股东网络对控股股东私利行为的影响研究
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摘要
从股东网络结构出发,实证检验了非控股股东网络位置对控股股东私利行为的抑制效应。实证结果表明:非控股股东的网络位置中心度对控股股东私利行为具有显著的抑制效应;而机构投资者持股作为一项重要的内部治理机制,能够促进上述非控股股东网络中心度对控股股东私利行为的抑制效应。通过进一步研究,发现非控股股东网络中心度对非国有控股股东私利行为具有显著的抑制效应,但对国有控股股东私利行为的抑制效应并不显著;在完善的法律环境中,非控股股东网络中心度对控股股东私利行为的抑制作用显著,而较差的法律环境则会导致这一抑制作用失效。
Different from the perspective of ownership structure,this study,based on network structure perspective,examines inhibitory effects of non-controlling shareholders' network positions toward self-interested behaviors of controlling shareholders.Our results show that the non-controlling shareholders' network positions have positive inhibitory effect on self-interested behaviors of controlling shareholders.As an important governance mechanism,institutional investor ownership has positive adjusting influence to above-mentioned causality.Through further researches,we find that inhibitory effect of non-controlling shareholders' network position is significant to non-state-owned controlling shareholders' self-interested behaviors,but it is not significant to state-owned controlling shareholders' self-interested behaviors.Compared with poor legal environments,non-controlling shareholders' network position can inhibit self-interested behaviors of controlling shareholders effectively in perfect legal environments.
Different from the perspective of ownership structure,this study,based on network structure perspective,examines inhibitory effects of non-controlling shareholders' network positions toward self-interested behaviors of controlling shareholders.Our results show that the non-controlling shareholders' network positions have positive inhibitory effect on self-interested behaviors of controlling shareholders.As an important governance mechanism,institutional investor ownership has positive adjusting influence to above-mentioned causality.Through further researches,we find that inhibitory effect of non-controlling shareholders' network position is significant to non-state-owned controlling shareholders' self-interested behaviors,but it is not significant to state-owned controlling shareholders' self-interested behaviors.Compared with poor legal environments,non-controlling shareholders' network position can inhibit self-interested behaviors of controlling shareholders effectively in perfect legal environments.
引文
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[25]王化成,曹丰,叶康涛.监督还是掏空:大股东持股比例与股价崩盘风险[J].管理世界,2015(2):45-57.
[26]杨忠诚,王宗军.基于机构投资者的董事会效率变化研究[J].管理学报,2008,5(2):233-236.
[27]王琨,肖星.机构投资者持股与关联方占用的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2005,8(2):27-33.
[28]王运通,姜付秀.多个大股东能否降低公司债务融资成本[J].世界经济,2017,40(10):119-143.
[29]刘少波,马超.经理人异质性与大股东掏空抑制[J].经济研究,2016,51(4):129-145.
[30]严若森,华小丽,钱晶晶.组织冗余及产权性质调节作用下连锁董事网络对企业创新投入的影响研究[J].管理学报,2018,15(2):217-229.
[31]王小鲁,樊纲,余静文.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2017.
[32]李延喜,陈克兢,姚宏,等.基于地区差异视角的外部治理环境与盈余管理关系研究——兼论公司治理的替代保护作用[J].南开管理评论,2012,15(4):89-100.
[2]高闯,关鑫.社会资本、网络连带与上市公司终极股东控制权——基于社会资本理论的分析框架[J].中国工业经济,2008(9):88-97.
[3]JIANG G,LEE C M C,YUE H.Tunneling through Intercorporate Loans:The China Experience[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,98(1):1-20.
[4]FAN J P H, WONG T J. Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2002,33(3):401-425.
[5]洪剑峭,薛皓.股权制衡对关联交易和关联销售的持续性影响[J].南开管理评论,2008,11(1):24-30.
[6]涂国前,刘峰.制衡股东性质与制衡效果——来自中国民营化上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2010(11):132-142.
[7]姜付秀,马云飙,王运通.退出威胁能抑制控股股东私利行为吗?[J].管理世界,2015(5):147-159.
[8]BEUSELINCK C,BLANCO B,GARCíA LARA J M.The Role of Foreign Shareholders in Disciplining Financial Reporting[J].Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2017,44(5/6):558-592.
[9]GRANOVETTER M.Economic Action and Social Structure:The Problem of Embeddedness[J].American Journal of Sociology,1985,91(3):481-510.
[10]LIN N.Social Capital:A Theory of Social Structure and Action[M].New York:Cambridge University Press,2001.
[11]马连福,张琦,王丽丽.董事会网络位置与企业技术创新投入——基于技术密集型上市公司的研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2016,37(4):126-136.
[12]刘健,刘春林.不确定性下关联股东网络的并购经验与并购绩效研究[J].南开管理评论,2016,19(3):4-17.
[13]郝云宏,朱炎娟,金杨华.大股东控制权私利行为模式研究:伦理决策的视角[J].中国工业经济,2013(6):83-95.
[14]马磊,徐向艺.中国上市公司控制权私有收益实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2007(5):56-63.
[15]鲍丰华,赵亚普,田龙伟,等.嵌入视角下的连锁董事网络、制度环境与民营企业慈善捐赠[J].管理学报,2018,15(10):1 037-1 046.
[16]MCEVILY B,MARCUS A.Embedded Ties and the Acquisition of Competitive Capabilities[J].Strategic Management Journal,2005,26(11):1 033-1 055.
[17]JIANG G,RAO P,YUE H.Tunneling through Non-Operational Fund Occupancy:An Investigation Based on Officially Identified Activities[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2015,32(3):295-311.
[18]JIAN M,WONG T J.Propping through Related Party Transactions[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2010,15(1):70-105.
[19]WELLMAN B. Network Analysis:Some Basic Principles[J].Sociological Theory,1983,1(1):155-200.
[20]MARTIN G,G?ZüBüYüK R,BECERRA M.Interlocks and Firm Performance:The Role of Uncertainty in the Directorate Interlock-Performance Relationship[J].Strategic Management Journal,2015,36(2):235-253.
[21]FREEMAN L C. Centrality in Social Networks Conceptual Carification[J].Social Networks,1978,1(3):215-239.
[22]ZAHEER A,BELL G G.Benefiting from Network Position:Firm Capabilities,Structural Holes,and Performance[J].Strategic Management Journal,2005,26(9):809-825.
[23]陈运森,谢德仁.网络位置、独立董事治理与投资效率[J].管理世界,2011(7):113-127.
[24]REAGANS R,ZUCKERMAN E W.Networks,Diversity,and Productivity:The Social Capital of Corporate R&D Teams[J].Organization Science,2001,12(4):502-517.
[25]王化成,曹丰,叶康涛.监督还是掏空:大股东持股比例与股价崩盘风险[J].管理世界,2015(2):45-57.
[26]杨忠诚,王宗军.基于机构投资者的董事会效率变化研究[J].管理学报,2008,5(2):233-236.
[27]王琨,肖星.机构投资者持股与关联方占用的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2005,8(2):27-33.
[28]王运通,姜付秀.多个大股东能否降低公司债务融资成本[J].世界经济,2017,40(10):119-143.
[29]刘少波,马超.经理人异质性与大股东掏空抑制[J].经济研究,2016,51(4):129-145.
[30]严若森,华小丽,钱晶晶.组织冗余及产权性质调节作用下连锁董事网络对企业创新投入的影响研究[J].管理学报,2018,15(2):217-229.
[31]王小鲁,樊纲,余静文.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2017.
[32]李延喜,陈克兢,姚宏,等.基于地区差异视角的外部治理环境与盈余管理关系研究——兼论公司治理的替代保护作用[J].南开管理评论,2012,15(4):89-100.