再制造闭环供应链产品回收合作模式研究
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摘要
研究了闭环供应链纵向合作回收的模式选择问题。构建了制造商成本分担和任务分担两种合作回收下的供应链博弈模型。分别求解得到非合作模式、成本分担以及任务分担三种模式下成员的最优零售价格、批发价格、合作分担比例、利润水平等。以非合作模式为参考,研究了制造商不同合作模式对闭环供应链零售价格、产品回收率及各成员利润的影响。通过理论研究发现:制造商的合作回收策略总能有利于产品市场价格的降低以及需求和产品回收率的增加。当制造商回收成本系数较高时,制造商更偏好采用成本分担,而当制造商回收成本系数较小时,制造商更偏好采用任务分担。利用数值仿真分析了不同合作回收策略对零售商利润水平的影响以及零售商对于合作模式的偏好。
The recycling and remanufacturing of products have the advantages of reducing resource consumption, greenhouse gas emissions and the production cost. The researchers focus on seeking the optimal recycling mode in the closed-loop supply chain. In recent years, most of the relevant researches assume that single member undertakes the recycling responsibility in the supply chain. However, the recycling enthusiasm would not be high with a single member undertaking the recycling responsibility, which is not conducive to the development of closed-loop supply chain. It is expected to improve the product recovery rate with more members participating in the product recycling activities and achieve a win-win state in the supply chain.At present, there are two main ways of recycling cooperation mode among supply chain members: cost sharing and responsibility sharing. Epson Corporation offers subsidies to retailers to encourage retailers to recycle ink cartridges and drums, which is a cost-sharing strategy that a manufacturer provides to encourage retailers to recycle used products. In addition, some manufacturers have built a dedicated recycling point for recycling products. Thus, the retailers in the region can recycle the used products to the point, and then the manufacturers can transport the used products to its manufacturing base. This is a typical cooperation model of product recovery responsibility.In this paper, two kinds of cooperative recovery models, cost sharing and responsibility sharing, are established as the retailer is considered as the recycling business. The main problems are discussed as follows: 1) Which is the optimal cooperation strategy between manufacturer and retailer under different cooperative recovery models? What is their optimal profit? 2) How do different cooperative recovery models affect the recovery of closed-loop supply chain products? What is the impact on product prices and demand? 3) As a provider of cooperation policy, what kind of cooperation policy does the manufacturer prefer more to provide for the retailer? 4) Does the retailer prefer manufacturer to provide cost sharing or responsibility sharing?Both cost-sharing and responsibility sharing cooperation recovery strategies are modeled by the game theory. The optimal strategies of the supply chain members are resolved under the three models. Taken the non-cooperation mode as benchmark model, we studied the influence of manufacturer's different cooperation recovery strategies on retail price, recovery rate and supply chain member's profit level. The cooperation recovery strategy provided by the manufacturer can be beneficial to lower the retailer price and improve the return rate. When recovery product is at lower price, cost-sharing strategy is more favorable for manufacturer. When the price is high, responsibility sharing strategy is more favorable for manufacturer. The numerical simulation method is utilized to figure out the preference of retailer to the cooperation strategies.
The recycling and remanufacturing of products have the advantages of reducing resource consumption, greenhouse gas emissions and the production cost. The researchers focus on seeking the optimal recycling mode in the closed-loop supply chain. In recent years, most of the relevant researches assume that single member undertakes the recycling responsibility in the supply chain. However, the recycling enthusiasm would not be high with a single member undertaking the recycling responsibility, which is not conducive to the development of closed-loop supply chain. It is expected to improve the product recovery rate with more members participating in the product recycling activities and achieve a win-win state in the supply chain.At present, there are two main ways of recycling cooperation mode among supply chain members: cost sharing and responsibility sharing. Epson Corporation offers subsidies to retailers to encourage retailers to recycle ink cartridges and drums, which is a cost-sharing strategy that a manufacturer provides to encourage retailers to recycle used products. In addition, some manufacturers have built a dedicated recycling point for recycling products. Thus, the retailers in the region can recycle the used products to the point, and then the manufacturers can transport the used products to its manufacturing base. This is a typical cooperation model of product recovery responsibility.In this paper, two kinds of cooperative recovery models, cost sharing and responsibility sharing, are established as the retailer is considered as the recycling business. The main problems are discussed as follows: 1) Which is the optimal cooperation strategy between manufacturer and retailer under different cooperative recovery models? What is their optimal profit? 2) How do different cooperative recovery models affect the recovery of closed-loop supply chain products? What is the impact on product prices and demand? 3) As a provider of cooperation policy, what kind of cooperation policy does the manufacturer prefer more to provide for the retailer? 4) Does the retailer prefer manufacturer to provide cost sharing or responsibility sharing?Both cost-sharing and responsibility sharing cooperation recovery strategies are modeled by the game theory. The optimal strategies of the supply chain members are resolved under the three models. Taken the non-cooperation mode as benchmark model, we studied the influence of manufacturer's different cooperation recovery strategies on retail price, recovery rate and supply chain member's profit level. The cooperation recovery strategy provided by the manufacturer can be beneficial to lower the retailer price and improve the return rate. When recovery product is at lower price, cost-sharing strategy is more favorable for manufacturer. When the price is high, responsibility sharing strategy is more favorable for manufacturer. The numerical simulation method is utilized to figure out the preference of retailer to the cooperation strategies.
引文
[1]Heese H S,Cattani K,Ferrer G,et al.Competitive advantage through take-back of used products[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2005,164(1):143-157.
[2]Ginsburg J.Once is not enough[J].Business Week,2001,04(16):128-129.
[3]Giutini R,Gaudette K.Remanufacturing:The next great opportunity for boosting US productivity[J].Business Horizons,2003,46(6):41-48.
[4]Savaskan R C,Bhattacharya S,Van Wassenhove L N.Closed-loop supply chain models with product remanufacturing[J].Management science,2004,50(2):239-252.
[5]Savaskan R C,Van Wassenhove L N.Reverse channel design:The case of competing retailers[J].Management Science,2006,52(1):1-14.
[6]Blackburn J D,Guide V D R,Souza G C,et al.Reverse supply chains for commercial returns[J].California Management Review,2004,46(2):6-22.
[7]Guide Jr V D R,Van Wassenhove L N.The reverse supply chain[J].Harvard Business Review,2002,80(2):25-26.
[8]黄祖庆,达庆利.直线型再制造供应链决策结构的效率分析[J].管理科学学报,2006,9(4):51-57.
[9]王文宾,达庆利.奖惩机制下闭环供应链的决策与协调[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(1):36-41.
[10]王玉燕.需求与成本双扰动时闭环供应链的生产策略和协调策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(5):1149-1157.
[11]汪翼,孙林岩,李刚等.闭环供应链的回收责任分担决策[J].系统管理学报,2009,18(4):378-384.
[12]Jacobs B W,Subramanian R.Sharing responsibility for product recovery across the supply chain[J].Production and Operations Management,2012,21(1):85-100.
[13]聂佳佳,石园.第三方负责回收闭环供应链的回收责任分担策略选择[J].系统科学与数学,2012,31(11):1550-1563.
[14]Subramanian R,Gupta S,Talbot B.Product design and supply chain coordination under extended producer responsibility[J].Production and Operations Management,2009,18(3):259-277.
[15]Yao Z,Leung S C H,Lai K K.Manufacturer's revenue-sharing contract and retail competition[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2008,186(2):637-651.
[16]Guide V D R,Van Wassenhove L N.The Evolution of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Research[J].Operations Research,2009,57(1):10-18.
[17]李新然,牟宗玉.需求扰动下闭环供应链的收益费用共享契约研究[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(6):88-96.
[18]易余胤,袁江.基于混合回收的闭环供应链协调定价模型[J].管理评论,2011,23(11):169-176.
[19]Toyasaki F,BoyacιT,Verter V.An Analysis of Monopolistic and Competitive Take-Back Schemes for WEEE Recycling[J].Production and Operations Management,2011,20(6):805-823.
(1)http://www.epson.com.cn/news/news/10166.html
(1)证明过程可向作者索取。
[2]Ginsburg J.Once is not enough[J].Business Week,2001,04(16):128-129.
[3]Giutini R,Gaudette K.Remanufacturing:The next great opportunity for boosting US productivity[J].Business Horizons,2003,46(6):41-48.
[4]Savaskan R C,Bhattacharya S,Van Wassenhove L N.Closed-loop supply chain models with product remanufacturing[J].Management science,2004,50(2):239-252.
[5]Savaskan R C,Van Wassenhove L N.Reverse channel design:The case of competing retailers[J].Management Science,2006,52(1):1-14.
[6]Blackburn J D,Guide V D R,Souza G C,et al.Reverse supply chains for commercial returns[J].California Management Review,2004,46(2):6-22.
[7]Guide Jr V D R,Van Wassenhove L N.The reverse supply chain[J].Harvard Business Review,2002,80(2):25-26.
[8]黄祖庆,达庆利.直线型再制造供应链决策结构的效率分析[J].管理科学学报,2006,9(4):51-57.
[9]王文宾,达庆利.奖惩机制下闭环供应链的决策与协调[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(1):36-41.
[10]王玉燕.需求与成本双扰动时闭环供应链的生产策略和协调策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(5):1149-1157.
[11]汪翼,孙林岩,李刚等.闭环供应链的回收责任分担决策[J].系统管理学报,2009,18(4):378-384.
[12]Jacobs B W,Subramanian R.Sharing responsibility for product recovery across the supply chain[J].Production and Operations Management,2012,21(1):85-100.
[13]聂佳佳,石园.第三方负责回收闭环供应链的回收责任分担策略选择[J].系统科学与数学,2012,31(11):1550-1563.
[14]Subramanian R,Gupta S,Talbot B.Product design and supply chain coordination under extended producer responsibility[J].Production and Operations Management,2009,18(3):259-277.
[15]Yao Z,Leung S C H,Lai K K.Manufacturer's revenue-sharing contract and retail competition[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2008,186(2):637-651.
[16]Guide V D R,Van Wassenhove L N.The Evolution of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Research[J].Operations Research,2009,57(1):10-18.
[17]李新然,牟宗玉.需求扰动下闭环供应链的收益费用共享契约研究[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(6):88-96.
[18]易余胤,袁江.基于混合回收的闭环供应链协调定价模型[J].管理评论,2011,23(11):169-176.
[19]Toyasaki F,BoyacιT,Verter V.An Analysis of Monopolistic and Competitive Take-Back Schemes for WEEE Recycling[J].Production and Operations Management,2011,20(6):805-823.
(1)http://www.epson.com.cn/news/news/10166.html
(1)证明过程可向作者索取。