公共物品供给与国内冲突的复发
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摘要
根据新制度经济学理论,不同类型的公共物品供给是国家对国民接受现存政治秩序和纳税的回报。长期的政治和社会经济物品供给不妥或不足会导致国民的"怨恨",破坏统治合法性,从而为反政府武装组织的动员和招募打开机会窗口,激发国内冲突。怨恨不会随着战争的结束而自动消失。对于普通士兵而言,怨恨是否会平息或化解取决于公共物品供给的变化。无论是原统治集团继续掌权,还是反叛集团取而代之,改善公共物品供给都是无法回避的问题,也是决定内战是否死灰复燃的关键因素。基于1947-2008年"武装冲突数据库"的"生存分析"支持了本文的基本假设,那就是公共物品供给显著地降低国内冲突复发的风险。经验研究还发现,战后和平建设主要是一个国内政治过程。国际战争、经济相互依存等国际因素会产生局部的显著影响,但作用并不大。国内政治物品的供给,尤其是政治参与和政治竞争对于冲突复发的遏制作用远比其他类型物品强。相对于经济物品,社会福利物品能够产生及时的作用,和平效果明显。此外,族群冲突的复发受制于更多类型的国内公共物品供给,因此较之非族群冲突,实现持久和平的机会更多,相对更容易化解。
According to Neo-Instituional Economics,different types of public goods are provided to the citizenry as a reward for their compliance with the existing political order as well as their due tax-paying.Long-term improper or insufficient provision of political and socio-economic goods is supposed to incur"resentment"among citizens,undermine the legitimacy of the political order,open a window of opportunity for mobilization and recruitment of the masses by armed anti-government groups,and eventually give rise to civil conflicts.Grievances,however,do not vanish automatically with the termination of a war.Whether the grievances of ordinary war participants can be addressed or not depends on the changes in the provision of public goods.Either ruling groups or rebel forces need to improve the provision of public goods as a means to success.It is also a key factor that determines whether the civil conflict will resurge.The"survival analysis"based on the Armed Conflict Database(1947-2008)lends support to the main hypothesis of this essay that public goods provision significantly reduces the risk of civil conflict recurrence.The empirical research also demonstrates that peace building is mainly a domestic political process,in which the impacts of international wars and economic interdependence are mild although significant.The provision of domestic political goods,particularly political participation and competition,plays a far greater role in preventing the recurrence of conflicts than that of other types of public goods.Compared to economic goods,social welfare goods generate timely and more pronounced effects that are conducive to peace.In addition,the recurrence of ethnic conflicts is empirically subject to more types of public goods provision than that of non-ethnic ones.As a result,ethnic conflicts are relatively more easily resolved and stand a good chance of achieving lasting peace.
According to Neo-Instituional Economics,different types of public goods are provided to the citizenry as a reward for their compliance with the existing political order as well as their due tax-paying.Long-term improper or insufficient provision of political and socio-economic goods is supposed to incur"resentment"among citizens,undermine the legitimacy of the political order,open a window of opportunity for mobilization and recruitment of the masses by armed anti-government groups,and eventually give rise to civil conflicts.Grievances,however,do not vanish automatically with the termination of a war.Whether the grievances of ordinary war participants can be addressed or not depends on the changes in the provision of public goods.Either ruling groups or rebel forces need to improve the provision of public goods as a means to success.It is also a key factor that determines whether the civil conflict will resurge.The"survival analysis"based on the Armed Conflict Database(1947-2008)lends support to the main hypothesis of this essay that public goods provision significantly reduces the risk of civil conflict recurrence.The empirical research also demonstrates that peace building is mainly a domestic political process,in which the impacts of international wars and economic interdependence are mild although significant.The provision of domestic political goods,particularly political participation and competition,plays a far greater role in preventing the recurrence of conflicts than that of other types of public goods.Compared to economic goods,social welfare goods generate timely and more pronounced effects that are conducive to peace.In addition,the recurrence of ethnic conflicts is empirically subject to more types of public goods provision than that of non-ethnic ones.As a result,ethnic conflicts are relatively more easily resolved and stand a good chance of achieving lasting peace.
引文
(1)关于内战/国内冲突的不同定义和操作方式,可参见Nicholas Sambanis,“What Is Civil War?Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.48,No.6(December 2004),pp.814-858。
(2)Charles Call,“Ending Wars,Building States,”in Charles Call and Vanessa Wyeth,eds.,Building States to Build Peace,Boulder,London:Lynne Rienner Publishers,2008,pp.1-22.
(3)Barbara Walter,“Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace,”Background Paper of World Development Report 2011,World Bank,September 13,2010,p.2.
(4)Roland Paris,ed.,At War’s End:Building Peace after Civil Conflict,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2004,p.6.
(5)卢凌宇:《认真对待“怨恨”:公共物品供给与国内冲突的发生》,载《世界经济与政治》2013年第11期,第130-133页。
(1)Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis,“Understanding Civil War:A New Agenda,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.46,No.1(February 2002),pp.3-12;Paul Collier,et al.,Breaking the Conflict Trap:Civil War and Development Policy,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2003.
(2)关于冲突复发的文献综述,可参见卢凌宇:《“冲突陷阱”研究述评》,载《国际观察》2018年第1期,第80-99页;Charles Call,Why Peace Fails:The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence,Washington,DC:Georgetown University Press,2012,pp.25-49;Tim Kovach,“Breaking the Conflict Trap:On the Factors Contributing to Civil War Recurrence,”Working paper,February 3,2013,pp.1-17。
(3)Fotini Christia,Alliance Formation in Civil Wars,Cambridge,MA:Cambridge University Press,2012.
(4)也有学者认为“怨恨”和“机会”无法充分地解释内战的复发,建议关注潜在的反叛者的政治选择以及他们同政府达成稳定共识的机会,参见Barbara Walter,“Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace,”Background Paper of World Development Report 2011,World Bank,September 13,2010,p.3。
(5)卢凌宇:《国内冲突的起源:“怨恨”还是“机会”》,载《中国社会科学报》2010年11月18日,第15版。
(6)也有一些例外,比如Lingyu Lu and Cameron Thies,“Economic Grievance and the Severity of Civil War,”Civil Wars,Vol.13,No.3(September 2011),pp.215-231。
(1)Francis Fukuyama,State-building Governance and World Order in the 21st Century,Ithaca,NY:Cornell University Press,2004.
(2)Barbara Walter,“Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace,”Background Paper of World Development Report 2011,World Bank,September 13,2010,p.7.也有少数例外,比如Stephen Stedman,“Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars:Lessons and Recommendations for Policymakers,”International Peace Academy and Center for International Security and Cooperation,working paper,New York,May 2001,pp.1-32。
(3)持这个观点的学者以芭芭拉·沃尔特为代表,参见Barbara Walter,“Does Conflict Beget Conflict?Explaining Recurring Civil War,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.41,No.3(May 2004),pp.371-388;Barbara Walter,“Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace,”Background Paper of World Development Report 2011,World Bank,September 13,2010,pp.1-41。
(4)Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl,“Enduring Rivalries:Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.37,No.2(June 1993),pp.147-171;Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl,“The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries:The Impact of Political Shocks,”American Journal of Political Science,Vol.39,No.1(February 1995),pp.30-52;Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz,War and Peace in International Rivalry,Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press,2000;William Thompson,“Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.45,No.3(December 2001),pp.557-586.
(5)例如Stephen Quackenbush and Jerome Venteicher,“Settlements,Outcomes,and the Recurrence of Conflict,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.45,No.6(November 2008),pp.723-742。
(1)Barbara Walter,“Does Conflict Beget Conflict?Explaining Recurring Civil War,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.41,No.3(May 2004),pp.371-388.
(2)Mark Bradbury,Becoming Somaliland,London:Progressio,2008.
(3)可参见Charles Call and William Stanley,“Civilian Security,”in Stephen Stedman,ed.,Ending Civil Wars:The Implementation of Peace Agreements,Boulder,CO:Lynne Rienner Publishers,2002,pp.303-326;Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler,“On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.46,No.1(February 2002),pp.13-28;Robert Orr,“The United States as Nation Builder:Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction,”in Robert Orr,ed.,Winning the Peace:An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction,Washington,D.C.:Center for Strategic and International Studies,2004,pp.3-18;Barnet Rubin,“The Politics of Security in Post-conflict State-building,”in Charles Call and Vanessa Wyeth,eds.,Building States to Build Peace,Boulder,CO:Lynne Rienner Publishers,2008,pp.25-48。
(1)Barbara Walter,“Designing Transitions from Civil War:Demobilization,Democratization,and Commitments to Peace,”International Security,Vol.24,No.1(Summer 1999),p.147.
(2)例如Tanja Ellingsen,“Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches’Brew?Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict during and after the Cold War,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.44,No.2(April 1999),pp.228-249。
(3)Susan Woodward,“Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation,”in Stephen Stedman,ed.,Ending Civil Wars:The Implementation of Peace Agreements,Boulder,CO:Lynne Rienner Publishers,2002,pp.183-214;J.M.Quinn,David Mason and Mehmet Gurses,“Sustaining the Peace:Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,”International Interactions,Vol.33,No.2(January2002),pp.167-193;Paul Collier,Anke Hoeffler and M?ns S?derbom,“Post-Conflict Risks,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.45,No.4(June 2008),pp.461-478;Nicholas Sambanis,“Short-and LongTerm Effects of UN Peace Operations,”World Bank Economic Review,Vol.22,No.1,2008,pp.9-32.
(4)John Lederach,Building Peace:Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies,Washington,D.C.:United States Institute of Peace Press,1997;Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler,“On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.46,No.1(February 2002),pp.13-28;John Prendergast and Emily Plumb,“Building Local Capacity:From Implementation to Peacebuilding,”in Stephen Stedman,ed.,Ending Civil Wars:The Implementation of Peace Agreements,Boulder,CO:Lynne Rienner Publishers,2002,pp.327-352;Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler,“Aid,Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies,”working paper,2002,pp.1-41,http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ball0144/research.htm;William Long and Peter Brecke,War and Reconciliation:Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution,Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,2003.
(5)Lisa Schirch,Ritual and Symbol in Peacebuilding,Bloomfield,CT:Kumarian Press,Inc.,2005.
(1)有少数学者试图用一个自变量来解释内战的发生和复发,比如“政治排斥”(political exclusion),参见Charles Call,Why Peace Fails:The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence,Washington,DC:Georgetown University Press,2012,pp.50-70。
(2)Ulrike Theuerkauf,“Institutional Design and Ethnic Violence:Do Grievances Help to Explain Ethnopolitical Instability,”Civil Wars,Vol.12,No.1/2(March-June 2010),pp.117-139.
(3)关于公共物品的定义,可参见Inge Kaul,“Defining Global Public Goods,”in Inge Kaul,Isabelle Grunberg and Marc Stern,eds.,Global Public Goods:International Cooperation in the 21st Century,New York:Oxford University Press,1999,pp.2-19;Paul Samuelson,“The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,”Review of Economics and Statistics,Vol.36,No.4(November 1954),pp.387-389。关于公共物品的特点和分类标准,请参见卢凌宇:《认真对待“怨恨”:公共物品供给与国内冲突的发生》,载《世界经济与政治》2013年第11期,第130-133页。
(4)卢凌宇:《认真对待“怨恨”:公共物品供给与国内冲突的发生》,载《世界经济与政治》2013年第11期,第126-127页。
(1)Barbara Walter,“Does Conflict Beget Conflict?Explaining Recurring Civil War,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.41,No.3(May 2004),pp.371-388.
(2)Ashraf Ghani,et al.,“Closing the Sovereignty Gap:An Approach to State-Building,”Overseas Development Institute,London,UK,2005,pp.1-20.
(1)Robert Orr,“The United States as Nation Builder:Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction,”in Robert Orr,ed.,Winning the Peace:An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction,Washington,D.C.:Center for Strategic and International Studies,2004,pp.3-18;Barnet Rubin,“The Politics of Security in Post-conflict State-building,”in Charles Call and Vanessa Wyeth,eds.,Building States to Build Peace,Boulder,London:Lynne Rienner Publishers,2008,pp.25-48.
(2)Mattes Michaela and Burcu Savun,“Fostering Peace after Civil War:Commitment Problems and Agreement Design,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.53,No.4(September 2009),pp.737-759.
(3)Virginia Fortna,Does Peacekeeping Work?Shaping Belligerents’Choices after Civil War,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2008.
(4)Joana Spear,“Disarmament and Demobilization,”in Stephen Stedman,ed.,Ending Civil Wars:The Implementation of Peace Agreements,Boulder,CO:Lynne Rienner Publishers,2002,pp.141-182.
(1)Caroline Hartzell,et al.,“Negotiated Civil War Settlements and Post-Conflict Governance:The Choice and Consequences of Institutional Design,”unpublished,Gettysburg College,Gettysburg,Penn.,1999,cited from Caroline Hartzell,et al.,“Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War:An Investigation of Some Key Variables,”International Organization,Vol.55,No.1(Winter 2001),pp.183-208.
(2)Alicia Levine,“Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence,”in Michael Brown,ed.,The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict,Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,1996,pp.311-340.
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(1)Amalendu Misra,Politics of Civil Wars:Conflict,Intervention and Resolution,London:Routledge,2008,p.1.
(2)William Douglas,“A Critique of Recent Trends in the Analysis of Ethnonationalism,”Ethnic and Racial Studies,Vol.11,No.2(April 1988),pp.192-206.
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(4)也可参见Elizabeth Crighton and Martha Mac Iver,“The Evolution of Protracted Ethnic Conflict:Group Dominance and Political Underdevelopment in Northern-Ireland and Lebanon,”Comparative Politics,Vol.23,No.1(January 1991),pp.127-142。
(5)参见Charles Tilly,Coercion,Capital and European States,AD 990-1992,Oxford:Blackwell Publishers,1990。
(6)Charles Call and Elizabeth Cousens,“Ending Wars and Building Peace,”International Studies Perspectives,Vol.9,No.1(January 2007),pp.1-21.
(1)Edward Miguel,Shanker Satyanath and Ernest Sergenti,“Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict:An Instrumental Variables Approach,”Journal of Political Economy,Vol.112,No.5(August 2004),pp.725-754.
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(3)Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff,Ethnic Conflict in World Politics,Boulder,CO:Westview,1994.
(4)Nicholas Sambanis,“Do Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?ATheoretical and Empirical Inquiry(Part 1),”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.45,No.3(June 2001),pp.259-282.
(5)Nicholas Sambanis,“Do Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?ATheoretical and Empirical Inquiry(Part 1),”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.45,No.3(June 2001),pp.259-282.
(6)Gudrun?stby,“Polarization,Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.45,No.2(March 2008),pp.143-162.
(7)F.Stewart,“Horizontal Inequalities:A Neglected Dimension of Development,”QEH Working Paper No.81,Oxford:Queen Elizabeth House,University of Oxford,2002,pp.1-40.
(1)Matt Bryden,“New Hope for Somalia?The Building Block Approach,”Review of African Political Economy,Vol.26,No.70(March 1999),pp.134-140.
(2)Matt Bryden,“New Hope for Somalia?The Building Block Approach,”Review of African Political Economy,Vol.26,No.70(March 1999),pp.134-140.
(3)World Bank,World Development Indicators(CD-ROM),Washington D.C.:World Bank,2010.
(4)Nils Gleditsch,Peter Wallensteen,Mikael Eriksson,Margareta Sollenberg and H?vard Strand,“Armed Conflict 1946-2001:A New Dataset,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.39,No.5(September2002),pp.615-637.
(1)Janet Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford Jones,Event History Modeling:A Guide for Social Scientists,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2004;Stephen Quackenbush and Jerome Venteicher,“Settlements,Outcomes,and the Recurrence of Conflict,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.45,No.6(November 2008),pp.723-742.
(1)表9是分裂模型,标准就是族群/非族群战争。
(1)关于这12个变量的数据来源以及具体操作,参见卢凌宇:《认真对待“怨恨”:公共物品供给与国内冲突的发生》,载《世界经济与政治》2013年第11期,第139-147页。
(2)后面的比例在0-100之间,100-比例表明政党竞争的激烈程度。
(3)上述指标的数据来源如下:(1)外交政策物品:Nils Gleditsch,Peter Wallensteen,Mikael Eriksson,Margareta Sollenberg and H?vard Strand,“Armed Conflict 1946-2001:A New Dataset,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.39,No.5(September 2002),pp.615-637;Arthur Banks,CrossNational Time-Series Data Archive,Jerusalem:Databanks International,2010。(2)国内政治物品:Tatu Vanhanen,“A New Dataset for Measuring Democracy,1810-1998,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.37,No.2(March 2000),pp.251-265;Nils Gleditsch,Peter Wallensteen,Mikael Eriksson,Margareta Sollenberg and H?vard Strand,“Armed Conflict 1946-2001:A New Dataset,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.39,No.5(September 2002),pp.615-637。(3)社会福利物品:Arthur Banks,Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive,Jerusalem:Databanks International,2010;Rodwan Abouharb and Anessa Kimball,“A New Dataset on Infant Mortality Rates,1816-2002,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.44,No.6(November 2007),pp.743-754。(4)经济物品:Arthur Banks,Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive,Jerusalem:Databanks International,2010;World Bank,“Conflict in Somalia:Drivers and Dynamics,”2005,http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOMALIA/Resources/conflictinsomalia.pdf。
(4)在现有关于国内冲突复发的文献中,维和行动(PKOs)是一个常见的控制变量。本文运行了两类模型,一类控制PKOs这个变量,另一类不控制,并没有发现实质性的差异。
(1)比如可参见Virginia Fortna,“Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.48,No.2(June 2004),pp.269-292;Virginia Fortna,Peace Time:Ceasefire Agreements and the Durability of Peace,Ithaca,NY:Cornell University Press,2004;J.M.Quinn,David Mason and Mehmet Gurses,“Sustaining the Peace:Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,”International Interactions,Vol.33,No.2(January2002),pp.167-193;T.David Mason,Mehmet Gurses,Patrick Brandt and Jason Michael Quinn,“When Civil Wars Recur:Conditions for Durable Peace after Civil Wars,”International Studies Perspective,Vol.12,No.2(May 2011),pp.171-189。
(2)Virginia Fortna,“Inside and Outside:Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars,”International Studies Review,Vol.5,No.4(December 2003),pp.97-114.
(3)Joakim Kreutz,“How and When Armed Conflicts End:Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.47,No.2(March 2010),pp.243-250.
(4)Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie,“Institutionalizing Peace:Power-sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management,”American Journal of Political Science,Vol.47,No.2(April 2003),pp.318-332.
(5)Anna Jarstad and Desiree Nilsson,“From Words to Deeds:The Implementation of PowerSharing Pacts in Peace Accords,”Conflict Management and Peace Science,Vol.25,No.3,2008,pp.206-223.
(1)Kristine Eck,“From Armed Conflict to War:Ethnic Mobilization and Conflict Intensification,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.53,No.2(September 2009),pp.369-388;Joakim Kreutz,“How and When Armed Conflicts End:Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.47,No.2(March 2010),pp.243-250.
(2)J.Singer,et al.,“Capability Distribution,Uncertainty,and Major Power War,1820-1965,”in Bruce Russett,ed.,Peace,War,and Numbers,Beverly Hills,CA:Sage,1972,pp.19-48.
(3)Barbara Walter,“Does Conflict Beget Conflict?Explaining Recurring Civil War,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.41,No.3(May 2004),pp.371-388;J.M.Quinn,David Mason and Mehmet Gurses,“Sustaining the Peace:Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,”International Interactions,Vol.33,No.2(January 2002),pp.167-193.
(4)Barbara Walter,“Does Conflict Beget Conflict?Explaining Recurring Civil War,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.41,No.3(May 2004),pp.371-388.
(5)Barbara Walter,“Does Conflict Beget Conflict?Explaining Recurring Civil War,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.41,No.3(May 2004),pp.371-388;J.M.Quinn,David Mason and Mehmet Gurses,“Sustaining the Peace:Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,”International Interactions,Vol.33,No.2(January 2002),pp.167-193.
(6)Barbara Walter,“Does Conflict Beget Conflict?Explaining Recurring Civil War,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.41,No.3(May 2004),pp.371-388;Barbara Walter,“Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace,”Background Paper of World Development Report 2011,World Bank,September 13,2010,pp.1-41.
(7)Joakim Kreutz,“How and When Armed Conflicts End:Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.47,No.2(March 2010),pp.243-250.
(1)作者曾考虑设置决定性胜利与和平协议的交互变量。从理论上讲,这个变量巩固和平的效果会更强大。但是,在本文的统计数据中,这两个变量互相排斥,所以作者把两者都保留在模型中,但没有设置它们的交互变量。
(2)关于考克斯模型在冲突复发研究中较近的应用,可参见Scott Wolford,“The Problem of Shared Victory:War-Winning Coalitions and Postwar Peace,”Journal of Politics,Vol.79,No.2(January 2017),pp.245-276。
(3)卢凌宇:《国家能力与国内冲突的复发》,载《国际安全研究》2015年第1期,第95-97页。
(4)Michael Ezell,Kenneth Land and Lawrence Cohen,“Modeling Multiple Failure Time Data:ASurvey of Variance-Corrected Proportional Hazards Models with Empirical Applications to Arrest Data,”Sociological Methodology,Vol.33,No.1,2003,pp.111-167;Per Andersen and R.Gill,“Cox’s Regression Model for Counting Processes:A Large Sample Study,”The Annals of Statistics,Vol.10,No.4(December 1982),pp.1100-1120;L.J.Wei,D.Y.Lin and L.Weissfeld,“Regression Analysis of Multivariate Incomplete Failure Time Data by Modeling Marginal Distributions,”Journal of the American Statistical Association,Vol.84,No.408(December 1989),pp.1065-1073;R.L.Prentice,B.J.Williams and A.V.Peterson,“On the Regression Analysis of Multivariate Failure Time Data,”Biometrika,Vol.68,No.44(August 1981),pp.373-379.关于魏布模型在内战复发研究中较近的应用,可参见Eric Keels,“Electoral Reforms and Peace Duration Following Negotiated Settlements,”International Interactions,Vol.23,No.1(February 2017),pp.1-26。
(1)Gary Goertz,Bradford Jones and Paul Diehl,“Maintenance Processes in International Rivalries,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.49,No.5(October 2005),pp.742-769;Paul Senese and Stephen Quackenbush,“The Effect of Dispute Settlements on Durations of Peace,”Journal of Politics,Vol.65,No.3(August 2003),pp.696-717.
(2)Janet Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford Jones,Event History Modeling:A Guide for Social Scientists,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2004.
(3)Peter Diggle,Patrick Heagerty,Kung-Yee Liang and Scott Zeger,Analysis of Longitudinal Data,2nd ed.,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1994,pp.138-140,146-147;Christopher Zorn,“Generalized Estimating Equation Models for Correlated Data:A Review Applications,”American Journal of Political Science,Vol.45,No.2(April 2001),pp.470-490.
(4)Christopher Zorn,“Generalized Estimating Equation Models for Correlated Data:A Review Applications,”American Journal of Political Science,Vol.45,No.2(April 2001),pp.470-490.
(5)Allison Bailey,We Shall Not Pass this Way Again:State-Building and the Long-Term Resolution of Civil Conflict,Ph.D.Dissertation of Political Science at Emory University,2005.
(1)Stephen Quackenbush and Jerome Venteicher,“Settlements,Outcomes,and the Recurrence of Conflict,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.45,No.6(November 2008),pp.723-742.
(2)Janet Box-Steffensmeier and Christopher Zorn,“Duration Models and Proportional Hazards in Political Science,”American Journal of Political Science,Vol.45,No.4(October 2001),pp.972-988.
(3)Mario Cleves,William Gould,Roberto Gutierrez and Yulia Marchenko,An Introduction to Survival Analysis Using Stata,College Station,TX:Stata Press,2004.
(4)卢凌宇:《认真对待“怨恨”:公共物品供给与国内冲突的发生》,载《世界经济与政治》2013年第11期,第148页。
(1)Marianne Dahl and Bj?rn H?yland,“Peace on Quicksand?Challenging the Conventional Wisdom about Economic Growth and Post-Conflict Risks,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.49,No.3(May 2012),pp.423-429.
(2)Paul Diehl,Daniel Druckman and James Wall,“International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution:A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.42,No.1(February 1998),pp.33-55.
(3)Havard Hegre,Scott Gates,Nils Petter Gleditsch and Tanja Ellingsen,“Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?Democracy,Political Chance and Civil War,1816-1992,”American Political Science Review,Vol.95,No.1(March 2001),pp.33-48.
(1)张春:《输家政治:非洲选举与族群冲突研究》,载《国际安全研究》2016年第1期,第117-145页;Dawn Brancati and Jack Snyder,“Time to Kill:The Impact of Election Timing on Postconflict Stability,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.57,No.5(October 2013),pp.822-853;Philip Roessler,Ethnic Politics and State Power in Africa:The Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap,Cambridge,MA:Cambridge University Press,2016。
(2)Meredith Sarkees,“The Correlates of War Data on War:An Update to 1997,”Conflict Management and Peace Science,Vol.18,No.1(September 2000),pp.123-144.
(3)比如Paul Collier et al.,The Conflict Trap:Civil War and Economic Development,Washington,D.C.:World Bank,2010;Astri Suhrke and Julia Buckmaster,“Aid,Growth,and Peace:A Comparative Analysis,”Conflict,Security and Development,Vol.6,No.3(October 2006),pp.354-357。
(1)Keith Darden and Harris Mylonas,“The Promethean Dilemma:Third-Party Nation-Building in Occupied Territories,”Ethnopolitics,Vol.11,No.1(October 2011),pp.1-9.
(2)Barbara Walter,“Does Conflict Beget Conflict?Explaining Recurring Civil War,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.41,No.3(May 2004),pp.371-388;J.M.Quinn,David Mason and Mehmet Gurses,“Sustaining the Peace:Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,”International Interactions,Vol.33,No.2(January 2002),pp.167-193.
(1)Aila Matanock,“Bullets for Ballots:Electoral Participation Provisions and Enduring Peace after Civil Conflict,”International Security,Vol.41,No.4(Spring 2017),pp.93-132.
(2)表5至表8可联系本文责任编辑获取。责任编辑电子邮箱:croton1985@163.com。
(1)Chalres Tilly and Sidney Tarrow,Contentious Politics,Boulder,CO:Paradigm Publishers,2007,p.137.
(2)Charles Call,“Liberia’s War Recurrence:Grievance over Greed,”Civil Wars,Vol.12,No.4(December 2010),pp.347-369.
(3)Charles Call,Why Peace Fails:The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence,Washington,DC:Georgetown University Press,2012,pp.6-8.
(1)卢凌宇:《认真对待“怨恨”:公共物品供给与国内冲突的发生》,载《世界经济与政治》2013年第11期,第151-152页。
(2)例如Pierre Englebert and Denis Tull,“Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa:Flawed Ideas about Failed States,”International Security,Vol.32,No.4(Spring 2008),pp.106-139;Ken Menkhaus,“Governance without Government in Somalia:Spoilers,State Building,and the Politics of Coping,”International Security,Vol.31,No.3(Winter 2006/2007),pp.74-106。
(2)Charles Call,“Ending Wars,Building States,”in Charles Call and Vanessa Wyeth,eds.,Building States to Build Peace,Boulder,London:Lynne Rienner Publishers,2008,pp.1-22.
(3)Barbara Walter,“Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace,”Background Paper of World Development Report 2011,World Bank,September 13,2010,p.2.
(4)Roland Paris,ed.,At War’s End:Building Peace after Civil Conflict,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2004,p.6.
(5)卢凌宇:《认真对待“怨恨”:公共物品供给与国内冲突的发生》,载《世界经济与政治》2013年第11期,第130-133页。
(1)Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis,“Understanding Civil War:A New Agenda,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.46,No.1(February 2002),pp.3-12;Paul Collier,et al.,Breaking the Conflict Trap:Civil War and Development Policy,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2003.
(2)关于冲突复发的文献综述,可参见卢凌宇:《“冲突陷阱”研究述评》,载《国际观察》2018年第1期,第80-99页;Charles Call,Why Peace Fails:The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence,Washington,DC:Georgetown University Press,2012,pp.25-49;Tim Kovach,“Breaking the Conflict Trap:On the Factors Contributing to Civil War Recurrence,”Working paper,February 3,2013,pp.1-17。
(3)Fotini Christia,Alliance Formation in Civil Wars,Cambridge,MA:Cambridge University Press,2012.
(4)也有学者认为“怨恨”和“机会”无法充分地解释内战的复发,建议关注潜在的反叛者的政治选择以及他们同政府达成稳定共识的机会,参见Barbara Walter,“Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace,”Background Paper of World Development Report 2011,World Bank,September 13,2010,p.3。
(5)卢凌宇:《国内冲突的起源:“怨恨”还是“机会”》,载《中国社会科学报》2010年11月18日,第15版。
(6)也有一些例外,比如Lingyu Lu and Cameron Thies,“Economic Grievance and the Severity of Civil War,”Civil Wars,Vol.13,No.3(September 2011),pp.215-231。
(1)Francis Fukuyama,State-building Governance and World Order in the 21st Century,Ithaca,NY:Cornell University Press,2004.
(2)Barbara Walter,“Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace,”Background Paper of World Development Report 2011,World Bank,September 13,2010,p.7.也有少数例外,比如Stephen Stedman,“Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars:Lessons and Recommendations for Policymakers,”International Peace Academy and Center for International Security and Cooperation,working paper,New York,May 2001,pp.1-32。
(3)持这个观点的学者以芭芭拉·沃尔特为代表,参见Barbara Walter,“Does Conflict Beget Conflict?Explaining Recurring Civil War,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.41,No.3(May 2004),pp.371-388;Barbara Walter,“Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace,”Background Paper of World Development Report 2011,World Bank,September 13,2010,pp.1-41。
(4)Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl,“Enduring Rivalries:Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.37,No.2(June 1993),pp.147-171;Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl,“The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries:The Impact of Political Shocks,”American Journal of Political Science,Vol.39,No.1(February 1995),pp.30-52;Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz,War and Peace in International Rivalry,Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press,2000;William Thompson,“Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.45,No.3(December 2001),pp.557-586.
(5)例如Stephen Quackenbush and Jerome Venteicher,“Settlements,Outcomes,and the Recurrence of Conflict,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.45,No.6(November 2008),pp.723-742。
(1)Barbara Walter,“Does Conflict Beget Conflict?Explaining Recurring Civil War,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.41,No.3(May 2004),pp.371-388.
(2)Mark Bradbury,Becoming Somaliland,London:Progressio,2008.
(3)可参见Charles Call and William Stanley,“Civilian Security,”in Stephen Stedman,ed.,Ending Civil Wars:The Implementation of Peace Agreements,Boulder,CO:Lynne Rienner Publishers,2002,pp.303-326;Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler,“On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.46,No.1(February 2002),pp.13-28;Robert Orr,“The United States as Nation Builder:Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction,”in Robert Orr,ed.,Winning the Peace:An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction,Washington,D.C.:Center for Strategic and International Studies,2004,pp.3-18;Barnet Rubin,“The Politics of Security in Post-conflict State-building,”in Charles Call and Vanessa Wyeth,eds.,Building States to Build Peace,Boulder,CO:Lynne Rienner Publishers,2008,pp.25-48。
(1)Barbara Walter,“Designing Transitions from Civil War:Demobilization,Democratization,and Commitments to Peace,”International Security,Vol.24,No.1(Summer 1999),p.147.
(2)例如Tanja Ellingsen,“Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches’Brew?Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict during and after the Cold War,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.44,No.2(April 1999),pp.228-249。
(3)Susan Woodward,“Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation,”in Stephen Stedman,ed.,Ending Civil Wars:The Implementation of Peace Agreements,Boulder,CO:Lynne Rienner Publishers,2002,pp.183-214;J.M.Quinn,David Mason and Mehmet Gurses,“Sustaining the Peace:Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,”International Interactions,Vol.33,No.2(January2002),pp.167-193;Paul Collier,Anke Hoeffler and M?ns S?derbom,“Post-Conflict Risks,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.45,No.4(June 2008),pp.461-478;Nicholas Sambanis,“Short-and LongTerm Effects of UN Peace Operations,”World Bank Economic Review,Vol.22,No.1,2008,pp.9-32.
(4)John Lederach,Building Peace:Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies,Washington,D.C.:United States Institute of Peace Press,1997;Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler,“On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.46,No.1(February 2002),pp.13-28;John Prendergast and Emily Plumb,“Building Local Capacity:From Implementation to Peacebuilding,”in Stephen Stedman,ed.,Ending Civil Wars:The Implementation of Peace Agreements,Boulder,CO:Lynne Rienner Publishers,2002,pp.327-352;Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler,“Aid,Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies,”working paper,2002,pp.1-41,http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ball0144/research.htm;William Long and Peter Brecke,War and Reconciliation:Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution,Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,2003.
(5)Lisa Schirch,Ritual and Symbol in Peacebuilding,Bloomfield,CT:Kumarian Press,Inc.,2005.
(1)有少数学者试图用一个自变量来解释内战的发生和复发,比如“政治排斥”(political exclusion),参见Charles Call,Why Peace Fails:The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence,Washington,DC:Georgetown University Press,2012,pp.50-70。
(2)Ulrike Theuerkauf,“Institutional Design and Ethnic Violence:Do Grievances Help to Explain Ethnopolitical Instability,”Civil Wars,Vol.12,No.1/2(March-June 2010),pp.117-139.
(3)关于公共物品的定义,可参见Inge Kaul,“Defining Global Public Goods,”in Inge Kaul,Isabelle Grunberg and Marc Stern,eds.,Global Public Goods:International Cooperation in the 21st Century,New York:Oxford University Press,1999,pp.2-19;Paul Samuelson,“The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,”Review of Economics and Statistics,Vol.36,No.4(November 1954),pp.387-389。关于公共物品的特点和分类标准,请参见卢凌宇:《认真对待“怨恨”:公共物品供给与国内冲突的发生》,载《世界经济与政治》2013年第11期,第130-133页。
(4)卢凌宇:《认真对待“怨恨”:公共物品供给与国内冲突的发生》,载《世界经济与政治》2013年第11期,第126-127页。
(1)Barbara Walter,“Does Conflict Beget Conflict?Explaining Recurring Civil War,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.41,No.3(May 2004),pp.371-388.
(2)Ashraf Ghani,et al.,“Closing the Sovereignty Gap:An Approach to State-Building,”Overseas Development Institute,London,UK,2005,pp.1-20.
(1)Robert Orr,“The United States as Nation Builder:Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction,”in Robert Orr,ed.,Winning the Peace:An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction,Washington,D.C.:Center for Strategic and International Studies,2004,pp.3-18;Barnet Rubin,“The Politics of Security in Post-conflict State-building,”in Charles Call and Vanessa Wyeth,eds.,Building States to Build Peace,Boulder,London:Lynne Rienner Publishers,2008,pp.25-48.
(2)Mattes Michaela and Burcu Savun,“Fostering Peace after Civil War:Commitment Problems and Agreement Design,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.53,No.4(September 2009),pp.737-759.
(3)Virginia Fortna,Does Peacekeeping Work?Shaping Belligerents’Choices after Civil War,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2008.
(4)Joana Spear,“Disarmament and Demobilization,”in Stephen Stedman,ed.,Ending Civil Wars:The Implementation of Peace Agreements,Boulder,CO:Lynne Rienner Publishers,2002,pp.141-182.
(1)Caroline Hartzell,et al.,“Negotiated Civil War Settlements and Post-Conflict Governance:The Choice and Consequences of Institutional Design,”unpublished,Gettysburg College,Gettysburg,Penn.,1999,cited from Caroline Hartzell,et al.,“Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War:An Investigation of Some Key Variables,”International Organization,Vol.55,No.1(Winter 2001),pp.183-208.
(2)Alicia Levine,“Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence,”in Michael Brown,ed.,The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict,Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,1996,pp.311-340.
(3)Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein,“Who Fights?The Determinants of Participation in Civil War,”American Journal of Political Science,Vol.52,No.2(April 2008),pp.436-455.
(1)Amalendu Misra,Politics of Civil Wars:Conflict,Intervention and Resolution,London:Routledge,2008,p.1.
(2)William Douglas,“A Critique of Recent Trends in the Analysis of Ethnonationalism,”Ethnic and Racial Studies,Vol.11,No.2(April 1988),pp.192-206.
(3)Ted Gurr,“Ethnic Warfare and the Changing Priorities of Global Security,”Mediterranean Quarterly,Vol.1,No.1,1990,pp.82-98.
(4)也可参见Elizabeth Crighton and Martha Mac Iver,“The Evolution of Protracted Ethnic Conflict:Group Dominance and Political Underdevelopment in Northern-Ireland and Lebanon,”Comparative Politics,Vol.23,No.1(January 1991),pp.127-142。
(5)参见Charles Tilly,Coercion,Capital and European States,AD 990-1992,Oxford:Blackwell Publishers,1990。
(6)Charles Call and Elizabeth Cousens,“Ending Wars and Building Peace,”International Studies Perspectives,Vol.9,No.1(January 2007),pp.1-21.
(1)Edward Miguel,Shanker Satyanath and Ernest Sergenti,“Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict:An Instrumental Variables Approach,”Journal of Political Economy,Vol.112,No.5(August 2004),pp.725-754.
(2)Yasemin Akbaba,“Who Discriminates More?Comparing Religious Discrimination in Western Democracies,Asia and the Middle East,”Civil Wars,Vol.11,No.3(September 2009),pp.321-358.
(3)Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff,Ethnic Conflict in World Politics,Boulder,CO:Westview,1994.
(4)Nicholas Sambanis,“Do Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?ATheoretical and Empirical Inquiry(Part 1),”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.45,No.3(June 2001),pp.259-282.
(5)Nicholas Sambanis,“Do Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?ATheoretical and Empirical Inquiry(Part 1),”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.45,No.3(June 2001),pp.259-282.
(6)Gudrun?stby,“Polarization,Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.45,No.2(March 2008),pp.143-162.
(7)F.Stewart,“Horizontal Inequalities:A Neglected Dimension of Development,”QEH Working Paper No.81,Oxford:Queen Elizabeth House,University of Oxford,2002,pp.1-40.
(1)Matt Bryden,“New Hope for Somalia?The Building Block Approach,”Review of African Political Economy,Vol.26,No.70(March 1999),pp.134-140.
(2)Matt Bryden,“New Hope for Somalia?The Building Block Approach,”Review of African Political Economy,Vol.26,No.70(March 1999),pp.134-140.
(3)World Bank,World Development Indicators(CD-ROM),Washington D.C.:World Bank,2010.
(4)Nils Gleditsch,Peter Wallensteen,Mikael Eriksson,Margareta Sollenberg and H?vard Strand,“Armed Conflict 1946-2001:A New Dataset,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.39,No.5(September2002),pp.615-637.
(1)Janet Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford Jones,Event History Modeling:A Guide for Social Scientists,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2004;Stephen Quackenbush and Jerome Venteicher,“Settlements,Outcomes,and the Recurrence of Conflict,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.45,No.6(November 2008),pp.723-742.
(1)表9是分裂模型,标准就是族群/非族群战争。
(1)关于这12个变量的数据来源以及具体操作,参见卢凌宇:《认真对待“怨恨”:公共物品供给与国内冲突的发生》,载《世界经济与政治》2013年第11期,第139-147页。
(2)后面的比例在0-100之间,100-比例表明政党竞争的激烈程度。
(3)上述指标的数据来源如下:(1)外交政策物品:Nils Gleditsch,Peter Wallensteen,Mikael Eriksson,Margareta Sollenberg and H?vard Strand,“Armed Conflict 1946-2001:A New Dataset,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.39,No.5(September 2002),pp.615-637;Arthur Banks,CrossNational Time-Series Data Archive,Jerusalem:Databanks International,2010。(2)国内政治物品:Tatu Vanhanen,“A New Dataset for Measuring Democracy,1810-1998,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.37,No.2(March 2000),pp.251-265;Nils Gleditsch,Peter Wallensteen,Mikael Eriksson,Margareta Sollenberg and H?vard Strand,“Armed Conflict 1946-2001:A New Dataset,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.39,No.5(September 2002),pp.615-637。(3)社会福利物品:Arthur Banks,Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive,Jerusalem:Databanks International,2010;Rodwan Abouharb and Anessa Kimball,“A New Dataset on Infant Mortality Rates,1816-2002,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.44,No.6(November 2007),pp.743-754。(4)经济物品:Arthur Banks,Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive,Jerusalem:Databanks International,2010;World Bank,“Conflict in Somalia:Drivers and Dynamics,”2005,http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOMALIA/Resources/conflictinsomalia.pdf。
(4)在现有关于国内冲突复发的文献中,维和行动(PKOs)是一个常见的控制变量。本文运行了两类模型,一类控制PKOs这个变量,另一类不控制,并没有发现实质性的差异。
(1)比如可参见Virginia Fortna,“Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.48,No.2(June 2004),pp.269-292;Virginia Fortna,Peace Time:Ceasefire Agreements and the Durability of Peace,Ithaca,NY:Cornell University Press,2004;J.M.Quinn,David Mason and Mehmet Gurses,“Sustaining the Peace:Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,”International Interactions,Vol.33,No.2(January2002),pp.167-193;T.David Mason,Mehmet Gurses,Patrick Brandt and Jason Michael Quinn,“When Civil Wars Recur:Conditions for Durable Peace after Civil Wars,”International Studies Perspective,Vol.12,No.2(May 2011),pp.171-189。
(2)Virginia Fortna,“Inside and Outside:Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars,”International Studies Review,Vol.5,No.4(December 2003),pp.97-114.
(3)Joakim Kreutz,“How and When Armed Conflicts End:Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.47,No.2(March 2010),pp.243-250.
(4)Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie,“Institutionalizing Peace:Power-sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management,”American Journal of Political Science,Vol.47,No.2(April 2003),pp.318-332.
(5)Anna Jarstad and Desiree Nilsson,“From Words to Deeds:The Implementation of PowerSharing Pacts in Peace Accords,”Conflict Management and Peace Science,Vol.25,No.3,2008,pp.206-223.
(1)Kristine Eck,“From Armed Conflict to War:Ethnic Mobilization and Conflict Intensification,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.53,No.2(September 2009),pp.369-388;Joakim Kreutz,“How and When Armed Conflicts End:Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.47,No.2(March 2010),pp.243-250.
(2)J.Singer,et al.,“Capability Distribution,Uncertainty,and Major Power War,1820-1965,”in Bruce Russett,ed.,Peace,War,and Numbers,Beverly Hills,CA:Sage,1972,pp.19-48.
(3)Barbara Walter,“Does Conflict Beget Conflict?Explaining Recurring Civil War,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.41,No.3(May 2004),pp.371-388;J.M.Quinn,David Mason and Mehmet Gurses,“Sustaining the Peace:Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,”International Interactions,Vol.33,No.2(January 2002),pp.167-193.
(4)Barbara Walter,“Does Conflict Beget Conflict?Explaining Recurring Civil War,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.41,No.3(May 2004),pp.371-388.
(5)Barbara Walter,“Does Conflict Beget Conflict?Explaining Recurring Civil War,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.41,No.3(May 2004),pp.371-388;J.M.Quinn,David Mason and Mehmet Gurses,“Sustaining the Peace:Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,”International Interactions,Vol.33,No.2(January 2002),pp.167-193.
(6)Barbara Walter,“Does Conflict Beget Conflict?Explaining Recurring Civil War,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.41,No.3(May 2004),pp.371-388;Barbara Walter,“Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace,”Background Paper of World Development Report 2011,World Bank,September 13,2010,pp.1-41.
(7)Joakim Kreutz,“How and When Armed Conflicts End:Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.47,No.2(March 2010),pp.243-250.
(1)作者曾考虑设置决定性胜利与和平协议的交互变量。从理论上讲,这个变量巩固和平的效果会更强大。但是,在本文的统计数据中,这两个变量互相排斥,所以作者把两者都保留在模型中,但没有设置它们的交互变量。
(2)关于考克斯模型在冲突复发研究中较近的应用,可参见Scott Wolford,“The Problem of Shared Victory:War-Winning Coalitions and Postwar Peace,”Journal of Politics,Vol.79,No.2(January 2017),pp.245-276。
(3)卢凌宇:《国家能力与国内冲突的复发》,载《国际安全研究》2015年第1期,第95-97页。
(4)Michael Ezell,Kenneth Land and Lawrence Cohen,“Modeling Multiple Failure Time Data:ASurvey of Variance-Corrected Proportional Hazards Models with Empirical Applications to Arrest Data,”Sociological Methodology,Vol.33,No.1,2003,pp.111-167;Per Andersen and R.Gill,“Cox’s Regression Model for Counting Processes:A Large Sample Study,”The Annals of Statistics,Vol.10,No.4(December 1982),pp.1100-1120;L.J.Wei,D.Y.Lin and L.Weissfeld,“Regression Analysis of Multivariate Incomplete Failure Time Data by Modeling Marginal Distributions,”Journal of the American Statistical Association,Vol.84,No.408(December 1989),pp.1065-1073;R.L.Prentice,B.J.Williams and A.V.Peterson,“On the Regression Analysis of Multivariate Failure Time Data,”Biometrika,Vol.68,No.44(August 1981),pp.373-379.关于魏布模型在内战复发研究中较近的应用,可参见Eric Keels,“Electoral Reforms and Peace Duration Following Negotiated Settlements,”International Interactions,Vol.23,No.1(February 2017),pp.1-26。
(1)Gary Goertz,Bradford Jones and Paul Diehl,“Maintenance Processes in International Rivalries,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.49,No.5(October 2005),pp.742-769;Paul Senese and Stephen Quackenbush,“The Effect of Dispute Settlements on Durations of Peace,”Journal of Politics,Vol.65,No.3(August 2003),pp.696-717.
(2)Janet Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford Jones,Event History Modeling:A Guide for Social Scientists,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2004.
(3)Peter Diggle,Patrick Heagerty,Kung-Yee Liang and Scott Zeger,Analysis of Longitudinal Data,2nd ed.,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1994,pp.138-140,146-147;Christopher Zorn,“Generalized Estimating Equation Models for Correlated Data:A Review Applications,”American Journal of Political Science,Vol.45,No.2(April 2001),pp.470-490.
(4)Christopher Zorn,“Generalized Estimating Equation Models for Correlated Data:A Review Applications,”American Journal of Political Science,Vol.45,No.2(April 2001),pp.470-490.
(5)Allison Bailey,We Shall Not Pass this Way Again:State-Building and the Long-Term Resolution of Civil Conflict,Ph.D.Dissertation of Political Science at Emory University,2005.
(1)Stephen Quackenbush and Jerome Venteicher,“Settlements,Outcomes,and the Recurrence of Conflict,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.45,No.6(November 2008),pp.723-742.
(2)Janet Box-Steffensmeier and Christopher Zorn,“Duration Models and Proportional Hazards in Political Science,”American Journal of Political Science,Vol.45,No.4(October 2001),pp.972-988.
(3)Mario Cleves,William Gould,Roberto Gutierrez and Yulia Marchenko,An Introduction to Survival Analysis Using Stata,College Station,TX:Stata Press,2004.
(4)卢凌宇:《认真对待“怨恨”:公共物品供给与国内冲突的发生》,载《世界经济与政治》2013年第11期,第148页。
(1)Marianne Dahl and Bj?rn H?yland,“Peace on Quicksand?Challenging the Conventional Wisdom about Economic Growth and Post-Conflict Risks,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.49,No.3(May 2012),pp.423-429.
(2)Paul Diehl,Daniel Druckman and James Wall,“International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution:A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.42,No.1(February 1998),pp.33-55.
(3)Havard Hegre,Scott Gates,Nils Petter Gleditsch and Tanja Ellingsen,“Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?Democracy,Political Chance and Civil War,1816-1992,”American Political Science Review,Vol.95,No.1(March 2001),pp.33-48.
(1)张春:《输家政治:非洲选举与族群冲突研究》,载《国际安全研究》2016年第1期,第117-145页;Dawn Brancati and Jack Snyder,“Time to Kill:The Impact of Election Timing on Postconflict Stability,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.57,No.5(October 2013),pp.822-853;Philip Roessler,Ethnic Politics and State Power in Africa:The Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap,Cambridge,MA:Cambridge University Press,2016。
(2)Meredith Sarkees,“The Correlates of War Data on War:An Update to 1997,”Conflict Management and Peace Science,Vol.18,No.1(September 2000),pp.123-144.
(3)比如Paul Collier et al.,The Conflict Trap:Civil War and Economic Development,Washington,D.C.:World Bank,2010;Astri Suhrke and Julia Buckmaster,“Aid,Growth,and Peace:A Comparative Analysis,”Conflict,Security and Development,Vol.6,No.3(October 2006),pp.354-357。
(1)Keith Darden and Harris Mylonas,“The Promethean Dilemma:Third-Party Nation-Building in Occupied Territories,”Ethnopolitics,Vol.11,No.1(October 2011),pp.1-9.
(2)Barbara Walter,“Does Conflict Beget Conflict?Explaining Recurring Civil War,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.41,No.3(May 2004),pp.371-388;J.M.Quinn,David Mason and Mehmet Gurses,“Sustaining the Peace:Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,”International Interactions,Vol.33,No.2(January 2002),pp.167-193.
(1)Aila Matanock,“Bullets for Ballots:Electoral Participation Provisions and Enduring Peace after Civil Conflict,”International Security,Vol.41,No.4(Spring 2017),pp.93-132.
(2)表5至表8可联系本文责任编辑获取。责任编辑电子邮箱:croton1985@163.com。
(1)Chalres Tilly and Sidney Tarrow,Contentious Politics,Boulder,CO:Paradigm Publishers,2007,p.137.
(2)Charles Call,“Liberia’s War Recurrence:Grievance over Greed,”Civil Wars,Vol.12,No.4(December 2010),pp.347-369.
(3)Charles Call,Why Peace Fails:The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence,Washington,DC:Georgetown University Press,2012,pp.6-8.
(1)卢凌宇:《认真对待“怨恨”:公共物品供给与国内冲突的发生》,载《世界经济与政治》2013年第11期,第151-152页。
(2)例如Pierre Englebert and Denis Tull,“Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa:Flawed Ideas about Failed States,”International Security,Vol.32,No.4(Spring 2008),pp.106-139;Ken Menkhaus,“Governance without Government in Somalia:Spoilers,State Building,and the Politics of Coping,”International Security,Vol.31,No.3(Winter 2006/2007),pp.74-106。