基于改进Shapley值法的新零售下供应链的利益分配策略
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摘要
新零售的未来发展会呈现全渠道的发展趋势,将线上线下更深度的融合,创造更多的消费场景.而零售行业的竞争在很大程度上是供应链的竞争,集成更深的供应链,以持续优化的供应链来支持新零售的体验.然而作为虚拟的动态企业联盟,供应链在运作过程中常常会因链上各节点企业追求"自身利益最大化"而进行独立决策,导致整个供应链难以协调,因此建立激励相容利益分配机制、制定科学合理的分配策略成为确保新零售下供应链持续稳定发展的核心.针对新零售下供应链的收益分配问题,在传统Shapley值法的基础上,考虑风险承担、创新资源投入和业务执行度,引入综合修正因子,建立了改进Shapley值法来确定收益分配系数,进而实现新零售下供应链上各主体利益的合理分配,最后通过实际算例进行分析,验证了方法的合理性和有效性.
The future development of new retail will present an omni-channel development trend,which will integrate deeper online and offline to create more consumption scenarios.The competition in the retail industry is largely a competition in the supply chain,integrating deeper supply chains to support the new retail experience with a continuously optimized supply chain.However,in the operation process of the supply chain,the conflicts of the operational goals of various enterprises often lead to the difficulty of coordination of the entire supply chain.As a virtual dynamic enterprise alliance,the nodes in the chain are still independent decision-making economic entities that pursue "maximizing profits",individual rationality.As a result,the overall irrationality,so the establishment of incentive-compatible benefit distribution mechanism,the formulation of a reasonable distribution of benefits has become the core to ensure stable,efficient and sustainable development of the supply chain under the new retail.In this paper,based on the traditional Shapley value method,considering the risk-bearing,innovation resource input and business execution degree,the comprehensive correction factor is introduced and the improved Shapley value method is established to determine the income distribution coefficient.Therefore,the rational distribution of the interests of the main bodies in the supply chain under the new retail is realized.Finally,an example is analyzed to verify the rationality and effectiveness of the method.
The future development of new retail will present an omni-channel development trend,which will integrate deeper online and offline to create more consumption scenarios.The competition in the retail industry is largely a competition in the supply chain,integrating deeper supply chains to support the new retail experience with a continuously optimized supply chain.However,in the operation process of the supply chain,the conflicts of the operational goals of various enterprises often lead to the difficulty of coordination of the entire supply chain.As a virtual dynamic enterprise alliance,the nodes in the chain are still independent decision-making economic entities that pursue "maximizing profits",individual rationality.As a result,the overall irrationality,so the establishment of incentive-compatible benefit distribution mechanism,the formulation of a reasonable distribution of benefits has become the core to ensure stable,efficient and sustainable development of the supply chain under the new retail.In this paper,based on the traditional Shapley value method,considering the risk-bearing,innovation resource input and business execution degree,the comprehensive correction factor is introduced and the improved Shapley value method is established to determine the income distribution coefficient.Therefore,the rational distribution of the interests of the main bodies in the supply chain under the new retail is realized.Finally,an example is analyzed to verify the rationality and effectiveness of the method.
引文
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[14]蔡利红.浅析农产品供应链中的利益分配[J].商业经济研究,2017(01):153-155.
[15]张媛媛,姜海虹,张漪,李艳萍.电子商务环境下供应链协同利益分配问题研究[J].商业经济研究,2016(06):67-69.
[16]王城松.基于修正Shapley值法的中小企业供应链协同创新收益分配研究[D].湖南大学,2017.
[2]周业付.基于改进Shapley值模型的农产品供应链利益分配机制[J].统计与决策,2017(23):52-54.
[3]胡湘云,王城松,刘小红.基于Shapley值法修正的中小企业供应链协同创新收益分配研究[J].工业技术经济,2017,36(07):143-149.
[4]赵树梅,徐晓红.“新零售”的含义、模式及发展路径[J].中国流通经济,2017,31(05):12-20.
[5]杜睿云,蒋侃.新零售:内涵、发展动因与关键问题[J].价格理论与实践,2017(02):139-141.
[6]李军,朱先奇,姚西龙,张琰.供应链企业协同创新利益分配策略-基于夏普利值法改进模型[J].技术经济,2016,35(09):122-126.
[7]刘春月.物流企业共同配送利益分配机理研究-基于Shapley值法修正模型[J].数学的实践与认识,2016,46(18):69-75.
[8]史文倩,张红丽.“农超对接”模式下参与主体收益分配分析-以“农户+合作社+超市”模式为例[J].江苏农业科学,2016,4(03):466-470.
[9]齐旭高,吕波,付强.基于Shapely修正的供应链协同产品创新收益分配[J].工业工程,2015,18(01):102-109.
[10]付秋芳,马健瑛,忻莉燕.基于Shapley-RIEP值的供应链收益分配模型[J].统计与决策,2015(02):52-56.
[11]盛松涛,张飞涟,张贵金.FAHP改进Shapley值法进行工程科技创新收益分配[J].计算机工程与应用,2014,50(16):250-254.
[12]梁鹏,李江.基于Shapley值法的农产品供应链联盟利益分配机制研究[J].商业研究,2013(08):191-194+216.
[13]YI Chaohui.Using Modified Shapley Value to Determine Revenue Allocation Within Supply Chain[J].Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering,2009:78-80.
[14]蔡利红.浅析农产品供应链中的利益分配[J].商业经济研究,2017(01):153-155.
[15]张媛媛,姜海虹,张漪,李艳萍.电子商务环境下供应链协同利益分配问题研究[J].商业经济研究,2016(06):67-69.
[16]王城松.基于修正Shapley值法的中小企业供应链协同创新收益分配研究[D].湖南大学,2017.