重叠共识:既不重叠,亦非共识
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摘要
许多学者把罗尔斯后期哲学中的重叠共识理念理解为一种聚合论证,认为它是通过把正义原则塑造为所有合理整全学说的重叠部分来确保其作为社会共识的地位的。这种观点既不能解释重叠共识在证成正义原则时承担的功能,也无法真正使正义原则成为社会共识,因此是错误的。重叠共识其实是在人们已经形成关于正义原则的共识后,基于这种原则消化、处理各种整全学说的工作,它的本质是一种扩展论证,而非聚合论证。
引文
[1]John Rawls,A Theory of Justice,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1971,p.577.
[2]John Rawls,Political Liberalism,New York:Columbia University Press,2005,p.169.
[3]Jürgen Habermas,Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason:Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism,The Journal of Philosophy,1995,92(3).
[4]Gerald Gaus,The Order of Public Reason,New York:Cambridge University Press,2011,p.336.
[5]谭安奎.公共理性与民主理想[M].北京:三联书店,2016:105.
[6]陈肖生.公共辩护的理由结构与有效性[J].道德与文明,2015,(4).
[7]Samuel Scheffler,The Appeal of Political Liberalism,Ethics,1994,105(1).
[8]Jonathan Quong,Liberalism without Perfection,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2011,p.167.
[9]陈祖为.儒家致善主义[M].香港:商务印书馆,2016:22.
[10]Paul Weithman,Why Political Liberalism,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2011,p.310.
[11]Thomas Scanlon,Rawls on Justification,in S.Freeman,ed.,The Cambridge Companion to Rawls,New York:Cambridge University Press,2003,p.160.
[12]Kevin Vallier,Convergence and Consensus in Public Reason,Public Affairs Quarterly,2011,25(4).
[13]Thomas Nagel,Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,Philosophy and Public Affairs,1987,16(3).
[14]Samuel Freeman,Justice and the Social Contract,New York:Oxford University Press,2007,p.192.
[15]Paul Weithman,Legitimacy and the Project of Political Liberalism,in Brooks,Nussbaum,eds.,Rawls’s Political Liberalism,New York:Columbia University Press,2015,p.92.
(1)关于这种理解,可见Thomas Nagel,Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,Philosophy and Public Affairs,1987,16(3):266;Gerald Gaus,The Order of Public Reason,New York:Cambridge University Press,2011,p.336;Kevin Vallier,Convergence and Consensus in Public Reason,Public Affairs Quarterly,2011,25(4):264-267;陈肖生:《公共辩护的理由结构与有效性》,载《道德与文明》2015年第4期。
(1)罗尔斯本人在讲授重叠共识的理念时,也没有把各种合理整全学说重叠到一起去,而是画了几个互不相交的大圈,然后再把它们与正义原则分别联结起来。参见何怀宏:《寻求共识:从〈正义论〉到〈政治自由主义〉》,载《读书》1996年第6期,第24页。
(1)对罗尔斯的这种批评可见阿克塞尔·霍耐特:《自由的权利》,王旭译,社会科学文献出版社2013年版,第10页。
[2]John Rawls,Political Liberalism,New York:Columbia University Press,2005,p.169.
[3]Jürgen Habermas,Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason:Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism,The Journal of Philosophy,1995,92(3).
[4]Gerald Gaus,The Order of Public Reason,New York:Cambridge University Press,2011,p.336.
[5]谭安奎.公共理性与民主理想[M].北京:三联书店,2016:105.
[6]陈肖生.公共辩护的理由结构与有效性[J].道德与文明,2015,(4).
[7]Samuel Scheffler,The Appeal of Political Liberalism,Ethics,1994,105(1).
[8]Jonathan Quong,Liberalism without Perfection,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2011,p.167.
[9]陈祖为.儒家致善主义[M].香港:商务印书馆,2016:22.
[10]Paul Weithman,Why Political Liberalism,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2011,p.310.
[11]Thomas Scanlon,Rawls on Justification,in S.Freeman,ed.,The Cambridge Companion to Rawls,New York:Cambridge University Press,2003,p.160.
[12]Kevin Vallier,Convergence and Consensus in Public Reason,Public Affairs Quarterly,2011,25(4).
[13]Thomas Nagel,Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,Philosophy and Public Affairs,1987,16(3).
[14]Samuel Freeman,Justice and the Social Contract,New York:Oxford University Press,2007,p.192.
[15]Paul Weithman,Legitimacy and the Project of Political Liberalism,in Brooks,Nussbaum,eds.,Rawls’s Political Liberalism,New York:Columbia University Press,2015,p.92.
(1)关于这种理解,可见Thomas Nagel,Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,Philosophy and Public Affairs,1987,16(3):266;Gerald Gaus,The Order of Public Reason,New York:Cambridge University Press,2011,p.336;Kevin Vallier,Convergence and Consensus in Public Reason,Public Affairs Quarterly,2011,25(4):264-267;陈肖生:《公共辩护的理由结构与有效性》,载《道德与文明》2015年第4期。
(1)罗尔斯本人在讲授重叠共识的理念时,也没有把各种合理整全学说重叠到一起去,而是画了几个互不相交的大圈,然后再把它们与正义原则分别联结起来。参见何怀宏:《寻求共识:从〈正义论〉到〈政治自由主义〉》,载《读书》1996年第6期,第24页。
(1)对罗尔斯的这种批评可见阿克塞尔·霍耐特:《自由的权利》,王旭译,社会科学文献出版社2013年版,第10页。