供给国际维和行动——基于公共安全产品视角的思考
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摘要
国际维和行动是一种"联合公共安全产品",它同时兼顾了地区乃至全球层面的安全利益和供给方的私有利益。国际维和行动公私兼具的联合产品属性决定了其特有的供给模式,具体表现在国际维和行动供给兼具分工与代理的模式上。在联合国框架内,维和产品的供给主要体现为不同的分工形式:西方发达国家重点进行维和资金的投入,而发展中国家主要负责维和人员的投入。非联合国维和是联合国维和的重要补充,非联合国维和与联合国维和间形成一种相互代理的模式。国际维和产品的既有供给模式是维和制度安排、维和供给方私人利益占维和总体利益的比重、灵活使用强制手段和机制间比较优势互补等原因共同作用的结果。尽管现有的供给模式导致联合国维和权力的流散,但它同时增强了西方大国的维和主导地位和行动的灵活性,因为西方大国可以拥有更大的自主空间选择供给联合国维和行动还是其他的维和机制。在维和行动中的武力使用原则变得越发模糊的同时,国际维和行动供给本身也缺乏稳定性:一是国际维和行动供给不足;二是维和行动的质量难以保障。中国作为国际维和行动的积极贡献者,应重视维和行动的代理模式,通过有选择性地参与维和行动和创造选择性激励机制削弱维和供给的"搭便车"现象,同时细化维和行动内容,并建立更为广泛的国际维和伙伴关系。
International peacekeeping operations(IPOs) fall into the category of "joint products", which takes into account security interests at the regional and even global levels and the contributor-specifi c benefi ts. The characteristics of IPOs determine its unique supply model, which consists of both the division of labor and the proxy modes. Within UN peacekeeping framework, developed countries pay more attention to carrying out missions with financial contributions or supplying equipment, while developing countries are the major contributors of peacekeepers. Non-UN peacekeeping is an important complement to UN peacekeeping operations. UN-led and non-UN led missions can be each other's proxies, taking missions beyond each other's capabilities or willingness. The supply model of IPOs is the outcome of arrangement of peacekeeping regime, the weight of supplier's private interest of total peacekeeping benefi ts, as well as comparative advantages of each institution. This model will lead to the diffusion of UN power, whereas strengthening developed countries' dominance and fl exibility in IPOs. In order to increase the effectiveness of supplying IPOs, China should selectively participate in them, refi ne China's peacekeeping products and establish a broader international peacekeeping partnership.
International peacekeeping operations(IPOs) fall into the category of "joint products", which takes into account security interests at the regional and even global levels and the contributor-specifi c benefi ts. The characteristics of IPOs determine its unique supply model, which consists of both the division of labor and the proxy modes. Within UN peacekeeping framework, developed countries pay more attention to carrying out missions with financial contributions or supplying equipment, while developing countries are the major contributors of peacekeepers. Non-UN peacekeeping is an important complement to UN peacekeeping operations. UN-led and non-UN led missions can be each other's proxies, taking missions beyond each other's capabilities or willingness. The supply model of IPOs is the outcome of arrangement of peacekeeping regime, the weight of supplier's private interest of total peacekeeping benefi ts, as well as comparative advantages of each institution. This model will lead to the diffusion of UN power, whereas strengthening developed countries' dominance and fl exibility in IPOs. In order to increase the effectiveness of supplying IPOs, China should selectively participate in them, refi ne China's peacekeeping products and establish a broader international peacekeeping partnership.
引文
(1)关于将维和行动界定为国际公共产品,详见David B. Bobrow and Mark A. Boyer,“Maintaining System Stability:Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations,"Journal of Confict Resolution, Vol. 41, No.6, 1997, pp. 723-748; David B. Bobrow and Mark A. Boyer, Defensive Internationalism:Providing Public Goods in an Uncertain World, The University of Michigan Press, 2005, pp. 222-269; Hirofumi Shimizu's doctoral dissertation, UN Peacekeeping as a Public Good:Analyses of the UN Member States'Peacekeeping Financial Contribution Behavior, 1999, p. 2; Ann Arbor:"An Economic Analysis of the UN Peacekeeping Assessment System,"Defense and Peace Economics, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2005, pp. 1-18; Hirofumi Shimizu and Todd Sandler,"Peace-keeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994-2000,"Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No.6, 2002, pp. 651-668; Alexander Kocks,"The Political Economy of Peacekeeping:Providing UN Peace Operations as Transnational Public Goods,"paper presented to the Conference on the Sixth Pan-European International Relations Conference of the ECPR Standing Group on International Relations(SGIR), August2007; Jonah Victor,"African Peacekeeping in Africa:Warlord Politics, Defense Economics, and State Legitimacy,"Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 47, No. 2, 2010, pp. 217-229; Vincenzo Bove and Leandro Elia,"Supplying Peace:Participation in and Troop Contribution to Peacekeeping Mission,"Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 48, No. 6, 2011, pp. 699-714; Khusrav Gaibulloev, Justin George, Todd Sandler and Hirofumi Shimizu,"Personnel Contributions to UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions:A Public Goods Approach,"Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 52, No. 6, 2015, pp. 727-742; Todd Sandler,"International Peacekeeping Operations:Burden Sharing and Effectiveness,"Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 61, No. 9, 2017,pp. 1875-1897; Timothy J. A. Passmore, Andrew F. Hart and Megan Shannon,"Rallying the Troops:Collective Action and Self-interest in UN Peacekeeping Contributions,"Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 55,No. 3, 2018, pp. 366-379 and etc。
(2)桑德勒的定义原文为Joint products arise when an activity yields two or more outputs that may vary in their degree of publicness,参见Todd Sandler,"Regional Public Goods and International Organizations,"The Review of International Organiiations,Vol. 1,No. 1, 2006, p. 9,同时参考马歇尔(Alfred Marshall)的定义:“不易独立生产的;是并于同一来源的”,见[英]阿尔弗里德·马歇尔著,陈良壁译:《经济学原理(下卷)》,北京:商务印书馆,1994年版,第76页。
(1)David B. Bobrow and Mark A. Boyer,"Maintaining System Stability:Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations,"Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 6, 1997, p. 727; Timothy Passmore, Megan Shannon and Andrew F. Hart,"Rallying the Troops:Collective Action and Self-interest in UN Peacekeeping Contributions,"Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 55, No. 3, 2018, p. 368.
(2)可根据公共性(publicness)程度,将公共产品分为纯公共产品、准公共产品、俱乐部产品、联合产品,详见樊勇明、薄思胜著:《区域公共产品理论与实践——解读区域合作新视点》,上海:上海人民出版社,2011年版,第31页。
(3)Hirofumi Shimizu and Todd Sandler,"Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994-2000,"Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No, 6, 2002, pp. 651-668.
(1)李增刚:《全球公共产品:定义、分类及其供给》,载《经济评论》,2006年第1期,第133页。
(2)Charles P. Kindleberger,"International Public Goods Without International Government,"American Economic Review, March 1986, pp. 1-13.
(1)数据来源于:Global Peace Operations Review, https://peaceoperationsreview.org/featureddata#euro_personnel,登录时间:2018年8月20日。
(2)联合国官网:《联合国维持和平人员:七十年的奉献与牺牲》,http://www.un.org/zh/events/peacekeepersday/,登录时间:2018年8月20日。
(3)Todd Sandler,"International Peacekeeping Operations:Burden Sharing and Effectiveness,"Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 61, No. 9, 2017, p. 1876.
(1)陆建新、王涛、周辉:《国际维和学》,北京:国防大学出版社,2015年版,第145页。
(2)Jyoti Khanna, Todd Sandler and Hirofumi Shimizu,"Sharing the Financial Burden for UN and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976-1996,"Journal of Confict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1998, pp. 176-195.
(1)Khusrav Gaibulloev, Todd Sandler and Hirofumi Shimizu,"Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping:Nonvoluntary versus Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good,"Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.53, No. 6, 2009, p.829.
(2)Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, 2nd ed., Cambridge:Polity Press, 2010, p.275.
(3)以2015年为例,前十名维和人员贡献国为孟加拉(8403人)、埃塞俄比亚(8287人)、印度(7798人)、巴基斯坦(7640)人,卢旺达(6085人)、尼泊尔(5399人)、塞内加尔(3471人)、加纳(3231人)、中国(3043人)、尼日利亚(2970人),2015年联合国维和人员总人数为107088人。数据来源于:Global Peace Operations Review, https://peaceoperationsreview.org/featured-data#euro_personnel,联合国维和行动官网:www.un.org/zh/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml,登录时间:2018年7月14日。
(1)Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams,"Who's keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations,"International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2005, p. 167.
(2)Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, p. 87.
(1)Julia C. Morse and Robert O. Keohane,"Contested Multilateralism,"The Review of International Organizations, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2014, pp. 385-412.
(1)Frederick H. Fleitz, Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s:Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests Westport, Conn.:Praeger, 2002, p. 64.
(2)赵磊、高心满等:《中国参与联合国维持和平行动的前沿问题》,北京:时事出版社,2011年版,第28页。
(3)本文认为维和代理关系不仅存在于联合国维和与非联合国维和机制之间,其他的组织、机制之间也存在这种代理关系,例如,非盟和北约之间。但碍于文章的篇幅,并不详加以讨论。
(4)Jeremie Labbe and Arthur Boutellis,"Peace Operations by Proxy:Implications for Humanitarian Action of UN Peacekeeping Partnership with Non-UN Security Forces,"International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95, 2013, pp. 539-559.
(1)Jeremie Labbe and Arthur Boutellis,"Peace Operations by Proxy:Implications for Humanitarian Action of UN Peacekeeping Partnership with Non-UN Security Forces,"International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95, 2013, p. 543.
(2)未经联合国授权并不意味着这些行动不具备合法性。
(1)Vincenzo Bove and Leandro Elia,"Supplying Peace:Participation in and Troop Contribution to Peacekeeping Missions,"Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 48, No. 6, 2011, pp. 699-714.
(2)Hirofumi Shimizu's doctoral dissertation, UN Peacekeeping as a Public Good:Analyses of the UN Member States'Peacekeeping Financial Contribution Behavior, 1999, p. 2.
(3)本文认为国家贡献维和行动的私有利益体现在两个层面:一方面是联合国的维和工资会诱使部分贫穷国家获取维和利润;另一层面为更广泛的利益。详见“Donor-specific benefits may derive from in-field troop training, greater prestige, improved legitimacy, enhanced ally favor, increased trade stability, augmented neighborhood stability, and improved foreign direct investment(FDI)protection.See Todd Sandler,"International Peacekeeping Operations:Burden Sharing and Effectiveness,"Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol. 61,No. 9, 2017, p.1883。
(1)刘丹:《联合国维和行动的困境及前景》,北京:时事出版社,2015年版,第50页。
(2)Khursav Gaibulloev, Todd Sandler and Hirofumi Shimizu,"Demands for UN and NonUN Peacekeeping:Nonvoluntary verus Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good,"Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 6, 2009, p. 828.
(3)有些非联合国维和行动中的“搭便车”现象会得到默认,或是得到了大国的鼓励,例如澳大利亚领导的所罗门行动。
(4)David B. Bobrow and Mark A. Boyer,"Maintaining System Stability:Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations,"Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 6, 1997, p.726; Jyoti Khanna, Todd Sandler and Hirofumi Shimizu,"Sharing the Financial Burden for UN and NATO Peacekeeping:1976-1996,"Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1998, pp. 176-195.
(1)Todd Sandler,"International Peacekeeping Operations:Burden Sharing and Effectiveness,"Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 61, No. 9, 2017, p. 1885.
(2)李东燕:《从平民保护到安全治理——加强联合国与所在国政府及民间组织的合作》,载《国际安全研究》,2014年第3期,第127页。
(3)Jeremie Labbe and Arthur Boutellis,"Peace Operations by Proxy:Implications for Humanitarian Action of UN Peacekeeping Partnership with Non-UN Security Forces,"International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95, 2013, p. 542.
(4)International Security Assistance Force(ISAF):Key Facts and Figures, https://www.nato.int/isaf/placemats_archive/2013-12-01-ISAF-Placemat.pdf,登录时间:2018年9月7日。
(1)陈楷鑫、张贵洪:《联合国维和行动武力使用规范的思考》,载《湘潭大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》,2018年第1期,第141-147页。
(2)The concept of local ownership was endorsed in peace operations in 2001, when UN Secretary General Kofi Annan noted that sustainable peace and development can only be achieved by the local population itself; the role of the United Nations is merely to facilitate the process that seeks to dismantle the structures of violence and create the conditions conducive to durable peace and sustainable development(United Nations,2001),see Wong Pearly,"'Local Ownership'in Peacebuilding-a Premature Rhetoric?"Peace and Progress, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2016, p. 47.
(3)刘丹:《联合国维和行动的困境及前景》,第41页。
(1)联合国大会、联合国安理会和秘书处被视为维和决策的“三驾马车”,秘书长特别代表(special representative of the secretary)为联合国维和行动最直接的负责人,向秘书长报告。数据来自于笔者根据联合国维和行动官方网站提供资料所进行的统计,详见https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors,登录时间:2018年9月19日。
(2)何银:《联合国维和事务与中国维和话语权建设》,载《世界经济与政治》,2016年第11期,第46页。关于西方国家在联合国秘书处任职人员的统计,可参见何银此篇文章。
(3)张春:《国际公共产品的供应竞争及其出路——亚太地区二元格局与中美新型大国关系建构》,载《当代亚太》,2014年第6期,第52-72页。
(4)Alexander Kocks,"The Political Economy of Peacekeeping:Providing UN Peace Operations as Transnational Public Goods,"Paper prepared for presentation at the Sixth Pan-European International Relations Conference of the ECPR Standing Group on International Relations(SGIR), August 2007, p. 10.
(1)2017年7月11日至2018年6月30日财政年度,联合国维持和平行动的核定预算约为68亿美元,相比2016-2017年核定预算,2017-2018年度平均减少7.5%,参见http://www.un.org/zh/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml,登录时间:2018年8月24日。
(1)[新西兰]马克·兰泰尼:《试析中国维和观念的演变》,载《国际政治研究》,2017年第4期,第54页。
(1)毛瑞鹏:《特朗普政府改革联合国财政制度的目标及策略分析》,载《国际论坛》,2017年11月,第1页。
(2)“公共产品如果不具有完全的消费的非排他性或非竞争性,那么排他性的消费机制和成本分担机制就有可能建立,并使国际合作成为可能。”参见庞珣:《国际公共产品中集体行动困境的克服》,载《世界经济与政治》,2012年第7期,第25页。
(3)Mancur Olson,"Increasing the Incentives for International Cooperation,"International Organization, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1971, pp. 866-874.
(4)Daniel G. Arce M.,"Asymmetric Leadership and International Public Goods,"Public Finance Review, Vol. 32, No, 5, 2004, p. 532.
(5)张春:《国际公共产品的供应竞争及其出路——亚太地区二元格局与中美新型大国关系建构》,第57页。
(1)[美]托德·桑德勒:《评估公共产品的最佳供应:寻找圣杯》,载[美]英吉·考尔等主编,张春波、高静译:《全球化之道——全球公共产品的提供与管理》,北京:人民出版社,2006年版,第121页。
(2)李东燕:《中国国际维和行动——概念与模式》,载《世界经济与政治》,2018年第4期,第103页。
(1)李东燕:《中国国际维和行动——概念与模式》,第103页;陈楷鑫:《联合国维和行动:一种全球安全治理的视角》,复旦大学博士论文,2018年。
(2)《习近平出席联合国维和峰会并发表讲话》,新华网:www.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-09/29/c_1116705308.htm,登录时间:2018年9月5日。
(1)刘铁娃:《中美联合国维和行动比较与合作空间分析》,载《国际政治研究》,2017年第4期,第33-52页。
(2)桑德勒的定义原文为Joint products arise when an activity yields two or more outputs that may vary in their degree of publicness,参见Todd Sandler,"Regional Public Goods and International Organizations,"The Review of International Organiiations,Vol. 1,No. 1, 2006, p. 9,同时参考马歇尔(Alfred Marshall)的定义:“不易独立生产的;是并于同一来源的”,见[英]阿尔弗里德·马歇尔著,陈良壁译:《经济学原理(下卷)》,北京:商务印书馆,1994年版,第76页。
(1)David B. Bobrow and Mark A. Boyer,"Maintaining System Stability:Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations,"Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 6, 1997, p. 727; Timothy Passmore, Megan Shannon and Andrew F. Hart,"Rallying the Troops:Collective Action and Self-interest in UN Peacekeeping Contributions,"Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 55, No. 3, 2018, p. 368.
(2)可根据公共性(publicness)程度,将公共产品分为纯公共产品、准公共产品、俱乐部产品、联合产品,详见樊勇明、薄思胜著:《区域公共产品理论与实践——解读区域合作新视点》,上海:上海人民出版社,2011年版,第31页。
(3)Hirofumi Shimizu and Todd Sandler,"Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994-2000,"Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No, 6, 2002, pp. 651-668.
(1)李增刚:《全球公共产品:定义、分类及其供给》,载《经济评论》,2006年第1期,第133页。
(2)Charles P. Kindleberger,"International Public Goods Without International Government,"American Economic Review, March 1986, pp. 1-13.
(1)数据来源于:Global Peace Operations Review, https://peaceoperationsreview.org/featureddata#euro_personnel,登录时间:2018年8月20日。
(2)联合国官网:《联合国维持和平人员:七十年的奉献与牺牲》,http://www.un.org/zh/events/peacekeepersday/,登录时间:2018年8月20日。
(3)Todd Sandler,"International Peacekeeping Operations:Burden Sharing and Effectiveness,"Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 61, No. 9, 2017, p. 1876.
(1)陆建新、王涛、周辉:《国际维和学》,北京:国防大学出版社,2015年版,第145页。
(2)Jyoti Khanna, Todd Sandler and Hirofumi Shimizu,"Sharing the Financial Burden for UN and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976-1996,"Journal of Confict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1998, pp. 176-195.
(1)Khusrav Gaibulloev, Todd Sandler and Hirofumi Shimizu,"Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping:Nonvoluntary versus Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good,"Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.53, No. 6, 2009, p.829.
(2)Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, 2nd ed., Cambridge:Polity Press, 2010, p.275.
(3)以2015年为例,前十名维和人员贡献国为孟加拉(8403人)、埃塞俄比亚(8287人)、印度(7798人)、巴基斯坦(7640)人,卢旺达(6085人)、尼泊尔(5399人)、塞内加尔(3471人)、加纳(3231人)、中国(3043人)、尼日利亚(2970人),2015年联合国维和人员总人数为107088人。数据来源于:Global Peace Operations Review, https://peaceoperationsreview.org/featured-data#euro_personnel,联合国维和行动官网:www.un.org/zh/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml,登录时间:2018年7月14日。
(1)Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams,"Who's keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations,"International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2005, p. 167.
(2)Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, p. 87.
(1)Julia C. Morse and Robert O. Keohane,"Contested Multilateralism,"The Review of International Organizations, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2014, pp. 385-412.
(1)Frederick H. Fleitz, Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s:Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests Westport, Conn.:Praeger, 2002, p. 64.
(2)赵磊、高心满等:《中国参与联合国维持和平行动的前沿问题》,北京:时事出版社,2011年版,第28页。
(3)本文认为维和代理关系不仅存在于联合国维和与非联合国维和机制之间,其他的组织、机制之间也存在这种代理关系,例如,非盟和北约之间。但碍于文章的篇幅,并不详加以讨论。
(4)Jeremie Labbe and Arthur Boutellis,"Peace Operations by Proxy:Implications for Humanitarian Action of UN Peacekeeping Partnership with Non-UN Security Forces,"International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95, 2013, pp. 539-559.
(1)Jeremie Labbe and Arthur Boutellis,"Peace Operations by Proxy:Implications for Humanitarian Action of UN Peacekeeping Partnership with Non-UN Security Forces,"International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95, 2013, p. 543.
(2)未经联合国授权并不意味着这些行动不具备合法性。
(1)Vincenzo Bove and Leandro Elia,"Supplying Peace:Participation in and Troop Contribution to Peacekeeping Missions,"Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 48, No. 6, 2011, pp. 699-714.
(2)Hirofumi Shimizu's doctoral dissertation, UN Peacekeeping as a Public Good:Analyses of the UN Member States'Peacekeeping Financial Contribution Behavior, 1999, p. 2.
(3)本文认为国家贡献维和行动的私有利益体现在两个层面:一方面是联合国的维和工资会诱使部分贫穷国家获取维和利润;另一层面为更广泛的利益。详见“Donor-specific benefits may derive from in-field troop training, greater prestige, improved legitimacy, enhanced ally favor, increased trade stability, augmented neighborhood stability, and improved foreign direct investment(FDI)protection.See Todd Sandler,"International Peacekeeping Operations:Burden Sharing and Effectiveness,"Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol. 61,No. 9, 2017, p.1883。
(1)刘丹:《联合国维和行动的困境及前景》,北京:时事出版社,2015年版,第50页。
(2)Khursav Gaibulloev, Todd Sandler and Hirofumi Shimizu,"Demands for UN and NonUN Peacekeeping:Nonvoluntary verus Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good,"Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 6, 2009, p. 828.
(3)有些非联合国维和行动中的“搭便车”现象会得到默认,或是得到了大国的鼓励,例如澳大利亚领导的所罗门行动。
(4)David B. Bobrow and Mark A. Boyer,"Maintaining System Stability:Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations,"Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 6, 1997, p.726; Jyoti Khanna, Todd Sandler and Hirofumi Shimizu,"Sharing the Financial Burden for UN and NATO Peacekeeping:1976-1996,"Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1998, pp. 176-195.
(1)Todd Sandler,"International Peacekeeping Operations:Burden Sharing and Effectiveness,"Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 61, No. 9, 2017, p. 1885.
(2)李东燕:《从平民保护到安全治理——加强联合国与所在国政府及民间组织的合作》,载《国际安全研究》,2014年第3期,第127页。
(3)Jeremie Labbe and Arthur Boutellis,"Peace Operations by Proxy:Implications for Humanitarian Action of UN Peacekeeping Partnership with Non-UN Security Forces,"International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95, 2013, p. 542.
(4)International Security Assistance Force(ISAF):Key Facts and Figures, https://www.nato.int/isaf/placemats_archive/2013-12-01-ISAF-Placemat.pdf,登录时间:2018年9月7日。
(1)陈楷鑫、张贵洪:《联合国维和行动武力使用规范的思考》,载《湘潭大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》,2018年第1期,第141-147页。
(2)The concept of local ownership was endorsed in peace operations in 2001, when UN Secretary General Kofi Annan noted that sustainable peace and development can only be achieved by the local population itself; the role of the United Nations is merely to facilitate the process that seeks to dismantle the structures of violence and create the conditions conducive to durable peace and sustainable development(United Nations,2001),see Wong Pearly,"'Local Ownership'in Peacebuilding-a Premature Rhetoric?"Peace and Progress, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2016, p. 47.
(3)刘丹:《联合国维和行动的困境及前景》,第41页。
(1)联合国大会、联合国安理会和秘书处被视为维和决策的“三驾马车”,秘书长特别代表(special representative of the secretary)为联合国维和行动最直接的负责人,向秘书长报告。数据来自于笔者根据联合国维和行动官方网站提供资料所进行的统计,详见https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors,登录时间:2018年9月19日。
(2)何银:《联合国维和事务与中国维和话语权建设》,载《世界经济与政治》,2016年第11期,第46页。关于西方国家在联合国秘书处任职人员的统计,可参见何银此篇文章。
(3)张春:《国际公共产品的供应竞争及其出路——亚太地区二元格局与中美新型大国关系建构》,载《当代亚太》,2014年第6期,第52-72页。
(4)Alexander Kocks,"The Political Economy of Peacekeeping:Providing UN Peace Operations as Transnational Public Goods,"Paper prepared for presentation at the Sixth Pan-European International Relations Conference of the ECPR Standing Group on International Relations(SGIR), August 2007, p. 10.
(1)2017年7月11日至2018年6月30日财政年度,联合国维持和平行动的核定预算约为68亿美元,相比2016-2017年核定预算,2017-2018年度平均减少7.5%,参见http://www.un.org/zh/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml,登录时间:2018年8月24日。
(1)[新西兰]马克·兰泰尼:《试析中国维和观念的演变》,载《国际政治研究》,2017年第4期,第54页。
(1)毛瑞鹏:《特朗普政府改革联合国财政制度的目标及策略分析》,载《国际论坛》,2017年11月,第1页。
(2)“公共产品如果不具有完全的消费的非排他性或非竞争性,那么排他性的消费机制和成本分担机制就有可能建立,并使国际合作成为可能。”参见庞珣:《国际公共产品中集体行动困境的克服》,载《世界经济与政治》,2012年第7期,第25页。
(3)Mancur Olson,"Increasing the Incentives for International Cooperation,"International Organization, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1971, pp. 866-874.
(4)Daniel G. Arce M.,"Asymmetric Leadership and International Public Goods,"Public Finance Review, Vol. 32, No, 5, 2004, p. 532.
(5)张春:《国际公共产品的供应竞争及其出路——亚太地区二元格局与中美新型大国关系建构》,第57页。
(1)[美]托德·桑德勒:《评估公共产品的最佳供应:寻找圣杯》,载[美]英吉·考尔等主编,张春波、高静译:《全球化之道——全球公共产品的提供与管理》,北京:人民出版社,2006年版,第121页。
(2)李东燕:《中国国际维和行动——概念与模式》,载《世界经济与政治》,2018年第4期,第103页。
(1)李东燕:《中国国际维和行动——概念与模式》,第103页;陈楷鑫:《联合国维和行动:一种全球安全治理的视角》,复旦大学博士论文,2018年。
(2)《习近平出席联合国维和峰会并发表讲话》,新华网:www.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-09/29/c_1116705308.htm,登录时间:2018年9月5日。
(1)刘铁娃:《中美联合国维和行动比较与合作空间分析》,载《国际政治研究》,2017年第4期,第33-52页。