非捆绑性冲突管理战略的选择:第三方调停还是双边协商
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摘要
武力冲突中的冲突双方在选择第三方调停和双边协商这两种相似的冲突管理战略时遵循着相反的战略考量。当前,以和平方式管理冲突成为结束武力冲突的主流。而在冲突管理的诸多战略中,相较于捆绑性冲突管理战略,非捆绑性冲突管理战略又更为普及。但是,同属于非捆绑性战略,为什么有些冲突双方选择了第三方调停,而有些冲突双方选择了双边协商?这是当前研究中未曾得到系统回答的问题。从国际关系研究中不确定性机制的视角看,冲突管理开始时冲突双方对对方继续冲突决心的不确定性水平高低是导致冲突双方在第三方调停和双边协商的选择上产生分野的直接原因。冲突双方力量差距、冲突中冲突双方政权更替情况以及冲突已产生的沉没成本是测量和评估冲突双方对对方继续冲突决心的不确定性水平的三个重要因素。当冲突双方力量差距较小,冲突双方中一方以上发生或即将发生政权更替以及冲突管理开始前冲突的高沉没成本,都将使冲突双方倾向于选择第三方调停;反之,则选择双边协商的可能性更大。
The selection of mediation and negotiation which are similar in practice follows opposite strategic motives in the conflict management process. Compared with achieving a decisive victory, the peaceful management of the conflict serves as the mainstream in the violent conflict resolution process. And within a number of conflict management strategies, the non-binding strategies are more prevalent than the binding strategies in practice. However, while both of them belong to the non-binding conflict management strategy, why do some of disputants select mediation while others turn to negotiation instead? Furthermore, why mediation, which is more costly, is more prevalent than negotiation, which is less costly? These are the questions which are not given a systematic study in the existing research. Through introducing the uncertainty mechanism into the analysis, this article argues that the different levels of disputants' uncertainty regarding opponents' resolve to continue fighting contributes to the different selections of mediation or negotiation in the conflict management process. Three influential factors are applied to capture the level of uncertainty: the power disparity between the disputants, the change of leadership between the disputants, and the sunk cost of the conflict when conflict management process initiates. By compiling the International Conflict Management(ICM) 1945-2003 dataset for the analysis, I find that mediation is more likely when the power disparity is small, and there is or will be a leadership change during the conflict, as well as a large sunk cost of the conflict. Otherwise, the selection of negotiation is more likely. Based on the empirical analysis, the article discusses the results with case studies jointly, which renders important policy implications to the relevant research further.
The selection of mediation and negotiation which are similar in practice follows opposite strategic motives in the conflict management process. Compared with achieving a decisive victory, the peaceful management of the conflict serves as the mainstream in the violent conflict resolution process. And within a number of conflict management strategies, the non-binding strategies are more prevalent than the binding strategies in practice. However, while both of them belong to the non-binding conflict management strategy, why do some of disputants select mediation while others turn to negotiation instead? Furthermore, why mediation, which is more costly, is more prevalent than negotiation, which is less costly? These are the questions which are not given a systematic study in the existing research. Through introducing the uncertainty mechanism into the analysis, this article argues that the different levels of disputants' uncertainty regarding opponents' resolve to continue fighting contributes to the different selections of mediation or negotiation in the conflict management process. Three influential factors are applied to capture the level of uncertainty: the power disparity between the disputants, the change of leadership between the disputants, and the sunk cost of the conflict when conflict management process initiates. By compiling the International Conflict Management(ICM) 1945-2003 dataset for the analysis, I find that mediation is more likely when the power disparity is small, and there is or will be a leadership change during the conflict, as well as a large sunk cost of the conflict. Otherwise, the selection of negotiation is more likely. Based on the empirical analysis, the article discusses the results with case studies jointly, which renders important policy implications to the relevant research further.
引文
(1)第三方调停是指冲突双方通过邀请一个第三方介入冲突管理过程,通过和平方式从中斡旋,从而达到平息冲突这一目的的战略。
(2)双边协商是指冲突双方通过举行直接的和平谈判来达到平息冲突这一目的的战略。
(3)Patrick M. Regan and Allan C. Stam, “In the Nick of Time: Conflict Management, Mediation Timing, and the Duration of Interstate Disputes,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.44, No.2, 2000, pp.239-260; Russell J. Leng and Patrick M. Regan, “Social and Political Cultural Effects on the Outcomes of Mediation in Militarized Interstate Disputes,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.47, No.3, 2003, pp.431-452; Yoram Z. Haftel, “Designing for Peace: Regional Integration Arrangements, Institutional Variation, and Militarized Interstate Disputes,” International Organization, Vol.61, No.1, 2007, pp.217-237; Katherine Barbieri, “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.33, No.1, 1996,pp.29-49; Paul F. Diehl, Jennifer Reifschneider and Paul R. Hensel, “United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict,” International Organization, Vol.50, No.4, 1996, pp.683-700.
(4)《中国坚持通过谈判解决中国与菲律宾在南海的有关争议(全文)》,http://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2016-07/13/c_1119210479.htm,访问时间:2018年12月4日。
(5)《首次中国—阿富汗—巴基斯坦三方外长对话联合新闻公报》,https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/t1522137.shtml,访问时间:2018年12月4日。
(6)Stephen E. Gent and Megan Shannon, “Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict Management: Choosing the Ties That Bind,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.55, No.5, 2011, pp.710-734; Emilia Justyna Powell and Krista E. Wiegand, “Strategic Selection: Political and Legal Mechanisms of Territorial Dispute Resolution,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.51, No.3, 2014, pp.361-374.
(7)Stephen E. Gent and Megan Shannon, “Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict Management: Choosing the Ties That Bind,” pp.710-734.
(8)在主要的冲突管理战略分类中,第三方调停和双边协商也是非捆绑性战略中仅有的两类。
(9)这里的成本有因第三方介入使冲突双方留在谈判中不可轻易退出而产生的时间和妥协成本,还有因第三方利益入侵风险而带来的额外成本。
(10)Paul R. Hensel, “Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816-1992,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.45, No.1, 2001, pp.81-109; Patrick Regan and Russell J. Leng, “Culture and Negotiation in Militarized Interstate Disputes,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.20, No.2, 2003, pp.111-132; Hoon Lee and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, “Foreign Direct Investment and Territorial Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.56, No.4, 2012, pp.675-703; Holley E. Hansen, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Stephen C. Nemeth, “IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: Moving Beyond the Global Versus Regional Dichotomy,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.52, No.2, 2008, pp.295-325; Megan Shannon, “Preventing War and Providing the Peace? International Organizations and the Management of Territorial Disputes,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.26, No.2, 2009, pp.144-163; Derrick V. Frazier and William J. Dixon, “Third-Party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements, 1946-2000,” International Conflict Mediation, London: Routledge, 2008, pp.61-84; Jacob Bercovitch, Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, “The Management and Termination of Protracted Interstate Conflicts: Conceptual and Empirical Considerations,” Millennium, Vol.26, No.3, 1997, pp.751-769; 漆海霞、张鸿文:《国际冲突中调停者的偏向与调停效果》,载《国际安全研究》,2015年第4期,第129—154、159—160页;陈然、漆海霞:《国际组织调停研究的争论与发展》,载《国际政治科学》,2014年第1期,第73—99页;漆海霞:《国际调停历史与策略的量化分析——兼析朝核问题六方会谈》,载《世界经济与政治》,第98—117、158—159页;陈冲:《多方调停的社会网络分析》,载《国际政治科学》,2012年第4期,第18—62页;卢璟、陈冲:《国际调停发生的讨价还价模型:一种定量检验》,载《国际政治科学》,第58—81、157—158页;陈冲、卢璟:《国际危机调停的供需因素(1918—2001)》,载《国际政治科学》,2011年第2期,第1—40页;陈冲:《国际冲突调停的理论与方法争鸣——评〈调停国际危机〉、〈国际冲突调停〉与〈国际调停互动〉》,载《当代亚太》,2011年第3期,第132—157页。
(11)本文所要讨论的是冲突双方共同的决策倾向,而非对冲突中一方或者逐一对每一个冲突方的决策倾向进行讨论。
(12)雅各布·贝尔科维奇曾尝试对第三方调停及双边协商的选择机制进行讨论,但由于缺少明确的理论和过于宽泛的讨论,使得对两种战略选择没有做出清晰的区分。参见Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, “Negotiation or Mediation? An Exploration of Factors Affecting the Choice of Conflict Management in International Conflict,” Negotiation Journal, Vol.17, No.1, 2001, pp.59-77。
(13)或者自行退出会承担高成本的惩罚性后果。
(14)Stephen E. Gent and Megan Shannon, “Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict Management: Choosing the Ties That Bind,” pp.710-734; Emilia Justyna Powell and Krista E. Wiegand, “Strategic Selection: Political and Legal Mechanisms of Territorial Dispute Resolution,” pp.361-374.
(15)Joel P. Trachtman and Philip M. Moremen, “Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Whose Right Is It Anyway,” Harvard International Law Journal, Vol.44, 2003, p.221; Lesley G. Terris and Zeev Maoz, “Rational Mediation: A Theory and a Test,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.42, No.5, 2005, pp.563-583; Quan Li, “Foreign Direct Investment and Interstate Military Conflict,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol.62, No.1, 2008, pp.53-66.
(16)每种战略的最终预期收益将由多方面因素共同决定,如冲突烈度、冲突方式等。
(17)Christopher W. Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2014, p.6.
(18)Muhammet A. Bas and Robert J. Schub, “How Uncertainty About War Outcomes Affects War Onset,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.60, No.6, 2016, pp.1099-1128.
(19)James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization, Vol.49, No.3, 1995, pp.379-414; Branislav L. Slantchev, “The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States,” American Political Science Review, Vol.97, No.1, 2003, pp.123-133; Branislav L. Slantchev, “Military Coercion in Interstate Crises,” American Political Science Review, Vol.99, No.4, 2005, pp.533-547; Branislav L. Slantchev, “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations,” American Political Science Review, Vol.97, No.4, 2003, pp.621-632; Branislav L. Slantchev, “Feigning Weakness,” International Organization, Vol.64, No.3, 2010, pp.357-388; James D. Morrow, “Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.33, No.4, 1989, pp.941-972; Robert Powell, “Bargaining and Learning While Fighting,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.48, No.2, 2004, pp.344-361; Andrew Kydd, “Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.47, No.4, 2003, pp.597-611.
(20)具体论述可参见James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” pp.379-414。
(21)接受冲突管理与对冲突管理表现多大诚意是两个不同的议题。参见Molly M. Melin and Isak Svensson, “Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars,” International Interactions, Vol.35, No.3, 2009, pp.249-271; J. Michael Greig and Patrick M. Regan, “When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.52, No.4, 2008, pp.759-781。
(22)Peter Wallensteen and Isak Svensson, “Talking Peace: International Mediation in Armed Conflicts,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.51, No.2, 2014, pp.315-327.
(23)Peter Wallensteen and Isak Svensson, “Talking Peace: International Mediation in Armed Conflicts,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.51, No.2, 2014, pp.315-327.
(24)Muhammet A. Bas and Robert Schub, “Theoretical and Empirical Approaches to Uncertainty and Conflict in International Relations,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, 2017, http://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-537,访问时间:2019年1月4日。
(25)David Singer, Stuart Bremer and John Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820--1965,” in Bruce M. Russett, ed., Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills/London: Sage, 1972, pp.19-48; Robert Powell, “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.5, No.1, 2002, pp.1-30.
(26)否则,冲突管理一旦失败,为了弥补冲突管理造成的沉没成本,力量较强一方将通过武力获取更多,而力量较弱一方也将因此失去更多,这是力量较弱一方不愿意承担的结果。因此,当接受冲突管理时,力量较弱一方将倾向于展示更多诚意,而力量较强一方也因本身的优势而不惮于反馈更多的诚意,从而获得较之于继续战斗更大的收益。此外,斯兰特雪夫和费伦都认为,无论力量强弱,战争对冲突双方都是不利的。参见Branislav L. Slantchev, “The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States,” pp.123-133; Branislav L. Slantchev, “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations,” pp.621-632; James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” pp.379-414。
(27)Joakim Kreutz, “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.47, No.2, 2010, pp.243-250; Kamarulzaman Askandar, Jacob Bercowtch and Mikio Oishi, “The ASEAN Way of Conflict Management: Old Patterns and New Trends,” Asian Journal of Political Science, Vol.10, No.2, 2002, pp.21-42; Nigel Lo, Barry Hashimoto and Dan Reiter, “Ensuring Peace: Foreign-Imposed Regime Change and Postwar Peace Duration, 1914-2001,” International Organization, Vol.62, No.4, 2008, pp.717-736.
(28)在此,政权更替是指政治领导权更替,而非政治体制更替。
(29)Kyle Beardsley and Nigel Lo, “Third-Party Conflict Management and the Willingness to Make Concessions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.58, No.2, 2014, pp.363-392; Clayton L. Thyne, “Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences: The Effect of Interstate Relations on Civil War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.50, No.6, 2006, pp.937-961; Bethany Lacina, “Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.50, No.2, 2006, pp.276-289; Kyle Beardsley, “Agreement Without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency Problems,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.52, No.4, 2008, pp.723-740.
(30)根据战争相关指数(COW)数据库的定义,高烈度的战争是指总体相关伤亡在1000人以上的冲突。
(31)其中,非洲1634例、中东911例、欧洲893例、亚太地区707例、西亚和南亚474例、中南美洲447例。从冲突类型的角度分类,则有国家间冲突管理2046例、国内冲突管理3020例。
(32)这里需要厘清一个调停研究中长期混淆的问题,即对第三方调停是否发生以及对选择何种调停方的分析是基于不同因素。对于是否选择第三方调停,冲突双方更关注于已产生的沉没成本;而对于选择何种调停方,冲突双方更多会考量调停将以什么方式进行、调停的目标是什么。因此,选择调停与否是基于当前的判断,而选择调停方则更多体现对前景的预期。
(33)武力是否使用以及使用武力的等级。
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(36)David B. Carter and Paul Poast, “Why Do States Build Walls? Political Economy, Security, and Border Stability,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.61, No.2, 2017, pp.239-270; Monica Duffy Toft, “Territory and War,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.51, No.2, 2014, pp.185-198.
(37)Sandra Montoya, “Inter and Intrastate Conflicts Nexus: The Colombian Peace Process, as a Means to Prevent Interstate Conflicts in South America and Rethink Regional Security,” 2017, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2973973,访问时间:2019年1月4日; Lucas Hahn, “Global Economic Expansion and the Prevalence of Militarized Interstate Disputes,” Honors Projects in Economics, Paper 24, 2016, https://digitalcommons.bryant.edu/honors_economics/24,访问时间:2019年1月4日。
(38)例如中日就钓鱼岛及其周边海域的争端便包含了领土、油气开采权等多方面的诉求。
(39)James Heckman, “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error (with an Application to the Estimation of Labor Supply Functions),” Econometrica, Vol.47, No.1, 1977, pp.153-161.
(40)James Heckman, “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error (with an Application to the Estimation of Labor Supply Functions),” pp.153-161; James Heckman, “Varieties of Selection Bias,” The American Economic Review, Vol.80, No.2, 1990, pp.313-318; Chun-Lo Meng and Peter Schmidt, “On the Cost of Partial Observability in the Bivariate Probit Model,” International Economic Review, Vol.26, No.1, 1985, pp.71-85; Jeffrey A. Dubin and Douglas Rivers, “Selection Bias in Linear Regression, Logit and Probit Models,” Sociological Methods & Research, Vol.18, No.2-3, 1989, pp.360-390.
(41)其他的两步选择模型还有萨多丽选择模型(Sartori Selection Model)等。
(42)Lee Sigelman and Langche Zeng, “Analyzing Censored and Sample-Selected Data with Tobit and Heckit Models,” Political Analysis, Vol.8, No.2, 1999, pp.167-182; Tobias B?hmelt, “The Effectiveness of Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies in Third-Party Interventions,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.47, No.2, 2010, pp.167-178.
(43)Anne E. Sartori, “An Estimator for Some Binary-Outcome Selection Models Without Exclusion Restrictions,” Political Analysis, Vol.11, No.2, 2003, pp.111-138.
(44)James Heckman, “Varieties of Selection Bias,” pp.313-318.
(45)因此,删节probit模型的最终表达方式为: a.选择方程Y=α1+β1*力量差距+β2*政权更替+β3*冲突相关伤亡+β4*冲突方关系+β5*冲突方同质性+β6*冲突方联合度+β7*议题复杂性+β8*共同民主性+ε1。 b.结果方程选择方程Y=α2+β1*力量差距+β2*政权更替+β3*冲突相关伤亡+β4*冲突方关系+β5*冲突方同质性+β6*冲突方联合度+β7*议题复杂性+ε2。 其中,。此外,logistic模型方程与此处结果方程相同。
(46)Jon Abbink, “Briefing: The Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Dispute,” African Affairs, Vol.97, No.389, 1998, pp.551-565; Ken Menkhaus and John Prendergast, “Conflict and Crisis in the Greater Horn of Africa,” Current History, Vol.98, No.628, 1999, p.213; John G. Nyuot Yoh, “Peace Processes and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa,” African Security Studies, Vol.12, No.3, 2003, pp.83-93.
(47)Huliaras Asteris, “Qadhafi's Comeback: Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s,” African Affairs, Vol.100, No.398, 2001, pp.5-25; Kevin Hamilton, “Beyond the Border War: The Ethio-Eritrean Conflict and International Mediation Efforts,” Journal of Public and International Affairs, Vol.11, No.1, 2000, pp.113-136.
(48)吴志成、陈一一:《美国在黄岩岛与钓鱼岛问题上的立场缘何不同?》,载《现代国际关系》,2013年第4期,第31—36页。
(49)虽然中菲黄岩岛争端也曾经在2016年经历过“第三方仲裁”,但是此次仲裁本身并未得到中国的认可,因此并不能算作真正意义上的仲裁。
(50)《中国坚持通过谈判解决中国与菲律宾在南海的有关争议(全文)》,http://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2016-07/13/c_1119210479.htm,访问时间:2018年12月4日。
(51)这一种对其他变量取真实值的预测概率的计算方法较之经典的预测概率计算方法更准确。参见Michael Hanmer and Kerem Ozan Kalkan, “Behind the Curve: Clarifying the Best Approach to Calculating Predicted Probabilities and Marginal Effects from Limited Dependent Variable Models,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.57, No.1, 2013, pp.263-277。
(52)Sumathi Subbiah, “Security Council Mediation and the Kashmir Dispute: Reflections on Its Failures and Possibilities for Renewal,” BC Int'l & Comp. L. Rev., Vol.27, No.1, 2004, p.173; Ali Khan, “The Kashmir Dispute: A Plan for Regional Cooperation,” Colum. J. Transnat'l L., Vol.31, 1993, p.495.
(53)谢勇:《萨瓦卡尔的“两个民族理论”与“印巴分治”》,载《东南亚南亚研究》,2017年第1期,第37—43页;劳拉·舒尔曼、冯传禄:《南亚的地缘战略动态及克什米尔问题》,载《印度洋经济体研究》,2017年第1期,第60—70页;王伟华:《基于亚洲新安全观的克什米尔问题解决方案》,载《国际展望》,2014年第6期,第71—89页。
(54)Paul F. Diehl, Jennifer Reifschneider and Paul R. Hensel, “United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict,” pp.683-700; Paul S. Kapur, “India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not like Cold War Europe,” International Security, Vol.30, No.2, 2005, pp.127-152; Stephen Philip Cohen, “India, Pakistan and Kashmir,” in Sumit Gengulty, ed., India as an Emerging Power, London: Routledge, 2003, pp.36-63.
(55)Jér?me Tubiana and Emily Walmsley, The Chad-Sudan Proxy War and the “Darfurization” of Chad: Myths and Reality, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2008.
(56)Elke Grawert, “Cross-Border Dynamics of Violent Conflict: The Case of Sudan and Chad,” Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol.43, No.6, 2008, pp.595-614; Patrick Berg, “A Crisis-Complex, Not Complex Crises: Conflict Dynamics in the Sudan, Chad, and Central African Republic Tri-Border Area,” Central African Conflict Dynamics, IPG 4, 2008, pp.72-86.
(57)James D. Morrow, “Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining,” pp.941-972; Robert Powell, “Bargaining and Learning While Fighting,” pp.344-361; Andrew Kydd, “Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation,” pp.597-611.
(58)《中国介入南苏丹内战调停凸显对非影响力》,http://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/waimeishuo/nansudan/,访问时间:2018年12月20日。
(59)《南苏丹冲突双方领导人直接谈判未获实质突破》,http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0622/c1002-30077723.html,访问时间:2018年12月22日。
(60)Nguyen Hong Thao, “Vietnam and the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea,” Ocean Development & International Law, Vol.32, No.2, 2001, pp.105-130;李忠林:《印尼和菲律宾专属经济区划界及对中菲南海争端的启示》,载《亚太安全与海洋研究》,2016 年第 5 期,第33—47页。
(61)《中国—菲律宾南海问题双边磋商机制第一次会议联合新闻稿》,http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2017-05/20/nw.D110000renmrb_20170520_4-03.htm,访问时间:2018年12月20日。
(2)双边协商是指冲突双方通过举行直接的和平谈判来达到平息冲突这一目的的战略。
(3)Patrick M. Regan and Allan C. Stam, “In the Nick of Time: Conflict Management, Mediation Timing, and the Duration of Interstate Disputes,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.44, No.2, 2000, pp.239-260; Russell J. Leng and Patrick M. Regan, “Social and Political Cultural Effects on the Outcomes of Mediation in Militarized Interstate Disputes,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.47, No.3, 2003, pp.431-452; Yoram Z. Haftel, “Designing for Peace: Regional Integration Arrangements, Institutional Variation, and Militarized Interstate Disputes,” International Organization, Vol.61, No.1, 2007, pp.217-237; Katherine Barbieri, “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.33, No.1, 1996,pp.29-49; Paul F. Diehl, Jennifer Reifschneider and Paul R. Hensel, “United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict,” International Organization, Vol.50, No.4, 1996, pp.683-700.
(4)《中国坚持通过谈判解决中国与菲律宾在南海的有关争议(全文)》,http://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2016-07/13/c_1119210479.htm,访问时间:2018年12月4日。
(5)《首次中国—阿富汗—巴基斯坦三方外长对话联合新闻公报》,https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/t1522137.shtml,访问时间:2018年12月4日。
(6)Stephen E. Gent and Megan Shannon, “Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict Management: Choosing the Ties That Bind,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.55, No.5, 2011, pp.710-734; Emilia Justyna Powell and Krista E. Wiegand, “Strategic Selection: Political and Legal Mechanisms of Territorial Dispute Resolution,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.51, No.3, 2014, pp.361-374.
(7)Stephen E. Gent and Megan Shannon, “Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict Management: Choosing the Ties That Bind,” pp.710-734.
(8)在主要的冲突管理战略分类中,第三方调停和双边协商也是非捆绑性战略中仅有的两类。
(9)这里的成本有因第三方介入使冲突双方留在谈判中不可轻易退出而产生的时间和妥协成本,还有因第三方利益入侵风险而带来的额外成本。
(10)Paul R. Hensel, “Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816-1992,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.45, No.1, 2001, pp.81-109; Patrick Regan and Russell J. Leng, “Culture and Negotiation in Militarized Interstate Disputes,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.20, No.2, 2003, pp.111-132; Hoon Lee and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, “Foreign Direct Investment and Territorial Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.56, No.4, 2012, pp.675-703; Holley E. Hansen, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Stephen C. Nemeth, “IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: Moving Beyond the Global Versus Regional Dichotomy,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.52, No.2, 2008, pp.295-325; Megan Shannon, “Preventing War and Providing the Peace? International Organizations and the Management of Territorial Disputes,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.26, No.2, 2009, pp.144-163; Derrick V. Frazier and William J. Dixon, “Third-Party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements, 1946-2000,” International Conflict Mediation, London: Routledge, 2008, pp.61-84; Jacob Bercovitch, Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, “The Management and Termination of Protracted Interstate Conflicts: Conceptual and Empirical Considerations,” Millennium, Vol.26, No.3, 1997, pp.751-769; 漆海霞、张鸿文:《国际冲突中调停者的偏向与调停效果》,载《国际安全研究》,2015年第4期,第129—154、159—160页;陈然、漆海霞:《国际组织调停研究的争论与发展》,载《国际政治科学》,2014年第1期,第73—99页;漆海霞:《国际调停历史与策略的量化分析——兼析朝核问题六方会谈》,载《世界经济与政治》,第98—117、158—159页;陈冲:《多方调停的社会网络分析》,载《国际政治科学》,2012年第4期,第18—62页;卢璟、陈冲:《国际调停发生的讨价还价模型:一种定量检验》,载《国际政治科学》,第58—81、157—158页;陈冲、卢璟:《国际危机调停的供需因素(1918—2001)》,载《国际政治科学》,2011年第2期,第1—40页;陈冲:《国际冲突调停的理论与方法争鸣——评〈调停国际危机〉、〈国际冲突调停〉与〈国际调停互动〉》,载《当代亚太》,2011年第3期,第132—157页。
(11)本文所要讨论的是冲突双方共同的决策倾向,而非对冲突中一方或者逐一对每一个冲突方的决策倾向进行讨论。
(12)雅各布·贝尔科维奇曾尝试对第三方调停及双边协商的选择机制进行讨论,但由于缺少明确的理论和过于宽泛的讨论,使得对两种战略选择没有做出清晰的区分。参见Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, “Negotiation or Mediation? An Exploration of Factors Affecting the Choice of Conflict Management in International Conflict,” Negotiation Journal, Vol.17, No.1, 2001, pp.59-77。
(13)或者自行退出会承担高成本的惩罚性后果。
(14)Stephen E. Gent and Megan Shannon, “Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict Management: Choosing the Ties That Bind,” pp.710-734; Emilia Justyna Powell and Krista E. Wiegand, “Strategic Selection: Political and Legal Mechanisms of Territorial Dispute Resolution,” pp.361-374.
(15)Joel P. Trachtman and Philip M. Moremen, “Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Whose Right Is It Anyway,” Harvard International Law Journal, Vol.44, 2003, p.221; Lesley G. Terris and Zeev Maoz, “Rational Mediation: A Theory and a Test,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.42, No.5, 2005, pp.563-583; Quan Li, “Foreign Direct Investment and Interstate Military Conflict,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol.62, No.1, 2008, pp.53-66.
(16)每种战略的最终预期收益将由多方面因素共同决定,如冲突烈度、冲突方式等。
(17)Christopher W. Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2014, p.6.
(18)Muhammet A. Bas and Robert J. Schub, “How Uncertainty About War Outcomes Affects War Onset,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.60, No.6, 2016, pp.1099-1128.
(19)James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization, Vol.49, No.3, 1995, pp.379-414; Branislav L. Slantchev, “The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States,” American Political Science Review, Vol.97, No.1, 2003, pp.123-133; Branislav L. Slantchev, “Military Coercion in Interstate Crises,” American Political Science Review, Vol.99, No.4, 2005, pp.533-547; Branislav L. Slantchev, “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations,” American Political Science Review, Vol.97, No.4, 2003, pp.621-632; Branislav L. Slantchev, “Feigning Weakness,” International Organization, Vol.64, No.3, 2010, pp.357-388; James D. Morrow, “Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.33, No.4, 1989, pp.941-972; Robert Powell, “Bargaining and Learning While Fighting,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.48, No.2, 2004, pp.344-361; Andrew Kydd, “Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.47, No.4, 2003, pp.597-611.
(20)具体论述可参见James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” pp.379-414。
(21)接受冲突管理与对冲突管理表现多大诚意是两个不同的议题。参见Molly M. Melin and Isak Svensson, “Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars,” International Interactions, Vol.35, No.3, 2009, pp.249-271; J. Michael Greig and Patrick M. Regan, “When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.52, No.4, 2008, pp.759-781。
(22)Peter Wallensteen and Isak Svensson, “Talking Peace: International Mediation in Armed Conflicts,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.51, No.2, 2014, pp.315-327.
(23)Peter Wallensteen and Isak Svensson, “Talking Peace: International Mediation in Armed Conflicts,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.51, No.2, 2014, pp.315-327.
(24)Muhammet A. Bas and Robert Schub, “Theoretical and Empirical Approaches to Uncertainty and Conflict in International Relations,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, 2017, http://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-537,访问时间:2019年1月4日。
(25)David Singer, Stuart Bremer and John Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820--1965,” in Bruce M. Russett, ed., Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills/London: Sage, 1972, pp.19-48; Robert Powell, “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.5, No.1, 2002, pp.1-30.
(26)否则,冲突管理一旦失败,为了弥补冲突管理造成的沉没成本,力量较强一方将通过武力获取更多,而力量较弱一方也将因此失去更多,这是力量较弱一方不愿意承担的结果。因此,当接受冲突管理时,力量较弱一方将倾向于展示更多诚意,而力量较强一方也因本身的优势而不惮于反馈更多的诚意,从而获得较之于继续战斗更大的收益。此外,斯兰特雪夫和费伦都认为,无论力量强弱,战争对冲突双方都是不利的。参见Branislav L. Slantchev, “The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States,” pp.123-133; Branislav L. Slantchev, “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations,” pp.621-632; James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” pp.379-414。
(27)Joakim Kreutz, “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.47, No.2, 2010, pp.243-250; Kamarulzaman Askandar, Jacob Bercowtch and Mikio Oishi, “The ASEAN Way of Conflict Management: Old Patterns and New Trends,” Asian Journal of Political Science, Vol.10, No.2, 2002, pp.21-42; Nigel Lo, Barry Hashimoto and Dan Reiter, “Ensuring Peace: Foreign-Imposed Regime Change and Postwar Peace Duration, 1914-2001,” International Organization, Vol.62, No.4, 2008, pp.717-736.
(28)在此,政权更替是指政治领导权更替,而非政治体制更替。
(29)Kyle Beardsley and Nigel Lo, “Third-Party Conflict Management and the Willingness to Make Concessions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.58, No.2, 2014, pp.363-392; Clayton L. Thyne, “Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences: The Effect of Interstate Relations on Civil War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.50, No.6, 2006, pp.937-961; Bethany Lacina, “Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.50, No.2, 2006, pp.276-289; Kyle Beardsley, “Agreement Without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency Problems,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.52, No.4, 2008, pp.723-740.
(30)根据战争相关指数(COW)数据库的定义,高烈度的战争是指总体相关伤亡在1000人以上的冲突。
(31)其中,非洲1634例、中东911例、欧洲893例、亚太地区707例、西亚和南亚474例、中南美洲447例。从冲突类型的角度分类,则有国家间冲突管理2046例、国内冲突管理3020例。
(32)这里需要厘清一个调停研究中长期混淆的问题,即对第三方调停是否发生以及对选择何种调停方的分析是基于不同因素。对于是否选择第三方调停,冲突双方更关注于已产生的沉没成本;而对于选择何种调停方,冲突双方更多会考量调停将以什么方式进行、调停的目标是什么。因此,选择调停与否是基于当前的判断,而选择调停方则更多体现对前景的预期。
(33)武力是否使用以及使用武力的等级。
(34)Constantin Ruhe, “Anticipating Mediated Talks: Predicting the Timing of Mediation with Disaggregated Conflict Dynamics,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.52, No.2, 2015, pp.243-257; Ezra Schricker, The Indirect Effects of Mediation: A Dynamic Model of Mediation and Conflict, Ph.D. Dissertation, the Ohio State University, 2016.
(35)Holley E. Hansen, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Stephen C. Nemeth, “IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: Moving Beyond the Global Versus Regional Dichotomy,” pp.295-325; Paul R. Hensel, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Thomas E. Sowers II, “Conflict Management of Riparian Disputes,” Political Geography, Vol.25, No.4, 2006, pp.383-411; Kyle Beardsley and Nathan Danneman, “Mediation in International Conflicts,” in Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, Searchable and Linkable Resource, 2015, pp.1-13; Paul F. Diehl and Patrick Regan, “The Interdependence of Conflict Management Attempts,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.32, No.1, 2015, pp.99-107.
(36)David B. Carter and Paul Poast, “Why Do States Build Walls? Political Economy, Security, and Border Stability,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.61, No.2, 2017, pp.239-270; Monica Duffy Toft, “Territory and War,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.51, No.2, 2014, pp.185-198.
(37)Sandra Montoya, “Inter and Intrastate Conflicts Nexus: The Colombian Peace Process, as a Means to Prevent Interstate Conflicts in South America and Rethink Regional Security,” 2017, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2973973,访问时间:2019年1月4日; Lucas Hahn, “Global Economic Expansion and the Prevalence of Militarized Interstate Disputes,” Honors Projects in Economics, Paper 24, 2016, https://digitalcommons.bryant.edu/honors_economics/24,访问时间:2019年1月4日。
(38)例如中日就钓鱼岛及其周边海域的争端便包含了领土、油气开采权等多方面的诉求。
(39)James Heckman, “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error (with an Application to the Estimation of Labor Supply Functions),” Econometrica, Vol.47, No.1, 1977, pp.153-161.
(40)James Heckman, “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error (with an Application to the Estimation of Labor Supply Functions),” pp.153-161; James Heckman, “Varieties of Selection Bias,” The American Economic Review, Vol.80, No.2, 1990, pp.313-318; Chun-Lo Meng and Peter Schmidt, “On the Cost of Partial Observability in the Bivariate Probit Model,” International Economic Review, Vol.26, No.1, 1985, pp.71-85; Jeffrey A. Dubin and Douglas Rivers, “Selection Bias in Linear Regression, Logit and Probit Models,” Sociological Methods & Research, Vol.18, No.2-3, 1989, pp.360-390.
(41)其他的两步选择模型还有萨多丽选择模型(Sartori Selection Model)等。
(42)Lee Sigelman and Langche Zeng, “Analyzing Censored and Sample-Selected Data with Tobit and Heckit Models,” Political Analysis, Vol.8, No.2, 1999, pp.167-182; Tobias B?hmelt, “The Effectiveness of Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies in Third-Party Interventions,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.47, No.2, 2010, pp.167-178.
(43)Anne E. Sartori, “An Estimator for Some Binary-Outcome Selection Models Without Exclusion Restrictions,” Political Analysis, Vol.11, No.2, 2003, pp.111-138.
(44)James Heckman, “Varieties of Selection Bias,” pp.313-318.
(45)因此,删节probit模型的最终表达方式为: a.选择方程Y=α1+β1*力量差距+β2*政权更替+β3*冲突相关伤亡+β4*冲突方关系+β5*冲突方同质性+β6*冲突方联合度+β7*议题复杂性+β8*共同民主性+ε1。 b.结果方程选择方程Y=α2+β1*力量差距+β2*政权更替+β3*冲突相关伤亡+β4*冲突方关系+β5*冲突方同质性+β6*冲突方联合度+β7*议题复杂性+ε2。 其中,。此外,logistic模型方程与此处结果方程相同。
(46)Jon Abbink, “Briefing: The Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Dispute,” African Affairs, Vol.97, No.389, 1998, pp.551-565; Ken Menkhaus and John Prendergast, “Conflict and Crisis in the Greater Horn of Africa,” Current History, Vol.98, No.628, 1999, p.213; John G. Nyuot Yoh, “Peace Processes and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa,” African Security Studies, Vol.12, No.3, 2003, pp.83-93.
(47)Huliaras Asteris, “Qadhafi's Comeback: Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s,” African Affairs, Vol.100, No.398, 2001, pp.5-25; Kevin Hamilton, “Beyond the Border War: The Ethio-Eritrean Conflict and International Mediation Efforts,” Journal of Public and International Affairs, Vol.11, No.1, 2000, pp.113-136.
(48)吴志成、陈一一:《美国在黄岩岛与钓鱼岛问题上的立场缘何不同?》,载《现代国际关系》,2013年第4期,第31—36页。
(49)虽然中菲黄岩岛争端也曾经在2016年经历过“第三方仲裁”,但是此次仲裁本身并未得到中国的认可,因此并不能算作真正意义上的仲裁。
(50)《中国坚持通过谈判解决中国与菲律宾在南海的有关争议(全文)》,http://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2016-07/13/c_1119210479.htm,访问时间:2018年12月4日。
(51)这一种对其他变量取真实值的预测概率的计算方法较之经典的预测概率计算方法更准确。参见Michael Hanmer and Kerem Ozan Kalkan, “Behind the Curve: Clarifying the Best Approach to Calculating Predicted Probabilities and Marginal Effects from Limited Dependent Variable Models,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.57, No.1, 2013, pp.263-277。
(52)Sumathi Subbiah, “Security Council Mediation and the Kashmir Dispute: Reflections on Its Failures and Possibilities for Renewal,” BC Int'l & Comp. L. Rev., Vol.27, No.1, 2004, p.173; Ali Khan, “The Kashmir Dispute: A Plan for Regional Cooperation,” Colum. J. Transnat'l L., Vol.31, 1993, p.495.
(53)谢勇:《萨瓦卡尔的“两个民族理论”与“印巴分治”》,载《东南亚南亚研究》,2017年第1期,第37—43页;劳拉·舒尔曼、冯传禄:《南亚的地缘战略动态及克什米尔问题》,载《印度洋经济体研究》,2017年第1期,第60—70页;王伟华:《基于亚洲新安全观的克什米尔问题解决方案》,载《国际展望》,2014年第6期,第71—89页。
(54)Paul F. Diehl, Jennifer Reifschneider and Paul R. Hensel, “United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict,” pp.683-700; Paul S. Kapur, “India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not like Cold War Europe,” International Security, Vol.30, No.2, 2005, pp.127-152; Stephen Philip Cohen, “India, Pakistan and Kashmir,” in Sumit Gengulty, ed., India as an Emerging Power, London: Routledge, 2003, pp.36-63.
(55)Jér?me Tubiana and Emily Walmsley, The Chad-Sudan Proxy War and the “Darfurization” of Chad: Myths and Reality, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2008.
(56)Elke Grawert, “Cross-Border Dynamics of Violent Conflict: The Case of Sudan and Chad,” Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol.43, No.6, 2008, pp.595-614; Patrick Berg, “A Crisis-Complex, Not Complex Crises: Conflict Dynamics in the Sudan, Chad, and Central African Republic Tri-Border Area,” Central African Conflict Dynamics, IPG 4, 2008, pp.72-86.
(57)James D. Morrow, “Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining,” pp.941-972; Robert Powell, “Bargaining and Learning While Fighting,” pp.344-361; Andrew Kydd, “Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation,” pp.597-611.
(58)《中国介入南苏丹内战调停凸显对非影响力》,http://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/waimeishuo/nansudan/,访问时间:2018年12月20日。
(59)《南苏丹冲突双方领导人直接谈判未获实质突破》,http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0622/c1002-30077723.html,访问时间:2018年12月22日。
(60)Nguyen Hong Thao, “Vietnam and the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea,” Ocean Development & International Law, Vol.32, No.2, 2001, pp.105-130;李忠林:《印尼和菲律宾专属经济区划界及对中菲南海争端的启示》,载《亚太安全与海洋研究》,2016 年第 5 期,第33—47页。
(61)《中国—菲律宾南海问题双边磋商机制第一次会议联合新闻稿》,http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2017-05/20/nw.D110000renmrb_20170520_4-03.htm,访问时间:2018年12月20日。