零售商具相对公平的闭环供应链随机微分博弈模型
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摘要
针对一主导制造商和一零售商组成的闭环供应链动态系统,研究制造商回收模式下制造商的最优批发价格、最优回收努力投入策略以及零售商的最优销售价格策略的制定问题。利用Nash讨价还价博弈理论,构建具Nash公平关切参考点的"嫉妒/自豪"型的零售商公平效用泛函;利用微分博弈理论,给出制造商的均衡批发价格和回收努力投入策略、零售商的均衡产品销售价格策略以及制造商和零售商的最优值函数。研究发现:随零售商公平关切程度的提高,零售商会提高其产品销售价格,制造商会降低其产品批发价格,并减少回收努力投入;随外界随机干扰的增强,制造商会降低其产品批发价格,并加大回收努力投入以应对不确定性,而零售商会降低产品销售价格。算例结果表明:零售商公平关切程度越高,制造商最优值函数曲线下移,相反零售商最优值函数上升。
Considering a closed-loop supply chain dynamic system composed of a leading manufacturer and a retailer,this paper studies manufacturer's optimal wholesale price and recollecting effort strategies and retailer's pricing strategy under manufacturer recollecting mode.Retailer's fair utility with Nash bargaining point is constructed by Nash bargaining theory.Manufacturer's wholesale prices and recollecting efforts strategies,and retailer's pricing strategy,as well as their optimal value function are revealed by differential game theory.Results show that:As retailer's fair concern increases,retailer will improve sale price,and manufacture will reduce wholesale price and its recollecting effort.As randomness increases,manufacture will reduce wholesale price and increase its recollecting effort in order to cope with uncertainty,and retailer will reduce sale price.Numerical results show that:the higher retailer's fair concern is,the lower manufacturer's optimal value function is,and retailer's optimal value function is higher.
Considering a closed-loop supply chain dynamic system composed of a leading manufacturer and a retailer,this paper studies manufacturer's optimal wholesale price and recollecting effort strategies and retailer's pricing strategy under manufacturer recollecting mode.Retailer's fair utility with Nash bargaining point is constructed by Nash bargaining theory.Manufacturer's wholesale prices and recollecting efforts strategies,and retailer's pricing strategy,as well as their optimal value function are revealed by differential game theory.Results show that:As retailer's fair concern increases,retailer will improve sale price,and manufacture will reduce wholesale price and its recollecting effort.As randomness increases,manufacture will reduce wholesale price and increase its recollecting effort in order to cope with uncertainty,and retailer will reduce sale price.Numerical results show that:the higher retailer's fair concern is,the lower manufacturer's optimal value function is,and retailer's optimal value function is higher.
引文
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[16]张克勇,吴燕,侯世旺.零售商公平关切下闭环供应链定价策略研究[J].山东大学学报:理学版,2013,48(5):83-91.
[17]张克勇,吴燕,侯世旺.具公平关切零售商的闭环供应链差别定价策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(3):51-58.
[18]陈章跃,王勇,陈晓旭.制造商双向公平关切下闭环供应链的竞争分析[J].管理学报,2016,13(5):772-780.
[19]吴燕,张克勇,王建明.Nash讨价还价公平关切框架下闭环供应链定价机制研究[J].数学的实践与认识,2013,43(21):35-46.
[20]张克勇,吴燕,侯世旺.讨价还价公平关切下闭环供应链差别定价策略[J].工业工程,2013,16(6):95-100.
[21]KALISH S.Monopolist Pricing with Dynamic Demand and Production Cost[J].Marketing Science,1983,2(2):135-159.
[22]NERLOVE M,ARROW K.Optimal Advertising Policy under Dynamic Conditions[J].Economica,1962,29(114):129-142.
[2]SAVASKAN R C,BHATTACHARYA S,WASSENHOVE L N V.Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models with Product Remanufacturing[J].Management Science,2004,50(2):239-252.
[3]黄宗盛,聂佳佳,胡培.基于微分对策的再制造闭环供应链回收渠道选择策略[J].管理工程学报,2013,27(3):93-102.
[4]黄宗盛,聂佳佳,胡培.具竞争性零售商的闭环供应链微分对策模型[J].系统工程学报,2015,30(6):779-789.
[5]MINNER S,KIESMULLER G P.Dynamic Product Acquisition in Closed Loop Supply Chains[J].International Journal of Production Research,2012,50(11):2 836-2 851.
[6]CHEN J M,CHANG C I.Dynamic Pricing for New and Remanufactured Products in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2013,146(1):153-160.
[7]GIOVANNI P D,REDDY P V,ZACCOUR G.Incentive Strategies for an Optimal Recovery Program in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2016,249(2):605-617.
[8]何喜军,武玉英,杜同.基于微分对策的产品回收对供应链协同优化的影响[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(8):1 962-1 974.
[9]GUTH W,SCHMITTBERGER R,SCHWARZE B.An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining[J].Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,1987,3(4):367-388.
[10]FORSYTHE R,HOROWITZ J L,SAVIN N E,et al.Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments[J].Games and Economic Behavior,1994,6(3):347-369.
[11]FEHR E,GACHTER S.Fairness and Retaliation:The Economics of Reciprocity[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,2000,14(3):159-181.
[12]KATOK E,PAVLOV V.Fairness in Supply Chain Contracts:A Laboratory Study[J].Journal of Operations Management,2013,31(3):129-137.
[13]CUI T H,RAJU J S,ZHANG Z J.Fairness and Channel Coordination[J].Management Science,2007,53(8):1 303-1 314.
[14]杜少甫,杜婵,梁樑,等.考虑公平关切的供应链契约与协调[J].管理科学学报,2010,13(11):41-48.
[15]杜少甫,朱贾昂,高冬,等.Nash讨价还价公平参考下的供应链优化决策[J].管理科学学报,2013,16(3):68-72.
[16]张克勇,吴燕,侯世旺.零售商公平关切下闭环供应链定价策略研究[J].山东大学学报:理学版,2013,48(5):83-91.
[17]张克勇,吴燕,侯世旺.具公平关切零售商的闭环供应链差别定价策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(3):51-58.
[18]陈章跃,王勇,陈晓旭.制造商双向公平关切下闭环供应链的竞争分析[J].管理学报,2016,13(5):772-780.
[19]吴燕,张克勇,王建明.Nash讨价还价公平关切框架下闭环供应链定价机制研究[J].数学的实践与认识,2013,43(21):35-46.
[20]张克勇,吴燕,侯世旺.讨价还价公平关切下闭环供应链差别定价策略[J].工业工程,2013,16(6):95-100.
[21]KALISH S.Monopolist Pricing with Dynamic Demand and Production Cost[J].Marketing Science,1983,2(2):135-159.
[22]NERLOVE M,ARROW K.Optimal Advertising Policy under Dynamic Conditions[J].Economica,1962,29(114):129-142.