中美关系视域下的韩国角色论析
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摘要
不同的国家在国际社会扮演着不同的角色,其角色随着自身需求和环境条件的变化而变化,甚至是在不同的角色间转换和摇摆。国家的角色在彼此相互认知中建构和确定。韩国在中美关系影响下所扮演的角色异常复杂,主要由韩国的自身需求和中美两国对韩国的影响所致。韩国根据自身的安全战略需求有自身的角色定位和期望,同时寄希望于中美两国。美国因韩国特殊的地缘位置和美韩同盟关系,对韩国有很大的角色期待,希望韩国成为东亚地区遏制朝鲜和牵制中国的棋子。作为战略合作伙伴关系,中国期待韩国不要损害中国和平崛起与民族的伟大复兴所需要的周边环境,并有益于朝鲜半岛和东亚地区的和平与稳定。中美关系和朝核问题解决的不确定性使韩国在外交上摇摆于中美之间。韩国时而偏向中国,时而靠近美国。韩国的角色是中国、美国和韩国三方共同作用的结果。在韩部署"萨德"系统实际上是中美韩三国间的博弈,从中可以进一步清晰地看出韩国在中美关系中的尴尬与困境。
In the international community,different countries play different roles. In order to meet their own needs or adapt to the environment,the roles of such countries are not fixed and they would swing among many roles to maximize profits. There are significant interactions among different countries while they construct the roles of each other and due to this process,and the role of each state is built and identified in mutual cognition. In the case of South Korea,it plays an astonishingly complex role greatly influenced by the Sino-US relations,which is shaped by the needs of South Korea as well as influences of China and the United States. South Korea makes role positioning and expectations based on its own security strategic needs,while also hoping to play a leverage role between the US and China. Specifically,for the United States,it places great expectation for the role of South Korea since they have built special alliance relationship. Moreover,the special geographical position of South Korea strengthens this expectation. The United States wants South Korea to function as a chess piece in the East Asia to distract the North Korea and China. While China treats South Korea as a strategic partner. Activities which have negative impacts on the environment of China's peaceful rise and its great rejuvenation are not expected,and China supposes that South Korea should make a conscious effort for the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and East Asia. The uncertainty of Sino-US relations and the unsettlement of the North Korean nuclear issue give rise to the hesitation of South Korea in its diplomacy,making a sway between China and the United States. South Korea's role is the result of a combined influence of China,the United States and South Korea. The deployment of the THAAD system in South Korea is actually a game between China,the United States and South Korea,which further reflects South Korea's awkward role in the Sino-US relations.
In the international community,different countries play different roles. In order to meet their own needs or adapt to the environment,the roles of such countries are not fixed and they would swing among many roles to maximize profits. There are significant interactions among different countries while they construct the roles of each other and due to this process,and the role of each state is built and identified in mutual cognition. In the case of South Korea,it plays an astonishingly complex role greatly influenced by the Sino-US relations,which is shaped by the needs of South Korea as well as influences of China and the United States. South Korea makes role positioning and expectations based on its own security strategic needs,while also hoping to play a leverage role between the US and China. Specifically,for the United States,it places great expectation for the role of South Korea since they have built special alliance relationship. Moreover,the special geographical position of South Korea strengthens this expectation. The United States wants South Korea to function as a chess piece in the East Asia to distract the North Korea and China. While China treats South Korea as a strategic partner. Activities which have negative impacts on the environment of China's peaceful rise and its great rejuvenation are not expected,and China supposes that South Korea should make a conscious effort for the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and East Asia. The uncertainty of Sino-US relations and the unsettlement of the North Korean nuclear issue give rise to the hesitation of South Korea in its diplomacy,making a sway between China and the United States. South Korea's role is the result of a combined influence of China,the United States and South Korea. The deployment of the THAAD system in South Korea is actually a game between China,the United States and South Korea,which further reflects South Korea's awkward role in the Sino-US relations.
引文
(1)徐正源著:《中国负责任大国角色的建构》,中国人民大学出版社,2015年版,第34-35页。
(1)Minister of National Defense,Republic of Korea 2012 Defense White Paper,Dec.11,2012,p.40,https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/ROK_2012_White_Paper.pdf.
(2)Ihn-hwi Park,“Korea’s National Interests and Security Conditions in the Age of Globalization”,The Korean Journal of International Studies,Vol.9,No.2,Dec.2011,pp.207-231.
(3)Cheong Wa Dai,Office of the President,The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea,Jun.2009,p.21.
(1)Cheong Wa Dai,Office of the President,The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea,Jun.2009,p.21.
(2)段欣毅:“美国警告朝鲜称将集全球兵力应对半岛危机”,新华网,2009年10月23日,http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2009-10/23/content_12304971.htm。
(3)同(1)。
(4)同(1)。
(5)“韩国经济官员:中国成为韩国最大的贸易伙伴”,新华网,2015年9月2日,http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-09/02/c_1116453945.htm。
(6)“US Officials Warn Tensions with North Korea Are‘Coming to a head’”,The Gaurdian,Apr.16,2017,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/16/north-korea-donald-trump-china-south-korea.
(7)“中韩面向未来联合声明”,新华网,2013年6月27日,http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2013-06/27/c_116319763.htm。
(8)刘胜湘、李明月、戴卫华:“从中国的联合国投票看中国的朝鲜半岛政策”,《社会主义研究》,2013年第6期,第140页。
(1)刘胜湘、邬超:“从霸权稳定论看美国的亚太再平衡战略---兼论中国的应对之策”,《东北亚论坛》,2015年第5期,第77页。
(2)Ankit Panda,“Straight from the US State Department:The‘Pivot’to Asia Is Over”,The Diplomat,Mar.14,2017,http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/straight-from-the-us-state-department-thepivot-to-asia-is-over/?from=timeline.
(3)The White House,National Security Strategy of the United States of America,Dec.2017,pp.45-47,https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
(4)Joel S.Wi,t“Enhancing US Engagement with North Korea,”The Washington Quarterly,Vol.30,No.2,2007,p.67.
(5)同(4),p.46。
(6)The White House,National Security Strategy,Feb.2015,p.29,http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf.
(1)The White House,The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,Nov.23,1998,p.22.
(2)The White House,National Security Strategy,Feb.2015,p.24,http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf.
(3)同(2),p.10。
(4)U.S.Department of State,“Remarks with Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se before Their Meeting”,Mar.17,2017,https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/03/268501.htm.
(5)同(2)。
(6)Office of the Secretary of Defense,Annual Report to Congress:Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016,Apr.26,2016,p.41,https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf.
(7)同(6),p.45。
(8)Scott Snyder,“U.S.Rebalancing Strategy and South Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy”,Council on Foreign Relations,EAI Middle Power Diplomacy Initiative Working Paper 12,Feb.2015,p.2.
(9)Van Jackson,“The Rise and Persistence of Strategic Hedging across Asia:A System-level Analysis”,in Ashley J.Tellis,Abraham M.Denmark and Greg Chaffin,eds.,Strategic Asia 2014-15:U.S.Alliances and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power,Dec.2014,http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?id=307.
(1)The White House,National Security Strategy,Feb.2015,p.15,http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf.
(1)Cheong Wa Dai,Office of the President,The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea,Jun.2009,p.15.
(2)同(1),p.18。
(3)“中韩面向未来联合声明”,新华网,2013年6月27日,http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2013-06/27/c_116319763.htm。
(4)同(3)。
(1)Tim Sullivan,“North Korea Rolls Out Missiles,Other Weaponry at Parade”,The Associated Press,Apr.15,2017,https://www.yahoo.com/news/n-korea-gears-celebrate-birthday-countrysfounder-141648542.html.
(1)Cheong Wa Dai,Office of the President,The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea,Jun.2009,p.22.
(2)同(1),p.15。
(3)刘胜湘、李明月、戴卫华:“从中国的联合国投票看中国的朝鲜半岛政策”,《社会主义研究》,2013年第6期,第143页。
(4)Jae Ho Chung,“South Korea Between Eagle and Dragon”,Asian Survey,Vol.41,No.5,2001,p.779.
(5)Min-hyung Kim,“South Korea’s China Policy,Evolving Sino-ROK Relations,and Their Implications for East Asian Security”,Pacific Focus,Vol.31,Apr.2016,pp.56-78.
(6)Scott Snyder,“Between Ally and Partner:Korea-China Relations and the United States”,Far Eastern Economic Review,Vol.170,Apr.2007,pp.64-66.
(7)Eduard Jordan,“The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations:Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers”,Politikon,Vol.30,No.2,2003,pp.165-181.
(1)刘冲:“美国酝酿在韩部署“萨德”系统问题辨析”,《现代国际关系》,2015年第5期,第15页。
(2)李枏:“‘萨德’入韩:东北亚新冷战格局的浮现?”《世界知识》,2016年第15期,第28页。
(3)同(2),第13页。
(4)“2017年5月19日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会”,中国驻美大使馆网站,2017年5月19日,http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceus/chn/fyrth/t1463533.htm。
(5)Cheong Wa Dae,Park Geun-hye,A New Era of Hope,p.17,Feb.25,2013,https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/33379.pdf.
(6)“中等强国合作体(MIKTA)”包括墨西哥(Mexico)、印度尼西亚(Indonesia)、韩国(Korea)、土耳其(Turkey)和澳大利亚(Australia)。
(1)Minister of National Defense,Republic of Korea 2012 Defense White Paper,Dec.11,2012,p.40,https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/ROK_2012_White_Paper.pdf.
(2)Ihn-hwi Park,“Korea’s National Interests and Security Conditions in the Age of Globalization”,The Korean Journal of International Studies,Vol.9,No.2,Dec.2011,pp.207-231.
(3)Cheong Wa Dai,Office of the President,The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea,Jun.2009,p.21.
(1)Cheong Wa Dai,Office of the President,The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea,Jun.2009,p.21.
(2)段欣毅:“美国警告朝鲜称将集全球兵力应对半岛危机”,新华网,2009年10月23日,http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2009-10/23/content_12304971.htm。
(3)同(1)。
(4)同(1)。
(5)“韩国经济官员:中国成为韩国最大的贸易伙伴”,新华网,2015年9月2日,http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-09/02/c_1116453945.htm。
(6)“US Officials Warn Tensions with North Korea Are‘Coming to a head’”,The Gaurdian,Apr.16,2017,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/16/north-korea-donald-trump-china-south-korea.
(7)“中韩面向未来联合声明”,新华网,2013年6月27日,http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2013-06/27/c_116319763.htm。
(8)刘胜湘、李明月、戴卫华:“从中国的联合国投票看中国的朝鲜半岛政策”,《社会主义研究》,2013年第6期,第140页。
(1)刘胜湘、邬超:“从霸权稳定论看美国的亚太再平衡战略---兼论中国的应对之策”,《东北亚论坛》,2015年第5期,第77页。
(2)Ankit Panda,“Straight from the US State Department:The‘Pivot’to Asia Is Over”,The Diplomat,Mar.14,2017,http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/straight-from-the-us-state-department-thepivot-to-asia-is-over/?from=timeline.
(3)The White House,National Security Strategy of the United States of America,Dec.2017,pp.45-47,https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
(4)Joel S.Wi,t“Enhancing US Engagement with North Korea,”The Washington Quarterly,Vol.30,No.2,2007,p.67.
(5)同(4),p.46。
(6)The White House,National Security Strategy,Feb.2015,p.29,http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf.
(1)The White House,The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,Nov.23,1998,p.22.
(2)The White House,National Security Strategy,Feb.2015,p.24,http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf.
(3)同(2),p.10。
(4)U.S.Department of State,“Remarks with Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se before Their Meeting”,Mar.17,2017,https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/03/268501.htm.
(5)同(2)。
(6)Office of the Secretary of Defense,Annual Report to Congress:Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016,Apr.26,2016,p.41,https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf.
(7)同(6),p.45。
(8)Scott Snyder,“U.S.Rebalancing Strategy and South Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy”,Council on Foreign Relations,EAI Middle Power Diplomacy Initiative Working Paper 12,Feb.2015,p.2.
(9)Van Jackson,“The Rise and Persistence of Strategic Hedging across Asia:A System-level Analysis”,in Ashley J.Tellis,Abraham M.Denmark and Greg Chaffin,eds.,Strategic Asia 2014-15:U.S.Alliances and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power,Dec.2014,http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?id=307.
(1)The White House,National Security Strategy,Feb.2015,p.15,http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf.
(1)Cheong Wa Dai,Office of the President,The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea,Jun.2009,p.15.
(2)同(1),p.18。
(3)“中韩面向未来联合声明”,新华网,2013年6月27日,http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2013-06/27/c_116319763.htm。
(4)同(3)。
(1)Tim Sullivan,“North Korea Rolls Out Missiles,Other Weaponry at Parade”,The Associated Press,Apr.15,2017,https://www.yahoo.com/news/n-korea-gears-celebrate-birthday-countrysfounder-141648542.html.
(1)Cheong Wa Dai,Office of the President,The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea,Jun.2009,p.22.
(2)同(1),p.15。
(3)刘胜湘、李明月、戴卫华:“从中国的联合国投票看中国的朝鲜半岛政策”,《社会主义研究》,2013年第6期,第143页。
(4)Jae Ho Chung,“South Korea Between Eagle and Dragon”,Asian Survey,Vol.41,No.5,2001,p.779.
(5)Min-hyung Kim,“South Korea’s China Policy,Evolving Sino-ROK Relations,and Their Implications for East Asian Security”,Pacific Focus,Vol.31,Apr.2016,pp.56-78.
(6)Scott Snyder,“Between Ally and Partner:Korea-China Relations and the United States”,Far Eastern Economic Review,Vol.170,Apr.2007,pp.64-66.
(7)Eduard Jordan,“The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations:Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers”,Politikon,Vol.30,No.2,2003,pp.165-181.
(1)刘冲:“美国酝酿在韩部署“萨德”系统问题辨析”,《现代国际关系》,2015年第5期,第15页。
(2)李枏:“‘萨德’入韩:东北亚新冷战格局的浮现?”《世界知识》,2016年第15期,第28页。
(3)同(2),第13页。
(4)“2017年5月19日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会”,中国驻美大使馆网站,2017年5月19日,http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceus/chn/fyrth/t1463533.htm。
(5)Cheong Wa Dae,Park Geun-hye,A New Era of Hope,p.17,Feb.25,2013,https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/33379.pdf.
(6)“中等强国合作体(MIKTA)”包括墨西哥(Mexico)、印度尼西亚(Indonesia)、韩国(Korea)、土耳其(Turkey)和澳大利亚(Australia)。