高管薪酬差距、治理模式和企业创新
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摘要
高管薪酬差距是一个广受学者和实务界人士关注的问题,其对高管的社会心理和行为动机产生重要影响,并进一步影响企业的创新绩效。已有关于薪酬差距与企业创新之间关系的研究主要基于锦标赛理论和社会比较理论,分别从相互竞争和公平的视角对薪酬差距的经济后果进行分析。但是,这两种理论主要从薪酬差距对低薪酬获得者的立场,分析薪酬差距与创新的关系,忽视了薪酬差距对高薪酬获得者的心理和行为的影响。以心理学视角,从CEO自信、企业家精神和CEO的内在激励角度探讨高管薪酬差距对企业创新绩效的影响,并进一步考察监督型治理和信任型治理两种不同的治理模式对高管薪酬差距与企业创新之间关系的调节作用。采用2005年至2016年在上海和深圳两个证券交易所上市的企业数据,使用Stata 15. 0对研究假设进行实证检验。研究结果表明,高管薪酬差距对企业专利申请数量没有显著影响,但对专利授予数量有显著影响,表明增加高管的薪酬差距有利于提高企业的创新效率;相对于发明专利,高管薪酬差距增加对于实用新型专利和外观设计专利产生更加显著的影响。进一步地,监督型治理模式对高管薪酬差距与发明专利授予数量之间的关系有显著的负向调节作用,但对高管薪酬差距与专利申请数量之间的关系没有显著影响;信任型治理模式负向调节高管薪酬差距与企业申请专利数量之间的关系,却正向调节高管薪酬差距与专利授予数量之间的关系。综合分析可知,信任型治理模式能够提高企业创新的效率。把社会心理学和组织行为学的信任机制引入委托代理框架,提出监督型治理和信任型治理两种治理模式,并分析治理模式对高管薪酬差距与企业创新之间关系的调节作用,为理解和缓解企业创新过程中的代理问题提供了新的启示,即为了促进企业创新,需要构建信任型治理模式。
The executive pay dispersion is an issue of great concern to scholars and practitioners. The executive pay dispersion can exert an important impact on the social psychology and behavioral motivation of executives,and further affect the company's innovation performance. However,the research on the relationship between salary dispersion and corporate innovation is mainly based on tournament theory and social comparison theory. These two theories analyze the economic consequences of the pay dispersion from a competing and fair perspective and mainly focus on the relationship between the pay dispersion and the innovation from the position of the less paid recipients,ignoring the impact of the pay dispersion on the psychology and behavior of the high pay receivers.This paper studies the influence of the executive pay gap between CEO and other management compensation on enterprise innovation from the psychological perspective. The paper studies the impact of executive pay dispersion on corporate innovation performance from the perspective of the highest payee( CEO),and examines the moderating effect of governance mode by classifying the corporate governance mode into the trust-based governance and supervisory-based governance.The hypotheses are also testified according to the data in Chinese listed companies. Through the study,it is found that the executive pay dispersion has no significant impact on the number of patent applications,but it has a significant impact on the number of patents grant. These results imply that increasing the pay dispersion of executives is conducive to improving the company's innovation efficiency. Further analysis discovers that the increase in the executive pay dispersion has had a more significant impact on utility model patents and design patents compared with invention patents.Further,the supervisory-based governance plays a significant negative role in the relationship between the executive pay dispersion and the number of invention patents granted. However,there is no significant moderating impact on the relationship between the executive pay dispersion and the number of patent applications. The trust-based governance negatively impacts the relationship between the executive pay dispersion and the number of patent applications and positively impacts the relationship between the executive pay dispersion and the number of patent grants. A comprehensive analysis of the impact of the two governance modes on corporate innovation can be found that the trust governance mode can improve the efficiency of corporate innovation.This paper introduces the trust mechanism of social psychology and organizational behavior into the principal-agent framework,proposes two governance modes of supervised governance and trust-based governance,and analyzes the moderating effect of the governance mode on the relationship between executive pay dispersion and enterprise innovation. These results provide a new inspiration for understanding and explaining the agency problem in enterprise innovation.
The executive pay dispersion is an issue of great concern to scholars and practitioners. The executive pay dispersion can exert an important impact on the social psychology and behavioral motivation of executives,and further affect the company's innovation performance. However,the research on the relationship between salary dispersion and corporate innovation is mainly based on tournament theory and social comparison theory. These two theories analyze the economic consequences of the pay dispersion from a competing and fair perspective and mainly focus on the relationship between the pay dispersion and the innovation from the position of the less paid recipients,ignoring the impact of the pay dispersion on the psychology and behavior of the high pay receivers.This paper studies the influence of the executive pay gap between CEO and other management compensation on enterprise innovation from the psychological perspective. The paper studies the impact of executive pay dispersion on corporate innovation performance from the perspective of the highest payee( CEO),and examines the moderating effect of governance mode by classifying the corporate governance mode into the trust-based governance and supervisory-based governance.The hypotheses are also testified according to the data in Chinese listed companies. Through the study,it is found that the executive pay dispersion has no significant impact on the number of patent applications,but it has a significant impact on the number of patents grant. These results imply that increasing the pay dispersion of executives is conducive to improving the company's innovation efficiency. Further analysis discovers that the increase in the executive pay dispersion has had a more significant impact on utility model patents and design patents compared with invention patents.Further,the supervisory-based governance plays a significant negative role in the relationship between the executive pay dispersion and the number of invention patents granted. However,there is no significant moderating impact on the relationship between the executive pay dispersion and the number of patent applications. The trust-based governance negatively impacts the relationship between the executive pay dispersion and the number of patent applications and positively impacts the relationship between the executive pay dispersion and the number of patent grants. A comprehensive analysis of the impact of the two governance modes on corporate innovation can be found that the trust governance mode can improve the efficiency of corporate innovation.This paper introduces the trust mechanism of social psychology and organizational behavior into the principal-agent framework,proposes two governance modes of supervised governance and trust-based governance,and analyzes the moderating effect of the governance mode on the relationship between executive pay dispersion and enterprise innovation. These results provide a new inspiration for understanding and explaining the agency problem in enterprise innovation.
引文
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[5]SUNDER J,SUNDER S V,ZHANG J J.Pilot CEOs and corporate innovation.Journal of Financial Economics,2017,123(1):209-224.
[6]程新生,郑毅.公司治理机制中的信任关系及其对创新影响的模拟研究.管理学报,2014,11(6):869-875.CHENG Xinsheng,ZHENG Yi.A study on trust relationship in corporate governance mechanism and its impact on innovation by simulation.Chinese Journal of Management,2014,11(6):869-875.(in Chinese)
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[10]LARSON A.Network dyads in entrepreneurial settings:a study of the governance of exchange relationships.Administrative Science Quarterly,1992,37(1):76-104.
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[12]MAYER R C,DAVIS J H,SCHOORMAN F D.An integrative model of organizational trust.Academy of Management Review,1995,20(3):709-734.
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[15]刘智强,李超,廖建桥,等.组织中地位、地位赋予方式与员工创造性产出:来自国有企事业单位的实证研究.管理世界,2015(3):86-101.LIU Zhiqiang,LI Chao,LIAO Jianqiao,et al.The individual status in organizations,the status-conferral ways and employee's creative outcomes:a case study from the stateowned enterprises in China.Management World,2015(3):86-101.(in Chinese)
[16]ASTRACHAN J H.Strategy in family business:toward a multidimensional research agenda.Journal of Family Business Strategy,2010,1(1):6-14.
[17]MCEVILY B,PERRONE V,ZAHEER A.Trust as an organizing principle.Organization Science,2003,14(1):91-103.
[18]STRICKLAND L H.Surveillance and trust.Journal of Personality,1958,26(2):200-215.
[19]雅诺什·科尔奈.诚实与信任:后社会主义转轨的视角∥吴敬琏.比较.北京:中信出版社,2003:1-16.KORNAI J.Honesty and trust in the light of the post-socialist transition∥WU Jinglian.Comparative Studies.Beijing:China Citic Press,2003:1-16.(in Chinese)
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[21]孔东民,徐茗丽,孔高文.企业内部薪酬差距与创新.经济研究,2017,52(10):144-157.KONG Dongmin,XU Mingli,KONG Gaowen.Pay dispersion and firm innovation in China.Economic Research Journal,2017,52(10):144-157.(in Chinese)
[22]翟淑萍,毕晓方,李欣.薪酬差距激励了高新技术企业创新吗?.科学决策,2017(6):1-28.ZHAI Shuping,BI Xiaofang,LI Xin.Do incentive pay dispersion stimulate innovation of high-tech enterprise?.Scientific Decision Making,2017(6):1-28.(in Chinese)
[23]XU M L,KONG G W,KONG D M.Does wage justice hamper creativity?Pay gap and firm innovation in China.China Economic Review,2017,44:186-202.
[24]杨婵,贺小刚,朱丽娜,等.垂直薪酬差距与新创企业的创新精神.财经研究,2017,43(7):32-44.YANG Chan,HE Xiaogang,ZHU Lina,et al.Vertical pay dispersion and innovation spirit of new ventures.Journal of Finance and Economics,2017,43(7):32-44.(in Chinese)
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[26]程新生,李海萍.治理人监督与战略绩效信息偏误的情境依赖.管理科学学报,2011,14(10):1-10.CHENG Xinsheng,LI Haiping.Dependence on institution condition between governor supervision and distorted information of strategic performance:power development and punishment strength.Journal of Management Sciences in China,2011,14(10):1-10.(in Chinese)
[27]蔡宁,董艳华,刘峰.董事会之谜:基于尚德电力的案例研究.管理世界,2015(4):155-165.CAI Ning,DONG Yanhua,LIU Feng.The puzzle of board:based on the case study of Suntech.Management World,2015(4):155-165.(in Chinese)
[28]HAYWARD M L A,HAMBRICK D C.Explaining the premiums paid for large acquisitions:evidence of CEO hubris.Administrative Science Quarterly,1997,42(1):103-127.
[29]HUMPHERY-JENNER M,LISIC L L,NANDA V,et al.Executive overconfidence and compensation structure.Journal of Financial Economics,2016,119(3):533-558.
[30]YU C F J.CEO overconfidence,CEO compensation,and earnings manipulation.Journal of Management Accounting Research,2014,26(2):167-193.
[31]HAMBRICK D C,MASON P A.Upper echelons:the organization as a reflection of its top managers.Academy of Management Review,1984,9(2):193-206.
[32]余明桂,李文贵,潘红波.管理者过度自信与企业风险承担.金融研究,2013(1):149-163.YU Minggui,LI Wengui,PAN Hongbo.Managerial overconfidence and corporate risk-taking.Journal of Financial Research,2013(1):149-163.(in Chinese)
[33]BAKER M P,WURGLER J,YUAN Y.Global,local,and contagious investor sentiment.Journal of Financial Economics,2012,104(2):272-287.
[34]ADAM T R,FERNANDO C S,GOLUBEVA E.Managerial overconfidence and corporate risk management.Journal of Banking&Finance,2015,60:195-208.
[35]GALASSO A,SIMCOE T S.CEO overconfidence and innovation.Management Science,2011,57(8):1469-1484.
[36]GRIFFIN D,TVERSKY A.The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence.Cognitive Psychology,1992,24(3):411-435.
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