团体专利:一种专利向标准转化的制度安排
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摘要
专利制度安排的合理性,直接关系到专利成果的有效转化。同时也影响着由专利转化而形成的产业经济增长质量。专利向技术标准转化是技术转化的一条新兴战略选择。在这种路径设计中,由于专利产权划分不合理与专利信息不对称,易发生专利权滥用的不经济性冲突现象。虽然企业通过采用专利联营战略应对这种冲突,但是该战略存在不足,因为始终无法解决专利权的私权行为。因此,建立企业间共同拥有专利产权的团体专利制度,有助于更好解决技术转化中不经济的冲突。文章通过经济学的相关理论构建团体专利合作模型,论证了该制度安排对企业专利发展及其利益分配的必要性和可行性,从而通过该制度的实践为我国专利成果的有效转化探索出一条新路径,同时,也为国家实现创新驱动经济发展质量水平的提升提供有效的专利制度支撑。
The rationality of the patent system is directly related to the effectiveness of patent transformation, and it also affects the quality of industrial economic growth. A technological transformation, which is the conversion of patent to technological standards, is a new strategic conversion. In this path of design, it has the conflict of patent abuse, which is caused by the non-reasonable patent property right and the asymmetry of patent information. Although companies adopted the patent alliance strategy to deal with the conflict, there are many problems about the strategy, such as lack of clarity in the definition of property rights, reduced possibility of market innovation, lack of long-term stability mechanisms, possibility of new obstacles to technological progress, and lack of compatibility with group standard reforms. In general, it does not effectively promote the transformation of patents into technical standards. Because it cannot solve the act of private right of patent rights. Therefore, establishing a group patent system in which enterprises jointly own patent property rights, will break through internal monopolies and break through restriction that patents must be held by patent associations. It will combine relevant institutions in the upper and lower reaches of the industry and promote the flow of information among enterprises through joint property rights. It will form a new situation of patent sharing, patent joint research and development, and jointly promote the transformation of patents into technical standards. By building the model of patent cooperation by using the economic theories, which is the method to determine the necessity and feasibility of development of enterprise patents and distribution of the profits. The paper found it is helpful to increase the profit and public benefit of individual enterprises through the standard of the group for incorporation of patent rights, and it is easier to reduce the asymmetric loss of patent value information of standard users. At the same time, the paper found different companies have clearly the effects of joint research and development, common technical standards and product quality improvement after implementation of group common patents, because it reduces the cost of internal consumption. Therefore, the market increment has been generated, and public welfare has been increased through group patent co-ownership, which has reduced the public welfare losses caused by monopolies caused by patent pools.However, because of the quasi-public product attributes of group patents, if there is no binding cooperation agreement within the group, itwill be easy to cause disputes within the group that owns group patents due to the externality, which eventually leads to the inability of group patents to exist. Therefore, group patents should have the feasibility of establishing reasonable agreements to reduce externality. At the same time, it is a reasonable cooperation mechanism in itself by writing group patents into group standards. It helps to promote the production of products that match the value of patents by group members and avoids waste of patent value. Thus the experiment of this patent system has discovered a new path for patent results in China. Moreover, it supports the foundation of patent system, which improves the quality level for the development of innovation-driven economy.
The rationality of the patent system is directly related to the effectiveness of patent transformation, and it also affects the quality of industrial economic growth. A technological transformation, which is the conversion of patent to technological standards, is a new strategic conversion. In this path of design, it has the conflict of patent abuse, which is caused by the non-reasonable patent property right and the asymmetry of patent information. Although companies adopted the patent alliance strategy to deal with the conflict, there are many problems about the strategy, such as lack of clarity in the definition of property rights, reduced possibility of market innovation, lack of long-term stability mechanisms, possibility of new obstacles to technological progress, and lack of compatibility with group standard reforms. In general, it does not effectively promote the transformation of patents into technical standards. Because it cannot solve the act of private right of patent rights. Therefore, establishing a group patent system in which enterprises jointly own patent property rights, will break through internal monopolies and break through restriction that patents must be held by patent associations. It will combine relevant institutions in the upper and lower reaches of the industry and promote the flow of information among enterprises through joint property rights. It will form a new situation of patent sharing, patent joint research and development, and jointly promote the transformation of patents into technical standards. By building the model of patent cooperation by using the economic theories, which is the method to determine the necessity and feasibility of development of enterprise patents and distribution of the profits. The paper found it is helpful to increase the profit and public benefit of individual enterprises through the standard of the group for incorporation of patent rights, and it is easier to reduce the asymmetric loss of patent value information of standard users. At the same time, the paper found different companies have clearly the effects of joint research and development, common technical standards and product quality improvement after implementation of group common patents, because it reduces the cost of internal consumption. Therefore, the market increment has been generated, and public welfare has been increased through group patent co-ownership, which has reduced the public welfare losses caused by monopolies caused by patent pools.However, because of the quasi-public product attributes of group patents, if there is no binding cooperation agreement within the group, itwill be easy to cause disputes within the group that owns group patents due to the externality, which eventually leads to the inability of group patents to exist. Therefore, group patents should have the feasibility of establishing reasonable agreements to reduce externality. At the same time, it is a reasonable cooperation mechanism in itself by writing group patents into group standards. It helps to promote the production of products that match the value of patents by group members and avoids waste of patent value. Thus the experiment of this patent system has discovered a new path for patent results in China. Moreover, it supports the foundation of patent system, which improves the quality level for the development of innovation-driven economy.
引文
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[19] 李仁君.产权界定与资源配置[J].南开经济研究,1999(1):17-20.Li Renjun.Definition of property rights and allocation of resources [J].Nankai Economic Research,1999(1):17-20.
[20] 高鸿业.西方经济学(微观部分)[M].第五版,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000:70-71.Gao Hong ye.Western Economics (micro part) [M].fifth edition.Beijing:Renmin University of China Press,2000:70-71.
[21] 宋涛.政治经济学教程[M].第十版,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2013:24-126.Song Tao.Tutorial of political economy [M].tenth edition.Beijing:Renmin University of China Press,2013:24-126.
[22] Kicsiny R,Piscopo V,Scarelli A,et al .Dynamic Stackelberg game model for water rationalization indrought emergency[J].Journal of Hydrology,2014,517:557-565.
[23] 付湘,陆帆,胡铁松.利益相关者的水资源配置博弈[J].水利学报,2016,47(1):38-43.Fu Xiang,Lu fan,Hu Tiesong.Game theory in water resources allocation for stakeholders [J].Journal of Hydraulic Engineer,47(1):38-43.
[2] 李仲飞,杨亭亭.专利质量对公司投资价值的作用及影响机制[J].管理学报,2015,12(8):1230-1239.Li Zhongfei,Yang Tingting.Can patent quality corporate investment value?[J].Chinese Journal of Management,.2015,12(8):1230-1239.
[3] Leiponen,A.E.,2008.Competing through cooperation:The organization of standard setting in wireless telecommunications [J].Manage.Sci.54 (11),1904-1919.
[4] GB/T 20004.1-2016 .团体标准化第1部分:良好行为指南[S].GB/T 20004.1-2016 .Association standardization—Part 1:Guidelines for good practice[S].
[5] 张米尔,国伟,纪勇.技术专利与技术标准相互作用的实证研究[J].科研管理,2013,34(4)68-72.Zhang Mier,Guo Wei,Ji Yong.The interaction between technical patents and technical standards [J].Science Research Management,2013,34(4):68-72.
[6] Bekkers,R.,Bongard,R.,Nuvolari,A..An empirical study on the determinants of essential patent claims in compatibility standards[J].Res.Policy,2011(40):1001-1015.
[7] Mark R.Patterson.Inventions.Industry standards and intellectual property [J].Berkeley Technology Law Journal,2002,17(3).
[8] Kang,B,Motohashi,K.Essential intellectual property rights and inventors ‘involvement in standardization’ [J].Res.Policy,2015(44):483-492.
[9] Byeongwoo Kang,Rudi Bekkers.Just-in-time patents and the development of standards[J].Res.Policy,2015(44):1948-1961.
[10] 李江,王津晶等.中国专利默示许可实践研究[J].中国专利与商标,2014(4):67-77.Li Jiang,Wang Jin jing,et al.Study on the practice of implied patent licensing in China [J].China Patent & Trademark,2014(4):67-77.
[11] 郑伦幸.对标准必要专利权人拒绝许可行为的反垄断规制[J].知识产权,2016(7):67.Zhenglun Xing.Anti-monopoly regulation of standard patent holder's refusal to license [J].Intellectual Property Rights,2016(7):67.
[12] Blind,K.,Thumm,N.,2004.Interrelation between patenting and standardization strategies:Empirical evidence and policy implications [J].Research Policy,33 (10):1583-1598.
[13] 王先林.知识产权与反垄断法——知识产权滥用的反垄断问题研究[M].第一版,北京:法律出版社,2001.Wang Xianlin.Intellectual property rights and anti- monopoly law-.Study on the Antimonopoly of intellectual property rights abuse [M].First edition,Beijing:Law Press,2001.
[14] 斯蒂格利茨,沃尔什.经济学[M].第四版,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2006.Stiglitz,Walsh.Economics[M].Fourth Edition.Beijing:Renmin University of China Press,2006.
[15] 岳贤平.企业间专利组合的规模策略:基于古诺模型的研究[J].情报杂志,2012,31(11):118-122.YueXian Ping.Inter-firm Portfolios Scale Strategy:Based on Cournot model [J].Journal of Information,2012,31(11):118-122.
[16] 闫安,达庆利,裴凤.多个企业同时博弈的动态古诺模型的长期产量解研究[J].管理工程学报,2013,27(1):94-98.Yan An,Da Qing li,Pei Feng.A study on the long-term produce solutions of Dynamic Cournot Model with Muti-frims simultaneous-Move game [J].Journal of Industry Engineering /Engineering Managemengt,2013,27(1):94-98.
[17] 科斯.社会成本问题[A].科斯,等.财产权利与制度变迁[C].上海:上海三联书店,1994.Coase.Social cost problems,[A].Coase,et al.Property rights and institutional change [C].Shanghai:Shanghai Sanlian bookstore,1994.
[18] 科斯.社会成本问题的注释[A].盛洪主编.现代制度经济学(上卷)[C].北京:北京大学出版社,2003.Coase.The problem of social cost notes [A].Cheng Hong ed.Modern institutional economics (1) [C].Beijing:Peking University Press,2003.
[19] 李仁君.产权界定与资源配置[J].南开经济研究,1999(1):17-20.Li Renjun.Definition of property rights and allocation of resources [J].Nankai Economic Research,1999(1):17-20.
[20] 高鸿业.西方经济学(微观部分)[M].第五版,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000:70-71.Gao Hong ye.Western Economics (micro part) [M].fifth edition.Beijing:Renmin University of China Press,2000:70-71.
[21] 宋涛.政治经济学教程[M].第十版,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2013:24-126.Song Tao.Tutorial of political economy [M].tenth edition.Beijing:Renmin University of China Press,2013:24-126.
[22] Kicsiny R,Piscopo V,Scarelli A,et al .Dynamic Stackelberg game model for water rationalization indrought emergency[J].Journal of Hydrology,2014,517:557-565.
[23] 付湘,陆帆,胡铁松.利益相关者的水资源配置博弈[J].水利学报,2016,47(1):38-43.Fu Xiang,Lu fan,Hu Tiesong.Game theory in water resources allocation for stakeholders [J].Journal of Hydraulic Engineer,47(1):38-43.