学术和商业激励作用下的高校R&D活动影响研究
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摘要
随着传统型大学向创业型大学的转变,高校兼具知识创造和知识应用的双重特性。科研人员在R&D活动中追求学术价值和商业价值双重目标。本文基于一个简单模型来研究学术和商业激励两种方式对R&D活动时间配置以及项目选择的影响,基于此,进一步分析了组织最优激励契约设计。研究结果表明:高的商业激励会减少科研人员研究活动,但却激励科研人员选择高风险的基础研究,从而会带来突破性创新。组织层面高校应加大商业激励鼓励研究偏好人员,对偏好研究活动的人员,激励其进行开发活动;对于不偏好研究活动的人员,激励其增加努力程度。
At present,traditional universities are turning into entrepreneurial universities. Colleges and universities have dual characteristics in aspect of knowledge creation and knowledge application. They also have the conditions and abilities to control innovation,and meanwhile,the commercialization of their scientific and technological achievements has a direct contribution to the economic growth. However,colleges and universities are faced with many difficulties in selection of the type of research and development activities. On the one hand,scientific researchers pursue dual objectives in the R&D activities,namely,academic value and commercial value. On the other hand,it is difficult for scientific researchers and teams to coordinate the tension between research and commercialization activities,while it is feasible for universities( the organizational level) to coordinate the tension between research and commercialization activities. Due to the dual role of academic value and commercial value in academic research objectives,colleges and universities are still in the dilemma how to balance the internal management of research and development activities. Theoretically,existing literature are lack of further analysis on decision-making allocation for scientific researchers at the early stage of commercialization development under the academic incentive mechanism and it is worth discussing the promotion of commercial incentive action to basic research.Actually,it is necessary to consider the researchers' behaviors under different internal preferences as far as R&D incentive system is concerned because this incentive system can coordinate the research and development time allocation and selection of research and development project for the scientific researchers. Based on the above,through literature review,this paper summarizes the coordination and cooperation of researchers' behaviors under different internal preferences,and puts forward the research and development quadrant model of academic-commercial dual value. This research and development quadrant model is the basic starting point of incentive contractual relationship between scientific researchers and universities,and this new incentive contractual relationship is required to consider the judgment for academic value and commercial value of scientific researchers. Moreover,think about the coordination of research and development activities on the organizational level,and put forward the organization's optimal incentive scheme,which needs to achieve the optimal allocation of time to motivate researchers in research and development activities and balance the allocation of resources for basic research and application research projects. On this basis,by building a dynamic moral hazard model in continuous time,this paper explains the mechanism that academic incentive and commercial incentive affect the selection of the R&D activities of researchers and the relationship between the two types of incentive at the organizational level.Through the model analysis,we can conclude that there are many factors to influence the effect of R&D incentive system and the optimal contract design of the organizational level: First,in terms of the optimal time allocation decision in research and development activities of researchers,when the academic value of research activities in monetary form is higher than the commercial value of development,scientific researchers will not choose the development activities. When they obtain a research result with commercial value,the scientific researchers will choose development activities to achieve commercial value. In addition,high marginal commercial value,low development cost,low time discount factor,low marginal benefit of publication quality and high allocation of benefit will encourage scientific researchers to engage in commercial development activities.Second,in view of the distinction between basic research and application research,because basic research has high uncertainty and the research result is hard to be commercialized,but it has high academic value and the academic and commercial incentive strategy influence project decisions for basic research and application research,commercial incentives will prompt scientific researchers to choose the basic research projects with high risks in the projects with low costs,in another word,the researchers prefer basic research contributing to radical innovations. Actually,when they choose the basic research project with high risks and give up commercializing their current research idea,the scientific researchers can obtain better research idea in further innovation research. However,when the basic research projects have high risks,high costs and high academic value,the incentive effect of commercial incentives is not obvious. When the development cost of application research projects is lower and this application research project has lower risk,and the commercial incentive allocation increases,it stands to reason that the scientific researchers will choose application research projects. It can be seen that the commercial incentive has a different influence on the selection of the R&D activities types.In conclusion,it is not necessary for the commercial incentive to occupy the basic research input cost and the "Offset"in scientific research will not occur. For the design of the optimal contract of the organization under the dual effects of academic and commercial incentives,the key is building the incentive system between the organization and individuals. The optimal incentive contract design means that the organization provides different contracts for different individuals. The R&D influences the dual expectations to the research results of the individuals,and the premise of balancing the two activities is to find the " value fulcrum",that is,combining the contract of academic value and commercial value,and realize the optimal benefit of the organization under the constraints of maximizing the interests of scientific researchers. Therefore,colleges and universities should increase business incentives to encourage scientific researchers who prefer research activities and encourage them to carry out development activities. For those who do not prefer research activities,encourage them to increase their efforts. From a comprehensive perspective,academic incentive is characterized with low cost and lasting effect and commercial incentive is the important supplement to academic incentive. It is helpful to correctly judge the effect and effectiveness of the existing science and technology system on the R&D activities of colleges and universities through the discussion of the influence of the incentive policies on the efforts of researchers. More important,it helps to clarify the policy direction of scientific research incentive system innovation. In conclusion,this paper provides a meaningful policy adjustment and reform basis for further implementing the innovation-driven development strategy.
At present,traditional universities are turning into entrepreneurial universities. Colleges and universities have dual characteristics in aspect of knowledge creation and knowledge application. They also have the conditions and abilities to control innovation,and meanwhile,the commercialization of their scientific and technological achievements has a direct contribution to the economic growth. However,colleges and universities are faced with many difficulties in selection of the type of research and development activities. On the one hand,scientific researchers pursue dual objectives in the R&D activities,namely,academic value and commercial value. On the other hand,it is difficult for scientific researchers and teams to coordinate the tension between research and commercialization activities,while it is feasible for universities( the organizational level) to coordinate the tension between research and commercialization activities. Due to the dual role of academic value and commercial value in academic research objectives,colleges and universities are still in the dilemma how to balance the internal management of research and development activities. Theoretically,existing literature are lack of further analysis on decision-making allocation for scientific researchers at the early stage of commercialization development under the academic incentive mechanism and it is worth discussing the promotion of commercial incentive action to basic research.Actually,it is necessary to consider the researchers' behaviors under different internal preferences as far as R&D incentive system is concerned because this incentive system can coordinate the research and development time allocation and selection of research and development project for the scientific researchers. Based on the above,through literature review,this paper summarizes the coordination and cooperation of researchers' behaviors under different internal preferences,and puts forward the research and development quadrant model of academic-commercial dual value. This research and development quadrant model is the basic starting point of incentive contractual relationship between scientific researchers and universities,and this new incentive contractual relationship is required to consider the judgment for academic value and commercial value of scientific researchers. Moreover,think about the coordination of research and development activities on the organizational level,and put forward the organization's optimal incentive scheme,which needs to achieve the optimal allocation of time to motivate researchers in research and development activities and balance the allocation of resources for basic research and application research projects. On this basis,by building a dynamic moral hazard model in continuous time,this paper explains the mechanism that academic incentive and commercial incentive affect the selection of the R&D activities of researchers and the relationship between the two types of incentive at the organizational level.Through the model analysis,we can conclude that there are many factors to influence the effect of R&D incentive system and the optimal contract design of the organizational level: First,in terms of the optimal time allocation decision in research and development activities of researchers,when the academic value of research activities in monetary form is higher than the commercial value of development,scientific researchers will not choose the development activities. When they obtain a research result with commercial value,the scientific researchers will choose development activities to achieve commercial value. In addition,high marginal commercial value,low development cost,low time discount factor,low marginal benefit of publication quality and high allocation of benefit will encourage scientific researchers to engage in commercial development activities.Second,in view of the distinction between basic research and application research,because basic research has high uncertainty and the research result is hard to be commercialized,but it has high academic value and the academic and commercial incentive strategy influence project decisions for basic research and application research,commercial incentives will prompt scientific researchers to choose the basic research projects with high risks in the projects with low costs,in another word,the researchers prefer basic research contributing to radical innovations. Actually,when they choose the basic research project with high risks and give up commercializing their current research idea,the scientific researchers can obtain better research idea in further innovation research. However,when the basic research projects have high risks,high costs and high academic value,the incentive effect of commercial incentives is not obvious. When the development cost of application research projects is lower and this application research project has lower risk,and the commercial incentive allocation increases,it stands to reason that the scientific researchers will choose application research projects. It can be seen that the commercial incentive has a different influence on the selection of the R&D activities types.In conclusion,it is not necessary for the commercial incentive to occupy the basic research input cost and the "Offset"in scientific research will not occur. For the design of the optimal contract of the organization under the dual effects of academic and commercial incentives,the key is building the incentive system between the organization and individuals. The optimal incentive contract design means that the organization provides different contracts for different individuals. The R&D influences the dual expectations to the research results of the individuals,and the premise of balancing the two activities is to find the " value fulcrum",that is,combining the contract of academic value and commercial value,and realize the optimal benefit of the organization under the constraints of maximizing the interests of scientific researchers. Therefore,colleges and universities should increase business incentives to encourage scientific researchers who prefer research activities and encourage them to carry out development activities. For those who do not prefer research activities,encourage them to increase their efforts. From a comprehensive perspective,academic incentive is characterized with low cost and lasting effect and commercial incentive is the important supplement to academic incentive. It is helpful to correctly judge the effect and effectiveness of the existing science and technology system on the R&D activities of colleges and universities through the discussion of the influence of the incentive policies on the efforts of researchers. More important,it helps to clarify the policy direction of scientific research incentive system innovation. In conclusion,this paper provides a meaningful policy adjustment and reform basis for further implementing the innovation-driven development strategy.
引文
[1]Etzkowitz H.Research groups as‘quasi-firms’:The invention of the entrepreneurial university[J].Research Policy,2003,32(1):109-121.
[2]Rahim N A,Mohamed Z B,Amrin A.Commercialization of emerging technology:The role of academic entrepreneur[J].Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences,2015,169:53-60.
[3]柳卸林,何郁冰.基础研究是中国产业核心技术创新的源泉[J].中国软科学,2011(4):104-117.Liu Xielin,He Yubing.Basic research is the source of industrial core technological innovation in China[J].China Soft Science Magazine,2011(4):104-117.
[4]中国科技统计网.关于2015年全国科技经费投入统计公报[EB/OL].http://www.sts.org.cn/.Network science and technology of China statistics.About2015 national science and technology funds into statistical bulletin[EB/OL].http://www.sts.org.cn/.
[5]Murray F,Stern S.When ideas are not free:The impact of patents on scientific research[J].Nber/innovation Policy&the Economy,2011,7:33-69.
[6]Ambos T C,MkelK,Birkinshaw J,et al.When does university research get commercialized?Creating ambidexterity in research institutions[J].Journal of Management Studies,2008,45(8):1424-1447.
[7]Etzkowitz H,Webster A,Gebhardt C,et al.The future of the university and the university of the future:Evolution of ivory tower to entrepreneurial paradigm[J].Research Policy,2000,29(2):313-330.
[8]Siegel D S.Technology transfer offices and commercialization of university intellectual property:Performance and policy implications.Oxford Rev Econ Pol[J].Oxford Review of Economic Policy,2007,23(4):640-660.
[9]Lacetera N.Academic entrepreneurship[J].Managerial and Decision Economics,2009,464(1):443-464.
[10]Stern S.Do scientists pay to be scientists?[J].Management Science,2004,50(6):835-853.
[11]Aghion P,Dewatripont M,Stein J C.Academic freedom,private-sector focus,and the process of innovation[J].Rand Journal of Economics,2010,39(3):617-635.
[12]Blumenthal D,Campbell E G,Anderson M S,et al.Withholding research results in academic life science[J].1997.
[13]Banal-Esta1ol A,Macho-Stadler I.Commercial incentives in Academia.[J].UAB working paper,2007.
[14]Lacetera N,Zirulia L.Individual preferences,organization,and competition in a model of R&D incentive provision[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2012,84(2):550-570.
[15]Henard D H,Mcfadyen M A.The complementary roles of applied and basic research:A knowledge-based perspective[J].Journal of Product Innovation Management,2005,22(6):503-514.
[16]Campbell E G,Clarridge B R,Gokhale M,et al.Data withholding in academic genetics[J].Journal of the American Medical Association,2002,287(4):473-480.
[17]Thursby M,Thursby J,Gupta-Mukherjee S.Are there real effects of licensing on academic research?A life cycle view[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2007,63(4):577-598.
[18]石兵,曹效业,肖利.“前沿研究”、“转化型研究”与新交叉模型的建立[J].科研管理,2008,29(4):1-5.Shi Bing,Cao Xiaoye,Xiao Li.A new cross model based on the frontier research and translational research[J].Science Research Management,2008,29(4):01-05.
[19]张学文.开放科学的动机:基于两部门科学家的实证研究[J].科学学研究,2014,32(11):1620-1629.Zhang Xuewen.The motivation of open science:An empirical measuring for academic and industrial scientists[J].Studies in Science of Science,2014,32(11):1620-1629.
[20]Chang Y C,Yang P Y,Martin B R,et al.Entrepreneurial universities and research ambidexterity:A multilevel analysis[J].Technovation,2016,54:07-21.
[21]Besley T,Ghatak M.Competition and incentives with motivated agents[J].American Economic Review,2005,95(3):616-636.
[22]李靖,蒋士成,费方域.学术价值与商业价值:企业研发外包中的终止权配置研究[J].经济研究,2013(3):148-160.Li Jing,Jiang Shicheng,Fei Fangyu.Academic value vs.commercial value:The research on the allocation of termination rights in the process of R&D outsourcing of the firm[J].Economic Research Journal,2013(3):148-160.
[23]Jensen R,Thursby M.Proofs and prototypes for sale:The licensing of university inventions[J].American Economic Review,2001,91(1):240-259.
[24]Macho-stadler I.Designing contracts for university spinoffs[J].Journal of Economics&Management Strategy,2008,17(1):185-218.
[25]贺俊,黄阳华,沈云昌.校企合作研发的最优制度安排[J].中国工业经济,2011(2):151-160.He Jun,Huang Yanghua,Shen Yunchang.The optimal institutional arrangement for university-Industry collaborative research[J].China Industrial Economics,2011(2):151-160.
[26]Banalesta1ol A,Jofrebonet M,Meissner C.The impact of industry collaboration on academic research output:A dynamic panel data analysis[C]//Department of Economics,City U-niversity London,2008.
[27]Jensen R A,Thursby J G,Thursby M C.Disclosure and licensing of University inventions:‘The best we can do with the s**t we get to work with’[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2003,21(9):1271-1300.
[28]Thursby J G,Thursby M C.Gender patterns of research and licensing activity of science and engineering faculty[J].The Journal of Technology Transfer,2005,30(4):343-353.
[29]洪伟.公有主义和保密行为-科学研究的学术模型和市场模型述评[J].科学学研究,2010,28(3):339-345.Hong Wei.Communism and secrecy:A review of the academic and market models of scientific research[J].Studies in Science of Science,2010,28(3):339-345.
[30]Nelson R R.The simple economics of basic scientific research[J].Journal of Political Economy,1959,67(3):297-306.
[2]Rahim N A,Mohamed Z B,Amrin A.Commercialization of emerging technology:The role of academic entrepreneur[J].Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences,2015,169:53-60.
[3]柳卸林,何郁冰.基础研究是中国产业核心技术创新的源泉[J].中国软科学,2011(4):104-117.Liu Xielin,He Yubing.Basic research is the source of industrial core technological innovation in China[J].China Soft Science Magazine,2011(4):104-117.
[4]中国科技统计网.关于2015年全国科技经费投入统计公报[EB/OL].http://www.sts.org.cn/.Network science and technology of China statistics.About2015 national science and technology funds into statistical bulletin[EB/OL].http://www.sts.org.cn/.
[5]Murray F,Stern S.When ideas are not free:The impact of patents on scientific research[J].Nber/innovation Policy&the Economy,2011,7:33-69.
[6]Ambos T C,MkelK,Birkinshaw J,et al.When does university research get commercialized?Creating ambidexterity in research institutions[J].Journal of Management Studies,2008,45(8):1424-1447.
[7]Etzkowitz H,Webster A,Gebhardt C,et al.The future of the university and the university of the future:Evolution of ivory tower to entrepreneurial paradigm[J].Research Policy,2000,29(2):313-330.
[8]Siegel D S.Technology transfer offices and commercialization of university intellectual property:Performance and policy implications.Oxford Rev Econ Pol[J].Oxford Review of Economic Policy,2007,23(4):640-660.
[9]Lacetera N.Academic entrepreneurship[J].Managerial and Decision Economics,2009,464(1):443-464.
[10]Stern S.Do scientists pay to be scientists?[J].Management Science,2004,50(6):835-853.
[11]Aghion P,Dewatripont M,Stein J C.Academic freedom,private-sector focus,and the process of innovation[J].Rand Journal of Economics,2010,39(3):617-635.
[12]Blumenthal D,Campbell E G,Anderson M S,et al.Withholding research results in academic life science[J].1997.
[13]Banal-Esta1ol A,Macho-Stadler I.Commercial incentives in Academia.[J].UAB working paper,2007.
[14]Lacetera N,Zirulia L.Individual preferences,organization,and competition in a model of R&D incentive provision[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2012,84(2):550-570.
[15]Henard D H,Mcfadyen M A.The complementary roles of applied and basic research:A knowledge-based perspective[J].Journal of Product Innovation Management,2005,22(6):503-514.
[16]Campbell E G,Clarridge B R,Gokhale M,et al.Data withholding in academic genetics[J].Journal of the American Medical Association,2002,287(4):473-480.
[17]Thursby M,Thursby J,Gupta-Mukherjee S.Are there real effects of licensing on academic research?A life cycle view[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2007,63(4):577-598.
[18]石兵,曹效业,肖利.“前沿研究”、“转化型研究”与新交叉模型的建立[J].科研管理,2008,29(4):1-5.Shi Bing,Cao Xiaoye,Xiao Li.A new cross model based on the frontier research and translational research[J].Science Research Management,2008,29(4):01-05.
[19]张学文.开放科学的动机:基于两部门科学家的实证研究[J].科学学研究,2014,32(11):1620-1629.Zhang Xuewen.The motivation of open science:An empirical measuring for academic and industrial scientists[J].Studies in Science of Science,2014,32(11):1620-1629.
[20]Chang Y C,Yang P Y,Martin B R,et al.Entrepreneurial universities and research ambidexterity:A multilevel analysis[J].Technovation,2016,54:07-21.
[21]Besley T,Ghatak M.Competition and incentives with motivated agents[J].American Economic Review,2005,95(3):616-636.
[22]李靖,蒋士成,费方域.学术价值与商业价值:企业研发外包中的终止权配置研究[J].经济研究,2013(3):148-160.Li Jing,Jiang Shicheng,Fei Fangyu.Academic value vs.commercial value:The research on the allocation of termination rights in the process of R&D outsourcing of the firm[J].Economic Research Journal,2013(3):148-160.
[23]Jensen R,Thursby M.Proofs and prototypes for sale:The licensing of university inventions[J].American Economic Review,2001,91(1):240-259.
[24]Macho-stadler I.Designing contracts for university spinoffs[J].Journal of Economics&Management Strategy,2008,17(1):185-218.
[25]贺俊,黄阳华,沈云昌.校企合作研发的最优制度安排[J].中国工业经济,2011(2):151-160.He Jun,Huang Yanghua,Shen Yunchang.The optimal institutional arrangement for university-Industry collaborative research[J].China Industrial Economics,2011(2):151-160.
[26]Banalesta1ol A,Jofrebonet M,Meissner C.The impact of industry collaboration on academic research output:A dynamic panel data analysis[C]//Department of Economics,City U-niversity London,2008.
[27]Jensen R A,Thursby J G,Thursby M C.Disclosure and licensing of University inventions:‘The best we can do with the s**t we get to work with’[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2003,21(9):1271-1300.
[28]Thursby J G,Thursby M C.Gender patterns of research and licensing activity of science and engineering faculty[J].The Journal of Technology Transfer,2005,30(4):343-353.
[29]洪伟.公有主义和保密行为-科学研究的学术模型和市场模型述评[J].科学学研究,2010,28(3):339-345.Hong Wei.Communism and secrecy:A review of the academic and market models of scientific research[J].Studies in Science of Science,2010,28(3):339-345.
[30]Nelson R R.The simple economics of basic scientific research[J].Journal of Political Economy,1959,67(3):297-306.