全球价值链与美国贸易政策的调适逻辑
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摘要
2016年以来,美国贸易政策愈加复杂,特朗普政府既迎合民粹主义运动转向保护主义,以缓解国内受经济全球化冲击的群体的不满,又推动与欧盟和日本的新国际经济规则谈判,服务跨国资本全球扩张的需要。对此,全球价值链的关联作用、要素流动的调节功能和国际地位变化等分析视角并不能充分解释这一看似矛盾的政策变化。作为一种资本积累模式,全球价值链使得资本的选择空间扩大,劳动力市场调整的滞后性增强,从而调节着美国内部资本—劳动要素的竞争优势。资本和劳动要素拥有者分别凭借结构性权力和社会运动,围绕贸易政策的取向展开竞争,使得美国贸易政策的调适逻辑集中表现为服务资本利益与应对社会反向运动之间的平衡。这一逻辑体现在1961—1986年美国有选择的贸易自由化、1986—2015年推动资本自由流动和国际投资保护的政策以及2016年的民粹主义和保护主义等阶段。与单纯的权力或经济利益分析相比,资本—劳动要素竞争框架不仅有助于系统认识美国贸易政策转向的政治过程,还有利于认识20世纪60年代以来它随经济全球化而出现的动态变化。
The U.S. trade policy has been catchier since 2016. On the one hand,the Trump administration turns to protectionism to alleviate domestic populism; on the other hand,the Trump administration promotes new international economic rules with the EU and Japan to serve the global expansion of transnational capital. The analysis of global value chains and protectionism,factor mobility theory,and international status concerns cannot fully explain this seemingly contradictory policy change. As a model of capital accumulation,the global value chain regulates the competitive advantage of the capital-labor of the United States. The capital with structural power and the labor with social movement,influence the choice of trade policy,so the adaptive change of the U.S. trade policy is the result of the trade-off between serving capital and serving labor. This logic is reflected in the selective trade liberalization of the U.S. from 1961 to1986,the policy of promoting the free flow of capital and the protection of FDI from1986 to 2015, and populism and protectionism in 2016 general election. Compared with power structure or economic benefit and cost approach,the capital-labor competition framework helps to understand not only the political process of the turn of U. S.trade policy to protectionism,but also its change with economic globalization since the1960 s.
The U.S. trade policy has been catchier since 2016. On the one hand,the Trump administration turns to protectionism to alleviate domestic populism; on the other hand,the Trump administration promotes new international economic rules with the EU and Japan to serve the global expansion of transnational capital. The analysis of global value chains and protectionism,factor mobility theory,and international status concerns cannot fully explain this seemingly contradictory policy change. As a model of capital accumulation,the global value chain regulates the competitive advantage of the capital-labor of the United States. The capital with structural power and the labor with social movement,influence the choice of trade policy,so the adaptive change of the U.S. trade policy is the result of the trade-off between serving capital and serving labor. This logic is reflected in the selective trade liberalization of the U.S. from 1961 to1986,the policy of promoting the free flow of capital and the protection of FDI from1986 to 2015, and populism and protectionism in 2016 general election. Compared with power structure or economic benefit and cost approach,the capital-labor competition framework helps to understand not only the political process of the turn of U. S.trade policy to protectionism,but also its change with economic globalization since the1960 s.
引文
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