延迟有限理性下推测变差寡头博弈模型的复杂性
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  • 英文篇名:The Complexion of Conjectural Variation Duopoly Game Model Under Delayed Bounded Rationality
  • 作者:于羽
  • 英文作者:YU Yu;Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics,School of Economics;
  • 关键词:伯川德模型 ; 推测变差 ; 延迟有限理性 ; 混沌 ; DFC方法
  • 英文关键词:Bertrand model;;conjectural variation;;delayed bounded rationality;;chaos;;DFC method
  • 中文刊名:SSJS
  • 英文刊名:Mathematics in Practice and Theory
  • 机构:浙江财经大学经济学院;
  • 出版日期:2016-05-23
  • 出版单位:数学的实践与认识
  • 年:2016
  • 期:v.46
  • 基金:杭州市哲学社会科学规划项目(Z15JC055);; 浙江省软科学研究计划项目(2016C35044)
  • 语种:中文;
  • 页:SSJS201610008
  • 页数:8
  • CN:10
  • ISSN:11-2018/O1
  • 分类号:62-69
摘要
在参与人具有延迟有限理性决策下,构造含有伯川德推测变差的动态寡头模型,对模型的推测变差均衡点的存在性和唯一性进行了证明,把企业的产量调整速度作为变量,分析企业的产量调整速度的变化产生的周期分岔、混沌等复杂行为,并对比了延迟理性和DFC方法的混沌控制效果.研究表明,尽管二者作用机理不同,但混沌现象都发生了延迟甚至消失,即系统的稳定性增强.
        In this paper,we construct Bertrand dynamic duopoly model with conjectural variation.The existence and the uniqueness of conjectural variation equilibrium point of Bertrand model has been investigated;we consider the speed of production adjustment of firms as a variable and analyze the complex behaviors such as periodic bifurcation,chaos with the variation of the speed of production adjustment,and compared the effect of chaos control by delayed rationality and DFC method.The results show that although the two have different mechanisms,chaos phenomenon have delayed occurrence and even disappeared,that the stability of system enhanced.
引文
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