雾霾污染区域协同治理的“逐底竞争”检验
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摘要
地方政府在雾霾污染区域协同治理过程中的行为选择对雾霾污染治理效果发挥着重要作用。本文将环境规制的"逐底竞争"理论拓展到雾霾污染区域协同治理中,理论分析不同政绩考核情形下地方政府在雾霾污染区域协同治理中的行为变化,并利用2000—2016年中国省际面板数据,构建两区制空间Durbin模型对中国雾霾污染区域协同治理中的"逐底竞争"行为进行实证检验。研究结果表明:中国各地方政府在参与雾霾污染区域协同治理中的确存在"逐底竞争"特征。当政绩考核以经济利益为主要标准时,地方政府为了在晋升锦标赛中占据优势地位,会竞相放松雾霾污染治理力度,出现"逐底竞争",尽管中央已经将环境质量纳入地方政府的政绩考核体系,但"逐底竞争"现象依然存在。稳健性检验结果表明,本文的研究结论是稳健的。
The local government's choice in the process of regional collaborative governance of haze pollution plays an important role in haze pollution governance and even environmental governance effect. There are many studies on the competition of environmental regulation by local governments. However, the existing research on the regional strategic interaction of haze pollution governance in China has not been involved. This study extends the"race to the bottom"theory of environmental regulation to regional collaborative governance of haze pollution. From the theoretical analysis, it derives the change of local government's behavior in the regional collaborative governance of haze pollution under the situation of different performance evaluation system. The provincial data from 2000 to 2016 in China were used to build a two-regime spatial durbin model to empirically test the"race to the bottom"in the collaborative governance of haze pollution areas in China. The results show that the local governments have the characteristics of"race to the bottom" in the regional collaborative governance of haze pollution. When the performance evaluation standard is of economic benefits, local governments will compete to relax the haze pollution governance and appear"race to the bottom"in order to take advantage of the promotion championship. With the central government taking environmental quality into the performance evaluation system, the phenomenon of"race to the bottom"has weakened. However,the existence of haze pollution spillover effects will also lead to the tendency of local governments to tackle free rides and there is still"race to the bottom". The results of robustness test show that the conclusion of this study is robust. Therefore, in order to curb the occurrence of"race to bottom",the central authority should be strengthened, various systems and mechanisms should be improved,and a joint effort should be formed in the process of collaborative governance of haze pollution.
The local government's choice in the process of regional collaborative governance of haze pollution plays an important role in haze pollution governance and even environmental governance effect. There are many studies on the competition of environmental regulation by local governments. However, the existing research on the regional strategic interaction of haze pollution governance in China has not been involved. This study extends the"race to the bottom"theory of environmental regulation to regional collaborative governance of haze pollution. From the theoretical analysis, it derives the change of local government's behavior in the regional collaborative governance of haze pollution under the situation of different performance evaluation system. The provincial data from 2000 to 2016 in China were used to build a two-regime spatial durbin model to empirically test the"race to the bottom"in the collaborative governance of haze pollution areas in China. The results show that the local governments have the characteristics of"race to the bottom" in the regional collaborative governance of haze pollution. When the performance evaluation standard is of economic benefits, local governments will compete to relax the haze pollution governance and appear"race to the bottom"in order to take advantage of the promotion championship. With the central government taking environmental quality into the performance evaluation system, the phenomenon of"race to the bottom"has weakened. However,the existence of haze pollution spillover effects will also lead to the tendency of local governments to tackle free rides and there is still"race to the bottom". The results of robustness test show that the conclusion of this study is robust. Therefore, in order to curb the occurrence of"race to bottom",the central authority should be strengthened, various systems and mechanisms should be improved,and a joint effort should be formed in the process of collaborative governance of haze pollution.
引文
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[2]Woods N D.Interstate competition and environmental regulation:a test of the race-to-the-bottom thesis[J].Social Science Quarterly,2006,87(1):174-189.
[3]Busse M,Silberberger M.Trade in pollutive industries and the stringency of environmental regulations[J].Applied Economics Letters,2013,20(4):320-323.
[4]Chakraborty D,Mukherjee S.How do trade and investment flows affect environmental sustainability?Evidence from panel data[J].Environmental Development,2013,6:34-47.
[5]Fredriksson P G,Millimet D L.Strategic interaction and the determination of environmental policy across US states[J].Journal of Urban Economics,2002,51(1):101-122.
[6]Levinson A.Environmental regulatory competition:a status report and some new evidence[J].National Tax Journal,2003,56(1):91-106.
[7]Konisky D M.Regulatory competition and environmental enforcement:is there a race to the bottom?[J].American Journal of Political Science,2007,51(4):853-872.
[8]Renard M F,Xiong H.Strategic Interactions in Environmental Regulation Enforcement:Evidence from Chinese Provinces[R].Clermont-Ferrand:CERDI Working Paper,2012.
[9]朱平芳,张征宇.FDI竞争下的地方政府环境规制“逐底竞赛”存在么-来自中国地级城市的空间计量实证[J].数量经济研究,2010,(9):79-92.[Zhu P F,Zhang Z Y.Does environmental“race-to-the-bottom”exist for competing FDI among local governments:evidence from municipalities across China based on spatial econometric model[J].The Journal of Quantitative Economics,2010,(9):79-92.]
[10]赵霄伟.地方政府间环境规制竞争策略及其地区增长效应-来自地级市以上城市面板的经验数据[J].财贸经济,2014,35(10):105-113.[Zhao X W.Inter-local government strategies of environmental regulation competition and its economic growth effect[J].Finance&Trade Economics,2014,35(10):105-113.]
[11]李拓.土地财政下的环境规制“逐底竞争”存在吗?[J].中国经济问题,2016,(5):42-51.[Li T.Is there environmental regulation competition under land finance?[J].China Economic Studies,2016,(5):42-51.]
[12]王艳丽,钟奥.地方政府竞争、环境规制与高耗能产业转移-基于“逐底竞争”和“污染避难所”假说的联合检验[J].山西财经大学学报,2016,38(8):46-54.[Wang Y L,Zhong A.School of management,local government competition,environmental regulation and high energy consuming industries transfer:based on the joint test of“race-to-the-bottom”and“pollution haven”hypothesis[J].Journal of Shanxi University of Finance&Economics,2016,38(8):46-54.]
[13]杨海生,陈少凌,周永章.地方政府竞争与环境政策-来自中国省份数据的证据[J].南方经济,2008,(6):15-30.[Yang H S,Chen S L,Zhou Y Z.Local government competition and environmental policy:empirical evidence from province’s governments in China[J].South China Journal of Economics,2008,(6):15-30.]
[14]张文彬,张理芃,张可云.中国环境规制强度省际竞争形态及其演变-基于两区制空间Durbin固定效应模型的分析[J].管理世界,2010,(12):34-44.[Zhang W B,Zhang L F,Zhang K Y.The competition form and evolution of China provincial environmental regulation intensity:based on the analysis of a two-regime spatial durbin model with fixed effects[J].Management World,2010,(12):34-44.]
[15]王宇澄.基于空间面板模型的我国地方政府环境规制竞争研究[J].管理评论,2015,27(8):23-32.[Wang Y C.Research on environmental regulation competition of China based on spatial panel model[J].Management Review,2015,27(8):23-32.]
[16]Ulph A.Harmonization and optimal environmental policy in a federal system with asymmetric information[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2000,39(2):224-241.
[17]Porter G.Trade competition and pollution standards:“race to the bottom”or“stuck at the bottom”[J].The Journal of Environment&Development,1999,8(2):133-151.
[18]Wheeler D.Racing to the bottom?Foreign investment and air pollution in developing countries[J].The Journal of Environment&Development,2001,10(3):225-245.
[19]Rasli A M,Qureshi M I,Isah-Chikaji A,et al.New toxics,race to the bottom and revised environmental Kuznets curve:the case of local and global pollutants[J].Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews,2018,81(2):3120-3130.
[20]叶继革,余道先.我国出口贸易与环境污染的实证分析[J].国际贸易问题,2007,(5):72-77.[Ye J G,Yu D X.The empirical analysis of the export trade and environmental pollution of China[J].Journal of International Trade,2007,(5):72-77.]
[21]王孝松,李博,翟光宇.引资竞争与地方政府环境规制[J].国际贸易问题,2015,(8):51-61.[Wang X S,Li B,Zhai G Y.Competition in FDI introduction and environmental regulation of local government[J].Journal of International Trade,2015,(8):51-61.]
[22]朱平芳,张征宇,姜国麟.FDI与环境规制:基于地方分权视角的实证研究[J].经济研究,2011,(6):133-145.[Zhu P F,Zhang Z Y,Jiang G L.Empirical study of the relationship between FDIand environmental regulation:an intergovernmental competition perspective[J].Economic Research Journal,2011,(6):133-145.]
[23]臧新,赵炯.外资区域转移背景下FDI对我国劳动力流动的影响研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2016,(3):78-94.[Zang X,Zhao J.Study on the effect of FDI on China’s labor mobility under the background of FDI regional transfer[J].Journal of Quantitative&Technical Economics,2016,(3):78-94.]
[24]Andreoni J,Levinson A.The simple analytics of the environmental Kuznets Curve[J].Journal of Public Economics,2001,80(2):269-286.
[25]中华人民共和国国务院.国家环境保护“十二五”规划[EB/OL].(2011-12-20)[2018-03-20].http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2011-12/20/content_4661.htm.[State Council of the People’s Republic of China.National environmental protection plan for 12th Five-Year[EB/OL].(2011-12-20)[2018-03-20].http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2011-12/20/content_4661.htm.]
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[27]Lesage J P,Pace R K.Introduction to Spatial Econometrics[M].New York:CRC Press,2009.
[28]Van Donkelaar A,Martin R V,Brauer M,et al.Global estimates of fine particulate matter using a combined geophysical-statistical method with information from satellites,models,and monitors[J].Environmental Science&Technology,2016,50(7):3762-3772.
[29]美国哥伦比亚大学社会经济数据和应用中心.全球年度PM2.5(1998-2016)[EB/OL].(2018-01-03)[2018-03-20].http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/sdei-global-annual-gwr-pm2-5-modis-misr-seawifs-aod.[Socioeconomic Data and Application Center of Columbia University.Global Annual PM2.5(1998-2016)[EB/OL].(2018-01-03)[2018-03-20].http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/sdei-global-annual-gwr-pm2-5-modismisr-seawifs-aod.]
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[33]人民日报海外版.第三批中央环保督察反馈结束直击地方环保顽疾[EB/OL].(2017-08-06)[2018-06-06].http://www.gov.cn/hudong/2017-08/06/content_5216202.htm.[People’s Daily Overseas Edition.The Third Batch of Feedback from Central Environmental Protection Inspectors Ends Direct Attacks on Local Environmental Protection Problems[EB/OL].(2017-08-06)[2018-06-06].http://www.gov.cn/hudong/2017-08/06/content_5216202.htm.]
[34]央视网.严!准!狠!这些省份被中央环保督察组点名了![EB/OL].(2018-01-07)[2018-06-06].http://m.news.cctv.com/2018/01/07/ARTI4n UC6PXDd7i0HHgy P8b F180107.shtml.[CCTV.Strict!Quasi!Ruthless!These Provinces were Named by the Central Environmental Protection Inspectorate![EB/OL].(2018-01-07)[2018-06-06].http://m.news.cctv.com/2018/01/07/ARTI4nU-C6PXDd7i0HHgyP8bF180107.shtml.]