产业集群式转移与区域生产网络协同演化及政府行为研究
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摘要
本文运用演化博弈的基本理论和研究范式,对产业集群式转移与区域生产网络协同演化及政府行为进行分析。结果表明:集群转移企业与区域生产网络企业协同演化包含导入期-低度协同、成长期-耦合发展、成熟期-高度协同及转型期-分化重组四个阶段;集群转移企业与区域生产网络企业协同演化的核心机制是成本-收益机制,二者的初始状态及行为选择策略决定系统的演化路径;政府行为对集群转移企业与区域生产网络企业协同演化的演化阶段、整体演化速度起到重要的调节作用。
The industrial cluster transfer from developed regions to underdeveloped regions is becoming the dominant way of regional industrial transfer under the background of intra-product specialization.Industrial cluster transfer is the mass of the enterprise " unity" migration behavior.It includes cluster supply network,production and sales network such as symbiosis network across regions flow.Industrial cluster transfer not only reflects and reveals the basic features of the current regional industry transfer and its intrinsic motivation but also forms a profound impact on the regional production network.Therefore,it is an important theoretical problem to be solved in regional economic management that systematically discusses industrial cluster transfer and regional production network co-evolution and analyzes the role of the government behavior in the process.In this paper,by using the basic theory of evolutionary game and research paradigm,first of all,industrial cluster transfer and regional production network collaborative evolutionary stages and government behavior are analyzed;Then under the government involvement in the transfer of the cluster evolutionary game model of enterprises and regional production network are built,the main influencing factors of the co-evolution these are discussed;Finally,system evolution stages of the numerical simulation under the government intervention are analyzed,and relevant policy implications are discussed.The results show that the cluster transfer enterprise and regional production network co-evolution contain four stages,including early-low synergy,growth-coupling development,mature period-highly collaborative and transition-differentiation restructuring;The core of mechanism on co-evolution of cluster transfer enterprises and regional production network is cost-benefit mechanism because their initial state and behavior selection strategy decide the evolution path of system.Government behavior plays an important role in evolution stages and overall evolution speed of synergy evolution.This research is an innovative exploration about the industrial transfer and regional production network theory,which can provide the reference on guiding the regional industrial transfer orderly and promoting regional industrial transformation and upgrading.
The industrial cluster transfer from developed regions to underdeveloped regions is becoming the dominant way of regional industrial transfer under the background of intra-product specialization.Industrial cluster transfer is the mass of the enterprise " unity" migration behavior.It includes cluster supply network,production and sales network such as symbiosis network across regions flow.Industrial cluster transfer not only reflects and reveals the basic features of the current regional industry transfer and its intrinsic motivation but also forms a profound impact on the regional production network.Therefore,it is an important theoretical problem to be solved in regional economic management that systematically discusses industrial cluster transfer and regional production network co-evolution and analyzes the role of the government behavior in the process.In this paper,by using the basic theory of evolutionary game and research paradigm,first of all,industrial cluster transfer and regional production network collaborative evolutionary stages and government behavior are analyzed;Then under the government involvement in the transfer of the cluster evolutionary game model of enterprises and regional production network are built,the main influencing factors of the co-evolution these are discussed;Finally,system evolution stages of the numerical simulation under the government intervention are analyzed,and relevant policy implications are discussed.The results show that the cluster transfer enterprise and regional production network co-evolution contain four stages,including early-low synergy,growth-coupling development,mature period-highly collaborative and transition-differentiation restructuring;The core of mechanism on co-evolution of cluster transfer enterprises and regional production network is cost-benefit mechanism because their initial state and behavior selection strategy decide the evolution path of system.Government behavior plays an important role in evolution stages and overall evolution speed of synergy evolution.This research is an innovative exploration about the industrial transfer and regional production network theory,which can provide the reference on guiding the regional industrial transfer orderly and promoting regional industrial transformation and upgrading.
引文
[1]毛广雄,廖庆,刘传明,等.高新技术产业集群化转移的空间路径及机理研究——以江苏省为例[J].经济地理,2015,35(12):105-112.
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[12]马永红,李欢,王展昭.网络结构视角下的产业转移与企业创新绩效[J].科学学研究,2016,34(3):366-372.
[13]谢呈阳,周海波,胡汉辉.产业转移中要素资源的空间错配与经济效率损失:基于江苏传统企业调查数据的研究[J].中国工业经济,2014,(12):130-142.
[14]张龙鹏,周立群.产业转移缩小了区域经济差距吗——来自中国西部地区的经验数据[J].财经科学,2015,(2):80-88.
[15]刘德伟,李连芬.日本式国际生产网络的运行模式及其借鉴[J].财经科学,2015,(7):89-99.
[16]花磊,王文平.产业生命周期不同阶段的最优集体创新网络结构[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(5):129-140.
[17]张少军,刘志彪.全球价值链模式的产业转移——动力、影响与对中国产业升级和区域协调发展的启示[J].中国工业经济,2009,(11):5-15.
[18]张立建.两次国际产业转移本质探讨——基于产品生命周期理论视角[J].统计研究,2009,(10):39-46.
[19]张维迎.博弈与社会[M].北京大学出版社,2013.
[20]郭本海,李军强,刘思峰.县域间土地供给竞合关系演化博弈模型[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(12):77-85.
[21]Maynard S J.The Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conflict[J].Journal of Theory Biology,1973,(47):209-212.
[22]Taylor P D,Jonker L B.Evolutionarily stable strategy and game dynamics[J].Math Bioscience,1978,(40):145-156.
[23]Selten R.A note on evolutionary stable strategies inasymmetric animal conflicts[J].Journal of Theoretical Biology,1980,(84):93-101.
[24]Weibull W.Evolutionary game theory[M].Cambridge:MITPress,1995.
[25]Nyborg K,Rege M.On social norms:the evolution of considerate smoking behavior[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2003,(52):323-340.
[26]Sung-Ha H,Markos K,Luc R.Deterministic equations for stochastic spatial evolutionary games[J].Theoretical Economics,2013,8(3):829-874.
[27]Rieger M O.Evolutionary stability of prospect theory preferences[J].Journal of Mathematical Economics,2014,50(2):1-11.
[28]张华.协同创新、知识溢出的演化博弈机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(2):92-99.
[29]刘旭旺,汪定伟.分组评标专家行为的演化博弈分析[J].管理科学学报,2015,18(1):50-61.
[30]Friedman D.Evolutionary games in economics[J].Econometrica,1991,(59):637-666.
[31]汪辉,邓晓梅,杨伟华,等.中小企业信用再担保体系演化稳定条件分析[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(7):1-10.
[2]刘友金,胡黎明,赵瑞霞.基于产品内分工的国际产业转移新趋势研究动态[J].经济学动态,2011,(3):101-105.
[3]刘友金,胡黎明.产品内分工、价值链重组与产业转移——兼论产业转移过程中的大国战略[J].中国软科学,2011,(3):149-159.
[4]符正平,曾素英.集群产业转移中的转移模式与行动特征——基于企业社会网络视角的分析[J].管理世界,2008,(12):83-92.
[5]刘友金,李彬,刘天琦.产业集群式转移行为的实证研究[J].中国软科学,2015,(4):131-141.
[6]黄晓,胡汉辉,于斌斌.产业集群式转移中新集群网络的建构与演化——理论与实证[J].科学学研究,2015,33(4):539-548.
[7]Sammarra A,Belussi F.Evolution and relocation in fashion-led Italian districts:Evidence from two casestudies[J].Entrepreneurship&Regional Development,2006,18(6):543-562.
[8]Devigne D,Vanacker T,Manigart S,et al.The role of domestic and cross-border venture capital investors in the growth of portfolio companies[J].Small Business Economics,2013,40(3):553-573.
[9]Kim H D,Lee D H,Choe H,et al.The evolution of cluster network structure and firm growth:A study of industrial software clusters[J].Scientometrics,2014,99(1):77-95.
[10]后锐,杨建梅,姚灿中.全球产业重组与转移:基于跨国并购复杂网络的分析方法[J].系统管理学报,2010,19(2):129-135.
[11]杨宏翔,于斌斌.基于网络集成机制的产业集群转移研究——兼论浙江纺织产业的转移与升级[J].浙江树人大学学报(人文社会科学版),2012,(4):54-61.
[12]马永红,李欢,王展昭.网络结构视角下的产业转移与企业创新绩效[J].科学学研究,2016,34(3):366-372.
[13]谢呈阳,周海波,胡汉辉.产业转移中要素资源的空间错配与经济效率损失:基于江苏传统企业调查数据的研究[J].中国工业经济,2014,(12):130-142.
[14]张龙鹏,周立群.产业转移缩小了区域经济差距吗——来自中国西部地区的经验数据[J].财经科学,2015,(2):80-88.
[15]刘德伟,李连芬.日本式国际生产网络的运行模式及其借鉴[J].财经科学,2015,(7):89-99.
[16]花磊,王文平.产业生命周期不同阶段的最优集体创新网络结构[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(5):129-140.
[17]张少军,刘志彪.全球价值链模式的产业转移——动力、影响与对中国产业升级和区域协调发展的启示[J].中国工业经济,2009,(11):5-15.
[18]张立建.两次国际产业转移本质探讨——基于产品生命周期理论视角[J].统计研究,2009,(10):39-46.
[19]张维迎.博弈与社会[M].北京大学出版社,2013.
[20]郭本海,李军强,刘思峰.县域间土地供给竞合关系演化博弈模型[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(12):77-85.
[21]Maynard S J.The Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conflict[J].Journal of Theory Biology,1973,(47):209-212.
[22]Taylor P D,Jonker L B.Evolutionarily stable strategy and game dynamics[J].Math Bioscience,1978,(40):145-156.
[23]Selten R.A note on evolutionary stable strategies inasymmetric animal conflicts[J].Journal of Theoretical Biology,1980,(84):93-101.
[24]Weibull W.Evolutionary game theory[M].Cambridge:MITPress,1995.
[25]Nyborg K,Rege M.On social norms:the evolution of considerate smoking behavior[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2003,(52):323-340.
[26]Sung-Ha H,Markos K,Luc R.Deterministic equations for stochastic spatial evolutionary games[J].Theoretical Economics,2013,8(3):829-874.
[27]Rieger M O.Evolutionary stability of prospect theory preferences[J].Journal of Mathematical Economics,2014,50(2):1-11.
[28]张华.协同创新、知识溢出的演化博弈机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(2):92-99.
[29]刘旭旺,汪定伟.分组评标专家行为的演化博弈分析[J].管理科学学报,2015,18(1):50-61.
[30]Friedman D.Evolutionary games in economics[J].Econometrica,1991,(59):637-666.
[31]汪辉,邓晓梅,杨伟华,等.中小企业信用再担保体系演化稳定条件分析[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(7):1-10.