征地补偿谈判与农民权益维护的实证分析
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摘要
基于2018年全国10个区域征地的抽样调研数据,运用Logit计量分析模型就农村土地征收谈判对征地补偿水平的影响程度进行实证分析。研究发现,只要存在征地谈判,被征地农民实际获取的土地征收补偿水平就会超出地方政府制订的征地补偿方案;从边际效应来看,引入征地谈判后,使得被征地农民的土地征收实际补偿标准超出地方政府制订征地方案的概率增加36.1%。因此,在征地制度改革进程中,优化农村土地征收程序,增加征地谈判的协商环节,既可以有效维护被征地农民的合法权益,更能充分实现国家征地补偿制度的效能。
Based on the sample survey data of 10 regional land requisitions in 2018, this paper uses Logit econometric model to analyze empirically the impact of negotiation of rural land expropriation on the compensational levels for land requisition. The study has found that, the compensation of land expropriation that the land-expropriated farmers actually get will exceed the compensational scheme of land acquisition which is formulated by the local government. From the perspective of marginal effect, since the introduction of land requisition, the probability has increased by 36.1% that the actual compensational standard of land-expropriated farmers will exceed the land acquisition program formulated by the local government. Therefore, it is put forward that, in the process of institutional reform of land requisition, optimizing the procedure of rural land expropriation and increasing the consultation link of land acquisition negotiation can effectively safeguard the lawful rights and interests of the farmers who have been expropriated, and fully realize the effectiveness of the compensation system of the national land requisition.
Based on the sample survey data of 10 regional land requisitions in 2018, this paper uses Logit econometric model to analyze empirically the impact of negotiation of rural land expropriation on the compensational levels for land requisition. The study has found that, the compensation of land expropriation that the land-expropriated farmers actually get will exceed the compensational scheme of land acquisition which is formulated by the local government. From the perspective of marginal effect, since the introduction of land requisition, the probability has increased by 36.1% that the actual compensational standard of land-expropriated farmers will exceed the land acquisition program formulated by the local government. Therefore, it is put forward that, in the process of institutional reform of land requisition, optimizing the procedure of rural land expropriation and increasing the consultation link of land acquisition negotiation can effectively safeguard the lawful rights and interests of the farmers who have been expropriated, and fully realize the effectiveness of the compensation system of the national land requisition.
引文
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[2]刘奇.失地农民的叹息[J].中国发展观察,2013(8):45-47.
[3]戚晓明.人力资本、家庭禀赋与被征地农民就业--基于CF-PS 2014数据的分析[J].南京农业大学学报:社会科学版,2017,17(5):59-67.
[4]葛传路,岳虹.征地冲击对农户消费的影响[J].经济与管理研究,2017(12):46-56.
[5]连宏萍,张媛,曾元.制度适应理论视角下征地冲突及其化解--以北京新机场征地拆迁为例[J].中国行政管理,2017(12):117-122.
[6]李雅楠,谭术魁.征地类群体性事件防范绩效评估:理论与实证[J].中国土地科学,2017(9):89-96.
[7]刘守英.以地谋发展模式的风险与改革[J].国际经济评论,2012(2):92-109.
[8]丁琳琳,吴群,李永乐.土地征收中农户福利变化及其影响因素--基于江苏省不同地区的农户问卷调查[J].经济地理,2016,36(12):154-161.
[9]李怀,朱邦宁.“分配正义”视角下的土地增值收益分配制度创新[J].理论探索,2016(6):78-82.
[10]柴铎,董藩.美国土地发展权制度对中国征地补偿改革的启示--基于福利经济学的研究[J].经济地理,2014,34(2):148-153.
[11]李中.我国征地制度:问题、成因及改革路径[J].理论探索,2013(2):105-108.
[12]洪开荣,黄启斌.互动公平理念下的大型工业建设项目征地拆迁社会稳定风险因素分析[J].系统工程,2018(7):154-158.
[13]杨庆媛,杨人豪,曾黎.农村集体经营性建设用地入市促进农民土地财产性收入增长研究[J].经济地理,2017,37(8):155-161.
[14]洪开荣,孙丹,赵旭.参与方情绪对土地征收补偿策略的影响研究--基于RDEU演化博弈视角[J].现代财经,2017(9):48-51.
[15]刘祥琪,陈钊,赵阳.程序公正先于货币补偿:农民征地满意度的决定[J].管理世界,2012(2):44-51.
[16]耿羽.征地拆迁过程中的政府-农民博弈机制分析[J].甘肃行政学院学报,2014(6):24-35.
[17]杨华.农村征地拆迁中的阶层冲突[J].中州学刊,2013(2):70-75.
[18]贺雪峰.征地拆迁背景下的村庄政治[J].学习与探索,2016(11):42-48.
[19]晋洪涛,史清华,俞宁.谈判权、程序公平与征地制度改革[J].中国农村经济,2010(12):5-16.
[20]郎翠艳,张英魁.试论城市化进程中征地冲突及其对策[J].内蒙古农业大学学报:社会科学版,2008(3):243-248.