伯川德竞争下的混合寡头研发投入
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摘要
在考虑国外企业的进入和政府研发补贴的情形下,建立生产差异化产品企业的混合寡头博弈模型,将国内企业分为公有和私有两种情形,分别得出在伯川德竞争情形下产量、研发投入以及社会福利的均衡解,并分析了私有化,研发补贴对研发投入的影响。研究表明:在存在国外企业竞争且国外企业的生产效率偏高时,政府最优研发补贴与企业创新能力和产品差异都相关;企业私有化会降低国内企业的研发投入,研发补贴的激励会使私有企业的研发投入增加。
This paper constructs a mixed duopoly game model for firms with differentiated products,considering entry of the foreign firms and government's R&D subsidies.We derive the equilibrium solution of the output,R&D investment and social welfare under Bertrand competition,respectively,and analyze the impact of privatization and R&D subsidies on R&D investment,when domestic firms are public firms and private firms,respectively.The result shows that,in the presence of competition from foreign firms with high production efficiency,the government optimal subsidies are related to innovation capacity and product differentiation,and the privatization of enterprises reduces the domestic firms' R&D investment,and R&D subsidies increases R&D investment of private firms.
This paper constructs a mixed duopoly game model for firms with differentiated products,considering entry of the foreign firms and government's R&D subsidies.We derive the equilibrium solution of the output,R&D investment and social welfare under Bertrand competition,respectively,and analyze the impact of privatization and R&D subsidies on R&D investment,when domestic firms are public firms and private firms,respectively.The result shows that,in the presence of competition from foreign firms with high production efficiency,the government optimal subsidies are related to innovation capacity and product differentiation,and the privatization of enterprises reduces the domestic firms' R&D investment,and R&D subsidies increases R&D investment of private firms.
引文
[1]姜虹.我国风电涂料市场被国外企业所垄断[N].中国化工报,http://www.ccin.com.cn/ccin/news/2011/09/30/201640.shtml.
[2]Matsumura T.Stackelberg mixed duopoly with a foreign dompetitor[J].Bulletin of Economic Research,2003,55(3):275-287.
[3]Tomaru Y.Privatization,productive efficiency and social welfare with a foreign competitor[J].Research in Economics,2007,61(4):224-232.
[4]Matsumura T,Matsushima N,Ishibashi I.Privatization and entries of foreign enterprises in a differentiated industry[J].Journal of Economics,2009,98:203-219.
[5]Andersona S,Palma A,Thisse J.Privatization and efficiency in a differentiated industry[J].European Economic Review,1997,41:1635-1654.
[6]Wang L F S,Chen T-L.Mixed oligopoly,optimal privatization,and foreign penetration[J].Economic Modelling,2011,28:1465-1470.
[7]Poyago-Theotoky J.Mixed oligopoly,subsidization and the order of firm’s moves:An irrelevance result[J].Economics Bulletin,2001(12):1-5.
[8]Saha B.Mixed ownership in a mixed duopoly with differentiated products[J].Journal Economic,2009,98:25-43.
[9]JoséGil-MoltóM,Poyago-Theotoky J.R&D subsidies,spillovers,and privatization in mixed markets[J].Southern Economic Journal,2011,78(1):233-255.
[10]Tomaru Y.Mixed oligopoly,partial privatization and subsidization[J].Economics Bulletin,2006,12(5):1-6.
[11]Matsumura T.Partial privatization in mixed duopoly[J].Journal of Public Economics,1998,70:473-483.
[12]韩丽华.外国企业的技术溢出限制公有企业的私有化——基于混合寡头理论的分析[J].山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2010(5):103-107.
[13]王小芳.基于混合三寡头模型的企业跨国竞购行为[J].系统管理学报,2013,22(1):23-30.
[14]方海燕,达庆利.基于差异产品的政府最优R&D补贴策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2009,17(3):166-172.
[15]马家喜,仲伟俊,梅姝娥.不确定环境下基于Bertrand竞争的企业创新模式比较研究[J].管理工程学报,2010,24(1):152-157.
(1)为简化叙述,本文中用x来衡量企业1的研发投入[9]
[2]Matsumura T.Stackelberg mixed duopoly with a foreign dompetitor[J].Bulletin of Economic Research,2003,55(3):275-287.
[3]Tomaru Y.Privatization,productive efficiency and social welfare with a foreign competitor[J].Research in Economics,2007,61(4):224-232.
[4]Matsumura T,Matsushima N,Ishibashi I.Privatization and entries of foreign enterprises in a differentiated industry[J].Journal of Economics,2009,98:203-219.
[5]Andersona S,Palma A,Thisse J.Privatization and efficiency in a differentiated industry[J].European Economic Review,1997,41:1635-1654.
[6]Wang L F S,Chen T-L.Mixed oligopoly,optimal privatization,and foreign penetration[J].Economic Modelling,2011,28:1465-1470.
[7]Poyago-Theotoky J.Mixed oligopoly,subsidization and the order of firm’s moves:An irrelevance result[J].Economics Bulletin,2001(12):1-5.
[8]Saha B.Mixed ownership in a mixed duopoly with differentiated products[J].Journal Economic,2009,98:25-43.
[9]JoséGil-MoltóM,Poyago-Theotoky J.R&D subsidies,spillovers,and privatization in mixed markets[J].Southern Economic Journal,2011,78(1):233-255.
[10]Tomaru Y.Mixed oligopoly,partial privatization and subsidization[J].Economics Bulletin,2006,12(5):1-6.
[11]Matsumura T.Partial privatization in mixed duopoly[J].Journal of Public Economics,1998,70:473-483.
[12]韩丽华.外国企业的技术溢出限制公有企业的私有化——基于混合寡头理论的分析[J].山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2010(5):103-107.
[13]王小芳.基于混合三寡头模型的企业跨国竞购行为[J].系统管理学报,2013,22(1):23-30.
[14]方海燕,达庆利.基于差异产品的政府最优R&D补贴策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2009,17(3):166-172.
[15]马家喜,仲伟俊,梅姝娥.不确定环境下基于Bertrand竞争的企业创新模式比较研究[J].管理工程学报,2010,24(1):152-157.
(1)为简化叙述,本文中用x来衡量企业1的研发投入[9]