政府补贴和平台宣传投入下双渠道逆向供应链定价策略研究
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摘要
整合线上和线下回收渠道,构建互联网回收平台和拆解商竞争回收、合作拆解的逆向供应链模型。通过设定互联网回收平台的宣传效应系数,探讨政府补贴拆解商和互联网回收平台进行宣传投入对逆向供应链定价决策和利润的影响。研究结果表明政府补贴和宣传投入相结合模式能够提高互联网回收平台和拆解商的经济收益,且优于只有政府补贴拆解商的情形。当宣传效应系数较小时,在合理的宣传投入范围内,二者的利润大于无宣传投入时的利润;当宣传效应系数较大时,互联网回收平台的利润始终随着宣传投入的增加而增大,而拆解商的利润随着宣传投入的增大呈现先增加后减少的变化趋势。
This paper integrates online and offline recycling channels, and builds a reverse supply chain model in which the Internet recycling platform and dismantling companies compete for recycling and cooperative dismantling. By setting the recycling propaganda effect coefficient of the internet recycling platform, the purpose is to discuss the impact of government subsidizing the dismantling business and the recycling of Internet recycling platforms on pricing decisions and profits in the reverse supply chain. The research results show that the combination of the government's high subsidies and the low publicity investment of the Internet recycling platform can improve the economic benefits of the Internet recycling platform and the dismantling business, and is better than the situation where only the government subsidizes the dismantling business. When the propaganda effect coefficient is small, the profit of the two is greater than the profit when there is no publicity investment under the smaller publicity investment; when the propaganda effect coefficient is large, the profit of the Internet recovery platform is an increasing function of the publicity investment, and the profit of the dismantlers appears to increase first and then decrease as the publicity investment increases.
This paper integrates online and offline recycling channels, and builds a reverse supply chain model in which the Internet recycling platform and dismantling companies compete for recycling and cooperative dismantling. By setting the recycling propaganda effect coefficient of the internet recycling platform, the purpose is to discuss the impact of government subsidizing the dismantling business and the recycling of Internet recycling platforms on pricing decisions and profits in the reverse supply chain. The research results show that the combination of the government's high subsidies and the low publicity investment of the Internet recycling platform can improve the economic benefits of the Internet recycling platform and the dismantling business, and is better than the situation where only the government subsidizes the dismantling business. When the propaganda effect coefficient is small, the profit of the two is greater than the profit when there is no publicity investment under the smaller publicity investment; when the propaganda effect coefficient is large, the profit of the Internet recovery platform is an increasing function of the publicity investment, and the profit of the dismantlers appears to increase first and then decrease as the publicity investment increases.
引文
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[19] Amrouche N,Martín-Herrán G,Zaccour G.Pricing and advertising of private and national brands in a dynamic marketing channel[J].Journal of Optimization Theory & Applications,2008,137(3):465- 483.
[20] 吕芹,霍佳震.广告介入的供应商与零售商自有品牌竞争博弈[J].系统管理学报,2014,23(2):174-178.
[21] 谢家平,陈婉雪,梁玲,刘鲁浩.基于广告投入的闭环供应链渠道冲突下契约协调优化[J].统计与决策,2017(02):37- 42.
[22] 冯章伟,肖条军,柴彩春.第三方回收商领导型两级闭环供应链的回收与定价策略[J].中国管理科学,2018,26(1):118-127.
[2] 王昶,吕夏冰,孙桥.居民参与“互联网+回收”意愿的影响因素研究[J].管理学报,2017,14(12):1847-1854.
[3] 魏洁.废弃电器电子产品“互联网+”回收模式构建[J].科技管理研究,2016,36(21):230-234.
[4] Dennis W Krumwiede,Chwen Sheu.A model for reverse logistics entry by third-party providers[J].Omega,2002,30(5):325-333.
[5] Savaskan R C,Bhattacharya S,Wassenhove L N V.Closed-loop supply chain models with product remanufacturing[J].Management Science,2004,50(2):239-252.
[6] 舒秘,聂佳佳.产能约束对闭环供应链回收渠道选择的影响[J].运筹与管理,2015,24(4):52-57.
[7] 易余胤,梁家密.奖惩机制下的闭环供应链混合回收模式[J].计算机集成制造系统,2014,20(1):215-223.
[8] 温小琴,董艳茹.基于企业社会责任的逆向物流回收模式选择[J].运筹与管理,2016,25(1):275-281.
[9] 周雄伟,熊花纬,陈晓红.基于回收产品质量水平的闭环供应链渠道选择模型[J].控制与决策,2017,32(2):193-202.
[10] 熊中楷,梁晓萍.考虑消费者环保意识的闭环供应链回收模式研究[J].软科学,2014,28(11):61- 66.
[11] 倪明,张族华,郭军华,杨善林.不确定需求条件下双渠道回收闭环供应链回收模式比较[J].系统工程,2017,35(2):60- 68.
[12] Hong I H,Ke J S.Determining advanced recycling fees and subsidies in “E-scrap” reverse supply chains[J].Journal of Environmental Management,2011,92(6):1495-1502.
[13] D,He Y,Wu Y,et al.Analysis of supply chain under different subsidy policies of the government[J].Sustainability,2016,8(12):1290.
[14] Heydari J,Govindan K,Jafari A.Reverse and closed loop supply chain coordination by considering government role[J].Transportation Research Part D Transport & Environment,2017,52:379-398.
[15] 刘慧慧,刘涛.电器电子产品基金补贴和市场合作对正规回收渠道的影响研究[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(5):87-96.
[16] Giri B C,Chakraborty A,Maiti T.Pricing and return product collection decisions in a closed-loop supply chain with dual-channel in both forward and reverse logistics[J].Journal of Manufacturing Systems,2017,42:104-123.
[17] 朱晓东,吴冰冰,王哲.双渠道回收成本差异下的闭环供应链定价策略与协调机制[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(12):188-196.
[18] 许晓彬,杨斌,朱小林.“互联网+”背景下电子废弃物双渠道回收策略研究[J].华中师范大学学报(自然科学版),2016,50(5):683- 688.
[19] Amrouche N,Martín-Herrán G,Zaccour G.Pricing and advertising of private and national brands in a dynamic marketing channel[J].Journal of Optimization Theory & Applications,2008,137(3):465- 483.
[20] 吕芹,霍佳震.广告介入的供应商与零售商自有品牌竞争博弈[J].系统管理学报,2014,23(2):174-178.
[21] 谢家平,陈婉雪,梁玲,刘鲁浩.基于广告投入的闭环供应链渠道冲突下契约协调优化[J].统计与决策,2017(02):37- 42.
[22] 冯章伟,肖条军,柴彩春.第三方回收商领导型两级闭环供应链的回收与定价策略[J].中国管理科学,2018,26(1):118-127.