加强核心员工股权激励能提升公司绩效吗?
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摘要
以2012年实施股权激励计划的A股113家上市公司为样本,用2013—2017年数据建立面板模型,分析上市公司业绩与核心员工股权激励强度之间的内在联系,考察上市公司的股权激励效果。实证结果表明:核心员工股权激励强度的加大会对公司业绩产生积极作用;从激励方式来看,针对核心员工的激励方式——限制性股票可以产生相对更优的股权激励效果。将样本公司根据行业进行分样本回归发现,核心员工股权激励强度对公司业绩的促进作用不因行业不同而存在明显差异。本研究对近年来我国股权激励对象由以高管为主向以核心员工为主过渡的现象得到了解释。
Taking 113 A-share listed companies as samples that implemented the equity incentive plan in 2012 and establishing a panel model using data of 2013-2017,this paper analyses the intrinsic relationship between listed companies' performance and equity incentive of core employees,and examines the effects of listed companies' equity incentives. The empirical results show that the strengthening of equity incentives of core employees will have a positive effect on companies' performance. From the perspective of incentive method,restricted stocks,which can produce relatively better equity incentive effect,is more appropriate to motivate core employees.Through analysis of subsample regression,it is found that the intensity of equity incentive of core employees shows no industry difference in promoting companies' performance. The transition equity incentive in recent years from executives to core employees has been explained.
Taking 113 A-share listed companies as samples that implemented the equity incentive plan in 2012 and establishing a panel model using data of 2013-2017,this paper analyses the intrinsic relationship between listed companies' performance and equity incentive of core employees,and examines the effects of listed companies' equity incentives. The empirical results show that the strengthening of equity incentives of core employees will have a positive effect on companies' performance. From the perspective of incentive method,restricted stocks,which can produce relatively better equity incentive effect,is more appropriate to motivate core employees.Through analysis of subsample regression,it is found that the intensity of equity incentive of core employees shows no industry difference in promoting companies' performance. The transition equity incentive in recent years from executives to core employees has been explained.
引文
陈文强,贾生华. 2015.股权激励存在持续性的激励效应吗?——基于倾向得分匹配法的实证分析[J].财经论丛(9):59-68.
林大庞,苏冬蔚.2011.股权激励与公司业绩---基于盈余管理视角的新研究[J].金融研究(9):162-177.
刘广生,马悦.2013.中国上市公司实施股权激励的效果[J].中国软科学(7):110-121.
盛明泉,蒋伟. 2011.我国上市公司股权激励对公司业绩的影响——基于2006~2008年度的面板数据[J].经济管理(9):100-106.
沈敏荣.2017.有限责任公司的治理逻辑[J].河南财经政法大学学报(5):110-117.
石建中.2014.关于企业规模与企业绩效关系的实证研究[J].中国海洋大学学报(社会科学版)(5):85-92.
王琼,唐贞.2012.条件约束下负债融资对企业绩效影响分析---基于上市公司的实证研究[J].财会通讯(27):80-82.
肖淑芳,付威.2016.股权激励能保留人才吗?---基于再公告视角[J].北京理工大学学报(1):73-81.
颜爱民,马箭.2013.股权集中度、股权制衡对企业绩效影响的实证研究---基于企业生命周期的视角[J].系统管理学报(3):385-393.
叶陈刚,刘颖,刘洋.2013.股票期权实施中经理人盈余管理行为研究---行权业绩考核指标设置角度[J].会计研究(12):40-46.
ABOODY D,JOHNSON N B,KASZNIK R.2010.Employee stock options and future firm performance:evidence from option repricings[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,50(1):74-92.
BERLE A A,MEANS G C.1932.The modern corporation and private property[M].New York:Macmillan.
BRYAN S,HWANG L S,LILIEN S.2000.CEO stock-based compensation:An empirical analysis of incentive-intensity,relative mix and economic determinants[J].The Journal of Business,73(4):661-693.
COLES J L,DANIEL N D,NAVEEN L.2005.Managerial incentives and risk-taking[J].Journal of Financial Economics,79(2):431-468.
CORE J E,GUAY W R.2001.Stock option plans for non-executive employees[J].Journal of Financial Economics,61(2):253-287.
GAO U.1987.Employee stock ownership plans:Little evidence of effects on corporate performance[R].US General Accounting Office,October.
JENSEN M C,MECKLING W H.1976.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,3(4):305-360.
(1)“股权激励方案未实施”指目前股权激励方案处于“董事会预案”、“未通过”、“股东大会通过”或者“停止实施”状态。
(2)我国房地产企业大多资本雄厚,其竞争主要依赖于专业人才,因而本文将房地产行业归属于新兴行业。
林大庞,苏冬蔚.2011.股权激励与公司业绩---基于盈余管理视角的新研究[J].金融研究(9):162-177.
刘广生,马悦.2013.中国上市公司实施股权激励的效果[J].中国软科学(7):110-121.
盛明泉,蒋伟. 2011.我国上市公司股权激励对公司业绩的影响——基于2006~2008年度的面板数据[J].经济管理(9):100-106.
沈敏荣.2017.有限责任公司的治理逻辑[J].河南财经政法大学学报(5):110-117.
石建中.2014.关于企业规模与企业绩效关系的实证研究[J].中国海洋大学学报(社会科学版)(5):85-92.
王琼,唐贞.2012.条件约束下负债融资对企业绩效影响分析---基于上市公司的实证研究[J].财会通讯(27):80-82.
肖淑芳,付威.2016.股权激励能保留人才吗?---基于再公告视角[J].北京理工大学学报(1):73-81.
颜爱民,马箭.2013.股权集中度、股权制衡对企业绩效影响的实证研究---基于企业生命周期的视角[J].系统管理学报(3):385-393.
叶陈刚,刘颖,刘洋.2013.股票期权实施中经理人盈余管理行为研究---行权业绩考核指标设置角度[J].会计研究(12):40-46.
ABOODY D,JOHNSON N B,KASZNIK R.2010.Employee stock options and future firm performance:evidence from option repricings[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,50(1):74-92.
BERLE A A,MEANS G C.1932.The modern corporation and private property[M].New York:Macmillan.
BRYAN S,HWANG L S,LILIEN S.2000.CEO stock-based compensation:An empirical analysis of incentive-intensity,relative mix and economic determinants[J].The Journal of Business,73(4):661-693.
COLES J L,DANIEL N D,NAVEEN L.2005.Managerial incentives and risk-taking[J].Journal of Financial Economics,79(2):431-468.
CORE J E,GUAY W R.2001.Stock option plans for non-executive employees[J].Journal of Financial Economics,61(2):253-287.
GAO U.1987.Employee stock ownership plans:Little evidence of effects on corporate performance[R].US General Accounting Office,October.
JENSEN M C,MECKLING W H.1976.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,3(4):305-360.
(1)“股权激励方案未实施”指目前股权激励方案处于“董事会预案”、“未通过”、“股东大会通过”或者“停止实施”状态。
(2)我国房地产企业大多资本雄厚,其竞争主要依赖于专业人才,因而本文将房地产行业归属于新兴行业。