论美国宪法中的行政组织法定原则
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摘要
美国独立革命超越了普通法传统,提出了行政组织法定原则,但并非基于依法行政的需要,而是防止政治腐败。立法对于行政组织的设置享有细密的规范权力,排除了组织法事项的"行政保留",但是宪法确立的总统领导责任构成了对国会宽泛的组织设置权限的制约。法院在裁判中不只维护了宪法的分权原则,案例法也成为美国行政组织法的重要渊源。我国行政组织法学研究同样需要某种宪政视野和思路。
The American Revolution transcends the legal tradition of common law and generates the doctrine of statutory administrative bureaucracy,which is not aiming at rule of law,but to prevent from the political corruption.The Congress alone has a broad and exclusive power to create and specify the details of the administrative bureaucracy.However,the presidential leadership which is set up by constitution makes up a check on that broad power.By giving judgement,the judicial branch also plays a positive role in maintaining the check and balance.Therefore the case law becomes an important legal resource of the organic law of administrative bureaucracy.Likewise,our research on organic law of administrative bureaucracy should also be conducted under some constitutional perspective.
The American Revolution transcends the legal tradition of common law and generates the doctrine of statutory administrative bureaucracy,which is not aiming at rule of law,but to prevent from the political corruption.The Congress alone has a broad and exclusive power to create and specify the details of the administrative bureaucracy.However,the presidential leadership which is set up by constitution makes up a check on that broad power.By giving judgement,the judicial branch also plays a positive role in maintaining the check and balance.Therefore the case law becomes an important legal resource of the organic law of administrative bureaucracy.Likewise,our research on organic law of administrative bureaucracy should also be conducted under some constitutional perspective.
引文
[1]参见(韩)金东熙:《行政法Ⅰ》,赵峰译,中国人民大学出版社2008年版,页25—26。
[2]参见(日)大桥洋一:《行政法的结构变革》,吕艳滨译,中国人民大学出版社2008年版,页269—270页。(日)室井力主编:《日本现代行政法》,中国政法大学出版社1995年版,页270。以及台湾行政法学会:《行政法争议问题研究(上)》,五南图书出版公司2001年版,页279—280。
[3]参见沈岿:“公共行政组织建构的合法化进路——重新检视行政组织形式法治主义”,《法学研究》2005年第4期。
[4]参见Saikrishna B.Prakash,"Fragmented Features of the Constitution's Unitary Executive",45Willamette Law Review,701(2009).
[5]在诺曼底的封建传统中,honour作为某种采邑(fief),在起源上的确与公共职位(public office)相关。See O.F.Robinson,T.D.Fergus,W.M.Gordon,European legal history;sources and institutions,Butterworths legal Publisher,1994,p.32.实际上,在安茹王朝时期,领主权(lordship)和领主法院一起共同构成T honour.See J.E.AJolliffe,Angevin Kingship,A.&C.Black Ltd.,1963,pp.29—30.
[6]See Sir William Blackstone,Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books,vol.1,J.B.Lippincott Co.,1893,pp.180—181.
[7]See John M.Owen YV,The Clash of Ideas in World Politics:Transnational Net-works,States,and Regime Change,1510—2010,Princeton University Press,2010,p.129.
[8]See Constantin Fasolt,Past Sense—Studies in Medieval and Early Modern European History,Andrew Colin Gow.Leiden,2014,p.226.
[9]See F.W.Maitland,The Constitutional History of England—Course of Lectures Delivered,Cambridge University Press,1908,pp.153,162—163.
[10]Supra note 6,p.180.
[11]Ibid.,pp.227-228.
[12]See E.A.Reitan,"The Civil List in Eighteenth Century British Politics:Parliamentary Supremacy Versus the Independence of the Crown",9 The Historical Journal,318(1966).
[13]See Gordon S.Wood,The creation of the American Republic,1776—1787,The University of North Carolina Press,1969,pp.17,32.
[14]See George Elliott Howard,The American Nation:a History,Vol.8,Preliminaries of the Revolution,1763-1775,Harper&Brothers Publishers,1905,pp.28-30.
[15]Supra note 12.
[16]See Vernon Bogdanor,The monarchy and the Constitution,Oxford University Press,1995,pp.9—10.
[17]Supra note 13,p.33.
[18]See David A.J.Richards,"Revolution and Constitutionalism in America",in Michel Rosenfeld ed.,Constitutionalism,identity,difference,and legitimacy:theoretical perspectives,Duke University Press,1994,p.87.
[19]See John Phillip Reid,The concept of representation in the age of the American Revolution,University of Chicago Press,1989,pp.113-114.
[20]See Richard Snowden,The American Revolution:Written in the style of ancient history:in two volumes,vol.1,Joyes,Hoff&Derrica.,1793,pp.15-17.
[21]See Lee Ward,The politics of liberty in England and revolutionary America,Cambridge University Press,2004,pp.410-411.
[22]See Evarts Boutell Greene,The American Nation:a History,Vol.6,Provincial America 1690-1740,Harper&Brothers Publishers,1905,pp.65-66.
[23]Supra note 13,pp.404-407.
[24]Supra note 18,p.94.
[25]独立革命的积极倡导者Patrick Henry在弗吉尼亚宪法批准大会上的演讲就表达了这种情绪,他说新宪法创造的总统会变成一个国王,甚至有的方面连国王都不如。See Johathan Elliot,The debates in the several state conventions on the adoption of the Federal Constitution:as recommended by the general convention at Philadelphia in 1787,William S.Hein,1996,pp.58—59.
[26]See Max Farrand,The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,Yale University Press,1911,p.293.
[27]Ibid.,pp.316,321.
[28]Ibid.,pp.394-395.
[29]Ibid.,p.503.
[30]See Edward S.Corwin,The President:Office and Powers,1787—1984:history and analysis of practice and opinion,New York University Press.1984,p.4.
[31]See Christopher S.Yoo,Steven G.Calabresi,Anthony J.Colangelo,"The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era,1945—2004",90Iowa Law Review,601(2005).
[32]See The Federalist:No.74,the same view continued,in relation to the command of the national forces,and the power of pardoning,Liberty Fund,Inc.,2001,p.385.
[33]See Akhil Reed Amar,"Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause",82Virginia Law Review,647(1996).
[34]See John Yoo,"Unitary,Executive,or Both?",76The University of Chicago Law Review,1935(2009).
[35]See The Federalist:No.72,the same vieui continued,in regard to the re—eligibility of the president,Liberty Fund,Inc.,2001,p.374.
[36]See Lawrence Lessig,Cass R.Sunstein,"The President and the Administration",94Columbia Law Review,1(1994).
[37]实际上,研究指出,尽管在州的宪法批准大会遭遇失败,反联邦党依然全面参与了一届国会的竞选,并且其中有的人成功当选。他们尝试了一系列试图改变宪法的策略。宪法通过后,直到1791年,为了利用宪法反对汉密尔顿的国家银行提议,国会中的“反联邦党”才呈现出明显的对新宪法的强烈支持,此时才能认为宪法开始被全面接受了。而前述三个部门则是1789年建立的。See David J.Siemers,Ratifying the republic:Anti federalists and Federalists in Constitutional Time,Stanford University Press,2002,pp.6—8.
[38]See Steven G.Calabresi,Saikrishna B.Prakash,"The President's Power to Execute the Laws",104 The Yale Law Journal,541(1994).
[39]See Martin S.Flaherty,"The Most Dangerous Branch",105 The Yale Law Journal,1725(1996).
[40]See Peter L.Strauss,"The Place of Agencies in Government:Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch",84 Columbia Law Review,573(1984).
[41]See Peter L.Strauss,"Overseer,or the Decider?The President in Administrative Law",75 The George Washington Law Review,696(2007).
[42]See Paul R.Verkuil,"The Purposes And Limits of Independent Agencies",1988 Duke Law Journal,257(1998).
[43]See Steven G.Calabresi,Nicholas Terrell,"The Fatally Flawed Theory of the Unbundled Executive",93 Minnesota Law Review,1696(2009).
[44]See Elena Kagan,"Presidential Administration",114 Harvard Law Review,2245(2001).
[45]参见黄锦堂:“行政组织法之基本问”,载翁岳生编:《行政法》(上册),中国法制出版社2002年版,页335。
[46]See 16 U.S.C.§410111(c)(1)(2015)
[47]See Pub.L.101-576,titleⅠ,§102,titleⅡ,§202,§203,§205,Nov.15,1990,104 Stat.2838.
[48]See United States Statutes at Large,Volume 1 1st-5th,1789-1799,Statutel,Chapter 4.
[49]See 21 U.S.C.§393(2015).《美国法典》(US Code)编纂时将其列为第十章,但章名《MISCELLANEOUS》未变。
[50]一个典型的例子就是“公务接待”中的资金浪费问题,包括接待中的馈赠、娱乐、餐饮等支出,负责接待的一方也存在着以公务为名在接待活动中为本人谋取私利的情况,并非单纯只是遭到困扰的一方。
[51]See 51 U.S.C.§20113(c)(5)(2015).
[52]See 42 U.S.C.§7258(a)(1)(a)(7)(2015).
[53]See 3 U.S.C.§105(a)(2015).
[54]See Saikrishna B.Prakash,"Fragmented Features of the Constitution's Unitary Executive",45Willamette Law Review,701(2009).
[55]See 5 U.S.C.§552(a)(1)(2015).
[56]See 5 U.S.C.§553(b)(3)(A)(2015).
[57]See 78 Fed.Reg.23158(April 18,2013).
[58]See 41 C.F.R.§300-1.2.(2015).
[59]See James M.Buxbaum,The Corporate Politeia:a Conceptual Approach to Business,Government,and Society,University Press of America,1981,pp.30—31.
[60]See 49 U.S.C.§24301(a)(2),(a)(3)(2015).
[61]See Association of American Railroads v.United States Department of Transportation,721 F.3d666,(D.C.Cir.2013).
[62]See Carter v.Carter Coal Co.,298 U.S.238,(U.S.1936).该案争议的问题是,1935年的《烟煤保护法》(Bituminous Coal Conservation Act)授权多数煤炭生产者制定工资和工时方面的规则。接受本法see—tion 4规定准则(code)的煤炭生产者将会得到退税。这些煤炭生产者成为准则成员(code members)。但是该法同时规定一旦超过三分之二煤炭产量的煤炭生产者达成每周和每日最大工作时间的协议,并经代表着超过一半煤炭工人的代表同意,这个最大工时协议就必须被全体准则成员接受。违反者将被施加过高的税收并失去向美国政府及其合同商出售煤炭的机会。
[63]See DOT v.Ass'n of Am.R.R.,135 S.Ct.1225,(U.S.2015).
[64]See Lebron v.Nat'l R.R.Passenger Corp.,513 U.S.374,(U.S.1995).
[65]See Kevin M.Stack,"The President's Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws",106 Columbia Law Review,263(2006).
[66]See David Lewis,Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design,Stanford University Press,2004,pp.39,49.
[67]See Kent H.Barnett,"Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon",87 Notre Dame Law Review,1349(2012).
[68]See Richard J.Pierce,Jr,"Saving the Unitary Executive Theory From Those Who Would Distort and Abuse it:a Review of the Unitary Executive by Steven G.Calabresi and Christopher S.Yoo",12 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law,593(2010).
[69]See Myers v.United States,272 U.S.52,(U.S.1926).
[70]See Humphrey's Ex'r v.United States,295 U.S.602,(U.S.1935).
[71]本案判决两年之后,1937年罗斯福总统的行政管理委员会向他提交的报告中使用了这一术语。因为宪法显然是三权分立的,所以报告抨击这个“无头(headless)的第四分支”,是一个缺乏责任性的机构和不能被协调的权力,实际上是批评法院的组织创新超越了宪法的规定。参见James O.Freedman,Crtsis and hegitimacy:the Administrative Process and American Government,Cambridge University Press,1978,pp.17一18.但此后,由于独立管制委员会实践的确立,尽管宪法从未设想过这一机构的可能性,法院的这一组织创新还是被人们所接受,学者也开始在正面和肯定的意义上使用这一术语。可参见Emily S.Bremer,“The Unwritten Administrative Constitution",66 Florida Law Review,1215(2014).
[72]See Heidi Kitrosser,"The Accountable Executive",93 Minnesota Law Review,1741(2009).
[73]See Morrison v.Olson,487 U.S.654,(U.S.1988).
[74]See Ronald J.Krotoszynski,Jr,"Cooperative Federalism,The New Formalism,and the Separation of Powers Revisited:Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of State—Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law",61 Duke Law Journal,1599(2012).
[75]See Free Enter.Fund v.Pub.Co.Accounting Oversight Bd.,561 U.S.477,(U.S.2010).
[76]See Richard H.Pildes,"Free Enterprise Fund,Boundary—Enforcing Decisions,and the Unitary Executive Branch Theory of Government Administration",6 Duke Journal of Constitutional Law&Public Policy,1(2010).
[77]See Wiener v.United States,357 U.S.349,(U.S.1958).
[78]See SEC v.Blinder,Robinson&Co.,855 F.2d 677,(10th Cir.Colo.1988).1998年的“证券交易委员会诉罗宾森·布兰德公司”一案中,第十巡回区上诉法院适用了相同的判决逻辑。尽管立法并未规定SEC的委员享有免职保护,而只规定任期为5年,但法院主张,根据判例法,总统对官员的免职权是否应受到国会立法的约束,取决于相关组织职能的性质。因为SEC是独立管制机构,所以SEC委员就应当享有免职保护。
[79]See John A.Rohr,To Run a Constitution:The Legitimacy of the Administrative State,University Press of Kansas,1986,p.140.
[80]See Michael Stolleis,Public law in Germany,1800-1914,Berghahn Books,2001,p.401.
[81]参见(德)保罗·拉班德:“德意志帝国国家法”,柳建龙译,载王贵松主编:《宪政与行政法治评论(第六卷)》,中国人民大学出版社2012年,页168-170。
[82]Supra note 80.
[83]拉邦德提出法人“非渗透性理论”,认为组织规范在国家法人的人格之内,而不是人格之间,因而组织规范不涉法律关系之调整。参见李洪雷:“德国行政法学中行政主体概念的探讨”,《行政法学研究》2000年第1期。
[84]参见薛刚凌:“多元化背景下行政主体之建构”,《浙江学刊》2007年第2期。
[85]参见常秀鹏:“论高等学校特别公法人定位”,《河北法学》2009年第1期。
[86]如四川大学就“川医”命名争议向教育部提出行政复议案,北京大学诉邹恒甫名誉侵权案件等。
[87]参见王锴:“公用事业民营化探讨—基于公法学的思考”,《法学论坛》2012年第1期。
[88]参见薛刚凌:“我国行政主体理论之检讨—兼论全面研究行政组织法的必要性”,《政法论坛》1998年第6期。
[2]参见(日)大桥洋一:《行政法的结构变革》,吕艳滨译,中国人民大学出版社2008年版,页269—270页。(日)室井力主编:《日本现代行政法》,中国政法大学出版社1995年版,页270。以及台湾行政法学会:《行政法争议问题研究(上)》,五南图书出版公司2001年版,页279—280。
[3]参见沈岿:“公共行政组织建构的合法化进路——重新检视行政组织形式法治主义”,《法学研究》2005年第4期。
[4]参见Saikrishna B.Prakash,"Fragmented Features of the Constitution's Unitary Executive",45Willamette Law Review,701(2009).
[5]在诺曼底的封建传统中,honour作为某种采邑(fief),在起源上的确与公共职位(public office)相关。See O.F.Robinson,T.D.Fergus,W.M.Gordon,European legal history;sources and institutions,Butterworths legal Publisher,1994,p.32.实际上,在安茹王朝时期,领主权(lordship)和领主法院一起共同构成T honour.See J.E.AJolliffe,Angevin Kingship,A.&C.Black Ltd.,1963,pp.29—30.
[6]See Sir William Blackstone,Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books,vol.1,J.B.Lippincott Co.,1893,pp.180—181.
[7]See John M.Owen YV,The Clash of Ideas in World Politics:Transnational Net-works,States,and Regime Change,1510—2010,Princeton University Press,2010,p.129.
[8]See Constantin Fasolt,Past Sense—Studies in Medieval and Early Modern European History,Andrew Colin Gow.Leiden,2014,p.226.
[9]See F.W.Maitland,The Constitutional History of England—Course of Lectures Delivered,Cambridge University Press,1908,pp.153,162—163.
[10]Supra note 6,p.180.
[11]Ibid.,pp.227-228.
[12]See E.A.Reitan,"The Civil List in Eighteenth Century British Politics:Parliamentary Supremacy Versus the Independence of the Crown",9 The Historical Journal,318(1966).
[13]See Gordon S.Wood,The creation of the American Republic,1776—1787,The University of North Carolina Press,1969,pp.17,32.
[14]See George Elliott Howard,The American Nation:a History,Vol.8,Preliminaries of the Revolution,1763-1775,Harper&Brothers Publishers,1905,pp.28-30.
[15]Supra note 12.
[16]See Vernon Bogdanor,The monarchy and the Constitution,Oxford University Press,1995,pp.9—10.
[17]Supra note 13,p.33.
[18]See David A.J.Richards,"Revolution and Constitutionalism in America",in Michel Rosenfeld ed.,Constitutionalism,identity,difference,and legitimacy:theoretical perspectives,Duke University Press,1994,p.87.
[19]See John Phillip Reid,The concept of representation in the age of the American Revolution,University of Chicago Press,1989,pp.113-114.
[20]See Richard Snowden,The American Revolution:Written in the style of ancient history:in two volumes,vol.1,Joyes,Hoff&Derrica.,1793,pp.15-17.
[21]See Lee Ward,The politics of liberty in England and revolutionary America,Cambridge University Press,2004,pp.410-411.
[22]See Evarts Boutell Greene,The American Nation:a History,Vol.6,Provincial America 1690-1740,Harper&Brothers Publishers,1905,pp.65-66.
[23]Supra note 13,pp.404-407.
[24]Supra note 18,p.94.
[25]独立革命的积极倡导者Patrick Henry在弗吉尼亚宪法批准大会上的演讲就表达了这种情绪,他说新宪法创造的总统会变成一个国王,甚至有的方面连国王都不如。See Johathan Elliot,The debates in the several state conventions on the adoption of the Federal Constitution:as recommended by the general convention at Philadelphia in 1787,William S.Hein,1996,pp.58—59.
[26]See Max Farrand,The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,Yale University Press,1911,p.293.
[27]Ibid.,pp.316,321.
[28]Ibid.,pp.394-395.
[29]Ibid.,p.503.
[30]See Edward S.Corwin,The President:Office and Powers,1787—1984:history and analysis of practice and opinion,New York University Press.1984,p.4.
[31]See Christopher S.Yoo,Steven G.Calabresi,Anthony J.Colangelo,"The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era,1945—2004",90Iowa Law Review,601(2005).
[32]See The Federalist:No.74,the same view continued,in relation to the command of the national forces,and the power of pardoning,Liberty Fund,Inc.,2001,p.385.
[33]See Akhil Reed Amar,"Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause",82Virginia Law Review,647(1996).
[34]See John Yoo,"Unitary,Executive,or Both?",76The University of Chicago Law Review,1935(2009).
[35]See The Federalist:No.72,the same vieui continued,in regard to the re—eligibility of the president,Liberty Fund,Inc.,2001,p.374.
[36]See Lawrence Lessig,Cass R.Sunstein,"The President and the Administration",94Columbia Law Review,1(1994).
[37]实际上,研究指出,尽管在州的宪法批准大会遭遇失败,反联邦党依然全面参与了一届国会的竞选,并且其中有的人成功当选。他们尝试了一系列试图改变宪法的策略。宪法通过后,直到1791年,为了利用宪法反对汉密尔顿的国家银行提议,国会中的“反联邦党”才呈现出明显的对新宪法的强烈支持,此时才能认为宪法开始被全面接受了。而前述三个部门则是1789年建立的。See David J.Siemers,Ratifying the republic:Anti federalists and Federalists in Constitutional Time,Stanford University Press,2002,pp.6—8.
[38]See Steven G.Calabresi,Saikrishna B.Prakash,"The President's Power to Execute the Laws",104 The Yale Law Journal,541(1994).
[39]See Martin S.Flaherty,"The Most Dangerous Branch",105 The Yale Law Journal,1725(1996).
[40]See Peter L.Strauss,"The Place of Agencies in Government:Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch",84 Columbia Law Review,573(1984).
[41]See Peter L.Strauss,"Overseer,or the Decider?The President in Administrative Law",75 The George Washington Law Review,696(2007).
[42]See Paul R.Verkuil,"The Purposes And Limits of Independent Agencies",1988 Duke Law Journal,257(1998).
[43]See Steven G.Calabresi,Nicholas Terrell,"The Fatally Flawed Theory of the Unbundled Executive",93 Minnesota Law Review,1696(2009).
[44]See Elena Kagan,"Presidential Administration",114 Harvard Law Review,2245(2001).
[45]参见黄锦堂:“行政组织法之基本问”,载翁岳生编:《行政法》(上册),中国法制出版社2002年版,页335。
[46]See 16 U.S.C.§410111(c)(1)(2015)
[47]See Pub.L.101-576,titleⅠ,§102,titleⅡ,§202,§203,§205,Nov.15,1990,104 Stat.2838.
[48]See United States Statutes at Large,Volume 1 1st-5th,1789-1799,Statutel,Chapter 4.
[49]See 21 U.S.C.§393(2015).《美国法典》(US Code)编纂时将其列为第十章,但章名《MISCELLANEOUS》未变。
[50]一个典型的例子就是“公务接待”中的资金浪费问题,包括接待中的馈赠、娱乐、餐饮等支出,负责接待的一方也存在着以公务为名在接待活动中为本人谋取私利的情况,并非单纯只是遭到困扰的一方。
[51]See 51 U.S.C.§20113(c)(5)(2015).
[52]See 42 U.S.C.§7258(a)(1)(a)(7)(2015).
[53]See 3 U.S.C.§105(a)(2015).
[54]See Saikrishna B.Prakash,"Fragmented Features of the Constitution's Unitary Executive",45Willamette Law Review,701(2009).
[55]See 5 U.S.C.§552(a)(1)(2015).
[56]See 5 U.S.C.§553(b)(3)(A)(2015).
[57]See 78 Fed.Reg.23158(April 18,2013).
[58]See 41 C.F.R.§300-1.2.(2015).
[59]See James M.Buxbaum,The Corporate Politeia:a Conceptual Approach to Business,Government,and Society,University Press of America,1981,pp.30—31.
[60]See 49 U.S.C.§24301(a)(2),(a)(3)(2015).
[61]See Association of American Railroads v.United States Department of Transportation,721 F.3d666,(D.C.Cir.2013).
[62]See Carter v.Carter Coal Co.,298 U.S.238,(U.S.1936).该案争议的问题是,1935年的《烟煤保护法》(Bituminous Coal Conservation Act)授权多数煤炭生产者制定工资和工时方面的规则。接受本法see—tion 4规定准则(code)的煤炭生产者将会得到退税。这些煤炭生产者成为准则成员(code members)。但是该法同时规定一旦超过三分之二煤炭产量的煤炭生产者达成每周和每日最大工作时间的协议,并经代表着超过一半煤炭工人的代表同意,这个最大工时协议就必须被全体准则成员接受。违反者将被施加过高的税收并失去向美国政府及其合同商出售煤炭的机会。
[63]See DOT v.Ass'n of Am.R.R.,135 S.Ct.1225,(U.S.2015).
[64]See Lebron v.Nat'l R.R.Passenger Corp.,513 U.S.374,(U.S.1995).
[65]See Kevin M.Stack,"The President's Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws",106 Columbia Law Review,263(2006).
[66]See David Lewis,Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design,Stanford University Press,2004,pp.39,49.
[67]See Kent H.Barnett,"Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon",87 Notre Dame Law Review,1349(2012).
[68]See Richard J.Pierce,Jr,"Saving the Unitary Executive Theory From Those Who Would Distort and Abuse it:a Review of the Unitary Executive by Steven G.Calabresi and Christopher S.Yoo",12 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law,593(2010).
[69]See Myers v.United States,272 U.S.52,(U.S.1926).
[70]See Humphrey's Ex'r v.United States,295 U.S.602,(U.S.1935).
[71]本案判决两年之后,1937年罗斯福总统的行政管理委员会向他提交的报告中使用了这一术语。因为宪法显然是三权分立的,所以报告抨击这个“无头(headless)的第四分支”,是一个缺乏责任性的机构和不能被协调的权力,实际上是批评法院的组织创新超越了宪法的规定。参见James O.Freedman,Crtsis and hegitimacy:the Administrative Process and American Government,Cambridge University Press,1978,pp.17一18.但此后,由于独立管制委员会实践的确立,尽管宪法从未设想过这一机构的可能性,法院的这一组织创新还是被人们所接受,学者也开始在正面和肯定的意义上使用这一术语。可参见Emily S.Bremer,“The Unwritten Administrative Constitution",66 Florida Law Review,1215(2014).
[72]See Heidi Kitrosser,"The Accountable Executive",93 Minnesota Law Review,1741(2009).
[73]See Morrison v.Olson,487 U.S.654,(U.S.1988).
[74]See Ronald J.Krotoszynski,Jr,"Cooperative Federalism,The New Formalism,and the Separation of Powers Revisited:Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of State—Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law",61 Duke Law Journal,1599(2012).
[75]See Free Enter.Fund v.Pub.Co.Accounting Oversight Bd.,561 U.S.477,(U.S.2010).
[76]See Richard H.Pildes,"Free Enterprise Fund,Boundary—Enforcing Decisions,and the Unitary Executive Branch Theory of Government Administration",6 Duke Journal of Constitutional Law&Public Policy,1(2010).
[77]See Wiener v.United States,357 U.S.349,(U.S.1958).
[78]See SEC v.Blinder,Robinson&Co.,855 F.2d 677,(10th Cir.Colo.1988).1998年的“证券交易委员会诉罗宾森·布兰德公司”一案中,第十巡回区上诉法院适用了相同的判决逻辑。尽管立法并未规定SEC的委员享有免职保护,而只规定任期为5年,但法院主张,根据判例法,总统对官员的免职权是否应受到国会立法的约束,取决于相关组织职能的性质。因为SEC是独立管制机构,所以SEC委员就应当享有免职保护。
[79]See John A.Rohr,To Run a Constitution:The Legitimacy of the Administrative State,University Press of Kansas,1986,p.140.
[80]See Michael Stolleis,Public law in Germany,1800-1914,Berghahn Books,2001,p.401.
[81]参见(德)保罗·拉班德:“德意志帝国国家法”,柳建龙译,载王贵松主编:《宪政与行政法治评论(第六卷)》,中国人民大学出版社2012年,页168-170。
[82]Supra note 80.
[83]拉邦德提出法人“非渗透性理论”,认为组织规范在国家法人的人格之内,而不是人格之间,因而组织规范不涉法律关系之调整。参见李洪雷:“德国行政法学中行政主体概念的探讨”,《行政法学研究》2000年第1期。
[84]参见薛刚凌:“多元化背景下行政主体之建构”,《浙江学刊》2007年第2期。
[85]参见常秀鹏:“论高等学校特别公法人定位”,《河北法学》2009年第1期。
[86]如四川大学就“川医”命名争议向教育部提出行政复议案,北京大学诉邹恒甫名誉侵权案件等。
[87]参见王锴:“公用事业民营化探讨—基于公法学的思考”,《法学论坛》2012年第1期。
[88]参见薛刚凌:“我国行政主体理论之检讨—兼论全面研究行政组织法的必要性”,《政法论坛》1998年第6期。