会计准则变迁、准则执行环境与薪酬契约有效性
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摘要
评价会计准则变迁的经济后果,除了考虑会计准则本身之外,会计准则执行环境的影响也不容忽视。本文使用2002-2006年和2008-2014年的中国A股非金融类上市公司数据,结合准则执行环境的影响,考察新会计准则实施以来上市公司高管薪酬契约有效性变动状况。验证结果显示:通过新会计准则的施行,上市公司高管薪酬业绩降低且敏感性较为显著,高管薪酬向下的刚性特征同样显著。进一步结合准则执行层面因素的检验结果发现,在准则执行外部环境较好的样本组中,高管薪酬业绩敏感性降低的幅度更小,在非国有、中央政府控制和高管权力较大的上市公司中,高管薪酬业绩敏感性下降的更多。
Besides the accounting standards, the impact of the implementation environment of the accounting standards cannot be ignored regarding evaluating the economic consequences of the transition of accounting standards. Through sorting out the data of China A-shares of non-financial listed companies in the years of 2002-2006 and 2008-2014 under execution environment of the standards, this paper studies the effectiveness of executive compensation contract of the listed companies after the implementation of new accounting standards. Meanwhile, by employing the new accounting standards in 2007, this study conducts an empirical study on the change of usefulness of accounting information compensation contract before and after the changes of an accounting standard. Moreover,this study analyzes the influence of the standard execution environment on the changes mentioned above. There are three reasons. Firstly, the implementation of accounting standards can provide more direct and vital evidence. Secondly, the implementation of the effect of the IFRS research is carried out from the perspective of information before. However, research from the perspective of the compensation contract is comparatively rare. Domestic research in this area is even less, and there are no uniform conclusions. Thirdly, the relevant research at home and abroad only analyzes the influence of the criterion itself on the validity of the compensation contract, thus lacking research on the effect on the implementation level of the criterion.This study focuses on the significance of accounting information played in corporate contracts and governance. The current study investigates the influence of changes in accounting standards on external information users(e.g., analysts, creditors), which ignores the fact that the role of accounting information is to reflect the trustee's fiduciary duty. By employing long-term and extensive research samples and combining with the standards and company characteristics, this paper can provide more reliable and comprehensive empirical evidence of the sensitivity of executive pay with the implementation of new accounting standards.The research results show that after the implementation of new accounting standards, the effectiveness of accounting information compensation contract is reduced. In an ample group of the implementation of the standards, the degree of sensitivity reduction of executive compensation is less. While in the listed companies which are non-state or controlled by the central government or give greater power to the executive, the sensitivity of compensation performance for executive decreased more.The results indicate that firstly the contract effectiveness of accounting information compensation was decreased after the implementation of the new accounting standards. Therefore, in the formulation and implementation of standards, relevant departments should pay attention to the reflection of accounting information on the manager's fiduciary duty. Secondly, there are significant differences in the institutional environment in various regions of China, which affects the implementation of accounting standards, and then affects the usefulness of accounting information contract. Thirdly, it is obvious that executive pay experiences a downward trend, which could increase executive opportunism and risk.
Besides the accounting standards, the impact of the implementation environment of the accounting standards cannot be ignored regarding evaluating the economic consequences of the transition of accounting standards. Through sorting out the data of China A-shares of non-financial listed companies in the years of 2002-2006 and 2008-2014 under execution environment of the standards, this paper studies the effectiveness of executive compensation contract of the listed companies after the implementation of new accounting standards. Meanwhile, by employing the new accounting standards in 2007, this study conducts an empirical study on the change of usefulness of accounting information compensation contract before and after the changes of an accounting standard. Moreover,this study analyzes the influence of the standard execution environment on the changes mentioned above. There are three reasons. Firstly, the implementation of accounting standards can provide more direct and vital evidence. Secondly, the implementation of the effect of the IFRS research is carried out from the perspective of information before. However, research from the perspective of the compensation contract is comparatively rare. Domestic research in this area is even less, and there are no uniform conclusions. Thirdly, the relevant research at home and abroad only analyzes the influence of the criterion itself on the validity of the compensation contract, thus lacking research on the effect on the implementation level of the criterion.This study focuses on the significance of accounting information played in corporate contracts and governance. The current study investigates the influence of changes in accounting standards on external information users(e.g., analysts, creditors), which ignores the fact that the role of accounting information is to reflect the trustee's fiduciary duty. By employing long-term and extensive research samples and combining with the standards and company characteristics, this paper can provide more reliable and comprehensive empirical evidence of the sensitivity of executive pay with the implementation of new accounting standards.The research results show that after the implementation of new accounting standards, the effectiveness of accounting information compensation contract is reduced. In an ample group of the implementation of the standards, the degree of sensitivity reduction of executive compensation is less. While in the listed companies which are non-state or controlled by the central government or give greater power to the executive, the sensitivity of compensation performance for executive decreased more.The results indicate that firstly the contract effectiveness of accounting information compensation was decreased after the implementation of the new accounting standards. Therefore, in the formulation and implementation of standards, relevant departments should pay attention to the reflection of accounting information on the manager's fiduciary duty. Secondly, there are significant differences in the institutional environment in various regions of China, which affects the implementation of accounting standards, and then affects the usefulness of accounting information contract. Thirdly, it is obvious that executive pay experiences a downward trend, which could increase executive opportunism and risk.
引文
[1]Soderstrom,N.S.,Sun K.J..IFRS Adoption and Accounting Quality:A Review[J].European Accounting Review,2007,16(4):675-702.
[2]姜英兵,严婷.制度环境对会计准则执行的影响研究[J].会计研究,2012,(4):69-78.
[3]Holthausen,R.W.,and Watts,R.L..The Relevance of the Valuerelevance Literature for Financial Accounting Standards Setting[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,(31):3-75.
[4]Watts,R.,What Has the Invisible Hand Achieved?Accounting and Business Research,International Accounting Policy Forum,2006,51-61.
[5]侯青川,靳庆鲁,陈红.新会计准则、公司会计业绩与高管薪酬[J],上海财经大学工作论文,2010.
[6]陈春艳.会计准则变迁、会计信息质量与高管薪酬契约有效性的研究[D],武汉大学博士论文,2013.
[7]Bruggemann,U.,J.,Hitz,and T.,Sellhorn.Intended and Unintended Consequences of Mandatory IFRS Adoption:A Review of Extant Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research[J].European Accounting Review,2013,22(1):1-27.
[8]陈信元,何贤杰,田野.新会计准则研究:分析框架与综述[J].中国会计评论,2011,(9):141-158.
[9]孙峥,刘浩.国际财务报告准则带来了什么:全球发现[J].会计研究,2013,(1):13-19.
[10]Chen,T.,Chen,L.,Wang,S.,and Yao,C.,2012,The Impact of Mandatory IFRS Adoption on Bank Loan Contracting,Working Paper,Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
[11]Christensen,H.,Lee,E.,and Walker,M.Do IFRS Reconciliations Convey Information?The Debt Contracting Effect[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2009,47(5):1167-1199.
[12]Kim,J.,Tsui,J.and Yi,C..The Voluntary Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards and Loan Contracting around the World[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2011,16(4):79-811.
[13]李玉博.新会计准则对会计信息契约作用的影响研究[D],上海财经大学博士论文,2010.
[14]原红旗,李玉博,娄芳,张瑶.新会计准则与会计盈余的债务合约有效性[J].中国会计与财务研究,2013,(15):80-135.
[15]祝继高,林安雯,陆正飞.会计准则改革、会计利润信息与银行债务契约[J].中国会计评论,2011,(9):159-172.
[16]邹海峰,辛清泉,张金若.公允价值计量与高管薪酬契约[J].经济科学,2010,(5):102-110.
[17]徐经长,曾雪云.公允价值计量与管理层薪酬契约[J].会计研究,2010,(3):12-19.
[18]Ozkan,N.,Singer,Z.,and H.You.Mandatory IFRS Adoption and the Contractual Usefulness of Accounting Information in Executive Compensation[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2012,50(4):1077-1107.
[19]Voulgaris,G.,Gaeremynck,K.and Walker,M.,2011,IFRS and the Use of Accounting-Based Performance Measures in Executive Pay,Working Paper,University of Edinburgh Business School and Manchester Business School.
[20]杨晋渝,刘斌,孙立.盈余管理、高管薪酬敏感度和股权结构[J].重庆大学学报(社会科学版),2013,(19):70-76.
[21]刘斌,刘星,李世新,何顺文.CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究,2003,(3):35-39.
[22]Jensen,M.and K.Murphy.Performance Compensation and Top Management Incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,(98):225-264.
[23]Murphy,K..Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration:An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1985,7(1-3):11-42.
[24]Sloan,R..Accounting Earnings and Top Executive Compensation[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1993,16(1-2):55-100.
[25]Leone,A.,J.Wu,and J.Zimmerman.Asymmetric Sensitivity of CEOCash Compensation to Stock Returns[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2006,42(1-2):167-192.
[26]Li,Yubo,Fang Lou,Jiwei Wang,and Hongqi Yuan.A Survey of Executive Compensation Contracts in China’s Listed Companies[J].China Journal of Accounting Research,2013,(6):211-231.
[27]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效--一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000,(1):24-30.
[28]Jackson,S.,T.Lopez,and A.,Reitenga.Accounting Fundamental and CEO Bonus Compensation[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2008,27(5):374-393.
[29]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000,(3):32-39+64.
[30]杜兴强,王兴丽.高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究[J].会计研究,2007,(1):58-65.
[31]方军雄.我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗?[J].经济研究,2009,(3):110-124.
[32]Ball,R..IFRS:Pros and Cons of Investors,Accounting and Business Research[J].International Accounting Policy Forum,2006,(5):5-27.
[33]Holmstrom,Bengt.Moral Hazard and Observability[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1979,(10):74-91.
[34]Banker,R.,and S.Datar.Sensitivity,Precision and Linear Aggregation of Signals for Performance Evaluation[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1989,27(1):21-39.
[35]支小强.如何选择业绩评价标准--兼论业绩评价在激励机制中的作用[J].会计研究,2000,(11):25-30.
[36]Murphy,K.J..Performance Standards in Incentive Contracts[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,30(3):245-278.
[37]刘星,徐光伟.政府管制、管理层权力与国企高管薪酬刚性[J].经济科学,2012,(1)86-102.
[38]王跃堂,孙铮.会计改革与会计信息质量[J].会计研究,2001,(7):16-26.
[39]陈冬华,梁上坤,蒋德全.不同市场进程下高管激励契约的成本和选择:货币薪酬与在职消费[J].会计研究,2010,(11):56-64.
[40]刘凤委,孙铮,李增泉.政府干预、行业竞争与薪酬契约--来自国有上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2007,(9):76-84+128.
[41]辛清泉,谭伟强.市场化改革、企业业绩与国有企业经理薪酬[J].经济研究,2009,(3):68-81.
[42]Bai,C.,J.Lu,and Z.Tao,Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform:Empirical Evidence from China[J].American Economic Review,2006,96(2):353-357.
[43]Bai,C.,and L.Xu.Incentives for CEOs with Multitasks:Evidence from Chinese State-owned Enterprises0[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2005,33(3):517-539.
[44]Bebchuk,L.J.Fried,and D.Walker.Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation[J].The University of Chicago Law Review,2002,69(3):751-846.
[45]吕长江,赵宇恒.国有企业管理者激励效应研究--基于管理者权力的解释[J].管理世界,2008,(11):99-109.
[46]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010,(11):73-87.
[47]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数--各地区市场化相对进程2011年报告[R],北京:经济科学出版社,2011.
[48]张维迎,何荣住.信任及其解释:来自中国的跨省调查分析[J].经济研究,2002,(10):59-70.
[49]Driscoll J.C.,Kraay A.C.Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation with Spatially Dependent Panel Data[J].Review of Economics and Statistics,1998,80(4):549-560.
[50]连玉君,彭方平,苏治.融资约束与流动性管理行为[J].金融研究,2010,(10):158-171.
[51]Lambert,R.,and D.Larcker.An Analysis of the Use of Accounting and Market Measures of Performance in Executive Compensation Contracts[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1987,(25):85-125.
[2]姜英兵,严婷.制度环境对会计准则执行的影响研究[J].会计研究,2012,(4):69-78.
[3]Holthausen,R.W.,and Watts,R.L..The Relevance of the Valuerelevance Literature for Financial Accounting Standards Setting[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,(31):3-75.
[4]Watts,R.,What Has the Invisible Hand Achieved?Accounting and Business Research,International Accounting Policy Forum,2006,51-61.
[5]侯青川,靳庆鲁,陈红.新会计准则、公司会计业绩与高管薪酬[J],上海财经大学工作论文,2010.
[6]陈春艳.会计准则变迁、会计信息质量与高管薪酬契约有效性的研究[D],武汉大学博士论文,2013.
[7]Bruggemann,U.,J.,Hitz,and T.,Sellhorn.Intended and Unintended Consequences of Mandatory IFRS Adoption:A Review of Extant Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research[J].European Accounting Review,2013,22(1):1-27.
[8]陈信元,何贤杰,田野.新会计准则研究:分析框架与综述[J].中国会计评论,2011,(9):141-158.
[9]孙峥,刘浩.国际财务报告准则带来了什么:全球发现[J].会计研究,2013,(1):13-19.
[10]Chen,T.,Chen,L.,Wang,S.,and Yao,C.,2012,The Impact of Mandatory IFRS Adoption on Bank Loan Contracting,Working Paper,Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
[11]Christensen,H.,Lee,E.,and Walker,M.Do IFRS Reconciliations Convey Information?The Debt Contracting Effect[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2009,47(5):1167-1199.
[12]Kim,J.,Tsui,J.and Yi,C..The Voluntary Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards and Loan Contracting around the World[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2011,16(4):79-811.
[13]李玉博.新会计准则对会计信息契约作用的影响研究[D],上海财经大学博士论文,2010.
[14]原红旗,李玉博,娄芳,张瑶.新会计准则与会计盈余的债务合约有效性[J].中国会计与财务研究,2013,(15):80-135.
[15]祝继高,林安雯,陆正飞.会计准则改革、会计利润信息与银行债务契约[J].中国会计评论,2011,(9):159-172.
[16]邹海峰,辛清泉,张金若.公允价值计量与高管薪酬契约[J].经济科学,2010,(5):102-110.
[17]徐经长,曾雪云.公允价值计量与管理层薪酬契约[J].会计研究,2010,(3):12-19.
[18]Ozkan,N.,Singer,Z.,and H.You.Mandatory IFRS Adoption and the Contractual Usefulness of Accounting Information in Executive Compensation[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2012,50(4):1077-1107.
[19]Voulgaris,G.,Gaeremynck,K.and Walker,M.,2011,IFRS and the Use of Accounting-Based Performance Measures in Executive Pay,Working Paper,University of Edinburgh Business School and Manchester Business School.
[20]杨晋渝,刘斌,孙立.盈余管理、高管薪酬敏感度和股权结构[J].重庆大学学报(社会科学版),2013,(19):70-76.
[21]刘斌,刘星,李世新,何顺文.CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究,2003,(3):35-39.
[22]Jensen,M.and K.Murphy.Performance Compensation and Top Management Incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,(98):225-264.
[23]Murphy,K..Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration:An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1985,7(1-3):11-42.
[24]Sloan,R..Accounting Earnings and Top Executive Compensation[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1993,16(1-2):55-100.
[25]Leone,A.,J.Wu,and J.Zimmerman.Asymmetric Sensitivity of CEOCash Compensation to Stock Returns[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2006,42(1-2):167-192.
[26]Li,Yubo,Fang Lou,Jiwei Wang,and Hongqi Yuan.A Survey of Executive Compensation Contracts in China’s Listed Companies[J].China Journal of Accounting Research,2013,(6):211-231.
[27]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效--一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000,(1):24-30.
[28]Jackson,S.,T.Lopez,and A.,Reitenga.Accounting Fundamental and CEO Bonus Compensation[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2008,27(5):374-393.
[29]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000,(3):32-39+64.
[30]杜兴强,王兴丽.高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究[J].会计研究,2007,(1):58-65.
[31]方军雄.我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗?[J].经济研究,2009,(3):110-124.
[32]Ball,R..IFRS:Pros and Cons of Investors,Accounting and Business Research[J].International Accounting Policy Forum,2006,(5):5-27.
[33]Holmstrom,Bengt.Moral Hazard and Observability[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1979,(10):74-91.
[34]Banker,R.,and S.Datar.Sensitivity,Precision and Linear Aggregation of Signals for Performance Evaluation[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1989,27(1):21-39.
[35]支小强.如何选择业绩评价标准--兼论业绩评价在激励机制中的作用[J].会计研究,2000,(11):25-30.
[36]Murphy,K.J..Performance Standards in Incentive Contracts[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,30(3):245-278.
[37]刘星,徐光伟.政府管制、管理层权力与国企高管薪酬刚性[J].经济科学,2012,(1)86-102.
[38]王跃堂,孙铮.会计改革与会计信息质量[J].会计研究,2001,(7):16-26.
[39]陈冬华,梁上坤,蒋德全.不同市场进程下高管激励契约的成本和选择:货币薪酬与在职消费[J].会计研究,2010,(11):56-64.
[40]刘凤委,孙铮,李增泉.政府干预、行业竞争与薪酬契约--来自国有上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2007,(9):76-84+128.
[41]辛清泉,谭伟强.市场化改革、企业业绩与国有企业经理薪酬[J].经济研究,2009,(3):68-81.
[42]Bai,C.,J.Lu,and Z.Tao,Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform:Empirical Evidence from China[J].American Economic Review,2006,96(2):353-357.
[43]Bai,C.,and L.Xu.Incentives for CEOs with Multitasks:Evidence from Chinese State-owned Enterprises0[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2005,33(3):517-539.
[44]Bebchuk,L.J.Fried,and D.Walker.Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation[J].The University of Chicago Law Review,2002,69(3):751-846.
[45]吕长江,赵宇恒.国有企业管理者激励效应研究--基于管理者权力的解释[J].管理世界,2008,(11):99-109.
[46]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010,(11):73-87.
[47]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数--各地区市场化相对进程2011年报告[R],北京:经济科学出版社,2011.
[48]张维迎,何荣住.信任及其解释:来自中国的跨省调查分析[J].经济研究,2002,(10):59-70.
[49]Driscoll J.C.,Kraay A.C.Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation with Spatially Dependent Panel Data[J].Review of Economics and Statistics,1998,80(4):549-560.
[50]连玉君,彭方平,苏治.融资约束与流动性管理行为[J].金融研究,2010,(10):158-171.
[51]Lambert,R.,and D.Larcker.An Analysis of the Use of Accounting and Market Measures of Performance in Executive Compensation Contracts[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1987,(25):85-125.