摘要
在对个体风险偏好的现有刻画下,一个更加风险厌恶的个体未必会投资更多的预防性努力活动.为了解决这种不一致性,本文基于二次函数约束的Ross更加风险厌恶的刻画,获得了与个体风险偏好相一致的比较静态结果:当额外的预防性努力活动降低了个体最终财富的均值且损失发生的初始概率小于1/2时,一个二次函数约束的Ross更加风险厌恶的个体总是投资更多的预防性努力活动.
A more risk averse individual does not always invest more in precautionary effort in the current characterization of individual risk preferences. This paper uses the characterization of quadratically-restricted Ross more risk aversion to resolve this inconsistency, and obtains some comparative static results consistent with individual's risk preferences: when additional precautionary effort always reduces the mean of final wealth, and the initial probability of loss is less than 1/2, a quadratically-restricted Ross more risk averse individual always invests more in precautionary effort.
引文
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