VMCI下基于剩余产品成本分摊的生鲜农产品供应链协调
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摘要
研究由单生产商和单零售商构成的生鲜农产品供应链,其中,零售商作为主导者,负责产品的终端销售,生产商作为跟随者,负责产品的生产、运输任务以及剩余产品的处理。假设生鲜农产品市场需求受销售价格和产品新鲜度的双重影响,生产商管理零售商的库存且零售商按产品实际售出量支付货款,建立了VMCI模式下的两级Stackelberg博弈模型。研究表明:分散决策下生产商的最优库存因子低于集中决策下的取值,而参数满足特定条件下,零售价格和物流服务水平均大于集中决策下的相应值;由收入共享、物流服务成本共担和剩余产品成本分摊构成的契约组合可有效协调供应链系统。最后,通过数值模拟验证了上述契约组合的可行性。
This paper studies a fresh agri-product supply chain with a single manufacturer and a single retailer. The retailer acts as a leader who is responsible for selling products, while the manufacturer, a follower, is responsible for producing, transporting products, and disposing of residual products. Assuming that the sale price and freshness influence the market demand, a two-stage Stackelberg game model has been established under the vendor managed consignment inventory(VMCI) environment when the manufacturer manages the retailer's inventory while the retailer makes the payment according to the actual amount sold. The result shows that the optimal stocking factor in the decentralized mode is lower than the corresponding result in the centralized one while the optimal retailing price and logistics service level are higher than those in centralized mode under certain conditions. The contract combination, consisting of a revenue sharing contract, a logistics service cost sharing contract, and a residual products cost sharing contract, can efficiently coordinate the supply chain system. Further, the feasibility of the combination of the above contracts is verified by a numerical simulation.
This paper studies a fresh agri-product supply chain with a single manufacturer and a single retailer. The retailer acts as a leader who is responsible for selling products, while the manufacturer, a follower, is responsible for producing, transporting products, and disposing of residual products. Assuming that the sale price and freshness influence the market demand, a two-stage Stackelberg game model has been established under the vendor managed consignment inventory(VMCI) environment when the manufacturer manages the retailer's inventory while the retailer makes the payment according to the actual amount sold. The result shows that the optimal stocking factor in the decentralized mode is lower than the corresponding result in the centralized one while the optimal retailing price and logistics service level are higher than those in centralized mode under certain conditions. The contract combination, consisting of a revenue sharing contract, a logistics service cost sharing contract, and a residual products cost sharing contract, can efficiently coordinate the supply chain system. Further, the feasibility of the combination of the above contracts is verified by a numerical simulation.
引文
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[10] Lee J Y,Cho R K.Contracting for vendor-managed inventory with consignment stock and stockout-cost sharing [J].International Journal of Production Economics,2014,151(1):158-173
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[13] 王婧,陈旭.考虑流通损耗的生鲜农产品零售商期权订货策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2012,32(7):1408-1414.
[14] Cai X Q,Chen J,Xiao Y B,et al.Fresh-product supply chain management with logistics outsourcing [J].Omega-International Journal of Management Science,2013,41(4):752-765.
[15] 吴忠和,陈宏,赵千,等.时间约束下鲜活农产品供应链应急协调契约[J].系统管理学报,2014,23(1):49-56.
[16] 杨春,但斌,吴庆,等.考虑保鲜努力的生鲜农产品零售商与物流服务商的协调合同[J].技术经济,2010,29(12):122-126.
[17] 林略,杨书萍,但斌.收益共享契约下鲜活农产品三级供应链协调[J].系统工程学报,2010,25(4):484-491.
[18] 侯雅莉,周德群.价格依赖需求下的三阶层供应链的协调[J].统计与决策,2007(14):10-13.
[19] 马利军,曾清华,邵新建.幂函数需求模式下具有公平偏好的供应链协调[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(2):3009-3019.
[20] Li S J,Zhu Z B,Huang L H.Supply chain coordination and decision making under consignment contract with revenue sharing [J].International Journal of Production Economics,2009,120(1):88-99.
[21] 马利军,薛巍立,王汝现.零售商销售努力竞争时的供应链协调[J].系统管理学报,2013,22(6):808-813.
[2] Crawford F.Efficient consumer responses [J].Food Processing,1994,55(2):34-42.
[3] Wong W K,Qi J,Leung S Y S.Coordinating supply chains with sales rebate contracts and vendor-managed inventory [J].International Journal of Production Economics 2009,120 (1):151-161.
[4] Yao Y L,Dong Y,Dresner M.Managing supply chain backorders under vendor managed inventory:An incentive approach and empirical analysis [J].European Journal of Operational Research,2010,203 (2):350-359.
[5] 赵道致,吕昕.VMI模式下随机产量供应链风险分担契约研究[J].软科学,2012,26(6):125-131.
[6] 李新然,牟宗玉,黎高.VMI模式下考虑促销努力的销量回扣契约模型研究[J].中国管理科学,2012,20(4):86-94.
[7] Ru J,Wang Y Z.Consignment contracting:Who should control inventory in the supply chain?[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2010,201(3):760-769.
[8] Hu W,Li Y J,Govindan K.The impact of consumer returns policies on consignment contracts with inventory control [J].European Journal of Operational Research,2014,233(2):398-407.
[9] 王小斌.VMCI下供应链模糊需求信息共享价值与协调[J].系统工程学报,2013,28(6):795-803.
[10] Lee J Y,Cho R K.Contracting for vendor-managed inventory with consignment stock and stockout-cost sharing [J].International Journal of Production Economics,2014,151(1):158-173
[11] 陈军,但斌.基于实体损耗控制的生鲜农产品供应链协调[J].系统工程理论与实践,2009,29(3):54-62.
[12] 但斌,陈军.基于价值损耗的生鲜农产品供应链协调[J].中国管理科学,2008,16(5):42-49.
[13] 王婧,陈旭.考虑流通损耗的生鲜农产品零售商期权订货策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2012,32(7):1408-1414.
[14] Cai X Q,Chen J,Xiao Y B,et al.Fresh-product supply chain management with logistics outsourcing [J].Omega-International Journal of Management Science,2013,41(4):752-765.
[15] 吴忠和,陈宏,赵千,等.时间约束下鲜活农产品供应链应急协调契约[J].系统管理学报,2014,23(1):49-56.
[16] 杨春,但斌,吴庆,等.考虑保鲜努力的生鲜农产品零售商与物流服务商的协调合同[J].技术经济,2010,29(12):122-126.
[17] 林略,杨书萍,但斌.收益共享契约下鲜活农产品三级供应链协调[J].系统工程学报,2010,25(4):484-491.
[18] 侯雅莉,周德群.价格依赖需求下的三阶层供应链的协调[J].统计与决策,2007(14):10-13.
[19] 马利军,曾清华,邵新建.幂函数需求模式下具有公平偏好的供应链协调[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(2):3009-3019.
[20] Li S J,Zhu Z B,Huang L H.Supply chain coordination and decision making under consignment contract with revenue sharing [J].International Journal of Production Economics,2009,120(1):88-99.
[21] 马利军,薛巍立,王汝现.零售商销售努力竞争时的供应链协调[J].系统管理学报,2013,22(6):808-813.