集群式转移企业与承接地政府转-承行为的演化博弈研究
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摘要
本文运用演化博弈的基本理论和研究范式,从转移产业的产业类型视角对集群式转移企业与承接地政府的"转-承"行为进行理论及案例分析。结果表明:低产值-低利润产业集群式转移的演化均衡为{不转移,不承接};高产值-高利润产业集群式转移的演化均衡为{转移,承接};低产值-高利润产业集群式转移的演化均衡为{转移,不承接};对于高产值-低利润产业集群式转移,如果能在集群式转移企业与承接地政府间建立一个良好的合作机制,则可以促使均衡从{不转移,不承接}走向{转移,承接}。
The paper used the basic theory of evolutionary game and research paradigm. Based on the perspective of transferred industry type,it analyzed "transferring-bearing" behavior on clustered transfer firms and the recipient governments from theory and case. The results show that evolutionary equilibrium of low output-low profit industry clustered transfer is { don't move,don't accept}; Evolutionary equilibrium of high output-high profit industry clustered transfer is { move,accept}; Evolutionary equilibrium of low output-high profit industry clustered transfer is { move,don't accept }; Industrial clustered transfer for high output-low profit,if a good cooperation mechanism between clustered transfer firms and the recipient governments could be built,evolution can prompt equilibrium from{ don't move,don't accept} to { move,accept}.
The paper used the basic theory of evolutionary game and research paradigm. Based on the perspective of transferred industry type,it analyzed "transferring-bearing" behavior on clustered transfer firms and the recipient governments from theory and case. The results show that evolutionary equilibrium of low output-low profit industry clustered transfer is { don't move,don't accept}; Evolutionary equilibrium of high output-high profit industry clustered transfer is { move,accept}; Evolutionary equilibrium of low output-high profit industry clustered transfer is { move,don't accept }; Industrial clustered transfer for high output-low profit,if a good cooperation mechanism between clustered transfer firms and the recipient governments could be built,evolution can prompt equilibrium from{ don't move,don't accept} to { move,accept}.
引文
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[6]黄晓,胡汉辉,于斌斌.产业集群式转移中新集群网络的建构与演化——理论与实证[J].科学学研究,2015(4):539-548.
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[10]申俊涵.硅谷正在失去往日的光环,越来越多创新公司涌进北京[EB/OL].http://www.ikanchai.com/2014/1205/7551.shtml,2014-12-05.
[11]王朦.全球风投规模20强城市排名:北京上海入榜[EB/OL].http://tech.163.com/16/0131/17/BEM5LHAK000915BF.html,2016-01-31.
[12]周阳敏.回归式产业转移与集群升级研究——对固始银针产业集群的案例实证[J].产经评论,2011(6):20-31.
[13]侯国庭.潮起海宁,龙腾郎溪——记郎溪(中国)经都产业园[EB/OL].http://www.xuanwww.com/ycpd/bwgz/2013-12/19/content_94568.htm,2013-12-19.
[2]刘友金,胡黎明,赵瑞霞.基于产品内分工的国际产业转移新趋势研究动态[J].经济学动态,2011(3):101-105.
[3]DIJK J,P Pellenbarg.Firm relocation decision in the netherlands:an ordered logit approach[J].Papers in regional science,2000,79(2):191-219.
[4]刘友金,李彬,刘天琦.产业集群式转移行为的实证研究[J].中国软科学,2015(4):131-141.
[5]周华蓉,贺胜兵.政策引导下企业跨区域迁移的演化博弈分析[J].湖南科技大学学报(社会科学版),2015(2):85-91.
[6]黄晓,胡汉辉,于斌斌.产业集群式转移中新集群网络的建构与演化——理论与实证[J].科学学研究,2015(4):539-548.
[7]TAYLOR P D,JONKER L B.Evolutionarily stable strategy and game dynamics[J].Math bioscience,1978(40):145-156.
[8]孙庆文,陆柳,严广乐,车宏安.不完全信息条件下演化博弈均衡的稳定性分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2003(7):11-16.
[9]三大紧固件基地产业向外转移趋势明显[EB/OL].http://china.toocle.com/cbna/item/2012-01-10/6604750.html,2012-01-10.
[10]申俊涵.硅谷正在失去往日的光环,越来越多创新公司涌进北京[EB/OL].http://www.ikanchai.com/2014/1205/7551.shtml,2014-12-05.
[11]王朦.全球风投规模20强城市排名:北京上海入榜[EB/OL].http://tech.163.com/16/0131/17/BEM5LHAK000915BF.html,2016-01-31.
[12]周阳敏.回归式产业转移与集群升级研究——对固始银针产业集群的案例实证[J].产经评论,2011(6):20-31.
[13]侯国庭.潮起海宁,龙腾郎溪——记郎溪(中国)经都产业园[EB/OL].http://www.xuanwww.com/ycpd/bwgz/2013-12/19/content_94568.htm,2013-12-19.