城市商业银行董事长政治经历与银行风险承担
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摘要
高管经历特征是影响企业行为的重要因素,本文从城市商业银行董事长经历的视角讨论了董事长政治经历对银行风险承担的影响。实证结果表明,董事长政治经历显著提高了城市商业银行风险承担水平;董事长政治经历对城市商业银行风险承担的影响受董事长个体特征和城市商业银行经营特征的影响。年龄、性别、学历对董事长政治经历与城市商业银行风险承担的关系具有显著调节效应;而城市商业银行董事会规模、独立董事比率、境外战略投资者以及跨区域经营等特征也能显著影响董事长政治经历与城市商业银行风险承担的关系。本文为解释中国城市商业银行风险承担提供了新的视角。
The frequent occurrence of illegal events about top managers of commercial banks lead managers' personal background characteristics and commercial banks' risk-taking to the hot topic for the scholars and practitioners.The experience of executives is an important factor affecting corporate behavior.This paper discusses the impact of the political experience of chairman of the board on the risk exposure of the Chinese city commercial bank.With the data of 99 city commercial banks between 2007 and 2017,we empirically find that the political experience of the chairman of the board has significantly increased the bank's risk-taking level.The influence of the chairman's political experience on the bank's risk-taking is affected by the individual characteristics of the chairman of the board and the characteristics of the bank.Specifically,we find that age,gender,and academic qualifications of the chairman of the board have significant moderating effect on the relationship between the chairman's political experience and bank risk exposure.The chairman's age can negatively affect the relationship between the political experience of the chairman and the risk-bearing relationship.We also find that compared with woman,the bank with male chairman with political experience show a higher risk-taking level and the higher education degree of the chairman,the stronger impact of the chairman's political experience on the bank's risk-taking.From the perspective of characteristics of different banks,we find that the bank's board size,independent director ratio,overseas strategic investors,and cross-regional operations also have significant effects on the relationship between the chairman's political experience and the risk exposure of the bank.Our research provides a new perspective for explaining the risk-taking of Chinese city commercial banks.The stable operation and development of city commercial banks is of great significance to China's financial and economic progressing.At present,supervision of China's city commercial banks is concentrated at the China Banking Regulatory Commission.However,the development of city commercial banks is affected by many factors that the unilateral financial supervision may not improve the risk status of the city commercial banks.Therefore,the risk management in Chinese city commercial banks calls for the cooperation of different departments.Firstly,city commercial banks need to improve the corporate governance mechanism,and effectively improve the supervision role of the board of directors,independent directors and the board of supervisors in business decision-making on the basis of perfecting the board of directors,supervisors and other norms.At the same time,city commercial banks should avoid the absolute control of the bank chairman's individual management.For the ownership structure,other types of investors need to be introduced to promote the diversified development of equity,scientific and reasonable incentives and promotion mechanisms need to be formulated in combination with the performance indicators and risk measuring indicators of banking operations.Secondly,in the selection and appointment of the chairman of the board and other senior executives of the city commercial bank,both the career experiences and background characteristics of the candidates and the differences in bank operations should be considered.The executive experience,gender,age and academic qualifications of the candidates should be matched with the bank's operating characteristics,improving staffing efficiency and promoting the overall coordinated development of the city's commercial banks are also necessary.The supervision standards set by the financial supervision department for the city commercial banks should be distinguished from other types of banks,the characteristics of the small size of the city commercial banks needs to take into account,and the economic and financial development level of the area of the city commercial bank.However,bank risk exposure is affected by many complex elements,much more things needs to be considered by the financial supervision department.In the future,we will discuss more factors affecting bank risk exposure in depth.
The frequent occurrence of illegal events about top managers of commercial banks lead managers' personal background characteristics and commercial banks' risk-taking to the hot topic for the scholars and practitioners.The experience of executives is an important factor affecting corporate behavior.This paper discusses the impact of the political experience of chairman of the board on the risk exposure of the Chinese city commercial bank.With the data of 99 city commercial banks between 2007 and 2017,we empirically find that the political experience of the chairman of the board has significantly increased the bank's risk-taking level.The influence of the chairman's political experience on the bank's risk-taking is affected by the individual characteristics of the chairman of the board and the characteristics of the bank.Specifically,we find that age,gender,and academic qualifications of the chairman of the board have significant moderating effect on the relationship between the chairman's political experience and bank risk exposure.The chairman's age can negatively affect the relationship between the political experience of the chairman and the risk-bearing relationship.We also find that compared with woman,the bank with male chairman with political experience show a higher risk-taking level and the higher education degree of the chairman,the stronger impact of the chairman's political experience on the bank's risk-taking.From the perspective of characteristics of different banks,we find that the bank's board size,independent director ratio,overseas strategic investors,and cross-regional operations also have significant effects on the relationship between the chairman's political experience and the risk exposure of the bank.Our research provides a new perspective for explaining the risk-taking of Chinese city commercial banks.The stable operation and development of city commercial banks is of great significance to China's financial and economic progressing.At present,supervision of China's city commercial banks is concentrated at the China Banking Regulatory Commission.However,the development of city commercial banks is affected by many factors that the unilateral financial supervision may not improve the risk status of the city commercial banks.Therefore,the risk management in Chinese city commercial banks calls for the cooperation of different departments.Firstly,city commercial banks need to improve the corporate governance mechanism,and effectively improve the supervision role of the board of directors,independent directors and the board of supervisors in business decision-making on the basis of perfecting the board of directors,supervisors and other norms.At the same time,city commercial banks should avoid the absolute control of the bank chairman's individual management.For the ownership structure,other types of investors need to be introduced to promote the diversified development of equity,scientific and reasonable incentives and promotion mechanisms need to be formulated in combination with the performance indicators and risk measuring indicators of banking operations.Secondly,in the selection and appointment of the chairman of the board and other senior executives of the city commercial bank,both the career experiences and background characteristics of the candidates and the differences in bank operations should be considered.The executive experience,gender,age and academic qualifications of the candidates should be matched with the bank's operating characteristics,improving staffing efficiency and promoting the overall coordinated development of the city's commercial banks are also necessary.The supervision standards set by the financial supervision department for the city commercial banks should be distinguished from other types of banks,the characteristics of the small size of the city commercial banks needs to take into account,and the economic and financial development level of the area of the city commercial bank.However,bank risk exposure is affected by many complex elements,much more things needs to be considered by the financial supervision department.In the future,we will discuss more factors affecting bank risk exposure in depth.
引文
[1]尹威,刘晓星.地方政府行为与城市商业银行风险承担[J].哈尔滨:管理科学,2017,(6):79-91.
[2]陈峰.城市商业银行资本监管困境及成因分析[J].北京:国际金融研究,2005,(10):66-71.
[3]钱先航,曹廷求.董事会中的官员与银行审慎行为——基于城市商业银行的实证研究[J].西安:当代经济科学,2014,(6):49-60.
[4]Bushman,R.M.,R.H.Davidson,A.Dey,and A.Smith,Bank CEO Materialism:Risk Controls,Culture and Tail Risk[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2018,(65):191-220.
[5]Hung,C.H.D.,Y.Jiang,H.Liu,H.Tu,and S.Wang,Bank Political Connections and Performance in China[J].Journal of Financial Stability,2017,(32):57-69.
[6]Chen,H.K.,Y.C.Liao,C.Y.Lin,and J.F.Yen,The Effect of the Political Connections of Government Bank CEOs on Bank Performance During the Financial Crisis[J].Journal of Financial Stability,2018,(36):130-143.
[7]梁艳,杨振兴,姜玉萍.银行高管、社会联结与银行的风险承担[J].天津:现代财经,2016,(6):80-88.
[8]Hambrick,D.C.,and P.A.Mason,Upper Echelons:The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers [J].The Academy of Management Review,1984,9,(2):193-206.
[9]潘敏,魏海瑞.高管政治关联会影响商业银行信贷投放的周期性特征吗——来自中国银行业的经验证据[J].北京:财贸经济,2015,(4):60-73.
[10]López,M.,F.Tenjo,and H.Zárate,The Risk-taking Channel and Monetary Transmission Mechanism in Colombia[J].Ensayos Sobre Política Económica,2011,29,(64):212-234.
[11]于一,何维达.货币政策、信贷质量与银行风险偏好的实证检验[J].北京:国际金融研究,2011,(12):59-68.
[12]Borio,C.,and H.Zhu,Capital Regulation,Risk-taking and Monetary Policy:A Missing Link in the Transmission Mechanism[R].BIS Working Papers,No.268,2008.
[13]Dell’ Ariccia,G.,L.Laeven,and G.A.Suarez,Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy’s Risk Taking Channel:Evidence from the United States[J].The Journal of Finance,2017,4,(2):613-653.
[14]张雪兰,何德旭.货币政策立场与银行风险承担——基于中国银行业的实证研究(2000—2010)[J].北京:经济研究,2012,(5):31-44.
[15]Maddaloni,A.,and J.Peydró,Bank Risk-taking,Securitization,Supervision,and Low Interest Rates:Evidence from Euro Area and US Lending Standards[J].Review of Financial Studies,2010,24,(6):121-165.
[16]Berger,A.N.,L.F.Klapper,and R.Turk-Ariss,Bank Competition and Financial Stability [J].Journal of Financial Services Research,2009,35,(2):99-118.
[17]Adams,R.B.,and D.Ferreira,Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance and Performance[J].Journal of Financial Economics2009,94,(2):291–309.
[18]邹飞,王宗润.银行高管非金融从业经历与银行风险承担行为[J].北京:金融论坛,2013,(6):9-15.
[19]Boyd,J.H.,R.Jagannathan,and S.Kwak,What Caused The Current Financial Mess and What Can We Do about It?[J].Journal of Investment Management,2009,(7):1-17.
[20]Bhagat,S.,B.Bolton,and J.Lu,Size,Leverage,and Risk-taking of Financial Institutions[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2015,59,(3):520-537.
[21]Berger,A.N.,T.Kick,and K.Schaeck,Executive Board Composition and Bank Risk Taking[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2014,(C):48-65.
[22]Vroom,V.H.,and B.Pahl,Relationship between Age and Risk Taking among Managers[J].Journal of Applied Psychology,1971,55,(5):399-405.
[23]Margarethe,F.,K.Wiersema,and A.Bantel.Top Management Team Demography and Corporate Strategic Change[J].The Academy of Management Journal,1992,35,(1):91-121.
[24]Ska?a,D.,and L.Weill,Does CEO Gender Matter for Bank Risk?[J].Economic Systems,2018,42,(1):64-74.
[25]Diouf,I.,and D.Pépin,Gender and Central Banking[J].Economic Modelling,2017,(61):193-206.
[26]Jianakoplos,N.A.,and A.Bernasek,Are Women More Risk Averse?[J].Economic Inquiry,2010,36,(4):620-630.
[27]Bennani,H.Dissecting the Brains of Central Bankers:The Case of the ECB’s Governing Council Members on Reforms[J].International Economics,2015,(141):97-114.
[28]King,T.,A.Srivastav,and J.Williams,What’s in an Education?Implications of CEO Education for Bank Performance[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2016,(37):287-308.
[29]Delis,M.D.,and G.P.Kouretas,Interest Rates and Bank Risk Taking[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2011,35,(4):840-855.
[30]李常青,赖建清.董事会特征影响公司绩效吗?[J].北京:金融研究,2004,(5):64-77.
[31]Jensen,M.C.The Modern Industrial Revolution,Exit,and the Failure of Internal Control Systems[J].The Journal of Finance,1993,48,(3):831-880.
[32]吕勇斌.引入境外战略投资者是否提升了银行绩效——来自中国A股上市银行的证据[J].北京:宏观经济研究,2009,(10):64-68.
[33]吴成颂,周炜,王浩然.境外战略投资者能降低商业银行的风险承担吗?——来自城市商业银行的经验性证据[J].北京:国际金融研究,2017,361,(5):56-65.
[34]夏喆.公司治理、跨区域经营与风险承担——通径分析视角下我国城市商业银行的行为选择[J].北京:投资研究,2016,(3):26-42.
(1)数据源于中国银行保险监督管理委员会网站,详见http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/govView_D63FDEEA25C44D089 BC1DB5BA70B10CA.html以及http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docView/6B4D8373010B4DDC96F4B67A41A69584.html。
(2)数据源于中国银行保险监督管理委员会网站,详见http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docView/2ED43 A31B3CA4071A1D76901502E3A7A.html。
(1)如齐鲁银行董事长因骗贷案被免职(2011年),烟台银行董事长因票据案被双规(2012年),珠海华润银行董事长因受贿被免职(2015年)等。
(2)本文所指的银行高管是指高管个体,即商业银行董事长。当前,对于银行高管的研究有从高管个体角度对银行的经营管理展开研究,也有从高管团队的视角讨论高管对银行经营产生的影响,本文研究的是董事长个体特征对银行经营的影响,高管团队不属于本文的研究范围。
[2]陈峰.城市商业银行资本监管困境及成因分析[J].北京:国际金融研究,2005,(10):66-71.
[3]钱先航,曹廷求.董事会中的官员与银行审慎行为——基于城市商业银行的实证研究[J].西安:当代经济科学,2014,(6):49-60.
[4]Bushman,R.M.,R.H.Davidson,A.Dey,and A.Smith,Bank CEO Materialism:Risk Controls,Culture and Tail Risk[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2018,(65):191-220.
[5]Hung,C.H.D.,Y.Jiang,H.Liu,H.Tu,and S.Wang,Bank Political Connections and Performance in China[J].Journal of Financial Stability,2017,(32):57-69.
[6]Chen,H.K.,Y.C.Liao,C.Y.Lin,and J.F.Yen,The Effect of the Political Connections of Government Bank CEOs on Bank Performance During the Financial Crisis[J].Journal of Financial Stability,2018,(36):130-143.
[7]梁艳,杨振兴,姜玉萍.银行高管、社会联结与银行的风险承担[J].天津:现代财经,2016,(6):80-88.
[8]Hambrick,D.C.,and P.A.Mason,Upper Echelons:The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers [J].The Academy of Management Review,1984,9,(2):193-206.
[9]潘敏,魏海瑞.高管政治关联会影响商业银行信贷投放的周期性特征吗——来自中国银行业的经验证据[J].北京:财贸经济,2015,(4):60-73.
[10]López,M.,F.Tenjo,and H.Zárate,The Risk-taking Channel and Monetary Transmission Mechanism in Colombia[J].Ensayos Sobre Política Económica,2011,29,(64):212-234.
[11]于一,何维达.货币政策、信贷质量与银行风险偏好的实证检验[J].北京:国际金融研究,2011,(12):59-68.
[12]Borio,C.,and H.Zhu,Capital Regulation,Risk-taking and Monetary Policy:A Missing Link in the Transmission Mechanism[R].BIS Working Papers,No.268,2008.
[13]Dell’ Ariccia,G.,L.Laeven,and G.A.Suarez,Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy’s Risk Taking Channel:Evidence from the United States[J].The Journal of Finance,2017,4,(2):613-653.
[14]张雪兰,何德旭.货币政策立场与银行风险承担——基于中国银行业的实证研究(2000—2010)[J].北京:经济研究,2012,(5):31-44.
[15]Maddaloni,A.,and J.Peydró,Bank Risk-taking,Securitization,Supervision,and Low Interest Rates:Evidence from Euro Area and US Lending Standards[J].Review of Financial Studies,2010,24,(6):121-165.
[16]Berger,A.N.,L.F.Klapper,and R.Turk-Ariss,Bank Competition and Financial Stability [J].Journal of Financial Services Research,2009,35,(2):99-118.
[17]Adams,R.B.,and D.Ferreira,Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance and Performance[J].Journal of Financial Economics2009,94,(2):291–309.
[18]邹飞,王宗润.银行高管非金融从业经历与银行风险承担行为[J].北京:金融论坛,2013,(6):9-15.
[19]Boyd,J.H.,R.Jagannathan,and S.Kwak,What Caused The Current Financial Mess and What Can We Do about It?[J].Journal of Investment Management,2009,(7):1-17.
[20]Bhagat,S.,B.Bolton,and J.Lu,Size,Leverage,and Risk-taking of Financial Institutions[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2015,59,(3):520-537.
[21]Berger,A.N.,T.Kick,and K.Schaeck,Executive Board Composition and Bank Risk Taking[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2014,(C):48-65.
[22]Vroom,V.H.,and B.Pahl,Relationship between Age and Risk Taking among Managers[J].Journal of Applied Psychology,1971,55,(5):399-405.
[23]Margarethe,F.,K.Wiersema,and A.Bantel.Top Management Team Demography and Corporate Strategic Change[J].The Academy of Management Journal,1992,35,(1):91-121.
[24]Ska?a,D.,and L.Weill,Does CEO Gender Matter for Bank Risk?[J].Economic Systems,2018,42,(1):64-74.
[25]Diouf,I.,and D.Pépin,Gender and Central Banking[J].Economic Modelling,2017,(61):193-206.
[26]Jianakoplos,N.A.,and A.Bernasek,Are Women More Risk Averse?[J].Economic Inquiry,2010,36,(4):620-630.
[27]Bennani,H.Dissecting the Brains of Central Bankers:The Case of the ECB’s Governing Council Members on Reforms[J].International Economics,2015,(141):97-114.
[28]King,T.,A.Srivastav,and J.Williams,What’s in an Education?Implications of CEO Education for Bank Performance[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2016,(37):287-308.
[29]Delis,M.D.,and G.P.Kouretas,Interest Rates and Bank Risk Taking[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2011,35,(4):840-855.
[30]李常青,赖建清.董事会特征影响公司绩效吗?[J].北京:金融研究,2004,(5):64-77.
[31]Jensen,M.C.The Modern Industrial Revolution,Exit,and the Failure of Internal Control Systems[J].The Journal of Finance,1993,48,(3):831-880.
[32]吕勇斌.引入境外战略投资者是否提升了银行绩效——来自中国A股上市银行的证据[J].北京:宏观经济研究,2009,(10):64-68.
[33]吴成颂,周炜,王浩然.境外战略投资者能降低商业银行的风险承担吗?——来自城市商业银行的经验性证据[J].北京:国际金融研究,2017,361,(5):56-65.
[34]夏喆.公司治理、跨区域经营与风险承担——通径分析视角下我国城市商业银行的行为选择[J].北京:投资研究,2016,(3):26-42.
(1)数据源于中国银行保险监督管理委员会网站,详见http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/govView_D63FDEEA25C44D089 BC1DB5BA70B10CA.html以及http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docView/6B4D8373010B4DDC96F4B67A41A69584.html。
(2)数据源于中国银行保险监督管理委员会网站,详见http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docView/2ED43 A31B3CA4071A1D76901502E3A7A.html。
(1)如齐鲁银行董事长因骗贷案被免职(2011年),烟台银行董事长因票据案被双规(2012年),珠海华润银行董事长因受贿被免职(2015年)等。
(2)本文所指的银行高管是指高管个体,即商业银行董事长。当前,对于银行高管的研究有从高管个体角度对银行的经营管理展开研究,也有从高管团队的视角讨论高管对银行经营产生的影响,本文研究的是董事长个体特征对银行经营的影响,高管团队不属于本文的研究范围。