新能源汽车财政补贴政策监管演化稳定性分析
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摘要
构建新能源汽车企业与政府补贴动态演化系统是优化补贴监管策略的前提和基础,但在实际监管策略的制定中往往忽略了其动态性与有限理性。本文引入演化博弈模型,研究有限理性条件下新能源汽车企业与政府"骗补——监管"的动态性,通过复制动态方程与雅克比矩阵分析判定演化稳定策略。研究表明:企业和政府的演化稳定策略存在是有条件的,有四种情形存在演化稳定策略,一种情形不存在演化稳定策略;并且在长期演化过程中,系统存在两种演化均衡,政府的演化均衡策略都是检查。
The construction of a new energy auto companies and subsidy of government dynamic evolution system is the premise and basis for optimizing the subsidy supervision strategy. However,its dynamic and limited rationality are often neglected in the formulation of practical supervision strategies. This paper introduces evolutionary game model to study the dynamics of swindling supervision between new energy auto companies and governments under the condition of limited rationality,and determines evolutionary stability strategies by replicating dynamic equations and Jacobian matrix. The research shows that the evolutionary stabilization strategies between enterprises and governments exists conditionally. There are four situations in which evolutionary stabilization strategies exist,and there is no evolutionary stabilization strategy in one situation. In the long-term evolution process,there are two evolutionary equilibriums in the system. The government's evolutionary equilibrium strategy is checking.
The construction of a new energy auto companies and subsidy of government dynamic evolution system is the premise and basis for optimizing the subsidy supervision strategy. However,its dynamic and limited rationality are often neglected in the formulation of practical supervision strategies. This paper introduces evolutionary game model to study the dynamics of swindling supervision between new energy auto companies and governments under the condition of limited rationality,and determines evolutionary stability strategies by replicating dynamic equations and Jacobian matrix. The research shows that the evolutionary stabilization strategies between enterprises and governments exists conditionally. There are four situations in which evolutionary stabilization strategies exist,and there is no evolutionary stabilization strategy in one situation. In the long-term evolution process,there are two evolutionary equilibriums in the system. The government's evolutionary equilibrium strategy is checking.
引文
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[14]白雪,张祥.新能源汽车“十三五”开局回顾及未来展望[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2017,19(2):39~44.
[2]蔡玲如.环境污染监督博弈的动态性分析与控制策略[D].武汉:华中科技大学,2010.
[3]孙庆文,陆柳,严广乐,等.不完全信息条件下演化博弈均衡的稳定性分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2003,23(7):11~16.
[4]王先甲,全吉,刘伟兵.有限理性下的演化博弈与合作机制研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011,(s1):82~93.
[5]钟太勇,杜荣.基于博弈论的新能源汽车补贴策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2015,(s1):817~822.
[6] Hirte G,Tscharaktschiew S. The Optimal Subsidy on Electric Vehicles in German Metropolitan Areas:A Spatial General Equilibrium Analysis[J]. Energy Economics,2013,40(2):515~528.
[7]Aine Driscoll,Lyons S,Mariuzzo F,et al. Simulating Demand for Electric Vehicles Using Revealed Preference Data[J]. Energy Policy,2013,62(7):686~696.
[8] Tian Y,Govindan K,Zhu Q. A System Dynamics Model Based on Evolutionary Game Theory for Green Supply Chain Management Diffusion Among Chinese Manufacturers[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production,2014,80(7):96~105.
[9]张国兴,张绪涛,程素杰,等.节能减排补贴政策下的企业与政府信号博弈模型[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(4):129~136.
[10]孙红霞,吕慧荣.新能源汽车后补贴时代政府与企业的演化博弈分析[J].软科学,2018,32(2):24~29.
[11]王海啸,缪小明.我国新能源汽车研发补贴的博弈研究[J].软科学,2013,(6):29~32.
[12]彭红枫,杨柳明,王黎雪.基于演化博弈的金融创新与激励型监管关系研究[J].中央财经大学学报,2016,(9):92~100.
[13]赵令锐,张骥骧.碳排放权交易中企业减排行为的演化博弈分析[J].科技管理研究,2016,36(5):215~221.
[14]白雪,张祥.新能源汽车“十三五”开局回顾及未来展望[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2017,19(2):39~44.