制度的扭曲:第一作者制度与论文合作
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摘要
随着学术研究的日益规范化和复杂化,合作成为增加科研产出的主要途径。本文通过问卷收集了主要院校的科研评价制度,将其与三大经济管理类期刊的论文发表数据进行匹配,基于2000—2014年间部分高校调整第一作者制度的准自然实验,采用双重差分法(DID)的设计考察了科研制度对论文合作的影响。研究发现:(1)评职称认可非第一作者的制度能够使得论文合作的概率显著提高约33.5%,而评奖励承认非第一作者的制度没有显著影响;(2)在考虑了合作的异质性后,非第一作者制度主要促进了跨校合作,对院内合作和同校跨院合作的影响不明显;(3)作用机制分析表明,这种合作效应主要源自教师面临的晋升压力。本文的结论对于推动科研评价体系改革具有重要参考价值。
In recent years, the standardization of the research method and the improvement of publishing requirements have made it more difficult for researchers to publish independently. More and more researchers choose to engage in cooperative research. Taking the three important periodicals of economics and management in China: Social Sciences in China, Economic Research Journal and Management World as examples, the proportion of cooperative papers was only 32% in 2000 and had risen to 90% by 2014, which shows that cooperative research has become the mainstream trend. However, there are costs in cooperative research, especially due to the long-standing first author evaluation rule in China, which makes the coordination cost of cooperative research increase sharply. The first author rule is mainly derived from the contribution-based signature mechanism. Compared with the first-name alphabetical order prevalent in international journals, signature by contribution highlights the contribution of the first author, which correspondingly weakens the cooperative benefits of non-first authors. In high-quality research, every collaborator needs to make a lot of efforts, and the importance of contribution is often difficult to distinguish. Signature by contribution is obviously not an optimal result. In the case that only the first author is recognized in scientific research evaluation rule in universities, the benefit from cooperation(reflected in title promotion and scientific research awards) of non-first authors is basically zero. The existence of this benefit distribution mechanism will greatly reduce the probability of cooperation among researchers. Some existing studies have qualitatively analyzed the impact of the first author rule on cooperative incentives, but so far, the quantitative research in this area is still scant.This paper collects the scientific research evaluation rule of "985" universities and universities of finance and economics by the questionnaire survey and matches it with the published data of three major economics and management journals. Based on the quasi-natural experiment of adjusting the first author rule in some universities from 2000 to 2014, this paper uses the difference-in-differences method(DID) to investigate the effect of scientific research evaluation rule on co-authored papers. The results show thatthe non-first author rule in the professional qualifications institution can significantly stimulate teachers to cooperate, increasing about 33.5%, while awarding institution has no effect. Considered the heterogeneity of cooperation, the non-first author rule mainly promotes inter-university cooperation and has no obvious impact on inner cooperation. However, the abolishing of the first author rule may also lead to the emergence of the academic "free rider" behavior like "fake cooperation". After solving this problem, we find that the non-first author rule still promotes cooperation. Based on these conclusions, we analyze the impact mechanism from the perspective of promotion pressure. The results show that the non-first author rule in the professional qualifications institution has cooperative incentives only for teachers who have not yet been promoted to professors, but has no significant impact on teachers who have become professors.The contribution of this paper is mainly embodied in three aspects. Firstly, this paper quantitatively evaluates the impact of the first author rule on the co-authored paper incentive for the first time. Previous literature mainly explores the reasons for cooperative research from the perspectives of author's personal characteristics and thesis' s characteristics. A few literature on the impact of scientific research evaluation rule on the co-authored paper only analyzes qualitatively. This paper identifies the impact of the first author rule on cooperative incentives with the DID method by the quasi-natural experiments of adjusting the first author rule in some universities. Secondly, by the form of the questionnaire survey, we make statistics and descriptions on the scientific research evaluation rule of domestic universities in economics and management disciplines, which is of great significance to grasp the current situation of the construction of scientific research rule in universities. The results of the questionnaire survey show that, as time goes on, more and more universities begin to recognize the non-first-author paper, which is an important opportunity for researchers to strengthen academic cooperation and engage in important research with an international perspective. Finally, in the definition of paper cooperation, the previous literature only takes the number of paper's authors into consideration, and we not only consider the number of paper's authors but also the affiliation of each author. Based on it, cooperation can be divided into inner-school cooperation, inter-school cooperation, and inter-university cooperation.Finally, we put forward three policy suggestions from the perspective of bettering scientific research environment. As follows:(1) Establish a good academic reputation mechanism. The establishment of an academic reputation mechanism is the foundation. Without academic reputation mechanism, the abolishing of the first author rule may condone academic misconduct such as "free rider". On September 1 in 2016, the Ministry of Education has promulgated "the Measures for Preventing and Handling Academic Misconduct in the University" in the form of departmental regulations, but it only serves as a warning and precaution in advance. It is also necessary to establish an independent academic integrity investigation institution that publishes the list of irregular scholars and improves the self-discipline of scientific researchers. In addition, academic journals should give a warning or reject their submissions to researchers who violate academic ethics.(2) Reform the scientific research evaluation rule with papers as the core. In order to eliminate the scientific research evaluation rule with the number of papers and highly cited papers as the core, the peer review mechanism mainly carried out by the third-party evaluation institution should be gradually established. Besides that, on the establishment of an evaluation system, comprehensive and classification evaluations are equally important. Good classification evaluation mechanism means that teachers working in teaching or scientific research can be evaluated separately. At the same time, researchers working in basic or applied research can also be evaluated separately.(3) Reform the signature rule. On the basis of(1) and(2) points, the signature mechanism should be gradually changed to be sorted by initials of surnames. From the subject evaluation to academic ability evaluation, the first author rule should be broken. Only in the way, more and more researchers can be encouraged to working in the high-level of co-authored researches.
In recent years, the standardization of the research method and the improvement of publishing requirements have made it more difficult for researchers to publish independently. More and more researchers choose to engage in cooperative research. Taking the three important periodicals of economics and management in China: Social Sciences in China, Economic Research Journal and Management World as examples, the proportion of cooperative papers was only 32% in 2000 and had risen to 90% by 2014, which shows that cooperative research has become the mainstream trend. However, there are costs in cooperative research, especially due to the long-standing first author evaluation rule in China, which makes the coordination cost of cooperative research increase sharply. The first author rule is mainly derived from the contribution-based signature mechanism. Compared with the first-name alphabetical order prevalent in international journals, signature by contribution highlights the contribution of the first author, which correspondingly weakens the cooperative benefits of non-first authors. In high-quality research, every collaborator needs to make a lot of efforts, and the importance of contribution is often difficult to distinguish. Signature by contribution is obviously not an optimal result. In the case that only the first author is recognized in scientific research evaluation rule in universities, the benefit from cooperation(reflected in title promotion and scientific research awards) of non-first authors is basically zero. The existence of this benefit distribution mechanism will greatly reduce the probability of cooperation among researchers. Some existing studies have qualitatively analyzed the impact of the first author rule on cooperative incentives, but so far, the quantitative research in this area is still scant.This paper collects the scientific research evaluation rule of "985" universities and universities of finance and economics by the questionnaire survey and matches it with the published data of three major economics and management journals. Based on the quasi-natural experiment of adjusting the first author rule in some universities from 2000 to 2014, this paper uses the difference-in-differences method(DID) to investigate the effect of scientific research evaluation rule on co-authored papers. The results show thatthe non-first author rule in the professional qualifications institution can significantly stimulate teachers to cooperate, increasing about 33.5%, while awarding institution has no effect. Considered the heterogeneity of cooperation, the non-first author rule mainly promotes inter-university cooperation and has no obvious impact on inner cooperation. However, the abolishing of the first author rule may also lead to the emergence of the academic "free rider" behavior like "fake cooperation". After solving this problem, we find that the non-first author rule still promotes cooperation. Based on these conclusions, we analyze the impact mechanism from the perspective of promotion pressure. The results show that the non-first author rule in the professional qualifications institution has cooperative incentives only for teachers who have not yet been promoted to professors, but has no significant impact on teachers who have become professors.The contribution of this paper is mainly embodied in three aspects. Firstly, this paper quantitatively evaluates the impact of the first author rule on the co-authored paper incentive for the first time. Previous literature mainly explores the reasons for cooperative research from the perspectives of author's personal characteristics and thesis' s characteristics. A few literature on the impact of scientific research evaluation rule on the co-authored paper only analyzes qualitatively. This paper identifies the impact of the first author rule on cooperative incentives with the DID method by the quasi-natural experiments of adjusting the first author rule in some universities. Secondly, by the form of the questionnaire survey, we make statistics and descriptions on the scientific research evaluation rule of domestic universities in economics and management disciplines, which is of great significance to grasp the current situation of the construction of scientific research rule in universities. The results of the questionnaire survey show that, as time goes on, more and more universities begin to recognize the non-first-author paper, which is an important opportunity for researchers to strengthen academic cooperation and engage in important research with an international perspective. Finally, in the definition of paper cooperation, the previous literature only takes the number of paper's authors into consideration, and we not only consider the number of paper's authors but also the affiliation of each author. Based on it, cooperation can be divided into inner-school cooperation, inter-school cooperation, and inter-university cooperation.Finally, we put forward three policy suggestions from the perspective of bettering scientific research environment. As follows:(1) Establish a good academic reputation mechanism. The establishment of an academic reputation mechanism is the foundation. Without academic reputation mechanism, the abolishing of the first author rule may condone academic misconduct such as "free rider". On September 1 in 2016, the Ministry of Education has promulgated "the Measures for Preventing and Handling Academic Misconduct in the University" in the form of departmental regulations, but it only serves as a warning and precaution in advance. It is also necessary to establish an independent academic integrity investigation institution that publishes the list of irregular scholars and improves the self-discipline of scientific researchers. In addition, academic journals should give a warning or reject their submissions to researchers who violate academic ethics.(2) Reform the scientific research evaluation rule with papers as the core. In order to eliminate the scientific research evaluation rule with the number of papers and highly cited papers as the core, the peer review mechanism mainly carried out by the third-party evaluation institution should be gradually established. Besides that, on the establishment of an evaluation system, comprehensive and classification evaluations are equally important. Good classification evaluation mechanism means that teachers working in teaching or scientific research can be evaluated separately. At the same time, researchers working in basic or applied research can also be evaluated separately.(3) Reform the signature rule. On the basis of(1) and(2) points, the signature mechanism should be gradually changed to be sorted by initials of surnames. From the subject evaluation to academic ability evaluation, the first author rule should be broken. Only in the way, more and more researchers can be encouraged to working in the high-level of co-authored researches.
引文
[1] 孟大虎.转型中国的经济学转型——基于<北京师范大学学报>(社会科学版)的经验分析[J].北京师范大学学报(社会科学版),2008(2):103-114.Meng Dahu.The economics transition in the transitional China [J].Journal of Beijing Normal University (Social Science),2008(2):103-114.
[2] 王军.中国经济学学术期刊的评价[J].世界经济,2012(12):119-153.Wang Jun.Evaluation of Chinese journal of economics [J].The Journal of World Economy,2012(12):119-153.
[3] Hudson J.Trends in multi-authored papers in economics [J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,1996,10(3):153-158.
[4] McDowell J M,Michael M.The determinants of co-authorship:An analysis of the economics literature [J].Review of Economics and Statistics,1983,65(1):155-160.
[5] Laband D N,Tollison R D.Intellectual collaboration [J].Journal of Political Economy,2000,108(3):632-662.
[6] Piette M J,Ross K L.An analysis of the determinants of co-authorship in economics [J].Journal of Economic Education,1992,23(3):277-283.
[7] 潘士远.合作研究、协调成本与知识增长[J].北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005,42(4):88-97.Pan Shiyuan.Cooperative research,cost for coordination and accumulation of knowledge [J].Journal of Peking University (Philosophy and Social Sciences),2005,42(4):88-97.
[8] 魏立佳.合作还是独立发表?——中国经济学领域合作现象研究[J].经济资料译丛,2015(1):79-90.Wei Lijia.Cooperation or independent publication?A study on the phenomenon of cooperation in Chinese economics [J].Journal of Translation from Foreign Literature of Economics,2015(1):79-90.
[9] Brown C L,Chan K C,Chen C R.First-author conditions:Evidence from finance journal coauthorship [J].Applied Economics,2011,43(25):3687-3697.
[10] Joseph K,Laband D N,Patil V.Author order and research quality [J].Southern Economic Journal,2005,71(5),545-555.
[11] Engers M,Gans J S,Grant S,King S P,First-author conditions [J].Journal of Political Economy,1999,107(4):859-833.
[12] 才国伟,张学志,邓卫.“省直管县”改革会损害地级市的利益吗?[J].经济研究,2011(7):65-77.Cai Guowei,Zhang Xuezhi,Deng Wei,Does the reform of ‘county directly administrated by province’ damage the city′s interests?[J].Economic Research Journal,2011(7):65-77.
[13] 陈思霞,卢盛峰.分权增加了民生性财政支出吗?——来自中国“省直管县”的自然实验[J].经济学(季刊),2014,13(4):1261-1282.Chen Sixia,Lu Shengfeng.Does decentralization increase the public services expenditures:A quasi-experiment of ‘county administrated by province’ in China [J].China Economic Quarterly,2014,13(4):1261-1282.
[14] 王春雷.基于职称晋升竞争视角的科研合作研究[J].当代经济,2011(7):30-31.Wang Chunlei.Research on scientific research cooperation from the perspective of professional title promotion [J].Contemporary Economics,2011(7):30-31.
[15] 杨巧艳,石剑虹.高效职称评审工作问题分析及对策[J].教育教学论坛,2014(51):191-192.Yang Qiaoyan,Shi Jianhong.The analysis and countermeasures on the problems of professional title evaluation [J].Education Teaching Forum,2014(51):191-192.
[16] 周黎安,陈烨.中国农村税费改革的政策效果:基于双重差分模型的估计[J].经济研究,2005(8) :44-53.Zhou Lian,Chen Ye.The policy effect of tax-and-fees reforms in rural China:A difference-in-differences estimation [J].Economic Research Journal,2005(8):44-53.
[17] Barnett A H,Ault R W,Kaserman D W.The rising incidence of co-authorship in economics:Further evidence [J].Review of Economics and Statistics,1988,70(3):539-543.
[18] 刘本盛.关于国家创新体系建设的思考与建议[J].管理世界,2007(8):153-154.Liu Bensheng.Thoughts and suggestions on the construction of national innovation system [J].Management World,2007(8):153-154.
(1)这里需要说明的是首先,对于所有论文本文只统计到第三作者,第四及以上的作者不算。其次,如果一篇论文有三个作者,那么根据第二作者会统计一次合作情况,根据第三作者又会统计一次,由此会产生两条记录。
(2)举例:一篇论文三个作者的单位分别为:华中科技大学经济学院、武汉大学经济与管理学院、华中科技大学经济学院。根据定义一和定义二,作者二的合作情况均为跨校合作,但是第三作者合作情况根据定义一是跨校合作,根据定义二是同校同院合作。
(1)由于本文的数据是混合截面数据,选择这么长的时间是为了尽可能包含较多的实验组和控制组。在评职称中,其中浙江工商大学经济学院曾在2002年调整了评职称制度,考虑到大部分实验组均是在2006年及以后调整,所以这里将和浙江工商大学经济学院有关的样本与在2000年之前就已经调整的样本一起剔除。同样,评奖励政策调整主要发生在2009年及以后年份,因此样本范围是2000年至2008年。
[2] 王军.中国经济学学术期刊的评价[J].世界经济,2012(12):119-153.Wang Jun.Evaluation of Chinese journal of economics [J].The Journal of World Economy,2012(12):119-153.
[3] Hudson J.Trends in multi-authored papers in economics [J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,1996,10(3):153-158.
[4] McDowell J M,Michael M.The determinants of co-authorship:An analysis of the economics literature [J].Review of Economics and Statistics,1983,65(1):155-160.
[5] Laband D N,Tollison R D.Intellectual collaboration [J].Journal of Political Economy,2000,108(3):632-662.
[6] Piette M J,Ross K L.An analysis of the determinants of co-authorship in economics [J].Journal of Economic Education,1992,23(3):277-283.
[7] 潘士远.合作研究、协调成本与知识增长[J].北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005,42(4):88-97.Pan Shiyuan.Cooperative research,cost for coordination and accumulation of knowledge [J].Journal of Peking University (Philosophy and Social Sciences),2005,42(4):88-97.
[8] 魏立佳.合作还是独立发表?——中国经济学领域合作现象研究[J].经济资料译丛,2015(1):79-90.Wei Lijia.Cooperation or independent publication?A study on the phenomenon of cooperation in Chinese economics [J].Journal of Translation from Foreign Literature of Economics,2015(1):79-90.
[9] Brown C L,Chan K C,Chen C R.First-author conditions:Evidence from finance journal coauthorship [J].Applied Economics,2011,43(25):3687-3697.
[10] Joseph K,Laband D N,Patil V.Author order and research quality [J].Southern Economic Journal,2005,71(5),545-555.
[11] Engers M,Gans J S,Grant S,King S P,First-author conditions [J].Journal of Political Economy,1999,107(4):859-833.
[12] 才国伟,张学志,邓卫.“省直管县”改革会损害地级市的利益吗?[J].经济研究,2011(7):65-77.Cai Guowei,Zhang Xuezhi,Deng Wei,Does the reform of ‘county directly administrated by province’ damage the city′s interests?[J].Economic Research Journal,2011(7):65-77.
[13] 陈思霞,卢盛峰.分权增加了民生性财政支出吗?——来自中国“省直管县”的自然实验[J].经济学(季刊),2014,13(4):1261-1282.Chen Sixia,Lu Shengfeng.Does decentralization increase the public services expenditures:A quasi-experiment of ‘county administrated by province’ in China [J].China Economic Quarterly,2014,13(4):1261-1282.
[14] 王春雷.基于职称晋升竞争视角的科研合作研究[J].当代经济,2011(7):30-31.Wang Chunlei.Research on scientific research cooperation from the perspective of professional title promotion [J].Contemporary Economics,2011(7):30-31.
[15] 杨巧艳,石剑虹.高效职称评审工作问题分析及对策[J].教育教学论坛,2014(51):191-192.Yang Qiaoyan,Shi Jianhong.The analysis and countermeasures on the problems of professional title evaluation [J].Education Teaching Forum,2014(51):191-192.
[16] 周黎安,陈烨.中国农村税费改革的政策效果:基于双重差分模型的估计[J].经济研究,2005(8) :44-53.Zhou Lian,Chen Ye.The policy effect of tax-and-fees reforms in rural China:A difference-in-differences estimation [J].Economic Research Journal,2005(8):44-53.
[17] Barnett A H,Ault R W,Kaserman D W.The rising incidence of co-authorship in economics:Further evidence [J].Review of Economics and Statistics,1988,70(3):539-543.
[18] 刘本盛.关于国家创新体系建设的思考与建议[J].管理世界,2007(8):153-154.Liu Bensheng.Thoughts and suggestions on the construction of national innovation system [J].Management World,2007(8):153-154.
(1)这里需要说明的是首先,对于所有论文本文只统计到第三作者,第四及以上的作者不算。其次,如果一篇论文有三个作者,那么根据第二作者会统计一次合作情况,根据第三作者又会统计一次,由此会产生两条记录。
(2)举例:一篇论文三个作者的单位分别为:华中科技大学经济学院、武汉大学经济与管理学院、华中科技大学经济学院。根据定义一和定义二,作者二的合作情况均为跨校合作,但是第三作者合作情况根据定义一是跨校合作,根据定义二是同校同院合作。
(1)由于本文的数据是混合截面数据,选择这么长的时间是为了尽可能包含较多的实验组和控制组。在评职称中,其中浙江工商大学经济学院曾在2002年调整了评职称制度,考虑到大部分实验组均是在2006年及以后调整,所以这里将和浙江工商大学经济学院有关的样本与在2000年之前就已经调整的样本一起剔除。同样,评奖励政策调整主要发生在2009年及以后年份,因此样本范围是2000年至2008年。