.
[16]ASCHHOFF B.The effect of subsidies on R&D investment and success:do subsidy history and size matter?[R].ZEW Discussion Paper No.09-032,2009.
[17]CZARNITZKI D,TOOLE A A.Patent protection,market uncertainty,and R&D investment[J].Review of Economics and Statistics,2011,93(1):147-159.
[18]毛其淋,许家云.政府补贴对企业新产品创新的影响---基于补贴强度“适度区间”的视角[J].中国工业经济,2015(6):94-107.
[19]张杰,陈志远,杨连星,等.中国创新补贴政策的绩效评估:理论与证据[J].经济研究,2015(10):4-17.
[20]GRILICHES Z.Issues in assessing the contribution of research and development to productivity growth[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1979,10(1):92-116.
[21]JAFFE A B.Demand and supply influences in R&D intensity and productivity growth[J].Review of Economics and Statistics,1988,70(3):431-437.
[22]BRANSTETTER L G.Are knowledge spillovers international or intranational in scope?Microeconometric evidence from the U.S.and Japan[J].Journal of International Economics,2001,53(1):53-79.
[23]CHOI J P.Dynamic R&D competition under“hazard rate”uncertainty[J].Rand Journal of Economics,1991,22(4):596-610.
[24]LUINTEL K B,KHAN M.Are international R&D spillovers costly for the United States?[J].Review of Economics&Statistics,2004,86(4):896-910.
[25]MANSFIELD E,SCHWARTZ M,WAGNER S.Imitation costs and patents:an empirical study[J].Economic Journal,1981,91(364):907-918.
[26]COHEN W M,NELSON R R,WALSH J P.Protecting their intellectual assets:appropriability conditions and why U.S.manufacturing firms patent(or not)[R].National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.7552,2000.
[27]ARUNDEL A.The relative effectiveness of patents and secrecy for appropriation[J].Research Policy,2001,30(4):611-624.
[28]REITZIG M.What determines patent value?:Insights from the semiconductor industry[J].Research Policy,2003,32(1):13-26.
[29]HARHOFF D,HOISL K.Institutionalized incentives for ingenuity-patent value and the German Employees’Inventions Act[J].Research Policy,2007,36(8):1143-1162.
[30]POTTELSBERGHE DE LA B,ZEEBROECK N V.A brief history of space and time:the scope-year index as a patent value indicator based on families and renewals[J].Scientometrics,2008,75(2):319-338.
[31]寇宗来,周敏.机密还是专利?[J].经济学(季刊),2012,11(1):115-134.
[32]DENICOLV,FRANZONI L A.Patents,secrets,and the first-inventor defense[J].Journal of Economics&Management Strategy,2004,13(3):517-538.
[33]寇宗来,高琼.市场结构、市场绩效与企业的创新行为---基于中国工业企业层面的面板数据分析[J].产业经济研究,2013(3):1-11.
[34]BNABOU R,TIROLE J.Self-knowledge and self-regulation:an economic approach[J].Psychology of Economic Decisions,2003,30(25):1268-1270.
[35]TIROLE J.The theory of industrial organization[M].Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,1988.
[36]GILBERT R.Looking for Mr.Schumpeter:where are we in the competition-innovation debate?[J].Innovation Policy and the Economy,2006,6:159-215.
[37]SCOTCHMER S.Standing on the shoulders of giants:cumulative research and the patent law[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,1991,5(1):29-41.
[38]寇宗来,刘学悦.中国企业的专利行为[R].上海:复旦大学产业发展研究中心,2017.
[39]寇宗来,刘学悦.中国城市和产业创新力报告2017[R].上海:复旦大学产业发展研究中心,2017.
[40]JAFFE A.Technological opportunity and spillovers of R&D:evidence from firms’patents,profits and market value[R].National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.1815,1986:984-1001.
[41]BEISE M,STAHL H.Public research and industrial innovations in Germany[J].Research Policy,2016,28(4):397-422.
(1)这里的“威慑效应”与前文的“技术机会”是不同的。挤占技术机会是假定所有企业都创新成功的情况下哪家企业能申请到专利的问题;而威慑效应是预期到其他企业研发成功之后会挤出自己获取专利的机会,企业i会因此减少自己的研发支出。
(2)本文只保留A股上市企业控股比例大于等于50%的子公司。精确匹配和模糊匹配的细节参考寇宗来和刘学悦[38]的研究。相比该文献,本文还保留了从名称上来看专利申请人是上市公司子公司(或分支机构)的样本,例如,匹配了上市公司“中兴通讯股份有限公司”和专利申请人“深圳市中兴通讯股份有限公司上海第二研究所”。
(3)在2012版证监会行业分类代码中,B06~D46的行业属于工业行业。
(4)本文核心解释变量研发支出使用了滞后一期的数据,因此回归时2006年的样本会被删除,那些第一次在样本期内出现的样本也会被删除。
(5)参考寇宗来和刘学悦[39]的做法,本文在计算企业的专利向量时,根据上市企业(包括其子公司和分支机构)发明专利的专利分类号将每个专利对应到35个技术领域,因此专利向量是一个35维的向量。
(6)员工总数、营业收入、企业规模和市场集中度等指标都是使用上市企业年报的合并报表数据计算得出。
(7)本文还计算了各解释变量之间的VIF值(方差膨胀因子),各模型中最大的VIF值均远小于10,因此不存在共线性问题。
[2]AGHION P,HOWITT P.A model of growth through creative destruction[J].Econometrica,1992,60(2):323-351.
[3]文豪.市场特征、知识产权与技术创新:基于产业差异的分析[J].管理世界,2009(9):172-173.
[4]SCHUMPETER J A.A theory of economic development[M].Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1934.
[5]李汇东,唐跃军,左晶晶.用自己的钱还是用别人的钱创新?---基于中国上市公司融资结构与公司创新的研究[J].金融研究,2013(2):170-183.
[6]ARROW K J.Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention[M]//ROWLEY C K.Readings in industrial economics.London:Palgrav,1972:219-220.
[7]GILBERT R J,NEWBERY D M G.Preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly[J].American Economic Review,2001,74(3):514-526.
[8]SCHERER F M.Research and development resource allocation under rivalry[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1967,81(3):359-394.
[9]MANSFIELD E.Industrial research and technological innovation:an econometric analysis[J].Economica,1968,38(149):676.
[10]SCHWARTZ N,LOU N.Market structure and innovation[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1982.
[11]LEE E Y,CIN B C.The effect of risk-sharing government subsidy on corporate R&D investment:empirical evidence from Korea[J].Technological Forecasting&Social Change,2010,77(6):881-890.
[12]白俊红.中国的政府R&D资助有效吗?来自大中型工业企业的经验证据[J].经济学(季刊),2011,10(4):1375-1400.
[13]李杰,王兴棠,李捷瑜.研发补贴政策、中间品贸易自由化与企业研发投入[J].世界经济,2018(8):129-148.
[14]BRONZINI R,IACHINI E.Are incentives for R&D effective?Evidence from a regression discontinuity approach[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2014(4):100-134.
[15]WOLFF G B,REINTHALER V.The effectiveness of subsidies revisited:accounting for wage and employment effects in business R&D[J].Research Policy,2008,37(8):1403-1412.
[16]ASCHHOFF B.The effect of subsidies on R&D investment and success:do subsidy history and size matter?[R].ZEW Discussion Paper No.09-032,2009.
[17]CZARNITZKI D,TOOLE A A.Patent protection,market uncertainty,and R&D investment[J].Review of Economics and Statistics,2011,93(1):147-159.
[18]毛其淋,许家云.政府补贴对企业新产品创新的影响---基于补贴强度“适度区间”的视角[J].中国工业经济,2015(6):94-107.
[19]张杰,陈志远,杨连星,等.中国创新补贴政策的绩效评估:理论与证据[J].经济研究,2015(10):4-17.
[20]GRILICHES Z.Issues in assessing the contribution of research and development to productivity growth[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1979,10(1):92-116.
[21]JAFFE A B.Demand and supply influences in R&D intensity and productivity growth[J].Review of Economics and Statistics,1988,70(3):431-437.
[22]BRANSTETTER L G.Are knowledge spillovers international or intranational in scope?Microeconometric evidence from the U.S.and Japan[J].Journal of International Economics,2001,53(1):53-79.
[23]CHOI J P.Dynamic R&D competition under“hazard rate”uncertainty[J].Rand Journal of Economics,1991,22(4):596-610.
[24]LUINTEL K B,KHAN M.Are international R&D spillovers costly for the United States?[J].Review of Economics&Statistics,2004,86(4):896-910.
[25]MANSFIELD E,SCHWARTZ M,WAGNER S.Imitation costs and patents:an empirical study[J].Economic Journal,1981,91(364):907-918.
[26]COHEN W M,NELSON R R,WALSH J P.Protecting their intellectual assets:appropriability conditions and why U.S.manufacturing firms patent(or not)[R].National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.7552,2000.
[27]ARUNDEL A.The relative effectiveness of patents and secrecy for appropriation[J].Research Policy,2001,30(4):611-624.
[28]REITZIG M.What determines patent value?:Insights from the semiconductor industry[J].Research Policy,2003,32(1):13-26.
[29]HARHOFF D,HOISL K.Institutionalized incentives for ingenuity-patent value and the German Employees’Inventions Act[J].Research Policy,2007,36(8):1143-1162.
[30]POTTELSBERGHE DE LA B,ZEEBROECK N V.A brief history of space and time:the scope-year index as a patent value indicator based on families and renewals[J].Scientometrics,2008,75(2):319-338.
[31]寇宗来,周敏.机密还是专利?[J].经济学(季刊),2012,11(1):115-134.
[32]DENICOLV,FRANZONI L A.Patents,secrets,and the first-inventor defense[J].Journal of Economics&Management Strategy,2004,13(3):517-538.
[33]寇宗来,高琼.市场结构、市场绩效与企业的创新行为---基于中国工业企业层面的面板数据分析[J].产业经济研究,2013(3):1-11.
[34]BNABOU R,TIROLE J.Self-knowledge and self-regulation:an economic approach[J].Psychology of Economic Decisions,2003,30(25):1268-1270.
[35]TIROLE J.The theory of industrial organization[M].Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,1988.
[36]GILBERT R.Looking for Mr.Schumpeter:where are we in the competition-innovation debate?[J].Innovation Policy and the Economy,2006,6:159-215.
[37]SCOTCHMER S.Standing on the shoulders of giants:cumulative research and the patent law[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,1991,5(1):29-41.
[38]寇宗来,刘学悦.中国企业的专利行为[R].上海:复旦大学产业发展研究中心,2017.
[39]寇宗来,刘学悦.中国城市和产业创新力报告2017[R].上海:复旦大学产业发展研究中心,2017.
[40]JAFFE A.Technological opportunity and spillovers of R&D:evidence from firms’patents,profits and market value[R].National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.1815,1986:984-1001.
[41]BEISE M,STAHL H.Public research and industrial innovations in Germany[J].Research Policy,2016,28(4):397-422.
(1)这里的“威慑效应”与前文的“技术机会”是不同的。挤占技术机会是假定所有企业都创新成功的情况下哪家企业能申请到专利的问题;而威慑效应是预期到其他企业研发成功之后会挤出自己获取专利的机会,企业i会因此减少自己的研发支出。
(2)本文只保留A股上市企业控股比例大于等于50%的子公司。精确匹配和模糊匹配的细节参考寇宗来和刘学悦[38]的研究。相比该文献,本文还保留了从名称上来看专利申请人是上市公司子公司(或分支机构)的样本,例如,匹配了上市公司“中兴通讯股份有限公司”和专利申请人“深圳市中兴通讯股份有限公司上海第二研究所”。
(3)在2012版证监会行业分类代码中,B06~D46的行业属于工业行业。
(4)本文核心解释变量研发支出使用了滞后一期的数据,因此回归时2006年的样本会被删除,那些第一次在样本期内出现的样本也会被删除。
(5)参考寇宗来和刘学悦[39]的做法,本文在计算企业的专利向量时,根据上市企业(包括其子公司和分支机构)发明专利的专利分类号将每个专利对应到35个技术领域,因此专利向量是一个35维的向量。
(6)员工总数、营业收入、企业规模和市场集中度等指标都是使用上市企业年报的合并报表数据计算得出。
(7)本文还计算了各解释变量之间的VIF值(方差膨胀因子),各模型中最大的VIF值均远小于10,因此不存在共线性问题。