世界贸易组织上诉机构的危机与改革
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摘要
世界贸易组织争端解决机制的高效运行,对维护多边贸易体制的良好运作并促进世界经济贸易的稳定发展至关重要。美国持续阻挠上诉机构成员选任,致使世界贸易组织上诉机构和争端解决机制面临危机。这一危机深刻反映了近年来世界经济格局调整下的多边主义困境,是逆全球化趋势、世界贸易组织成员经济力量对比发生变化及法律层面等多重原因共同作用的结果。包括中国在内的世界贸易组织成员为回应这场危机提出各种改革方案,但因并未触及美国核心诉求而尚未奏效。世界贸易组织上诉机构的改革,不仅要考虑成员控制与上诉机构独立性之间的平衡,而且要以全面的系统的视野去应对。鉴于上诉机构即将停止运作这一迫在眉睫的危机,中国应联合其他重要世界贸易组织成员采取紧急行动,考虑启动多数成员投票程序,设计利用替代性上诉仲裁,并将国际规则引领与国内深化改革有机结合。
引文
(1)See Renato Ruggiero (Former WTO Director-General),The Future Path of the Multilateral Treading System——Address to the Korean Business Association in Seoul,Korea,https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sprr_e/seoul_e.htm,2019-01-09.
(2)参见赵维田:《论GATT/世贸组织争端解决机制》,《法学研究》1997年第3期。
(3)See WTO,Appellate Body Appointments Revision,WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.8,February 2019;WTO,Dispute Settlement Body Annual Report (2018),WT/DSB/W/76,30 November 2018.最近两次(2019年3月和4月)的争端解决机构会议议程上未出现关于上诉机构成员选任的议题。
(4)See Alan Wolff,The WTO and the Future of the Global Trading System,Speech Delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington D.C.,https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/ddgra_15oct18_e.htm,2019-01-10.
(5)See WTO,The Summary of the DSB Meeting on Feb.25,2019 – Member Considers Thai Request for Panel to Rule on Turkish Air Conditioner Duties,https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/dsb_25feb19_e.htm,2019-02-28.
(6)See Robert Howse,The World Trade Organization 20 Years on:Global Governance by Judiciary,27 European Journal of International Law,72 (2016).
(7)See Ian M.Sheldon,et.al.,Trade Liberalization and Constraints on Moves to Protectionism:Multilateralism vs.Regionalism,100 American Journal of Agricultural Economics,1375 (2018).
(8)See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,The 2018 American and Chinese Trade Wars Risk Undermining the World Trading System and Constitutional Democratics,EUI Working Paper Law 2018/17,http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/59444/LAW_2018_17.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y,2019-02-01.
(9)See Ian Bremmer,Us vs.Them :The Failure of Globalism,Portfolio/Penguin,2018,pp.1-204;胡加祥:《美国贸易保护主义国内法源流评析——兼评232条款和301条款》,《经贸法律评论》2019年第1期。
(10)See Daniel Deudney & Jeffrey Meiser,American Exceptionalism,in Michael Cox,Doug Stokes ed.,US Foreign Policy 2nd.,Oxford University Press,2012,pp.21-40.
(11)See WTO General Council,Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements under WTO Agreements:Communication from the U.S.,JOB/GC/148,Oct.2017;China — Certain Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights,Constitution of the Panel established at the request of the United States,Note by the Secretariat?,WT/DS542/9,17 January 2019;United States– Countervailing Measures on Certain Pipe and Tube Products(Turkey),Notification of an Appeal by the United States under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dispute(DSU),and Under Rule 20(1)of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review,WT/DS523/5,30 January 2019.
(12)See Mark Wu,The China Inc.Challenge to Global Trade Governance,57 Harvard International Law Journal,300-316 (2016).
(13)See WTO,An Undifferentiated WTO:Self-declared Development Status Risks Institutional Irrelevance - Communication from the United States,WT/GC/W/757,Jan.2019.
(14)See USTR,2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program,https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2019_Trade_Policy_Agenda_and_2018_Annual_Report.pdf,2019-03-04.
(15)See Alec S.Sweet,Thomas L.Brunnell,Turstee Courts and the Judicialization of International Regimes:The Politics of Majoritarian Activism in the European Convention on Human Rights,The European Union,and the World Trade Organization,1 Journal of Law and Courts,64-66 (2013).
(16)这里的国际公法的习惯解释规则指的是1969年《维也纳条约法公约》第31条和第32条规定的解释方法。关于世贸组织争端解决中的条约解释原则,see Yuejiao Zhang,The Contribution of WTO Appellate Body to Treaty Interpretation,in Robert AAzewdo,Gabrielle Marceau ed.,A History of Law and Lawyers in the GATT/WTO:The Development of the Rule of Law in the Multilateral Trading System,Cambridge University Press,2015,pp.57-96.
(17)See Judith Goldstein,Richard Steinberg,Regulatory Shift:The Rise of Judicial Liberalization at the WTO,in Walter Matti,Ngaire Woods ed.,The Politics of Global Regulation,Princeton University Press,2009,pp.211-241.
(18)See Bernard M.Hoekman,Michel M Kostecki,The Political Economy of World Trade System:The WTO and Beyond,3rd edition,Oxford University Press,2010,pp.638-663.
(19)See Debra Steger,The Founding of the Appellate Body,in Robert AAzewdo,Gabrielle Marceau ed.,A History of Law and Lawyers in the GATT/WTO:The Development of the Rule of Law in the Multilateral Trading System,Cambridge University Press,2015,pp.247-250.
(20)See Robert McDougall,Crisis in the WTO:Restoring the WTO Dispute Settlement Function,https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/Paper%20no.194.pdf,2019-01-15.
(21)See USTR,Further Contribution of the U.S.on Improving Flexibility and Member Control in WTO Dispute Settlement:Communication from the U.S.,TN/DS/W/82 & TN/DS/W82/Add.1,Oct.2005.
(22)See WTO,Working Procedures for Appellate Review,WT/AB/WP/W11,July.2010.
(23)See USTR,The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda,https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2018/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report%20I.pdf,2019-01-16.
(24)See WTO,Statement by Ambassador Robert Lighthizer United States Trade Representative,WT/MIN(17)/ST/128,Jan.2018.
(25)See WTO,Minutes of the Meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body,WT/DSB/M/379,May 2016.
(26)See Raj Bhala,The Power of the Past:Toward De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication,33 George Washington International Law Review,968 (2001) ;David Palmeter,The WTO as a Legal System,24 Fordham International Law Journal,471 (2000) .
(27)See European Union,Concept Paper –WTO Modernization Future EU Proposals on Dispute Settlement,http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157331.pdf,2019-01-18.
(28)See WTO,Strenthening and Modernizing the WTO:Discussion Paper,JOB/GC/201,Sep.2018.
(29)See WTO,Joint Communique of the Ottawa Group on WTO Reform – Comminication from Canada,WT/L/1057,January 2019.
(30)See WTO,Fostering A Discussion on the Functioning of the Appellate Body:Addressing the Issue of Alleged Judicial Activism by the Appellate Body,Communication from Honduras,WT/GC/W/760,January 2019.
(31)See WTO,Communication from the European Union,China,Canada,India,Norway,New Zealand,Switzerland,Australia,Republic of Korea,Iceland,Singapore,Mexico,Costa Rica and Montenegro to the General Council,WT/GC/W/752/Rev.2,December 2018.
(32)See WTO,Communication from the European Union,China,Canada to the General Council,WT/GC/W/753,Nov.2018;WT/GC/W/753/Rev.1,December 2018.
(33)See WTO,Adjudicative Bodies:Adding to or Diminishing Rights or Obligations under the WTO Agreement,WT/GC/W/754,Nov.2018;WT/GC/W/754/Rev.2,December 2018.
(34)See WTO,Fostering A Discussion on the Functioning of the Appellate Body,Communication from Honduras,WT/GC/W/758,Jan 2019;WT/GC/W/759,January 2019.
(35)See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann,The Workload of the WTO Appellate Body:Problems and Remedies,20 Journal of International Economic Law,706-707 (2017).
(36)See WTO,Fostering a Discussion on the Functioning of the Appellate Body,Communication from Honduras,WT/GC/W/758,WT/GC/W/759,January 2019.
(37)See WTO,Argentina – Measures Relating to Goods and Services,WT/DS453/AB/R,April 2016.
(38)See WTO,Fostering A Discussion on the Functioning of the Appellate Body,Addressing the Issue of Alleged Judicial Activism by the Appellate Body,Communication from Honduras,WT/GC/W/760,January 2019.
(39)关于完成法律分析,一般是指在某些上诉案件中,当上诉机构推翻专家组的某项法律认定后,因缺乏将案件发回重审的权力,根据专家组报告中的事实认定继续完成相关的法律分析。See Alan Yanovich,Tania Voon,Completing the Analysis in WTO Appeals:The Practice and Its Limitations,9 Journal of International Economic Law,934-936 (2006).
(40)See WTO,Communication from the European Union,China,Canada,India,Norway,New Zealand,Switzerland,Australia,Republic of Korea,Iceland,Singapore,Mexico,Costa Rica and Montenegro to the General Council,WT/GC/W/752/Rev.2,December 2018.
(41)See Robert McDougall,Crisis in the WTO:Restoring the WTO Dispute Settlement Function,https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/Paper%20no.194.pdf,2019-01-18.
(42)See WTO,Fostering a Discussion on the Functioning of the Appellate Body:Addressing the Issue of Alleged Judicial Activism by the Appellate Body,Communication from Honduras,WT/GC/W/760,January 2019.
(43)See Jacob K.Cogan,Competition and Control in International Adjudication,48 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law,449 (2008).
(44)See Tetyana Payosova,et.al.,The Dispute Settlement Crisis in the World Trade Organization:Causes and Cures,Peterson Institute for International Economics,PB 18-5,8-10 (2018).
(45)See Jennifer Hillman,Three Approaches to Fixing the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body:the Good,the Bad and the Ugly?https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Hillman-Good-Bad-Ugly-Fix-to-WTO-AB.pdf,2019-01-20.
(46)See James Bacchus,How to Solve the WTO Judicial Crisis,https://www.cato.org/blog/how-solve-WTO-judicial-crisis,2019-02-16.
(47)See USTR,The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda,https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2018/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report%20I.pdf,2019-01-16.
(48)See Robert McDougall,Crisis in the WTO:Restoring the WTO Dispute Settlement Function,https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/Paper%20no.194.pdf,2019-01-19.
(49)See Director General Roberto Azevêdo,The Time is Now to Confront Systemetic Challenges,https://www.WTO.org/english/news_e/news19_e/dgra_27feb19_e.htm,2019-02-28.
(50)See Mary E.Footer,The Role of Consensus in GATT/WTO Decision-making,17 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business,668 (1996/97).
(51)关于协商一致的缺陷,see Richard Blackhurst,David Hatridge,Improving the Capacity of WTO Institutions to Fulfil Their Mandate,7 Journal of International Economic Law,708-716 (2004).
(52)See Pieter J.Kuijper,From the Board:The U.S.Attack on the WTO Appellate Body,45 Legal Issues of Economic Integration,2-3 (2018).
(53)See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,How Should the EU and Other WTO Members React to Their WTO Governance and Appellate Body Crisis?Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies,Research Paper No.RSCAS 2018/71,https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3300738,2019-01-20.
(54)《维也纳条约法公约》第62条(情势根本变化)第3款规定可以援引情势根本变化暂时中止条约运行,这里的问题是是否可以援引该款暂时中止条约的某一条(而非整个条约)的运行。根据笔者的理解,中止整个条约运行是更为严重的后果,如果在情势根本变化的情况下可以中止整个条约的运行,那么中止运行其中的某个条款可被推定是允许的。
(55)See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,How Should the EU and Other WTO Members React to Their WTO Governance and Appellate Body Crisis?Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies,Research Paper No.RSCAS 2018/71,https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3300738,2019-01-20.
(56)See Akhil Raina,Meditations in An Emergency:The Appellate Body Deadlock——What It is,Why It is a Problem,and What to Do about It?Leuven Center for Global Governance Studies,Working Paper No.199,pp.13-14.
(57)See WTO,Improved Dispute Settlement:Elements for Consideration:Discussion Paper Prepared by United States Delegation,MTN.GNG/NG13/W/6,January 1987.
(58)See WTO,United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,Recourse to Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU,Award of the Arbitrator,WT/DS160/ARB25/1,9 November 2001.
(59)See Bashar H.Malkawi,Arbitration and the World Trade Organization:The Forgotten Provisions of Article 25 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,24 Journal of International Arbitration,182-183 (2002).
(60)See Jens H.Pohl,Blueprint for a Plurilateral WTO Arbitration Agreement under Article 25 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,in Denise Prevost,et.al.ed.,Restoring Trust in Trade,Hart Publishing,2018,pp.145-146.
(61)See Scott Andersen,et.al.,Using Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU to Ensure the Availability of Appeals,Centre for Trade and Economic Integration (CTEI) Working Paper,CTEI-2017-17,https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch//record/295745/files/CTEI-2017-17-.pdf,2019-02-01.
(62)See Scott Andersen,et.al.,Using Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU to Ensure the Availability of Appeals,Centre for Trade and Economic Integration (CTEI) Working Paper,CTEI-2017-17,https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch//record/295745/files/CTEI-2017-17-.pdf,2019-02-01.
(63)See Scott Andersen,et.al.,Using Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU to Ensure the Availability of Appeals,Centre for Trade and Economic Integration (CTEI) Working Paper,CTEI-2017-17,https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch//record/295745/files/CTEI-2017-17-.pdf,2019-02-01.
(64)See Scott Andersen,et.al.,Using Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU to Ensure the Availability of Appeals,Centre for Trade and Economic Integration (CTEI) Working Paper,CTEI-2017-17,https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch//record/295745/files/CTEI-2017-17-.pdf,2019-02-01.
(65)See Tetyana Payosova,et.al.,The Dispute Settlement Crisis in the World Trade Organization:Causes and Cures,Peterson Institute for International Economics,PB 18-5,11-12 (2018).
(66)See Jens H.Pohl,Blueprint for a Plurilateral WTO Arbitration Agreement under Article 25 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,in Denise Prevost et.al.ed.,Restoring Trust in Trade,Hart Publishing,2018,pp.148-149.
(67)习近平:《共建创新包容的开放型世界经济——在首届中国国际进口博览会开幕式上的主旨演讲》,http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2018-11/05/c_1123664692.htm,2019-01-28。
(68)我国于2018年11月23日对世贸组织改革提出三个基本原则和五点主张。三个基本原则包括:世贸组织改革应维护多边贸易体制非歧视和开放的核心价值、应保障发展中成员的发展利益以及遵循协商一致的决策机制。五点主张包括:维护多边贸易体制的主渠道地位、优先处理危及世贸组织生存的关键问题、解决规则公平并回应时代需要、保证发展中成员的特殊与差别待遇以及尊重成员各自的发展模式。参见中华人民共和国商务部:《商务部召开世贸组织改革有关问题新闻吹风会》,http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/xwfbh/20181123.shtml,2019-01-27。
(69)2018年7月第20次中欧领导人会晤发表联合声明,决定中欧就世贸组织改革开展合作,并为此建立一个副部级联合工作组。中欧双方均坚定支持多边贸易体制,本着求同存异原则就世贸组织改革相关问题进行沟通和交流。
(70)参见刘敬东:《全面开放新格局的国际法治内涵与路径》,《经贸法律评论》2019年第1期。
(71)See WTO,Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce,WT/L/1056,January 2019.
(2)参见赵维田:《论GATT/世贸组织争端解决机制》,《法学研究》1997年第3期。
(3)See WTO,Appellate Body Appointments Revision,WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.8,February 2019;WTO,Dispute Settlement Body Annual Report (2018),WT/DSB/W/76,30 November 2018.最近两次(2019年3月和4月)的争端解决机构会议议程上未出现关于上诉机构成员选任的议题。
(4)See Alan Wolff,The WTO and the Future of the Global Trading System,Speech Delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington D.C.,https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/ddgra_15oct18_e.htm,2019-01-10.
(5)See WTO,The Summary of the DSB Meeting on Feb.25,2019 – Member Considers Thai Request for Panel to Rule on Turkish Air Conditioner Duties,https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/dsb_25feb19_e.htm,2019-02-28.
(6)See Robert Howse,The World Trade Organization 20 Years on:Global Governance by Judiciary,27 European Journal of International Law,72 (2016).
(7)See Ian M.Sheldon,et.al.,Trade Liberalization and Constraints on Moves to Protectionism:Multilateralism vs.Regionalism,100 American Journal of Agricultural Economics,1375 (2018).
(8)See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,The 2018 American and Chinese Trade Wars Risk Undermining the World Trading System and Constitutional Democratics,EUI Working Paper Law 2018/17,http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/59444/LAW_2018_17.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y,2019-02-01.
(9)See Ian Bremmer,Us vs.Them :The Failure of Globalism,Portfolio/Penguin,2018,pp.1-204;胡加祥:《美国贸易保护主义国内法源流评析——兼评232条款和301条款》,《经贸法律评论》2019年第1期。
(10)See Daniel Deudney & Jeffrey Meiser,American Exceptionalism,in Michael Cox,Doug Stokes ed.,US Foreign Policy 2nd.,Oxford University Press,2012,pp.21-40.
(11)See WTO General Council,Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements under WTO Agreements:Communication from the U.S.,JOB/GC/148,Oct.2017;China — Certain Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights,Constitution of the Panel established at the request of the United States,Note by the Secretariat?,WT/DS542/9,17 January 2019;United States– Countervailing Measures on Certain Pipe and Tube Products(Turkey),Notification of an Appeal by the United States under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dispute(DSU),and Under Rule 20(1)of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review,WT/DS523/5,30 January 2019.
(12)See Mark Wu,The China Inc.Challenge to Global Trade Governance,57 Harvard International Law Journal,300-316 (2016).
(13)See WTO,An Undifferentiated WTO:Self-declared Development Status Risks Institutional Irrelevance - Communication from the United States,WT/GC/W/757,Jan.2019.
(14)See USTR,2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program,https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2019_Trade_Policy_Agenda_and_2018_Annual_Report.pdf,2019-03-04.
(15)See Alec S.Sweet,Thomas L.Brunnell,Turstee Courts and the Judicialization of International Regimes:The Politics of Majoritarian Activism in the European Convention on Human Rights,The European Union,and the World Trade Organization,1 Journal of Law and Courts,64-66 (2013).
(16)这里的国际公法的习惯解释规则指的是1969年《维也纳条约法公约》第31条和第32条规定的解释方法。关于世贸组织争端解决中的条约解释原则,see Yuejiao Zhang,The Contribution of WTO Appellate Body to Treaty Interpretation,in Robert AAzewdo,Gabrielle Marceau ed.,A History of Law and Lawyers in the GATT/WTO:The Development of the Rule of Law in the Multilateral Trading System,Cambridge University Press,2015,pp.57-96.
(17)See Judith Goldstein,Richard Steinberg,Regulatory Shift:The Rise of Judicial Liberalization at the WTO,in Walter Matti,Ngaire Woods ed.,The Politics of Global Regulation,Princeton University Press,2009,pp.211-241.
(18)See Bernard M.Hoekman,Michel M Kostecki,The Political Economy of World Trade System:The WTO and Beyond,3rd edition,Oxford University Press,2010,pp.638-663.
(19)See Debra Steger,The Founding of the Appellate Body,in Robert AAzewdo,Gabrielle Marceau ed.,A History of Law and Lawyers in the GATT/WTO:The Development of the Rule of Law in the Multilateral Trading System,Cambridge University Press,2015,pp.247-250.
(20)See Robert McDougall,Crisis in the WTO:Restoring the WTO Dispute Settlement Function,https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/Paper%20no.194.pdf,2019-01-15.
(21)See USTR,Further Contribution of the U.S.on Improving Flexibility and Member Control in WTO Dispute Settlement:Communication from the U.S.,TN/DS/W/82 & TN/DS/W82/Add.1,Oct.2005.
(22)See WTO,Working Procedures for Appellate Review,WT/AB/WP/W11,July.2010.
(23)See USTR,The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda,https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2018/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report%20I.pdf,2019-01-16.
(24)See WTO,Statement by Ambassador Robert Lighthizer United States Trade Representative,WT/MIN(17)/ST/128,Jan.2018.
(25)See WTO,Minutes of the Meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body,WT/DSB/M/379,May 2016.
(26)See Raj Bhala,The Power of the Past:Toward De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication,33 George Washington International Law Review,968 (2001) ;David Palmeter,The WTO as a Legal System,24 Fordham International Law Journal,471 (2000) .
(27)See European Union,Concept Paper –WTO Modernization Future EU Proposals on Dispute Settlement,http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157331.pdf,2019-01-18.
(28)See WTO,Strenthening and Modernizing the WTO:Discussion Paper,JOB/GC/201,Sep.2018.
(29)See WTO,Joint Communique of the Ottawa Group on WTO Reform – Comminication from Canada,WT/L/1057,January 2019.
(30)See WTO,Fostering A Discussion on the Functioning of the Appellate Body:Addressing the Issue of Alleged Judicial Activism by the Appellate Body,Communication from Honduras,WT/GC/W/760,January 2019.
(31)See WTO,Communication from the European Union,China,Canada,India,Norway,New Zealand,Switzerland,Australia,Republic of Korea,Iceland,Singapore,Mexico,Costa Rica and Montenegro to the General Council,WT/GC/W/752/Rev.2,December 2018.
(32)See WTO,Communication from the European Union,China,Canada to the General Council,WT/GC/W/753,Nov.2018;WT/GC/W/753/Rev.1,December 2018.
(33)See WTO,Adjudicative Bodies:Adding to or Diminishing Rights or Obligations under the WTO Agreement,WT/GC/W/754,Nov.2018;WT/GC/W/754/Rev.2,December 2018.
(34)See WTO,Fostering A Discussion on the Functioning of the Appellate Body,Communication from Honduras,WT/GC/W/758,Jan 2019;WT/GC/W/759,January 2019.
(35)See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann,The Workload of the WTO Appellate Body:Problems and Remedies,20 Journal of International Economic Law,706-707 (2017).
(36)See WTO,Fostering a Discussion on the Functioning of the Appellate Body,Communication from Honduras,WT/GC/W/758,WT/GC/W/759,January 2019.
(37)See WTO,Argentina – Measures Relating to Goods and Services,WT/DS453/AB/R,April 2016.
(38)See WTO,Fostering A Discussion on the Functioning of the Appellate Body,Addressing the Issue of Alleged Judicial Activism by the Appellate Body,Communication from Honduras,WT/GC/W/760,January 2019.
(39)关于完成法律分析,一般是指在某些上诉案件中,当上诉机构推翻专家组的某项法律认定后,因缺乏将案件发回重审的权力,根据专家组报告中的事实认定继续完成相关的法律分析。See Alan Yanovich,Tania Voon,Completing the Analysis in WTO Appeals:The Practice and Its Limitations,9 Journal of International Economic Law,934-936 (2006).
(40)See WTO,Communication from the European Union,China,Canada,India,Norway,New Zealand,Switzerland,Australia,Republic of Korea,Iceland,Singapore,Mexico,Costa Rica and Montenegro to the General Council,WT/GC/W/752/Rev.2,December 2018.
(41)See Robert McDougall,Crisis in the WTO:Restoring the WTO Dispute Settlement Function,https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/Paper%20no.194.pdf,2019-01-18.
(42)See WTO,Fostering a Discussion on the Functioning of the Appellate Body:Addressing the Issue of Alleged Judicial Activism by the Appellate Body,Communication from Honduras,WT/GC/W/760,January 2019.
(43)See Jacob K.Cogan,Competition and Control in International Adjudication,48 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law,449 (2008).
(44)See Tetyana Payosova,et.al.,The Dispute Settlement Crisis in the World Trade Organization:Causes and Cures,Peterson Institute for International Economics,PB 18-5,8-10 (2018).
(45)See Jennifer Hillman,Three Approaches to Fixing the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body:the Good,the Bad and the Ugly?https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Hillman-Good-Bad-Ugly-Fix-to-WTO-AB.pdf,2019-01-20.
(46)See James Bacchus,How to Solve the WTO Judicial Crisis,https://www.cato.org/blog/how-solve-WTO-judicial-crisis,2019-02-16.
(47)See USTR,The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda,https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2018/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report%20I.pdf,2019-01-16.
(48)See Robert McDougall,Crisis in the WTO:Restoring the WTO Dispute Settlement Function,https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/Paper%20no.194.pdf,2019-01-19.
(49)See Director General Roberto Azevêdo,The Time is Now to Confront Systemetic Challenges,https://www.WTO.org/english/news_e/news19_e/dgra_27feb19_e.htm,2019-02-28.
(50)See Mary E.Footer,The Role of Consensus in GATT/WTO Decision-making,17 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business,668 (1996/97).
(51)关于协商一致的缺陷,see Richard Blackhurst,David Hatridge,Improving the Capacity of WTO Institutions to Fulfil Their Mandate,7 Journal of International Economic Law,708-716 (2004).
(52)See Pieter J.Kuijper,From the Board:The U.S.Attack on the WTO Appellate Body,45 Legal Issues of Economic Integration,2-3 (2018).
(53)See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,How Should the EU and Other WTO Members React to Their WTO Governance and Appellate Body Crisis?Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies,Research Paper No.RSCAS 2018/71,https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3300738,2019-01-20.
(54)《维也纳条约法公约》第62条(情势根本变化)第3款规定可以援引情势根本变化暂时中止条约运行,这里的问题是是否可以援引该款暂时中止条约的某一条(而非整个条约)的运行。根据笔者的理解,中止整个条约运行是更为严重的后果,如果在情势根本变化的情况下可以中止整个条约的运行,那么中止运行其中的某个条款可被推定是允许的。
(55)See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,How Should the EU and Other WTO Members React to Their WTO Governance and Appellate Body Crisis?Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies,Research Paper No.RSCAS 2018/71,https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3300738,2019-01-20.
(56)See Akhil Raina,Meditations in An Emergency:The Appellate Body Deadlock——What It is,Why It is a Problem,and What to Do about It?Leuven Center for Global Governance Studies,Working Paper No.199,pp.13-14.
(57)See WTO,Improved Dispute Settlement:Elements for Consideration:Discussion Paper Prepared by United States Delegation,MTN.GNG/NG13/W/6,January 1987.
(58)See WTO,United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,Recourse to Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU,Award of the Arbitrator,WT/DS160/ARB25/1,9 November 2001.
(59)See Bashar H.Malkawi,Arbitration and the World Trade Organization:The Forgotten Provisions of Article 25 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,24 Journal of International Arbitration,182-183 (2002).
(60)See Jens H.Pohl,Blueprint for a Plurilateral WTO Arbitration Agreement under Article 25 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,in Denise Prevost,et.al.ed.,Restoring Trust in Trade,Hart Publishing,2018,pp.145-146.
(61)See Scott Andersen,et.al.,Using Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU to Ensure the Availability of Appeals,Centre for Trade and Economic Integration (CTEI) Working Paper,CTEI-2017-17,https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch//record/295745/files/CTEI-2017-17-.pdf,2019-02-01.
(62)See Scott Andersen,et.al.,Using Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU to Ensure the Availability of Appeals,Centre for Trade and Economic Integration (CTEI) Working Paper,CTEI-2017-17,https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch//record/295745/files/CTEI-2017-17-.pdf,2019-02-01.
(63)See Scott Andersen,et.al.,Using Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU to Ensure the Availability of Appeals,Centre for Trade and Economic Integration (CTEI) Working Paper,CTEI-2017-17,https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch//record/295745/files/CTEI-2017-17-.pdf,2019-02-01.
(64)See Scott Andersen,et.al.,Using Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU to Ensure the Availability of Appeals,Centre for Trade and Economic Integration (CTEI) Working Paper,CTEI-2017-17,https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch//record/295745/files/CTEI-2017-17-.pdf,2019-02-01.
(65)See Tetyana Payosova,et.al.,The Dispute Settlement Crisis in the World Trade Organization:Causes and Cures,Peterson Institute for International Economics,PB 18-5,11-12 (2018).
(66)See Jens H.Pohl,Blueprint for a Plurilateral WTO Arbitration Agreement under Article 25 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,in Denise Prevost et.al.ed.,Restoring Trust in Trade,Hart Publishing,2018,pp.148-149.
(67)习近平:《共建创新包容的开放型世界经济——在首届中国国际进口博览会开幕式上的主旨演讲》,http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2018-11/05/c_1123664692.htm,2019-01-28。
(68)我国于2018年11月23日对世贸组织改革提出三个基本原则和五点主张。三个基本原则包括:世贸组织改革应维护多边贸易体制非歧视和开放的核心价值、应保障发展中成员的发展利益以及遵循协商一致的决策机制。五点主张包括:维护多边贸易体制的主渠道地位、优先处理危及世贸组织生存的关键问题、解决规则公平并回应时代需要、保证发展中成员的特殊与差别待遇以及尊重成员各自的发展模式。参见中华人民共和国商务部:《商务部召开世贸组织改革有关问题新闻吹风会》,http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/xwfbh/20181123.shtml,2019-01-27。
(69)2018年7月第20次中欧领导人会晤发表联合声明,决定中欧就世贸组织改革开展合作,并为此建立一个副部级联合工作组。中欧双方均坚定支持多边贸易体制,本着求同存异原则就世贸组织改革相关问题进行沟通和交流。
(70)参见刘敬东:《全面开放新格局的国际法治内涵与路径》,《经贸法律评论》2019年第1期。
(71)See WTO,Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce,WT/L/1056,January 2019.