葛梯尔直觉普遍性的实验之争
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  • 英文篇名:Experimental Debates on Universality of Gettier Intuition
  • 作者:温媛媛 ; 曹剑波
  • 英文作者:WEN Yuan-yuan;CAO Jian-bo;Department of Philosophy,The Center for the Studies of Epistemology and Cognitive Science,Xiamen University;
  • 关键词:葛梯尔案例 ; 葛梯尔直觉 ; 实验知识论 ; 普遍性
  • 英文关键词:Gettier case;;Gettier intuition;;experimental epistemology;;universality
  • 中文刊名:ZRBZ
  • 英文刊名:Studies in Dialectics of Nature
  • 机构:厦门大学哲学系厦门大学知识论与认知科学研究中心;
  • 出版日期:2019-04-18
  • 出版单位:自然辩证法研究
  • 年:2019
  • 期:v.35;No.374
  • 基金:国家社科基金重大项目“当代知识论的系列研究”(14ZDB012)
  • 语种:中文;
  • 页:ZRBZ201904004
  • 页数:7
  • CN:04
  • ISSN:11-1649/B
  • 分类号:24-30
摘要
实验知识论对"处于葛梯尔案例中的主体没有知识"做了诸多实证研究,在葛梯尔直觉是否具有普遍性问题上出现的争论:小偷案例和语义整合法支持外行没有葛梯尔直觉,三分结构实验支持外行与哲学家共享葛梯尔直觉。葛梯尔直觉的多样性这一理论有其合理性,主张可用聚焦效应和修正的语境主义解释知识归赋的多样性。
        The experimental epistemology has made a series of empirical studies on " The subjects in Gettier cases have no knowledge ". There are some debates on whether Gettier intuition is universal or not. Burglar cases and the method of semantic integration support laypeople without Gettier intuition,the tripartite structure of Gettier cases shows that laypeople and philosophers share Gettier intuition. This paper agrees with the diversity of Gettier intuitions and holds that the diversity of knowledge attribution can be explained by focal effect and corrected contextualism.
引文
[1]Jonathan M.Weinberg,Shaun Nichols,Stephen P.Stich.Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions[C]//Joshua Knobe,Shaun Nichols,(eds.).Experimental Philosophy.New York:Oxford University Press,2008:17-46.
    [2]Christina Starmans,Ori Friedman.The Folk Conception of Knowledge[J].Cognition,2013,124(3):272-283.
    [3]Jennifer Nagel,Valerie San Juan,Raymond A.Mar,Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs[J].Cognition,2013,129(3):657.
    [4]John Turri.A Conspicuous Art:Putting Gettier to the Test[J].Philosophers'Imprint,2013,13(10).
    [5]Derek Powell.Zachary Horne,Nestorngel Pinillos.Semantic Integration as a Method for Investigating Concepts[C]//James R.Beebe(ed.).Advances in Experimental Epistemology,Bloomsbury Academic.2014:119-144.
    [6]曹剑波,万超前.实验知识论对经典思想实验的挑战[J].厦门大学学报(哲社版),2013(5):5-7.
    [7]David Bourget,David J.Chalmers.What do philosophers believe?[J].Philosophical Studies,2014,170(3):465-500.
    [8]Ernest Sosa.A Defense of the Use of Intuitions in Philosophy[C]//Dominic Murphy,Michael Bishop(eds.).Stich and His Critics.Oxford:Blackwell,2009:101-112.
    [9]曹剑波.实验知识论研究[M].厦门:厦门大学出版社,2018.
    [10]Timothy Williamson.Philosophical Expertise and the Burden of Proof[J].Metaphilosophy,2011,42(3):215-229.
    [11]Keith E.Stanovich.Distinguishing the Reflective,Algorithmic and Reflective Minds:Time for a Tripartite Theory?[C]//Jonathan St.B.T.Evans&Keith Frankish(eds.).In Two Minds:Dual Processes and Beyond.Oxford:Oxford University Press,2009:69.
    (1)受试者中,女性72名,年龄18-81,平均31岁,标准差12岁;19%上过1门以上的哲学课;每1-2分钟支付0.2美元,网上调查。排除了38份无效答案。
    (2)分别表示知识归赋的百分比和加权知识归赋均值。
    (1)标示段落在受试者的屏幕上中止了。

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