风险资本对企业代理成本的影响:公司治理的视角
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摘要
由于信息不对称和不确定性程度更高,通常创业型中小企业的代理成本更严重。风险资本作为创业企业的主要股权投资者,区别于其他类型机构投资者,积极参与被投资企业公司治理,对公司创始人大股东和管理层实施监督和激励,为保护其自身利益,风险资本有能力和动机缓解代理冲突。基于信息不对称理论和委托代理理论,通过分析风险资本的双重治理角色,从公司治理视角考察风险资本对企业两类代理成本的影响。以2004年至2013年中小板和创业板上市企业为研究样本,形成一个非平衡面板数据。利用多元回归方法中的固定效应模型,检验风险资本利用公司治理机制降低企业代理成本的有效性,并进一步考察家族企业对风险资本影响企业代理成本的调节效应。研究结果表明,(1)依据两类代理成本测量,风险资本支持的企业代理成本更低。(2)风险资本通过持有股份比例和董事会席位比例降低代理成本。(3)创业家族企业调节风险资本对代理成本的影响,风险资本深度参与非家族企业公司治理,对代理成本的降低作用更加明显。(4)采取更换代理成本测量指标和区分风险资本与私募股权等方式进行稳健性检验,上述结果依然成立;利用工具变量法、Heckman两阶段和双重差分方法克服潜在的内生性问题,结论保持不变。基于风险资本投资于创业企业的特点,分析代理成本的表现形式,论证风险资本对企业可能产生的两类代理成本的影响机制,发现风险资本可以有效监督创始人和职业经理人,研究结果对风险资本如何控制代理成本以及上市企业如何优化治理结构具有参考意义。
Due to the high degree of information asymmetry and uncertainty,the agency cost of small and medium-sized enterprises is more serious. Distinct from other institutional investors,venture capital mainly invest funds in small and medium-sized enterprises and are actively involved in the corporate governance of portfolio firms. In order to protect investment interests,venture capital monitor and motivate founders and managers of the portfolio firms. Therefore,venture capital have abilities and incentives to mitigate agency cost.Based on information asymmetry theory and principal-agent theory,this paper analyzes the dual governance role of venture capital in the portfolio firms,and investigates effects of venture capital on the two kinds of agency cost of the portfolio firms from a perspective of corporate governance. Using firms going public from the year 2004 to 2013 on the small and medium-sized enterprise board and growth enterprise market as an sample,we collected a unbalanced panel data set by hand. A fixed effect model in the multiple regression method is used to examine the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms of venture capital in mitigating agency cost. Then,we further examine whether family firms play a moderating role in the relationship between venture capital and agency cost of the portfolio firms.Firstly,venture capital-backed firms have significantly lower agency costⅠbetween outside shareholders and managers,and lower agency cost Ⅱ between minority shareholders and large shareholders. Secondly,venture capital' shareholding and board seats are significantly negatively associated with dual agency cost. Lastly,family firms play a moderating role between venture capital financing and agency cost. venture capital are more actively involved in the corporate governance of non-family firms,and the negative relationship between venture capital financing and agency cost is more pronounced in non-family firms. Finally,the robustness test is carried out by replacing the agency cost measure and distinguishing venture capital and private equity,and the above results are still robust. The instrumental variable method,the Heckman two stage and the difference-in-difference method are used to overcome the potential endogeneity problem,and the conclusion remains unchanged.According to the characteristics of venture capital investment in entrepreneurial firms,this study analyzes the origin of agency cost and documents the mechanisms of effects of venture capital on agency cost of portfolio firms. Empirical evidence suggests that venture capital are effective in monitoring founders and managers of the portfolio firms. Our finding has implications for venture capital to control agency cost of portfolio firms and for listed firms to optimize the governance structures.
Due to the high degree of information asymmetry and uncertainty,the agency cost of small and medium-sized enterprises is more serious. Distinct from other institutional investors,venture capital mainly invest funds in small and medium-sized enterprises and are actively involved in the corporate governance of portfolio firms. In order to protect investment interests,venture capital monitor and motivate founders and managers of the portfolio firms. Therefore,venture capital have abilities and incentives to mitigate agency cost.Based on information asymmetry theory and principal-agent theory,this paper analyzes the dual governance role of venture capital in the portfolio firms,and investigates effects of venture capital on the two kinds of agency cost of the portfolio firms from a perspective of corporate governance. Using firms going public from the year 2004 to 2013 on the small and medium-sized enterprise board and growth enterprise market as an sample,we collected a unbalanced panel data set by hand. A fixed effect model in the multiple regression method is used to examine the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms of venture capital in mitigating agency cost. Then,we further examine whether family firms play a moderating role in the relationship between venture capital and agency cost of the portfolio firms.Firstly,venture capital-backed firms have significantly lower agency costⅠbetween outside shareholders and managers,and lower agency cost Ⅱ between minority shareholders and large shareholders. Secondly,venture capital' shareholding and board seats are significantly negatively associated with dual agency cost. Lastly,family firms play a moderating role between venture capital financing and agency cost. venture capital are more actively involved in the corporate governance of non-family firms,and the negative relationship between venture capital financing and agency cost is more pronounced in non-family firms. Finally,the robustness test is carried out by replacing the agency cost measure and distinguishing venture capital and private equity,and the above results are still robust. The instrumental variable method,the Heckman two stage and the difference-in-difference method are used to overcome the potential endogeneity problem,and the conclusion remains unchanged.According to the characteristics of venture capital investment in entrepreneurial firms,this study analyzes the origin of agency cost and documents the mechanisms of effects of venture capital on agency cost of portfolio firms. Empirical evidence suggests that venture capital are effective in monitoring founders and managers of the portfolio firms. Our finding has implications for venture capital to control agency cost of portfolio firms and for listed firms to optimize the governance structures.
引文
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[28] SUCHARD J A. The impact of venture capital backing on the corporate governance of Australian initial public offerings.Journal of Banking&Finance,2009,33(4):765-774.
[29] PETRY S. Private equity monitoring in public firms. Manchester:The University of Manchester,2015.
[30] KRISHNAN C N V,IVANOV V I,MASULIS R W,et al.Venture capital reputation,post-IPO performance,and corporate governance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2011,46(5):1295-1333.
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[33] CROCE A,MARTJ. Productivity growth in private-equitybacked family firms. Entrepreneurship:Theory and Practice,2016,40(3):657-683.
[34] MARTJ,MENNDEZ-REQUEJO S,ROTTKE O M. The impact of venture capital on family businesses:evidence from Spain. Journal of World Business,2013,48(3):420-430.
[35]陈德球,肖泽忠,董志勇.家族控制权结构与银行信贷合约:寻租还是效率.管理世界,2013(9):130-143.CHEN Deqiu,XIAO Zezhong,DONG Zhiyong. Family control structure and bank loan contract:rent-seeking or efficiency.Management World,2013(9):130-143.(in Chinese)
[36] XU N H,CHEN Q Y,XU Y,et al. Political uncertainty and cash holdings:evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance,2016,40:276-295.
[37] JIANG G H,LEE C M C,YUE H. Tunneling through intercorporate loans:the China experience. Journal of Financial Economics,2010,98(1):1-20.
[38] CHEMMANUR T J,HU G,WU C P. Transforming the management and governance of private family firms in East Asia:the role of financial intermediaries. Chestnut Hill,MA:Boston College,2018.
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[2] BURCHARDT J,HOMMEL U,KAMURIWO D S,et al. Venture capital contracting in theory and practice:implications for entrepreneurship research. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2016,40(1):25-48.
[3] SCHMIDT K M. Convertible securities and venture capital finance. The Journal of Finance,2003,58(3):1139-1166.
[4] DESSEIN W. Information and control in ventures and alliances. The Journal of Finance,2005,60(5):2513-2549.
[5] BERNSTEIN S,GIROUD X,TOWNSEND R R. The impact of venture capital monitoring. The Journal of Finance,2016,71(4):1591-1622.
[6] BAKER M,GOMPERS P A. The determinants of board structure at the initial public offering. Journal of Law and Economics,2003,46(2):569-598.
[7]黄福广,彭涛,田利辉.风险资本对创业企业投资行为的影响.金融研究,2013(8):180-192.HUANG Fuguang,PENG Tao,TIAN Lihui. The effects of venture capital on the entrepreneurial firms'investment.Journal of Financial Research,2013(8):180-192.(in Chinese)
[8]陈孝勇,惠晓峰.创业投资的治理作用:基于高管薪酬契约设计视角的实证研究.南开管理评论,2015,18(2):126-135.CHEN Xiaoyong,HUI Xiaofeng. The governance effect of venture capital:an empirical research based on incentive contract of top managers. Nankai Business Review,2015,18(2):126-135.(in Chinese)
[9] KAPLAN S N,STROMBERG P. Characteristics,contracts and actions:evidence from venture capitalist analysis. The Journal of Finance,2004,59(5):2177-2210.
[10] YERRAMILLI V. Moral hazard,hold-up,and the optimal allocation of control rights. RAND Journal of Economics,2011,42(4):705-728.
[11] CELIKYURT U,SEVILIR M,SHIVDASANI A. Venture capitalists on boards of mature public firms. Review of Financial Studies,2014,27(1):56-101.
[12] BOTTAZZI L,RIN M D,HELLMANN T. Who are the active investors? Evidence from venture capital. Journal of Financial Economics,2008,89(3):488-512.
[13] HOCHBERG Y V. Venture capital and corporate governance in the newly public firm. Review of Finance,2012,16(2):429-480.
[14]周建,杨帅,余耀东.创始人和风险资本对民营企业董事会独立性的影响研究:来自中国创业板民营上市公司IPO的经验证据.管理评论,2014,26(4):142-153.ZHOU Jian,YANG Shuai,YU Yaodong. Founders,venture capital and board independence:evidence from Chinese private enterprises'implementation of IPO in GEM. Management Review,2014,26(4):142-153.(in Chinese)
[15] BEUSELINCK C,DELOOF M,MANIGART S. Private equity involvement and earnings quality. Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2009,36(5/6):587-615.
[16] WONGSUNWAI W. The effect of external monitoring on accrual-based and real earnings management:evidence from venture-backed initial public offerings. Contemporary Accounting Research,2013,30(1):296-324.
[17] TIAN X,UDELL G F,YU X Y. Disciplining delegated monitors:when venture capitalists fail to prevent fraud by their IPO firms. Journal of Accounting&Economics,2016,61(2/3):526-544.
[18]胡志颖,周璐,刘亚莉.风险投资、联合差异和创业板IPO公司会计信息质量.会计研究,2012(7):48-56.HU Zhiying,ZHOU Lu,LIU Yali. Venture capital,syndicate diversity and the accounting information quality of IPO companies in ChiNext market. Accounting Research,2012(7):48-56.(in Chinese)
[19]徐虹,林钟高,朱雅萍.风险投资异质性、公司治理机制与企业IPO前盈余管理.财经论丛,2017(12):69-78.XU Hong,LIN Zhonggao,ZHU Yaping. VC's heterogeneities,corporate governance mechanism and earnings management Pre-IPO. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics,2017(12):69-78.(in Chinese)
[20]王会娟,张然.私募股权投资与被投资企业高管薪酬契约:基于公司治理视角的研究.管理世界,2012(9):156-167.WANG Huijuan,ZHANG Ran. Private equity investment and executive compensation contract of the invested firms:based on the perspective of corporate governance. Management World,2012(9):156-167.(in Chinese)
[21]陈闯,张岩,吴晓晖.风险投资、创始人与高管薪酬:多边代理视角.管理科学学报,2017,20(6):78-88.CHEN Chuang,ZHANG Yan,WU Xiaohui. Venture capital,founder and top management team compensation:a view from multiple agency theory. Journal of Management Sciences in China,2017,20(6):78-88.(in Chinese)
[22] JENSEN M C,MECKLING W H. Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[23] SHLEIFER A,VISHNY R W. A survey of corporate governance. The Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):737-783.
[24] ANG J S,COLE R A,LIN J W. Agency costs and ownership structure. The Journal of Finance,2000,55(1):81-106.
[25] PORTA R L,LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F,SHLEIFER A,et al.Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58(1/2):3-27.
[26]戴亦一,肖金利,潘越.“乡音”能否降低公司代理成本?基于方言视角的研究.经济研究,2016,51(12):147-160,186.DAI Yiyi,XIAO Jinli,PAN Yue. Can “local accent”reduce agency cost? A study based on the perspective of dialects.Economic Research Journal,2016,51(12):147-160,186.(in Chinese)
[27]郑国坚,林东杰,张飞达.大股东财务困境、掏空与公司治理的有效性:来自大股东财务数据的证据.管理世界,2013(5):157-168.ZHENG Guojian,LIN Dongjie,ZHANG Feida. Large shareholders'financial distress,tunneling and effectiveness of corporate governance. Management World,2013(5):157-168.(in Chinese)
[28] SUCHARD J A. The impact of venture capital backing on the corporate governance of Australian initial public offerings.Journal of Banking&Finance,2009,33(4):765-774.
[29] PETRY S. Private equity monitoring in public firms. Manchester:The University of Manchester,2015.
[30] KRISHNAN C N V,IVANOV V I,MASULIS R W,et al.Venture capital reputation,post-IPO performance,and corporate governance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2011,46(5):1295-1333.
[31] BONINI S,ALKAN S,SALVI A. The effects of venture capitalists on the governance of firms. Corporate Governance:An International Review,2012,20(1):21-45.
[32]苏琦,李新春.内部治理、外部环境与中国家族企业生命周期.管理世界,2004(10):85-96.SU Qi,LI Xinchun. Internal governance,outside environment and Chinese family firms life cycle. Management World,2004(10):85-96.(in Chinese)
[33] CROCE A,MARTJ. Productivity growth in private-equitybacked family firms. Entrepreneurship:Theory and Practice,2016,40(3):657-683.
[34] MARTJ,MENNDEZ-REQUEJO S,ROTTKE O M. The impact of venture capital on family businesses:evidence from Spain. Journal of World Business,2013,48(3):420-430.
[35]陈德球,肖泽忠,董志勇.家族控制权结构与银行信贷合约:寻租还是效率.管理世界,2013(9):130-143.CHEN Deqiu,XIAO Zezhong,DONG Zhiyong. Family control structure and bank loan contract:rent-seeking or efficiency.Management World,2013(9):130-143.(in Chinese)
[36] XU N H,CHEN Q Y,XU Y,et al. Political uncertainty and cash holdings:evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance,2016,40:276-295.
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