反腐败、企业家能力与企业创新
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摘要
本文利用中国上市公司企业家能力指数(CCEIBNU),探究企业家能力对企业创新的影响机理,结合当前反腐败的背景,深入研究反腐败对企业家能力与企业创新的影响,并进行实证检验,得出如下结论:(1)企业家能力的提升对企业创新有积极作用。非国有企业中企业家能力和企业创新显著正相关,但在国有企业中只有企业家关系网络能力与企业创新正相关。(2)反腐败增加了企业家寻租的成本和难度,企业家能力会更多地配置到生产领域,促进企业增加创新投入,因此,反腐败会强化企业家能力对创新的促进作用。(3)进一步对企业分类研究发现,反腐败对国有企业和非国有企业的创新都有一定的促进作用,并会加强非国有企业的企业家能力对企业创新的正效应,对于国有企业来讲,反腐败加强了企业家人力资本对企业创新的积极影响,而企业家关系网络对企业创新的影响不再显著。
Facing the great pressure of domestic economic downturn and the transformation of economic structure,enterprise innovation has become the next focus of economic development. Therefore,it is an important topic for studying the influence factor of the enterprise innovation. Entrepreneur is the main part of enterprise innovation.Entrepreneur competencies determine the development track of enterprises and has the most direct and fundamental influence on the enterprise innovation. Chinese economy has experienced a rapid development after implementing the policy of "reform and opening". But the economic growth has also brought massive official corruption. The rent-seeking and corruption will lead to the misconfiguration of entrepreneur competencies from productive field to non-productive field and produce the crowding-out effect to entrepreneur competencies,thus being not conducive to innovation. Accordingly,it is essential to implement anti-corruption policy to avoid the grave consequences brought by corruption. On one hand,anti-corruption can reduce the illegal rent-seeking behavior of entrepreneur. On the other hand,it can prevent the "grabbing hand"of governmental official reach out to enterprises and further facilitating all the efforts of entrepreneur can be made to enterprise innovation. After the 18 th CPC National Congress,the Chinese authorities have strengthened the anti-corruption efforts. This article mainly resolves the following two problems. First,what is the impact of entrepreneur competencies on enterprise innovation. Second,whether entrepreneur competencies can be given full play in the improved government-business environment and further promoting enterprise innovation.This article investigated the influence mechanism of entrepreneur competencies on enterprise innovation using CCEIBNUand further made an intensive study of the effect of anti-corruption on the relationship between entrepreneur competencies and enterprise innovation based on the background of the current anti-corruption efforts. After the empirical examination,we draw the following conclusions. 1. The promotion of entrepreneur competencies have a positive effect on enterprise innovation. Significant positive correlation exists between entrepreneur competencies and enterprise innovation in non-state-owned enterprises. But the positive correlation only exists between entrepreneur network competencies and enterprise innovation in state-owned enterprises. 2. Anti-corruption increases the cost and difficulty of rent-seeking,thus configuring entrepreneur competencies to production field and further facilitating the increase of R&D input. Hence,anti-corruption will intensify the promotion of entrepreneur competencies to enterprise innovation. 3. Further study found that anti-corruption has a certain role in promoting enterprise innovation for both state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. For the non-state-owned enterprises,anti-corruption can enhance the positive effect of entrepreneur competencies on enterprise innovation. For the state-owned enterprises,anti-corruption can enhance the positive effect of entrepreneur human capital on enterprise innovation. But the effect of entrepreneur network on enterprise innovation is not significant.Therefore,we can obtain the following policy recommendations. 1. Creating a good environment which can be favorable for cultivating entrepreneur competencies. Constructing a new government-business relation and defining the legal limits of the power of government officials. Mobilizing the enthusiasm of the government and enterprises to promoting enterprise innovation. 2. Strengthening the anti-corruption efforts at the government level and cutting off the channels of rent-seeking of entrepreneur. More importantly,anti-corruption should be institutionalized and carried out for a long period. 3. On the premise of improving the responsibility mechanism of state-owned enterprise executives,exploring to construct professional manager market and evaluation system of state-owned enterprise executives.
Facing the great pressure of domestic economic downturn and the transformation of economic structure,enterprise innovation has become the next focus of economic development. Therefore,it is an important topic for studying the influence factor of the enterprise innovation. Entrepreneur is the main part of enterprise innovation.Entrepreneur competencies determine the development track of enterprises and has the most direct and fundamental influence on the enterprise innovation. Chinese economy has experienced a rapid development after implementing the policy of "reform and opening". But the economic growth has also brought massive official corruption. The rent-seeking and corruption will lead to the misconfiguration of entrepreneur competencies from productive field to non-productive field and produce the crowding-out effect to entrepreneur competencies,thus being not conducive to innovation. Accordingly,it is essential to implement anti-corruption policy to avoid the grave consequences brought by corruption. On one hand,anti-corruption can reduce the illegal rent-seeking behavior of entrepreneur. On the other hand,it can prevent the "grabbing hand"of governmental official reach out to enterprises and further facilitating all the efforts of entrepreneur can be made to enterprise innovation. After the 18 th CPC National Congress,the Chinese authorities have strengthened the anti-corruption efforts. This article mainly resolves the following two problems. First,what is the impact of entrepreneur competencies on enterprise innovation. Second,whether entrepreneur competencies can be given full play in the improved government-business environment and further promoting enterprise innovation.This article investigated the influence mechanism of entrepreneur competencies on enterprise innovation using CCEIBNUand further made an intensive study of the effect of anti-corruption on the relationship between entrepreneur competencies and enterprise innovation based on the background of the current anti-corruption efforts. After the empirical examination,we draw the following conclusions. 1. The promotion of entrepreneur competencies have a positive effect on enterprise innovation. Significant positive correlation exists between entrepreneur competencies and enterprise innovation in non-state-owned enterprises. But the positive correlation only exists between entrepreneur network competencies and enterprise innovation in state-owned enterprises. 2. Anti-corruption increases the cost and difficulty of rent-seeking,thus configuring entrepreneur competencies to production field and further facilitating the increase of R&D input. Hence,anti-corruption will intensify the promotion of entrepreneur competencies to enterprise innovation. 3. Further study found that anti-corruption has a certain role in promoting enterprise innovation for both state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. For the non-state-owned enterprises,anti-corruption can enhance the positive effect of entrepreneur competencies on enterprise innovation. For the state-owned enterprises,anti-corruption can enhance the positive effect of entrepreneur human capital on enterprise innovation. But the effect of entrepreneur network on enterprise innovation is not significant.Therefore,we can obtain the following policy recommendations. 1. Creating a good environment which can be favorable for cultivating entrepreneur competencies. Constructing a new government-business relation and defining the legal limits of the power of government officials. Mobilizing the enthusiasm of the government and enterprises to promoting enterprise innovation. 2. Strengthening the anti-corruption efforts at the government level and cutting off the channels of rent-seeking of entrepreneur. More importantly,anti-corruption should be institutionalized and carried out for a long period. 3. On the premise of improving the responsibility mechanism of state-owned enterprise executives,exploring to construct professional manager market and evaluation system of state-owned enterprise executives.
引文
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[14]陈爽英,井润田,龙小宁,邵云飞.民营企业家社会关系资本对研发投资决策影响的实证研究[J].北京:管理世界,2010,(1).
[15]戴锦.国有企业政策工具属性研究[J].成都:经济学家,2013,(8).
[16]党力,杨瑞龙,杨继东.反腐败与企业创新.基于政治关联的解释[J].北京:中国工业经济,2015,(7).
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[24]贺小刚,张远飞,连燕玲,吕斐斐.政治关联与企业价值——民营企业与国有企业的比较分析[J].北京:中国工业经济,2013,(1).
[25]黄继承,盛明泉.高管背景特征具有信息含量吗[J].北京:管理世界,2013,(9).
[26]李后建,张剑.腐败与企业创新.润滑剂抑或绊脚石[J].天津:南开经济研究,2015,(2).
[27]李小荣,董红晔.高管权力,企业产权与权益资本成本[J].北京:经济科学,2015,(4).
[28]李小荣,刘行.CEO vs CFO性别与股价崩盘风险[J].北京:世界经济,2012,(12).
[29]林慧婷,王茂林.管理者过度自信,创新投入与企业价值[J].北京:经济管理,2014,(11).
[30]刘运国,刘雯.我国上市公司的高管任期与R&D支出[J].北京:管理世界,2007,(1).
[31]陆国庆,王舟,张春宇.中国战略性新兴产业政府创新补贴的绩效研究[J].北京:经济研究,2014,(7).
[32]毛其淋,许家云.中国企业对外直接投资是否促进了企业创新[J].北京:世界经济,2014,(8).
[33]潘越,潘健平,戴亦一.公司诉讼风险,司法地方保护主义与企业创新[J].北京:经济研究,2015,(3).
[34]万广华,吴一平.司法制度,工资激励与反腐败:中国案例[J].北京:经济学(季刊),2012,(3).
[35]王端旭,潘奇.企业慈善捐赠带来价值回报吗——以利益相关者满足程度为调节变量的上市公司实证研究[J].北京:中国工业经济,2011,(7).
[36]王少飞,官峰,高斯达,陈雷雨.地方政府换届与企业募资投向变更的有效性[J].上海:财经研究,2014,(11).
[37]王文春,荣昭.房价上涨对工业企业创新的抑制影响研究[J].北京:经济学(季刊),2014,(2).
[38]温军,冯根福.异质机构,企业性质与自主创新[J].北京:经济研究,2012,(3).
[39]武亚军.“战略框架式思考”,“悖论整合”与企业竞争优势——任正非的认知模式分析及管理启示[J].北京:管理世界,2013,(4).
[40]杨其静.企业成长.政治关联还是能力建设?[J].北京:经济研究,2011,(10).
[41]于风政.论“腐败”的定义[J].北京:新视野,2003,(5).
[42]袁建国,后青松,程晨.企业政治资源的诅咒效应——基于政治关联与企业技术创新的考察[J].北京:管理世界,2015,(1).
[43]周璐,王前锋.企业社会责任对技术创新影响研究[J].武汉:财会通讯,2013,(3).
[2]Baumol W,Entrepreneurship.Productive,Unproductive,and Destructive[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,98,(5):893-921.
[3]Dimitratos P,Amorós J E,Etchebarne M S.Micro-multinational or not?International Entrepreneurship,Networking and Learning Effects[J].Journal of Business Research,2014,67,(5):908-915.
[4]Izquierdo E,Deschoolmeester D,Salazar D.The Importance of Competencies for Entrepreneurship:A View From Entrepreneurs and Scholar’s Perspective[C].Int Ent Conference in Reino Unido,2005.
[5]Hoffman,D E.The Oligarchs.Wealth and Power in the New Russia[M].New York:Public Affairs,2002.
[6]Klitgaard,Robert.Strategies Against Corruption[J].Agencia Espa1ola de Cooperación Internacional Foro Iberoamericano sobre el Combate a la Corrupción,Santa Cruz de la Sierra,1998,(7):15-16.
[7]Leff N H.Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption[J].American Behavioral Scientist,1964,8,(3):8-14.
[8]Mahagaonkar P.Corruption and Innovation.A Grease or Sand Relationship?[J].Jena Economic Research Papers,2008,(17):1-24.
[9]Man T,Lau T,Chan K F.The Competitiveness of Small and Medium Enterprises.A Conceptualization With Focus on Entrepreneurial Competencies[J].Journal of Business Venturing,2002,17,(2):123-142.
[10]Papadakis V,Bourantas D.The Chief Executive Officer as Corporate Champion of Technological Innovation.A Empirical Investigaion[J].Technology Analysis&Strategic Management,1998,10,(1):89-110.
[11]Shleifer A,Vishny R W.Politicians and Firms[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109,(4):995-1025.
[12]Teece D J.Business models,Business Strategy and Innovation[J].Long Range Planning,2010,43,(2):172-194.
[13]Teece,D J.Firm Organization,Industrial Structure,and Technological innovation[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,1996,31,(2):193-224.
[14]陈爽英,井润田,龙小宁,邵云飞.民营企业家社会关系资本对研发投资决策影响的实证研究[J].北京:管理世界,2010,(1).
[15]戴锦.国有企业政策工具属性研究[J].成都:经济学家,2013,(8).
[16]党力,杨瑞龙,杨继东.反腐败与企业创新.基于政治关联的解释[J].北京:中国工业经济,2015,(7).
[17]杜雯翠,高明华.市场结构,企业家能力与经营绩效——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].杭州:浙江工商大学学报,2013,(1).
[18]高明华,焦豪,苏然.中国上市公司企业家能力指数研究[J].哈尔滨:黑龙江社会科学,2014,(1).
[19]高明华等.中国上市公司企业家能力指数报告2012[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2012.
[20]高明华等.中国上市公司企业家能力指数报告2014[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2014.
[21]高明华等.中国公司治理分类指数报告No.15(2016)[M].上海:中国出版集团东方出版中心,2016.
[22]公婷,吴木銮.关于以薪养廉有效性的探讨——基于中国的经验[J].北京:经济社会体制比较,2012,(5).
[23]贺小刚,李新春.企业家能力与企业成长——基于中国经验的实证研究[J].北京:经济研究,2005,(10).
[24]贺小刚,张远飞,连燕玲,吕斐斐.政治关联与企业价值——民营企业与国有企业的比较分析[J].北京:中国工业经济,2013,(1).
[25]黄继承,盛明泉.高管背景特征具有信息含量吗[J].北京:管理世界,2013,(9).
[26]李后建,张剑.腐败与企业创新.润滑剂抑或绊脚石[J].天津:南开经济研究,2015,(2).
[27]李小荣,董红晔.高管权力,企业产权与权益资本成本[J].北京:经济科学,2015,(4).
[28]李小荣,刘行.CEO vs CFO性别与股价崩盘风险[J].北京:世界经济,2012,(12).
[29]林慧婷,王茂林.管理者过度自信,创新投入与企业价值[J].北京:经济管理,2014,(11).
[30]刘运国,刘雯.我国上市公司的高管任期与R&D支出[J].北京:管理世界,2007,(1).
[31]陆国庆,王舟,张春宇.中国战略性新兴产业政府创新补贴的绩效研究[J].北京:经济研究,2014,(7).
[32]毛其淋,许家云.中国企业对外直接投资是否促进了企业创新[J].北京:世界经济,2014,(8).
[33]潘越,潘健平,戴亦一.公司诉讼风险,司法地方保护主义与企业创新[J].北京:经济研究,2015,(3).
[34]万广华,吴一平.司法制度,工资激励与反腐败:中国案例[J].北京:经济学(季刊),2012,(3).
[35]王端旭,潘奇.企业慈善捐赠带来价值回报吗——以利益相关者满足程度为调节变量的上市公司实证研究[J].北京:中国工业经济,2011,(7).
[36]王少飞,官峰,高斯达,陈雷雨.地方政府换届与企业募资投向变更的有效性[J].上海:财经研究,2014,(11).
[37]王文春,荣昭.房价上涨对工业企业创新的抑制影响研究[J].北京:经济学(季刊),2014,(2).
[38]温军,冯根福.异质机构,企业性质与自主创新[J].北京:经济研究,2012,(3).
[39]武亚军.“战略框架式思考”,“悖论整合”与企业竞争优势——任正非的认知模式分析及管理启示[J].北京:管理世界,2013,(4).
[40]杨其静.企业成长.政治关联还是能力建设?[J].北京:经济研究,2011,(10).
[41]于风政.论“腐败”的定义[J].北京:新视野,2003,(5).
[42]袁建国,后青松,程晨.企业政治资源的诅咒效应——基于政治关联与企业技术创新的考察[J].北京:管理世界,2015,(1).
[43]周璐,王前锋.企业社会责任对技术创新影响研究[J].武汉:财会通讯,2013,(3).