中国保障房配建模式的政策逻辑研究
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摘要
从2007年起,我国部分城市开始探索保障房建设的配建模式,全国各城市和地区配建的保障房包括保障性租赁住房、限价房、经济适用房、自住型商品房等各种形式。政策运行十年来,配建模式始终面临开发商缺乏动力的挑战。运用决策树模型考察配建保障房参与主体即中央政府、地方政府、房地产开发商及购房者的行为选择,发现如下结论:(1)地方政府最终会整体考虑"财务成本"与"政治成本",将保障房建设量最小化;(2)地方政府在对中低收入家庭可支付住房供给的责任与存在的财政压力进行综合权衡后,最终会在配建模式的要素选择上将成本转嫁给开发商;(3)选择竞标配建项目的房地产开发商,会通过提高配建保障房的名义成本或抬高商品房销售价格实现套利;(4)配建保障房最终会形成对商品住房市场的挤出效应,既会减少中低收入家庭对配建保障房的可得性,也会刺激普通商品住房价格的上涨。可以说,保障房配建的政策逻辑,反映出政府在解决中低收入家庭住房问题时,对可支付住房内在特性的追求与新自由主义内在动力之间的冲突与悖论,各行为主体从各自"理性"出发,是造成政策失灵的重要原因。
Since 2007,some cities in China have begun to explore the inclusionary mode for affordable housing supply. The affordable housing provided by cities and regions across the country includes various forms such as affordable rental housing,price-limited housing,economic comfortable housing,and self-occupied commercial housing. In the past ten years,the inclusionary mode has always faced the challenge from real estate developers who lack of motivation. Using the decision tree model to examine the behavioral choices of the participating entities including the central government,local governments,real estate developers and home-buyers,the following conclusions were found:( 1) Local governments will consider ‘financial costs' and ‘political costs' as a whole to minimize the amount of affordable housing supply.( 2)After comprehensively weighs the responsibility for the affordable housing supply and the existing financial pressures,the local government will eventually pass the cost on to the real estate developers.( 3) The real estate developer who chooses the bidding project will realize the arbitrage by increasing the nominal cost of the affordable housing or raising the selling price of the commercial housing.( 4) The inclusionary mode for affordable housing supply will eventually form a crowding out effect on the commodity housing market,which will reduce the possibility for low-and middle-income families to get the affordable housing,and will also stimulate the rise of commodity housing prices. It can be said that the policy logic of the inclusionary mode for affordable housing supply reflects the conflict and paradox between the pursuit of the intrinsic characteristics of affordable housing and the internal motivation of neoliberalism when the government solves the housing problem of low-and middle-income families. The participants in the inclusionary mode choose behaviors from their respective ‘rationality'are an important cause of policy failure.
Since 2007,some cities in China have begun to explore the inclusionary mode for affordable housing supply. The affordable housing provided by cities and regions across the country includes various forms such as affordable rental housing,price-limited housing,economic comfortable housing,and self-occupied commercial housing. In the past ten years,the inclusionary mode has always faced the challenge from real estate developers who lack of motivation. Using the decision tree model to examine the behavioral choices of the participating entities including the central government,local governments,real estate developers and home-buyers,the following conclusions were found:( 1) Local governments will consider ‘financial costs' and ‘political costs' as a whole to minimize the amount of affordable housing supply.( 2)After comprehensively weighs the responsibility for the affordable housing supply and the existing financial pressures,the local government will eventually pass the cost on to the real estate developers.( 3) The real estate developer who chooses the bidding project will realize the arbitrage by increasing the nominal cost of the affordable housing or raising the selling price of the commercial housing.( 4) The inclusionary mode for affordable housing supply will eventually form a crowding out effect on the commodity housing market,which will reduce the possibility for low-and middle-income families to get the affordable housing,and will also stimulate the rise of commodity housing prices. It can be said that the policy logic of the inclusionary mode for affordable housing supply reflects the conflict and paradox between the pursuit of the intrinsic characteristics of affordable housing and the internal motivation of neoliberalism when the government solves the housing problem of low-and middle-income families. The participants in the inclusionary mode choose behaviors from their respective ‘rationality'are an important cause of policy failure.
引文
(1)Evans,M.(Ed.).,“Policy transfer in global perspective”.Ashgate Publishing,2004,p.6-18.
(2)James Lee&Yapeng Zhu,“Urban governance,neoliberalism and housing reform in China”.The Pacific Review,Vol.19(1),2006,p.39-61.
(3)Youqin Huang,“A room of one’s own:housing consumption and residential crowding in transitional urban China”,Environment and planning,Vol.35,2003,p.591-614.
(4)对住房可负担能力的测量,传统方法将其定义为房价收入比(PIR:price to income ratio)即房价与个人年收入之比,尽管房价收入比有诸多局限,并有相关文献支撑以剩余收入法来衡量住房可负担能力,但当前房价收入比仍然被广泛用于衡量中国住房可负担能力。经验法则是当家庭每月收入不超过30%用于获得适足住房时,或住房购买价格不超过家庭年收入的3倍时则意味着住房是可得的。根据我国实际情况,一般认为国内房价收入比的合理区间为6~7,按照这一标准衡量,全国35个重点城市仅有长沙处于相对合理区间,为6.67。
(5)2017年35个重点城市房价收入比出炉:仅一城合理[EB/OL],https://www.Rong 360.com/gl/2018/03/13/153566.html,2018-5-8.
(6)Ranvinder S.Sandhu&Brian C.Aldrich,“Third World Housing:The Future is Now”,Habitat International,22(3),1998,p.209-213.
(7)Ya Ping Wang&Alan Murie,“The New Affordable and Social Housing Provision System in China:Implications for Comparative Housing Studies”,International Journal of Housing Policy,11(3),2011,p.237-254.
(1)Joyce Yanyun Man.,Affordable housing in China,Land Lines:Peking University-Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy:Beijing,2011,p.16-20.
(2)Kelsey J.,Rolling Back the State:Privatisation of Power in Aotearoa(Auckland:Bridget Williams Books),1993.
(3)朱小丰:《保障房建设的配建模式研究》,财政部财政科学研究所,2012年,第17页。
(4)异地建设费的收取标准通常包括两种形式:对于经济适用房等产权出售型住房,按照上年度同类型同地段平均销售价格缴纳每平方米异地建设费;或按配建项目楼面地价及房屋建造单价之和,乘以应配建保障房建筑面积得出。
(5)卢超:《通过市场主体实现住房保障之国家义务---美国包容性规划法律政策的启示》,《比较法研究》,2014年,第33-44页。
(1)Victoria Basolo,“The Impacts of Intercity Competition and Intergovernmental Factors on Local Affordable Housing Expenditures”,Housing Policy Debate,10(3),1999,p.659-688.
(2)Victoria Basolo,“City Spending on Economic Development Versus Affordable housing:Does Inter-City Competition pr Local Politics Drive Decisions?”Journal of Urban Affairs,22(3),2000,p.317-332.
(3)Schneider M,The competitive city.Pittsburgh:University of Pittsburgh Press,1989.p.24.
(4)Joyce Yanyun Man,Affordable housing in China,Land Lines,p.16-20.
(1)Todd Sinai&Joel Waldfogel,“Do low income housing subsidies increase housing consumption”,NBER working paper,2002.
(2)中华企业、陆家嘴、浦东金桥三家上市房地产企业在其2005年的年报中公布,其销售利润率分别达到了44.15%、41.58%和52.85%。
(1)Charles M.Tiebout,“A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”,The Journal of Political Economy,64(5),1956,p.416-424.
(2)Claudine C.Stuchell,A new Affordable Housing Model in China:A Case-Based Examination of a Private Developer’s Role,Academic Degree Dissertation:Massachusetts Institute of Technology,2008.
(3)Jing Ulrich,China’s Housing Imbalance-Is Affordable Housing the Cure?J.P.Morgan’s Hands-On China Series,2010.
(4)Claudine C.Stuchell,A new Affordable Housing Model in China:A Case-Based Examination of a Private Developer’s Role,2008.
(1)Avner Greif,Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy:Lesson from Medieval Trade.Cambridge University Press,2006.
(2)Jing Ulrich,China’s Housing Imbalance---Is Affordable Housing the Cure,2010.
(1)Hackworth J,The Neo-liberal City-Governance,Ideology,and Development in American Urbanism.Ithaca:Cornell University Press,2007.
(2)Glynn Sarah,Where the Other Half Lives:Lower Income Housing in a Neoliberal World.New York:Pluto Press,2009.
(3)Ray Forrest&Yosuke Hirayama,2009.“The uneven Impact of Neoliberalism on housing opportunities”.International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,33(4),2009,p.998-1013
(4)Ray Forrest&Yosuke Hirayama,neoliberalism and the reproduction of home ownership.Amsterdam:Conference paper at the International RC21 Conference 2011.
(5)Justin Kadi,Neoliberal Dutch housing policies:Analyzing market-oriented regulatory reforms in Amsterdam’s housing market.International RC 21 Conference:Amsterdam,2011
(6)Kelsey J.,Rolling Back the State:Privatisation of Power in Aotearoa,1993.
(7)Jamie Peck&Adam Tickell.(2002).Neoliberalizing Space,Antipode,34,2002,p.380-404.
(8)Jago Dodson,“The‘Roll’of the State:Government,Neoliberalism and Housing Assistance in Four Advanced E-conomies”.Housing,Theory and Society,23(4),2006,p.224-243.
(9)Justin Kadi,Neoliberal Dutch housing policies:Analyzing market-oriented regulatory reforms in Amsterdam’s housing market,2011.
(1)Vera Chouinard.&Valorie A Crooks.(2008).Negotiating neoliberal environments in British Columbia and Ontario,Canada:Restructuing of state-voluntary sector relations and disability organizations’struggles to survive,Environment and Planning:Government and Policy,26,2008,p.173-190.
(2)James Barlow&Simon Duncan.Success and failure in housing provision:European systems compared.Pergamon Press,1994.
(3)David Harvey,A Brief History of Neoliberalism,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2005.
(4)卢超:《通过市场主体实现住房保障之国家义务---美国包容性规划法律政策的启示》,《比较法研究》2014年,第33-44页。
(1)Harloe,M.,Housing and social change in Europe and the USA,in The Changing Role of Social Rented Housing,(eds M.Ball,M.Harloe and M.Martens),Routledge,London,1988,p.41-86.
(2)James Lee&Yapeng Zhu,“Urban governance,neoliberalism and housing reform in China”.The Pacific Review,Vol.19(1),2006,p.39-61.
(3)Youqin Huang,“A room of one’s own:housing consumption and residential crowding in transitional urban China”,Environment and planning,Vol.35,2003,p.591-614.
(4)对住房可负担能力的测量,传统方法将其定义为房价收入比(PIR:price to income ratio)即房价与个人年收入之比,尽管房价收入比有诸多局限,并有相关文献支撑以剩余收入法来衡量住房可负担能力,但当前房价收入比仍然被广泛用于衡量中国住房可负担能力。经验法则是当家庭每月收入不超过30%用于获得适足住房时,或住房购买价格不超过家庭年收入的3倍时则意味着住房是可得的。根据我国实际情况,一般认为国内房价收入比的合理区间为6~7,按照这一标准衡量,全国35个重点城市仅有长沙处于相对合理区间,为6.67。
(5)2017年35个重点城市房价收入比出炉:仅一城合理[EB/OL],https://www.Rong 360.com/gl/2018/03/13/153566.html,2018-5-8.
(6)Ranvinder S.Sandhu&Brian C.Aldrich,“Third World Housing:The Future is Now”,Habitat International,22(3),1998,p.209-213.
(7)Ya Ping Wang&Alan Murie,“The New Affordable and Social Housing Provision System in China:Implications for Comparative Housing Studies”,International Journal of Housing Policy,11(3),2011,p.237-254.
(1)Joyce Yanyun Man.,Affordable housing in China,Land Lines:Peking University-Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy:Beijing,2011,p.16-20.
(2)Kelsey J.,Rolling Back the State:Privatisation of Power in Aotearoa(Auckland:Bridget Williams Books),1993.
(3)朱小丰:《保障房建设的配建模式研究》,财政部财政科学研究所,2012年,第17页。
(4)异地建设费的收取标准通常包括两种形式:对于经济适用房等产权出售型住房,按照上年度同类型同地段平均销售价格缴纳每平方米异地建设费;或按配建项目楼面地价及房屋建造单价之和,乘以应配建保障房建筑面积得出。
(5)卢超:《通过市场主体实现住房保障之国家义务---美国包容性规划法律政策的启示》,《比较法研究》,2014年,第33-44页。
(1)Victoria Basolo,“The Impacts of Intercity Competition and Intergovernmental Factors on Local Affordable Housing Expenditures”,Housing Policy Debate,10(3),1999,p.659-688.
(2)Victoria Basolo,“City Spending on Economic Development Versus Affordable housing:Does Inter-City Competition pr Local Politics Drive Decisions?”Journal of Urban Affairs,22(3),2000,p.317-332.
(3)Schneider M,The competitive city.Pittsburgh:University of Pittsburgh Press,1989.p.24.
(4)Joyce Yanyun Man,Affordable housing in China,Land Lines,p.16-20.
(1)Todd Sinai&Joel Waldfogel,“Do low income housing subsidies increase housing consumption”,NBER working paper,2002.
(2)中华企业、陆家嘴、浦东金桥三家上市房地产企业在其2005年的年报中公布,其销售利润率分别达到了44.15%、41.58%和52.85%。
(1)Charles M.Tiebout,“A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”,The Journal of Political Economy,64(5),1956,p.416-424.
(2)Claudine C.Stuchell,A new Affordable Housing Model in China:A Case-Based Examination of a Private Developer’s Role,Academic Degree Dissertation:Massachusetts Institute of Technology,2008.
(3)Jing Ulrich,China’s Housing Imbalance-Is Affordable Housing the Cure?J.P.Morgan’s Hands-On China Series,2010.
(4)Claudine C.Stuchell,A new Affordable Housing Model in China:A Case-Based Examination of a Private Developer’s Role,2008.
(1)Avner Greif,Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy:Lesson from Medieval Trade.Cambridge University Press,2006.
(2)Jing Ulrich,China’s Housing Imbalance---Is Affordable Housing the Cure,2010.
(1)Hackworth J,The Neo-liberal City-Governance,Ideology,and Development in American Urbanism.Ithaca:Cornell University Press,2007.
(2)Glynn Sarah,Where the Other Half Lives:Lower Income Housing in a Neoliberal World.New York:Pluto Press,2009.
(3)Ray Forrest&Yosuke Hirayama,2009.“The uneven Impact of Neoliberalism on housing opportunities”.International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,33(4),2009,p.998-1013
(4)Ray Forrest&Yosuke Hirayama,neoliberalism and the reproduction of home ownership.Amsterdam:Conference paper at the International RC21 Conference 2011.
(5)Justin Kadi,Neoliberal Dutch housing policies:Analyzing market-oriented regulatory reforms in Amsterdam’s housing market.International RC 21 Conference:Amsterdam,2011
(6)Kelsey J.,Rolling Back the State:Privatisation of Power in Aotearoa,1993.
(7)Jamie Peck&Adam Tickell.(2002).Neoliberalizing Space,Antipode,34,2002,p.380-404.
(8)Jago Dodson,“The‘Roll’of the State:Government,Neoliberalism and Housing Assistance in Four Advanced E-conomies”.Housing,Theory and Society,23(4),2006,p.224-243.
(9)Justin Kadi,Neoliberal Dutch housing policies:Analyzing market-oriented regulatory reforms in Amsterdam’s housing market,2011.
(1)Vera Chouinard.&Valorie A Crooks.(2008).Negotiating neoliberal environments in British Columbia and Ontario,Canada:Restructuing of state-voluntary sector relations and disability organizations’struggles to survive,Environment and Planning:Government and Policy,26,2008,p.173-190.
(2)James Barlow&Simon Duncan.Success and failure in housing provision:European systems compared.Pergamon Press,1994.
(3)David Harvey,A Brief History of Neoliberalism,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2005.
(4)卢超:《通过市场主体实现住房保障之国家义务---美国包容性规划法律政策的启示》,《比较法研究》2014年,第33-44页。
(1)Harloe,M.,Housing and social change in Europe and the USA,in The Changing Role of Social Rented Housing,(eds M.Ball,M.Harloe and M.Martens),Routledge,London,1988,p.41-86.