新法律过程、话语综合和制度微观分析
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摘要
法律过程学派的历史发展历程充满了波折和艰辛,不仅先后遭受法经济学、批判法学派等的围攻和批判,又与后芝加哥学派法经济学、边缘学术研究、大陆社会理论等学派发生研究观点、研究路线的碰撞和比较。法律过程学派融合了众多基础学科的视野,为各学科的发展和探讨提供了崭新的聚焦点,将研究目光放在对制度的微观分析上,探寻社会效益和个人利益等目标价值,促进法学各分支学科之间进行有效互动和良性发展,以期实现社会公正和效率等法律价值。重新解读法律过程学派视野下的创新性前沿研究,以实现法学学科多元化的发展目标。
The historical development of the legal process movement is difficult.It has been besieged and criticized by law and economics,critical legal studies and so on,and its research ideas and research technology routes had taken place in the Post-law and economics,Outsider Scholarship and Continental Social Theory.Legal process movement combines many fields of vision and the basic disciplines for the development of various disciplines,and it provides a new focus on the research of microscopic analysis and the system,so as to explore the social and personal interests of the target value,and to promote effective interaction and benign development among all branches of law,with a great view to realize the legal value of social justice and efficiency,and re-understanding of the discourse synthesis,and systematic microanalysis under the perspective of the legal process school,and make us to realize the diversification of jurisprudence significance of development Goal.
The historical development of the legal process movement is difficult.It has been besieged and criticized by law and economics,critical legal studies and so on,and its research ideas and research technology routes had taken place in the Post-law and economics,Outsider Scholarship and Continental Social Theory.Legal process movement combines many fields of vision and the basic disciplines for the development of various disciplines,and it provides a new focus on the research of microscopic analysis and the system,so as to explore the social and personal interests of the target value,and to promote effective interaction and benign development among all branches of law,with a great view to realize the legal value of social justice and efficiency,and re-understanding of the discourse synthesis,and systematic microanalysis under the perspective of the legal process school,and make us to realize the diversification of jurisprudence significance of development Goal.
引文
(1)“综合”这个术语在此处是指为了一个共同的主题,将两种可认明的和先前对立的方法结合起来所做的刻意努力。这一概念来源于黑格尔,参见Georg W.F.Hegel,Hegel’s Science of Logic,H.D.Lewis ed.,A.V.Miller Trans,2ded.,1976,pp.793-818。但是在此唯一需要声明的是黑格尔的方法对知识社会学来讲是十分有用的。
(1)William C.Chase,The American Law School and the Rise of Administrative Governmen,1982,pp.23-59;Robert Stevens,Law School:Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s,1983,pp.51-53.
(2)Thomas C.Grey,“Langdell’s Orthodoxy”,45 U.Pitt.L.Rev.1(1983),p.1;Dennis Patterson,“Langdell’s Legacy”,90 Nw.U.L.Rev.196(1995),pp.200-201;John H.Schlegel,“Langdell’s Legacy or,The Case of the Empty Envelope”,36 Stan.L.Rev.(1984),pp.1517-1520;G.Edward White,“The Impact of Legal Science on Tort Law 1880-1910”,78 Colum.L.Rev.(1978),pp.213-220.在最近的文章中,Anthony Sebok建议形式主义者致力于法律实证主义方法。参见Anthony Sebok,“Misunderstanding Positivism”,93 Mich.L.Rev.(1995),pp.2054,2065-2072。虽然形式主义者因为渴望(我们现在称之为自命不凡)法律成为科学的学科而拒绝自然法或神灵启示的法律,但他们似乎相信普遍原则是以远离主权命令的平缓过程的方式嵌入在司法判决体系内的。Paul Carrington还指出形式主义和实证主义的联系,但他认为这种联系是法律独立于政治,而不是法律浮现于可认明的命令这种更具体的断言。Paul Carrington,“HailLangdell”,20 Law &Soc.Inquiry(1995),pp.691,707-710。
(3)John C.Gray,The Nature and Sources of the Law,1909,p.291.(将任何关于实证法的观念引入法律的概念都是法理学的倒退);Oliver W.Holmes,“The Path of the Law”,10 Harv.L.Rev.(1897),pp.457,469-474(讨论了法律与作为向关于法律规则的价值的启迪怀疑论迈出的第一步的历史发展之间的关系);Roscoe Pound,“Mechanical Jurisprudence”,8Colum.L.Rev.(1908),pp.605-606(指出“要牢记法律不能变得过于科学以致人们无法领会其运作或者过于科学而不能服务于正义目的”)。
(4)就像Justice Holmes所称,法律“背后如果没有一定明确的权威便不能存在。就其在一个国家的实施而言,普通法并不是一般意义上的普通法而是依靠国家权威而存在的国家法”。U.S.Supreme Court,Black,White Taxicab,Transfer Co.v.Brown,Yellow Taxicab,Transfer Co.,276U.S.1928,pp.518-533(Holmes对此是有异议的);Jerome Frank,Law and the Modern Mind,1930,pp.32-33(认为普通法并未先存于司法判决,但它是这些判决或者关于这些判决的预言的产物);Felix Cohen,“Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach”,35 Colum.L.Rev.(1935),pp.809,837(“法律值得服从并不是出于其本善,而是由于其背后的权力”)。
(5)Alexander M.Bickel,The Least Dangerous Branch,1962,pp.1-34;Charles L.Black,Jr.,The People and the Court,1960,pp.1-33;Herbert Wechsler,“Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law”,73 Harv.L.Rev.1(1959),p.9.
(6)Lon L.Fuller,The Morality of Law,1964,pp.152-185;Henry M.Hart,Jr.,Albert M.Sacks,The Legal Process,pp.1009-1010,1111,William Eskridge,Jr.,Philip P.Frickey eds.,1994;David Shapiro,“The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy”,78 Harv.L.Rev.921(1965),pp.926-942.哈特和萨克斯论战的资料在1955年至1958年得以发展,并随后广泛流通。William Eskridge,Jr.,Philip P.Frickey,“An Historical and Critical Introduction to the Legal Process”,Henry M.Hart,Jr.,Albert M.Sacks,1994,pp.51,87,206.
(1)Herbert Wechsler,“Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law”,73 Harv.L.Rev.1(1959),p.17;Kent Greenawalt,“The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles”,78 Colum.L.Rev.(1978),pp.982-1021(讨论了“作为对法律过程中完整性和理性的要求的中立原则的价值”)。
(2)Lon L.Fuller,“The Forms and Limits of Adjudication”,92 Harv.L.Rev.353(1978),pp.365-366.尽管这篇文章在1978年发表,但它是法律过程时代的产物,著于1957年且在1959年和1961年加以修改。各种各样的草稿得以广泛传阅,此文在那个时期产生了相当大的影响。Kenneth I.Winston,“Introduction to Fuller”,92 Harv.L.Rev.353(1978),p.353.
(3)Kelsen认为法律全部是由最高统治者的命令所构成,并不体现任何规范性原则。Hans Kelsen,General Theory of Law and State,Anders Wedberg trans.,1945,pp.15-28(在凯尔森之后的一般理论);Hans Kelsen,Pure Theory of Law,Max Knight trans.,2ded.,1967,pp.1-58.
(4)United States Supreme Court:United States v.Carolene Prods.Co.,304U.S.,1938,pp.144,152.在杰西·乔柏《司法审查》和《国家政治进程》的第4-59页(1980年版)及约翰·哈特·伊利《民主与不信任》的第73-179页(1980年版)中,人权本位和政治过程观点的综合首次获得正当理由,但是在整个法律过程立场中一直隐含着将民事权利置于其他宪法保障之上的偏爱,参见Paul Freund,“The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties”,4 Vand.L.Rev.533(1951),pp.545-551;Herbert Wechsler,“The Political Safeguards of Federalism:The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government”,54 Colum.L.Rev.543(1954),p.578(该书认为最高法院没有必要保护联邦制)。
(5)Alexander M.Bickel,The Least Dangerous Branch,1962,pp.29-33;U.S.Supreme Court:Black,White Taxicab,Transfer Co.v.Brown,Yellow Taxicab,Transfer Co.,276 U.S.1928,pp.64-68;Herbert Wechsler,“The Political Safeguards of Federalism:The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government”,54Colum.L.Rev.543(1954),pp.10-20.
(1)不仅是法律的内容(在这种情况下指宪法)综合考虑实证的和规范考虑,法律概念本身也综合了这些因素。这一问题是著名的富勒与哈特论战的基础。Lon L.Fuller,“The Forms and Limits of Adjudication”,92 Harv.L.Rev.353(1978),pp.133-145.
(2)Henry M.Hart,Jr.,Albert M.Sacks,The Legal Process,pp.693-697;Lon L.Fuller,“The Forms and Limits of Adjudication”,92 Harv.L.Rev.353(1978),pp.365-372;David Shapiro,“The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy”,78 Harv.L.Rev.921(1965),pp.942-958.
(3)Alexander M.Bickel,The Least Dangerous Branch,1962,pp.16-23.
(4)Alexander M.Bickel,The Least Dangerous Branch,1962,pp.29-33;U.S.Supreme Court:Black,White Taxicab,Transfer Co.v.Brown,Yellow Taxicab,Transfer Co.,276 U.S.1928,pp.34-55;Paul J.Mishkin,“The Supreme Court,1964Term—Foreword:The High Court,the Great Writ,and the Due Process of Time and Law”,79 Harv.L.Rev56(1965),pp.60-62.
(5)Alexander M.Bickel,The Least Dangerous Branch,1962,pp.49-65,124-133.位于第二位的是James B.Thayer,形式主义批评家和法律过程方法的先驱(参见上书第35-44页)。Bickel的观点再次在法律过程学派的广阔界限内受到回击。参见Gerald Gunther,“The Subtle Vices of the‘Passive Virtues’—A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review”,64 Colum.L.Rev.1(1964),passim。
(1)Richard Posner,“The Economic Analysis of Law”,1st ed.,1972,pp.152-154;Ronald Coase,“The Federal Communications Commission”,2 J.L.&Econ.1(1959),passim;Arthur Devany,Ross Eckert,Charles Meyers,Donald O’Hara and Richard Scott,“A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum—A Legal-EconomicEngineering Study”,21 Stan.L.Rev.1499(1969),pp.1505-1512;Richard Epstein,“A Common Law for Labor Relations:A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation”,92 Yale L.J.(1983),pp.1357,1359;Daniel R.Fischel,“Efficient Capital Market Theory,the Market for Corporate Control,and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers”,57 Tex.L.Rev.1(1978),pp.24-26;Jonathan Macey,“Special Interest Groups and the Judicial Function:The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall”,33 Emory L.J.1(1983),p.2;Kenneth Scott,“In Quest of Reason:The Licensing Decisions of the Federal Banking Agencies”,42 U.Chi.L.Rev.235(1975),pp.283-296.
(2)James M.Buchanan,Gordon Tullock,The Calculus of Consent,1962,pp.3-39;Morris P.Fiorina,Congress:Keystone of the Washington Establishment,1977,pp.39-40;David R.Mayhew,Congress:The Electoral Connection,1974,p.13;Dennis Mueller,Public ChoiceⅡ,1989,pp.1-6.许多法律团体已经适应了这种趋势。参见Peter H.Aranson,Ernest Gellhornand Glen O.Robinson,“A Theory of Legislative Delegation”,68 Cornell L.Rev.1,(1982),pp.41-45;Jonathan R.Macey,Geoffrey P.Miller,“Origin of the Blue Sky Laws”,70 Tex.L.Rev.347(1991),passim.(对蓝天法案的描述是对利益集团施压的回应,而不是致力于保护投资者。)关于这一点的一般讨论,参见Daniel A.Farber,Philip P.Frickey,Law and Public Choice,University of Chicago Press,1991,p.20-23.
(3)Peter H.Aranson,Ernest Gellhornand Glen O.Robinson,“A Theory of Legislative Delegation”,68 Cornell L.Rev.1(1982),p.39.
(4)William A.Niskanen Jr.,Bureaucracy and Representative Government,1971,pp.38-42;Gordon Tullock,The Politics of Bureaucracy,1965,pp.134-136,167-170;Jean-Luc Migue,Gerard Belanger,“Toward a General Theory of Managerial Discretion”,17 Pub.Choice27(1974),passim;Paul Wyckoff,“The Sample Analytics of Slack-Maximizing Bureaucracy”,67 Pub.Choice35(1989),pp.36-38.
(5)关于发展司法行为的公共选择理论的一些努力,参见Rafael Gely,Pablo T.Spiller,“The Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions:The Case of Roosevelt’s Court-Packing Plan”,12Int’l Rev.L.&Econ.45(1992),pp.46-48;William Landes,Richard Posner,“The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective”,18 J.L.&Econ.875(1975),pp.885-887;Richard A.Posner,“What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?(The Same Thing Everybody Else Does)”,3 Sup.Ct.Econ.Rev.1(1993),pp.13-15,31-39。
(1)Frank H.Easterbrook,“Statutes’Domains”,50 U.Chi.L.Rev.533(1983),pp.533,544-551(推荐法官解释策略,基于制定法总是讨价还价且立法机关并没有规划,只有通过立法的事实);Jonathan R.Macey,“Promoting PublicRegarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model”,86 Colum.L.Rev.223(1986),pp.240-250 (推荐法官从公共视角理解权力寻租或私人法令);Richard A.Posner,“Economics,Politics,and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution”,49 U.Chi.L.Rev.263(1982),pp.272-282(此文推荐解释策略基于对立法机关出于多重性目的的认识,牵涉授权给一些有限的利益集团)。
(2)Richard A.Posner,“Economics,Politics,and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution”,49 U.Chi.L.Rev.263(1982),pp.93-104;Richard A.Posner,“Economics,Politics,and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution”,49 U.Chi.L.Rev.263(1982),pp.156-172;Geoffrey P.Miller,“The True Story of Carolene Products”,Sup.Ct.Rev.397(1987),pp.422-428.
(3)相反,政治的经济分析大量聚焦在立法机关上,因为立法活动很容易被定型为最大化再选机会的努力。Morris P.Fiorina,Congress:Keystone of the Washington Establishment,1977,passim;David R.Mayhew,Congress:The Electoral Connection,1974,passim;cf.Mancur Olson,The Logic of Collective Action,355(1403)Harvard University Press,1965,passim(该文讨论了利益集团对选举过程的影响)。
(4)Morton J.Horwitz,The Transformation of American Law,1780-1860,1977,p.30;Roberto M.Unger,The Critical Legal Studies Movement,Harvard Law Review,Vol.96.No.3,1986,pp.5-8;Gerald E.Frug,“The City as a Legal Concept”,93 Harv.L.Rev.(1980),pp.1057,1059-1062(以上这些作者认为,城市的政治定位是权力关系的映射,而不是地方管辖的中立原则);Duncan Kennedy,“The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries”,28 Buff.L.Rev.(1979),pp.205,211-221.
(5)Roberto M.Unger,The Critical Legal Studies Movement,Harvard Law Review,Vol.96.No.3,1986,pp.5-8;Clare Dalton,“An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine”,94 Yale L.J.(1985),pp.997,1002-1003;Gary Peller,“The Metaphysics of American Law”,73 Cal.L.Rev.(1985),pp.1151,1152;Joseph W.Singer,“The Player and the Cards:Nihilism and Legal Theory”,94 Yale L.J.1,(1984),pp.5-7;Mark V.Tushnet,“Following the Rules Laid Down:A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles”,96 Harv.L.Rev.(1983),pp.781,824-827.
(6)Max Horkheimer,Theodor W.Adorno,Dialectic of Enlightenment,John Cumming trans.,1972,pp.20-23.
(1)Jacques Derrida,Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry:An Introduction,John P.Leavey Jr.trans.,1989,pp.66-76;Jacques Derrida,Of Grammatology,Gayatri C.Spivak trans.,1976,pp.11-26;Jacques Derrida,Writing and Differenc,Alan Bass trans.,1978,pp.278-282.
(2)Mark Tushnet,Red,White and Blue,1988,pp.191-199.
(3)关于批判法学研究抨击法经济学,可参见Mark Kelman,“Choice and Utility”,Wis.L.Rev.769(1979),passim;Duncan Kennedy,“Cost Benefit Analysis of Eminent Problems:A Critique”,33 Stan.L.Rev.387(1981),passim。关于法经济学抨击批判法学研究,可参见Richard Posner,The Problems of Jurisprudence,1990,pp.153-157;Lewis Kornhauser,“The Great Image of Authority”,36 Stan.L.Rev.349(1984),pp.379-387;Linz Audain,“Critical Legal Studies,Feminism,Law and Economics,and the Veil of Intellectual Tolerance:ATentative Case for Cross-Jurisprudential Dialogue”,20 Hofstra L.Rev(1992),pp.1017,1087-1090(描述了两项运动彼此的对立)。
(4)Donald N.McCloskey,If You’re So Smart,1990,pp.5-9;Donald N.McCloskey,Knowledge and Persuasion in Economics,1994,pp.3-4;Donald N.McCloskey,The Rhetoric of Economics,1985,pp.5-11.
(1)Jurgen Habermas,Theory and Practice,John Viertel trans.,1973,pp.253-282.;Herbert Marcuse,One Dimensional Man,1964,pp.144-199.
(2)Gary Minda,Postmodern Legal Movements,1995,pp.208-223;Donald N.Gjerdingen,“The Future of Legal Scholarship and the Search for a Modern Theory of Law”,35 Buff.L.Rev.1986,pp.381,386-397;Edward L.Rubin,“The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship”,86 Mich.L.Rev.(1988),pp.1835,1847-1853.
(3)Max Lerner,America as a Civilization,Volume One:The Basic Frame,1957,pp.209-238;Alexis de Tocqueville,Democracy in America,J.P.Mayer ed.,George Lawrence trans.,Doubleday 1969,1835,pp.612-614;Gordon S.Wood,The Radicalism of the American Revolution,1991,pp.189-212.
(1)例如,法律过程方法于对宪法两个最复杂的适用在1980年得以出版。法律和实践理性运动在法律过程运动中汲取了部分灵感。Anthony T.Kronman,“Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of Prudence”,94 Yale L.J.(1985),pp.1567,1567-1573.
(2)Stephen Breyer,Regulation and Its Reform,1982(拜耳之后提到了“规制”),pp.15-35,341-368.关于正义,Breyer的观点有较新的解释,Stephen Breyer,Breaking the Vicious Circle:Toward Effective Risk Regulation,1993,pp.55-81.
(3)Stephen Breyer,Regulation and Its Reform,1982,p.271-284;Robert Dorfman,Nancy S.Dorfman:Economics of the Environment,1977,passim;T.H.Tietenberg,Emissions Trading:An Exercise in Reforming Pollution Policy,1985,passim;Bruce A.Ackerman,Richard B.Stewart,“Reforming Environmental Law”,37 Stan.L.Rev.(1985),pp.1333,1341-1351;Richard B.Stewart,“Regulation,Innovation,and Administrative Law:A Conceptual Framework”,69 Cal.L.Rev.(1981),pp.1256,1263-1277.关于这个问题的对抗性观点不仅强调有关适当管控方法辩论的重要性,而且介绍了法律过程的其他主题,例如政治合法性和在实施这些方法上不同制度的比较能力。Steven Kelman,“What Price Incentives?”Economists and the Environment(1981),pp.27-88;Howard Latin,“Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency:Implementation of Uniform Standards and‘Fine-Tuning’Regulatory Reforms”,37 Stan.L.Rev.(1985),pp.1267,1292-1314.
(4)Ian Ayres,“Fair Driving:Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations”,104 Harv.L.Rev.(1991),pp.817 ,863-871(新车购买);Robert D.Cooter,Edward L.Rubin,“A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Payments”,66Tex.L.Rev.(1987),pp.63,97-123(消费者付费);Michael Klausner,“Market Failure and Community Investment:A Market-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act”,143 U.Pa.L.Rev.(1995),pp.1561,1580-1592(内城区住宅抵押贷款市场)。
(5)Richard A.Posner,“Economics,Politics,and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution”,49 U.Chi.L.Rev.263(1982),pp.98-102;William M.Landes,Richard A.Posner,“Adjudication as a Private Good”,8 J.Legal Stud.(1979),pp.235,236-242;Richard A.Posner,Andrew M.Rosenfield,“Impossibility and Related Doctrine in Contract Law:An Economic Analysis”,6 J.Legal Stud.(1977),pp.83,118;Paul H.Rubin,“Why Is the Common Law Efficient?”6 J.Legal Stud.(1977),pp.51,61.
(6)Paul H.Rubin,“Why Is the Common Law Efficient?”6 J.Legal Stud.(1977),pp.1399,1400.
(1)Robert Cooter,Stephen Marks and Robert Mnookin,“Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior”,11 J.Legal Stud.(1982),pp.225,242-247;Ronald J.Gilson,Robert H.Mnookin,“Disputing Through Agents:Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation”,94Colum.L.Rev.(1994),pp.509,550-557;Louis Kaplow,Steven Shavell,“Legal Advice About Information to Present in Litigation:Its Effects and Social Desirability”,102Harv.L.Rev.(1989),pp.567,606-615.Robert D.Cooter,Daniel L.Rubinfeld,“Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution”,27 J.Econ.Literature(1989),pp.1067,1067-1086(测量研究)。
(2)William N.Eskridge,Jr.,“Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions”,101 Yale L.J.(1991),pp.331 ,353-379;William N.Eskridge,Jr.,John A.Ferejohn,“The Article I,Section 7Game”,80 Geo.L.J.(1992),pp.523 ,528-533;William N.Eskridge,Jr.,Philip P.Frickey,“The Supreme Court,1993 Term—Foreword:Law as Equilibrium”,108 Harv.L.Rev.(1994),pp.27,30-42;John A.Ferejohn,Barry R.Weingast,“A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation”,12 Int’l Rev.L.&Econ.(1992),pp.263,276-279;Daniel B.Rodriguez,“The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform”,72 Wash.U.L.Q.1(1994),pp.42-51;Pablo T.Spiller,“Politicians,Interest Groups,and Regulators:A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation,or‘Let Them Be Bribed’”,33 J.L.&Econ(1990),pp.65,65-72.
(3)关于政治过程中博弈论应用的理论文献综述,参见Herve Moulin,Game Theory for the Social Sciences,1981,passim;Peter C.Ordeshook,Game Theory and Political Theory,1986,pp.222-235;Peter C.Ordeshook,A Political Theory Primer,1992,passim.
(4)Bruce A.Ackerman,Reconstructing American Law,1984,pp.46-71.
(5)Neil K.Komesar,Imperfect Alternatives:Choosing Institutions in Law,Economics,and Public Policy,1994,pp.3-13,53-150.
(1)James Q.Wilson,The Politics of Regulation,in The Politics of Regulation,James Q.Wilson ed.,1980,pp.357,370-372.
(2)Neil K.Komesar,Imperfect Alternatives:Choosing Institutions in Law,Economics,and Public Policy,1994,p.271(“制度分析必须是综合性的。不管多复杂,单一的制度分析是无效的替代品,不能评估相关瑕疵制度替代品的优劣”)。另一个有趣的方法是,Jane Schacter对于民主法律解释的定义,体现了以过程为导向的概念,例如政治活动的保留、反从属化、与政治分支的合作关系,与之更相关的是基于公共选择考虑的司法约束。参见Jane S.Schacter,“Metademocracy:The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation”,108 Harv.L.Rev.(1995),pp.593,613-646。
(3)种族批判理论已强调了这一点,参见Kimberle Crenshaw,Race,“Reform and Retrenchment:Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law”,101 Harv.L.Rev.(1988),pp.1331,1356(作者认为,“尽管种族批判学者声称他们的项目关注支配地位,但少有人对具体解决种族支配做出实质性努力,而且他们的工作似乎并不建立在种族压迫的现实上”);Richard Delgado,“The Ethereal Scholar:Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?”,22 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev.(1987),pp.301,304,307(作者主张,“批判法学研究对权利和规则的批判是其项目最具疑问的方面,没有为少数族裔学者和律师提供什么答案”);Patricia J.Williams,“Alchemical Notes:Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights”,22 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev.(1987),pp.401,405(作者认为,“批判法学研究忽视了权利主张和权利利益已帮助黑人、其他少数族裔和贫困者的程度”)。Mary Joe Frug,“A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto(An Unfinished Draft)”,105 Harv.L.Rev.(1992),pp.1045,1058(该书断言,“激进女权主义者确信女性之所以被定为女性是依靠男性主导的性主从关系,导致她们认为性工作者应该从这种环境中解脱出来而不是支持这种工作”);Martha R.Mahoney,“Legal Images of Battered Women:Redefining the Issue of Separation”,90 Mich.L.Rev.(1991),pp.1,2(该文认为“对女性的严重伤害源自于法律文化扭曲了我们的经历的方式”)。
(4)Derrick Bell,And We Are Not Saved:The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice,1987,pp.3-6;Patricia J.Williams,The Alchemy of Race and Rights,1991,pp.61-63,166-68;Alex M.Johnson,Jr.,“How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent Integration:Destabilizing Race as a Vehicle to Integrate Neighborhoods”,143 U.Pa.L.Rev.(1995),pp.1595,1609-1616;Charles R.LawrenceⅢ,“The Id,the Ego,and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism”,39 Stan.L.Rev.317,(1987),passim.
(1)Derek Bok,“Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Law”,84 Harv.L.Rev.(1971),pp.1394,1417-1420.
(2)Regina Austin,“Sapphire Bound”,Wis.L.Rev.(1989)(讨论了法庭需要少数群体成员的生活现状保持敏感),pp.539 ,563-564;Alex M.Johnson,Jr.,Bid Whist,Tonk,and United States v.Fordice:“Why Integrationism Fails AfricanAmericans Again”,81 Cal.L.Rev.1401(1993),passim(重新评估文中所提及南方黑人大学的综合目标);Mari J.Matsuda,Looking to the Bottom:Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,22 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev.(1987),pp.323,373-388(质疑对赔偿的教条性异议);Patricia J.Williams,“Alchemical Notes:Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights”,22 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev.(1987),pp.432-433(断言需要重构性质和权利的定义以便权利保护真实的个人隐私)。
(3)Edward L.Rubin,“On Beyond Truth:A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship”,80 Cal.L.Rev.(1992),pp.889,953-957.
(4)这个主题影响了种族批判理论如何对待权利。特别明确的表述,参见Patricia J.Williams,“Alchemical Notes:Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights”,22 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev.(1987),pp.151-152,Richard Delgado,“Roderigo’s Ninth Chronicle:Race,Legal Instrumentalism,and the Rule of Law”,143 U.Pa.L.Rev.(1994),pp.379,387-388.
(1)Catharine A.MacKinnon,Toward a Feminist Theory of the State,1989,pp.237-238(在自由国家,法治不仅使超越女性的男性权力制度化,也使男性形式的权力制度化);Lucinda M.Finley,“Transcending Equality Theory:A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate”,86 Colum.L.Rev.(1986),pp.1118,1118-1122(公私范围的传统区分,有助于维持职场中女性的主从属地位);Robin West,“Jurisprudence and Gender”,55 U.Chi.L.Rev.(1988),pp.1,4(父权制实际上是真正非以性别分类的法学的政治前提,因为父权制是认为男性的价值高于女性价值的政治结构);Joan C.Williams,“Deconstructing Gender”,87 Mich.L.Rev.(1989),pp.797,826(“对女性的歧视以及女性所做选择的歧视必须都被视为系统地使女性处于劣势的权力关系的综合系统的元素”)。
(2)Catharine A.MacKinnon,Toward a Feminist Theory of the State,1989,pp.136-141,168-170.
(3)一个著名的例子就是激进女权主义者参与竞选,参见the Self:“Autobiographical Performances in Outsider Scholarship”,81 Va.L.Rev.(1995),pp.1229,1234-1260(识别嵌入外人叙述传统价值体系);Dennis Patterson,“Postmodernism/Feminism/Law”,77 Cornell L.Rev.(1992),pp.254,305-316(讨论了以改革为导向的女权主义学术的现代思想);Edward L.Rubin,“On Beyond Truth:A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship”,80 Cal.L.Rev.(1992),pp.954 -955(突出了建议的务实性质和女权主义学派中理论定位的总体质量之间的对比)。以获得反色情法令的通过。Paul Brest,Ann Vandenberg,“Politics,Feminism,and the Constitution:The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis”,39Stan.L.Rev.607(1987),passim.Anne M.Coughlin,“Regulating the Self:Autobiographical Performances in Outsider Scholarship”,81 Va.L.Rev.1995,pp.1229,1234-1260(以识别外来叙事中的传统价值体系);Dennis,“Patterson,Postmodernism/Feminism/Law”,77 Cornell L.Rev.1992,pp.254,305-16(论女权主义学术改革的现代性);Edward L.Rubin,“On Beyond Truth:A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship”,80 Cal.L.Rev.(1992),pp.954-955(强调实用主义性质与女权主义学术理论的全球品质的对比建议)。
(4)Kathryn Abrams,“Sex Wars Redux:Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory”,95 Colum.L.Rev.304(1995),passim;Anne M.Coughlin,“Excusing Women”,82 Cal.L.Rev.(1994),pp.1,45-48;Martha R.Mahoney,“Legal Images of Battered Women:Redefining the Issue of Separation”,90 Mich.L.Rev.(1991),pp.53-63.
(1)William N.Eskridge,Jr.,“Gaylegal Narratives”,46Stan.L.Rev.607(1994),passim;Nancy D.Polikoff,“This Child Does Have Two Mothers:Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families”,78 Geo.L.J.(1990),pp.459,471(亲子身份的新定义对于适应现代家庭的庞杂是十分必要的);Kendall Thomas,“Beyond the Privacy Principle”,92Colum.L.Rev.(1992),pp.1431,1461-1492.
(2)Neil K.Komesar,Imperfect Alternatives:Choosing Institutions in Law,Economics,and Public Policy,1994,p.5.
(1)关于这个领域发展的讨论,参见Oliver E.Williamson,Markets and Hierarchies:Analysis and Antitrust Implications,1975,pp.1-8。
(2)John R.Commons,Institutional Economics:Its Place in Political Economy,1934,passim;Thorstein Veblen,The Theory of the Leisure Class,1912,passim.
(3)Oliver E.Williamson,The Economic Institutions of Capitalism,1985,pp.85-162;Armen A.Alchian,“Specificity,Specializations,and Coalitions”,140 J.Institutional &Theoretical Econ.34(1984),pp.34,38-40;R.H.Coase,“The Nature of the Firm”,4 Economica(1937),pp.386,390-398;R.H.Coase,“The Problem of Social Cost”,3 J.L.&Econ.1(1960),pp.16-17.
(4)Oliver E.Williamson,The Economic Institutions of Capitalism,1985,pp.15-42.
(5)Douglass C.North,Institutions,Institutional Change and Economic Performance,1990,pp.22-23;Herbert A.Simon,Administrative Behavior,2ded.,1961,pp.24-27;Oliver E.Williamson,The Economic Institutions of Capitalism,1985,pp.45-46;Oliver E.Williamson,The Economic Institutions of Capitalism,1985,pp.21-26.
(1)Douglass C.North,Institutions,Institutional Change and Economic Performance,1990,pp.36-45;Oliver E.Williamson,The Economic Institutions of Capitalism,1985,pp.131-62,206-39,298-325.
(2)Oliver E.Williamson,The Economic Institutions of Capitalism,1985,pp.131-162;Oliver E.Williamson,The Economic Institutions of Capitalism,1985,pp.117-131.
(3)Howard Margolis,Selfishness,Altruism,and Rationality,1982,pp.1-5;Douglass C.North,Structure and Change in Economic History,1981,pp.18,47,205;Robert Sugden,The Economics of Rights,Co-operation and Welfare,1986,pp.6-7;Robert Cooter,“Law and Unified Social Theory”,22 J.L.&Soc’y,1995,pp.50,61-66;Mark Granovetter,“Economic Action and Social Structure:The Problem of Embeddedness”,91 Am.J.Soc.(1985),pp.481,481-483.
(4)Robert C.Ellickson,Order Without Law:How Neighbors Settle Disputes,1991,pp.1-11.
(5)Douglass C.North,Structure and Change in Economic History,1981,pp.54-60;Oliver E.Williamson,The Economic Institutions of Capitalism,1985,pp.163-205.
(6)Douglass C.North,Structure and Change in Economic History,1981,p.54.
(7)Oliver E.Williamson,Chester Barnard and the Incipient Science of Organization,in Organization Theory:From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond,Oliver E.Williamson ed.,1995,pp.172,194-200;Oliver E.Williamson,Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory,in Organization Theory:From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond,1995,p.207,231-238(以下统称为威廉森的交易成本经济学)。
(1)Douglass C.North,Structure and Change in Economic History,1981,pp.46-53;Paul R.Milgrom,Douglass C.North,Barry R.Weingast,“The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade:The Law Merchant,Private Judges,and the Champagne Fairs”,2 Econ.&Pol.1(1990),pp.9-14.
(2)Oliver E.Williamson,Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory,in Organization Theory:From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond,1995,p.217。波斯纳(Richard Posner)认为交易成本经济学不是一个真正的新方法,参见Richard A.Posner,“The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics”,149 J.Institutional &Theoretical Econ.(1993),pp.73,74-76,82-84.作为回应,作者查阅了Kenneth Scott,Comment,“The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics”,149 J.Institutional &Theoretical Econ.(1993),p.92;Oliver E.Williamson,“Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics”,149J.Institutional &Theoretical Econ.99,99n.1(1993),pp.101-105。尽管波斯纳这么认为,但很多经济学家视交易成本经济学为一个重要的创新且相信其可以领导法学进入全新方向。
(3)J.M.Balkin,“Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory”,96 Yale L.J.(1987),pp.743,767-785;J.M.Balkin,“Transcendental Deconstruction,Transcendent Justice”,92 Mich.L.Rev.(1994),pp.1131,1137-1142.Drucilla Cornell,The Philosophy of the Limit:Systems Theory and Feminist Legal Reform,in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice,Drucilla Cornell,Michael Rosenfeld and David G.Carlson eds.,1992,pp.68,69;Jacques Derrida,Force of Law:The‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’,in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice,1992,pp.3,6-8.
(4)John Hasnas,“Back to the Future:From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism,or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument”,45 Duke L.J.(1995),pp.84,103-106;John Stick,“Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?”100 Harv.L.Rev.(1986),pp.332,334;Daniel C.Chow,“Trashing Nihilism”,65 Tul.L.Rev.(1990),pp.221,227-228(提供了批判法学研究关于解构主义适用的一般批评)。
(1)Edward L.Rubin,“On Beyond Truth:A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship”,80 Cal.L.Rev.(1992),pp.1838-1847。
(2)Martin Heidegger,Being and Time,1962;Edmund Husserl,The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,David Carr trans.,1970;Edmund Husserl,Ideas,1962;Ludwig Wittgenstein,Philosophical Investigations,G.E.M.Auscombe trans.,1958.
(3)Richard Rorty ed.,The Linguistic Turn:Recent Essays in Philosophical Method,1967,pp.1-39,43-124.
(4)Niklas Luhmann,The Differentiation of Society,Stephen Holmes,Charles Larmore trans.,1982,pp.238-242(下文简称为卢曼所提出的的“分化”);Niklas Luhmann,Political Theory in the Welfare State,John Bednarz Jr.trans.,1990,pp.232-234(下文简称为卢曼所提出的的政治理论);Claus Offe,Contradictions of the Welfare State,John Keaneed.,1984,pp.162-178,256-258;Gunther Teubner,Law as an Autopoietic System,ZenonBankowski ed.,Anne Bankowska,Ruth Adler trans.,1993,passim;Gunther Teubner,The Transformation of Law in the Welfare State,in Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State Gunther,Teubner ed.,1986,pp.3,3-9.系统理论的早期版本构成了美国组织社会学的一个主题。Ludwig von Bertalanffy,General Systems Theory,1968,passim.卢曼对更普遍的社会理论这一方法的适应表明了他的制度取向。
(5)Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,pp.51-52.
(6)Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,pp.49-61.
(7)Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,p.52.
(8)Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,pp.334-342.
(9)Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,pp.152-154.
(1)Jean L.Cohen,AndrewArato,Civil Society and Political Theory,1992,pp.316-332.
(2)Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,p.187.这个选择的过程不仅把法律纳入了政治体系,也赋予了系统中特定组件或者子系统的重要意义。“实证法通过政治手段更新和变革的渠道涉及将政党政治机制付诸实施,使其变成制度,且不允许其成为缺乏影响力的拙劣门面……”Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,p.189.
(3)Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,pp.77-78.
(4)Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,p.75.
(5)Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,p.109.
(6)Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,pp.167-169.这一立场将卢曼置于与现代法律实证主义创始人凯尔森对立的地位。Hans Kelsen,General Theory of Law and State,Anders Wedberg trans.,1945,pp.58-64.但是Luhmann没有意识到在法律体系中武力或者暴力的角色。Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,pp.83-90.
(7)Niklas Luhmann,Political Theory in the Welfare State,John Bednarz Jr.trans.,1990,pp.117-154;Niklas Luhmann,The Unity of the Legal System,in Autopoietic Law:A New Approach to Law and Society,Gunther Teubner ed.,1987,pp.12,14-16.
(8)Niklas Luhmann,The Unity of the Legal System,in Autopoietic Law:A New Approach to Law and Society,Gunther Teubner ed.,1987,pp.13-24;Gunther Teubner,Evolution of Autopoietic Law,in Autopoietic Law:A New Appproach to Law and Society,1987,passim;Gunther Teubner,“How the Law Thinks:Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law”,23Law,Soc’y Rev.727,1989,passim.
(9)Gunther Teubner,“How the Law Thinks:Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law”,23 Law,Soc’y Rev.727,1989,p.41.
(10)Jean-Francois Lyotard,The Postmodern Condition:A Report on Knowledge(Geoff Bennington,Brian Massumi trans.,1984),p.24.
(1)Jean Baudrillard,In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities(Paul Foss,John Johnston,Paul Patton trans.),1983;Gilles Deleuze,Felix Guattari,Anti-Oedipus,1983,pp.17-19,362-65;Michel Foucault,The Order of Things,1970,pp.373 -387;Jean-Francois Lyotard,The Postmodern Condition:A Report on Knowledge(Geoff Bennington,Brian Massumi trans.,1984),p.15.
(2)Michel Foucault,The Order of Things,1970,p.387.
(3)Jean-Francois Lyotard,The Postmodern Condition:A Report on Knowledge(Geoff Bennington,Brian Massumi trans.,1984),pp.3-6.
(4)Jean-Francois Lyotard,The Postmodern Condition:A Report on Knowledge,Geoff Bennington,Brian Massumi trans.,1984,p.15;Jean-Francois Lyotard,The Inhuman,1991,pp.62-65(该书认为全球范围内知识的计算机化正在用后现代制度结构取代人类记忆和传统文化)。
(5)Jean Baudrillard,Fatal Strategies,Jim Fleming ed.,amp Philip Beitchman,and W.G.J.Niesluchowski trans.,1983,pp.81-99,166-179.
(6)Gilles Deleuze,Felix Guattari,A Thousand Plateaus:Capitalism and Schizophrenia,1987,pp.3-25,351-423.
(7)Steven Best,Douglas Kellner,Postmodern Theory:Critical Interrogations,1991,pp.34-75.
(1)Michel Foucault,The Archaeology of Knowledge,1972,pp.199-211;Michel Foucault,The Archaeology of Knowledge,1972,passim.
(2)Michel Foucault,Discipline and Punish:The Birth of the Prison,Alan Sheridan trans.,1975.
(3)Michel Foucault,Discipline and Punish:The Birth of the Prison,Alan Sheridan trans.,1975,pp.73-75,114-126.这个时期的改革者寻求一种公平且具有象征意义的惩罚机制。
(4)Michel Foucault,Discipline and Punish:The Birth of the Prison,Alan Sheridan trans.,1975,pp.139-141.
(5)Michel Foucault,Discipline and Punish:The Birth of the Prison,Alan Sheridan trans.,1975,pp.135-138.
(6)Michel Foucault,Discipline and Punish:The Birth of the Prison,Alan Sheridan trans.,1975,pp.209-228,307-308.
(7)Nancy Fraser,Unruly Practices:Power,Discourse,and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory,1989,pp.28-30.
(8)Foucault关于性的作品也可能会被解读为提倡这个主张。Michel Foucault,The History of Sexuality,Robert Hurley trans.,Vintage Books 1990,1976,pp.92-102.Foucault关于性的社会结构的评论与激进女权主义和同性恋研究中的一些实质性问题有密切关系。然而,《规训与惩罚》一书中的制度分析与之更相关,也更直接地指向了新法律综合。
(9)Jurgen Habermas,The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence trans.,MIT Press 1989,1962.
(10)Jurgen Habermas,The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence trans.,MIT Press 1989,1962,pp.27-31,181-189,222-235.
(11)Jurgen Habermas,The Theory of Communicative Action:Reason and Rationalization of Society,Thomas McCarthy trans.,Beacon Press 1984,1981,passim.
(12)Jurgen Habermas,The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence trans.,MIT Press 1989,1962.pp.339-344.
(1)Jurgen Habermas,The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence trans.,MIT Press 1989,1962,p.13(将生活世界定义为“社会成员预设为知识背景的解释整体性的限制”);Jurgen Habermas,The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence trans.,MIT Press1989,1962,pp.119-152,Thomas McCarthy trans.,Beacon Press 1987.
(2)哈贝马斯认为,法律变成了这一进程的工具。他声明:法律充当了组织媒介控制的子系统的工具,而这些子系统不管怎样已经在涉及由共同理解主导的行为的规范语境上变得自治。经济、商业、企业和行政法的大部分领域都适用于此:法律以承担操控媒体自身的角色与权力和金钱的媒介结合起来(参见上书第365页)。将法律用作操控机制扭曲了其规范性功能。见上书第365-367页。
(3)Jurgen Habermas,Between Facts and Norms:Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy,William Rehg trans.,1996,pp.40,23-25;James Bohman,“Complexity,Pluralism and the Constitutional State:On Habermas’s Faktizitat und Geltung”,28 Law &Soc’y Rev.(1994),pp.897,912-920;Michael Rosenfeld,“Law as Discourse:Bridging the Gap Between Democracy and Rights”,108 Harv.L.Rev.(1995),p.1163(reviewing Between Facts and Norms)。哈贝马斯作品的制度化途径,尤其是其最近的作品,较之其更加抽象的对话语伦理的认识论导向的讨论,似乎与批判种族理论和激进女权主义理论的联系更加紧密。女权主义者阅读了哈贝马斯的大量作品(约翰娜米汉主编于1995年)。
(4)Jurgen Habermas,Between Facts and Norms:Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy,William Rehg trans.,1996,pp.287-328.他因此挑战了某些独立领域(例如国家与公民社会)为准自治的系统理论分析。Niklas Luhmann,The Differentiation of Society,Stephen Holmes,Charles Larmore trans.,1982,pp.76-82;Gunther Teubner,“How the Law Thinks:Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law”,23 Law,Soc’y Rev.727,1989,pp.100-122。
(5)Jurgen Habermas,Between Facts and Norms:Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy,William Rehg trans.,1996,pp.341-359.上书提出了哈贝马斯依赖美国公民共和主义学派。关于这一学派思想的综述,Frank Michelman,“Law’s Republic”,97 Yale L.J.1988,pp.1493,1494-1507;Cass R.Sunstein,“Interest Groups in American Public Law”,38 Stan.L.Rev.1985,pp.29,31-48。当然,这项运动表现了法学的另一重要主题,且亦需成为话语综合分析的部分。尽管公民共和主义具有特定的抽象特色,在这一领域的学术,例如以上引用的作品,揭示了在制度设置上的共同关注。
(6)Thomas McCarthy,Practical Discourse:On the Relation of Morality to Politics,inHabermas and the Public Sphere,Craig Calhoun ed.,1992,pp.51,52-57.
(7)Jurgen Habermas,“Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States”,1 Eur.J.Phil.128(1993),passim.
(8)Jean L.Cohen,AndrewArato,Civil Society and Political Theory,1992,pp.210-231;Claus Offe,Contradictions of the Welfare State,John Keaneed.,1984,pp.37-46;Alain Touraine,The Voice and the Eye:An Analysis of Social Movements,Alan Duff trans.,Cambridge University Press,1981,pp.102-109.
(1)Alexis de Tocqueville,Democracy in America,J.P.Mayer ed.,George Lawrence trans.,Doubleday 1969,1835,pp.513-517.
(2)Jean L.Cohen,AndrewArato,Civil Society and Political Theory,1992,pp.492-604.
(3)Roberto M.Unger,False Necessity:Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy,1987,pp.395-441.
(4)Roberto M.Unger,False Necessity:Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy,1987.pp.172-176.
(5)当代学术中的其他趋势可能为此方法论提供更多支持。一个著名的例子就是美国社会学“新制度主义”运动。James G.March,Johan P.Olsen,Rediscovering Institutions,1989,pp.1-2,16-19;Paul J.DiMaggio,Walter W.Powell,Introduction to The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis,Walter W.Powell,Paul J.DiMaggio eds.,1991,pp.1,11 -15.对于这一趋势与批判种族理论的连接关系的标示,参见Paul J.DiMaggio,Francie Ostrower,Race,Ethnicity,and Participation in the Arts,1992,passim。
(6)这一趋势在近来摆脱行政法继承的传统并发展管控问题的更加综合、多层次的分析的努力中尤其显著。Christopher F.Edley,Jr.,Administrative Law:Rethinking Judicial Control of Bureaucracy,1990,pp.9-12;Thomas O.McGarity,Reinventing Rationality:The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy,1991,pp.9-17(此书分析了联邦机构决策模型);Susan Rose-Ackerman,Rethinking the Progressive Agenda:The Reform of the American Regulatory State,1992,p.13(该书为通过一系列学科综合而创建行政改革议程辩称);Cass R.Sunstein,After the Rights Revolution:Reconceiving the Regulatory State,1990,pp.8-10(书中考虑了管理规则与历史参照、偏爱法定解释原则和宪法性原则)。
(1)Douwe W.Fokkema,Literary History,Modernism and Postmodernism,1984,pp.41,45;Clifford Geertz,Local Knowledge:Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology,1983,p.4(并未记录“一般”社会理论的近代抑制);Jean-Francois Lyotard,The Inhuman,1991,pp.23-24(定义了作为“元叙事”所抑制的“后现代”思想)。
(2)事实上,作为所建议的综合的理论是相当普遍的;交易成本经济学立志于确认经济行为的普遍性原则,然而哈贝马斯凭借其多箱式网格和对世界历史的迅速调查例证了显著的现代主义理论化。
(3)Gunther Teubner,“How the Law Thinks:Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law”,23 Law,Soc’y Rev.727,1989,pp.100-122;Niklas Luhmann,The Self-Reproduction of Law and Its Limits,in Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State,23 Law,Soc’y Rev.727,1989,pp.111-112;Gunther Teubner,Introduction to Autopoietic Law,in Autopoietic Law:A New Approach to Law and Society,23 Law,Soc’y Rev.727,1989,pp.1-11.
(1)Oliver E.Williamson,“Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics”,149J.Institutional &Theoretical Econ.99,99n.1(1993),pp.215-223.
(2)Edward L.Rubin,“Beyond Public Choice:Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes”,66N.Y.U.L.Rev.1,1991,pp.45-63.
(1)George P.Fletcher,“Two Modes of Legal Thought”,90 Yale L.J.,1981,pp.970,995-1003;Pierre J.Schlag,“Normativity and the Politics of Form”,139 U.Pa.L.Rev.,1991,pp.801,808-852;Mark Tushnet,“Legal Scholarship:Its Causes and Cure”,90 Yale L.J.,1981,pp.1205,1208-1215.以上这些著作倾向于批判法学的规约性,但普遍集中于未经检验的或自反性规定。正如这些学者所评论的那样,这一现象普遍存在且是事实,这是法律作为独立学科所固有的。Edward L.Rubin,“Beyond Public Choice:Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes”,66 N.Y.U.L.Rev.1,1991,pp.1847-1859.
(2)Edward L.Rubin,“The Concept of Law and the New Public Law Scholarship”,89 Mich.L.Rev.,1991,pp.792,792-793.
(1)Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of1994’s,12U.S.C.s 1831r-1(d),1994,p.106.这一法令规定,当州际银行建议在低收入或中等收入区域关闭分支机构时,这些区域的居民将发起社区领导与监管机构之间针对“考察获得充足替代设施和服务的可行性”的会议。
(2)几个州政府已经以不同形式制定这一建议,但不包括联邦政府。例如,Ⅲ.Comp.Stat.ch.205,1993,p.605;Mass.Ann.Laws ch.167D,Law.Co-op.1987,p.2;Minn.Stat.Ann.,West 1988 &Supp.1996,pp.48-512.其基本观点是银行必须对低收入者和年长者的活期存款账户提供低市场利率。John P.Caskey,Fringe Banking,1994,pp.128-133(提出一个“适度的、联邦的生命线银行法”,使低收入家庭受益);Glenn B.Canner,Ellen Maland,Basic Banking,73Fed.Reserve Bull.,1987,pp.255,256-269.(对一般银行评估的建议,即保证一项最低金融服务标准应当适用于所有居民,不论其收入如何。)
(3)Community Reinvestment Act of1977,12U.S.C.,1994,pp.2901-2907。这一法案要求联邦监管者对银行进行评估,以确定银行是否符合其所经营的区域的信用要求。当决定是否通过银行兼并、分支机构收购、分支机构开业及分支机构重置时,监管机构需要考察这些被公开发布的评估报告。“For a comprehensive survey”,see Roland E.Brandel,DavidE.Teitelbaum,The Community Reinvestment Act:Policies and Compliance,1991.
(4)A.Brooke Overby,“The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered”,143 U.Pa.L.Rev.1995,pp.1431,1446-53 ,1497-1505;Anthony D.Taibi,“Banking,Finance,and Community Economic Empowerment:Structural Economic Theory,Procedural Civil Rights,and Substantive Racial Justice”,107 Harv.L.Rev.,1994,pp.1463,1469-1470.
(5)Jonathan R.Macey,Geoffrey P.Miller,“The Community Reinvestment Act:An Economic Analysis”,79 Va.L.Rev.,1993,pp.291,295-297.
(1)Michael Klausner,“Market Failure and Community Investment:A Market-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act”,143 U.Pa.L.Rev.,1995,pp.1561,1564-1565;Edward L.Rubin,“The Lifeline Banking Controversy:Putting Deregulation to Work for the Low-Income Consumer”,67 Ind.L.J.,1992,pp.213,224-229;Peter P.Swire,“Safe Harbors and a Proposal to Improve the Community Reinvestment Act”,79 Va.L.Rev.,1993,pp.349,351-357.
(2)Lon L.Fuller,“The Forms and Limits of Adjudication”,92 Harv.L.Rev.353(1978),pp.95-151.
(1)Lon L.Fuller,“The Forms and Limits of Adjudication”,92 Harv.L.Rev.353(1978),pp.95-151.
(2)Alexander M.Bickel,The Least Dangerous Branch,1962,pp.23-28;U.S.Supreme Court:Black,White Taxicab,Transfer Co.v.Brown,Yellow Taxicab,Transfer Co.,276U.S.1928,pp.156-182.
(3)ImreLakatos,The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,John Worrall,Gregory Currie eds.,1978,pp.47-52.
(1)Paul D.Carrington,“Of Law and the River”,34 J.Legal Educ.,1984,pp.222,227-228.
(2)Owen M.Fiss,“The Death of the Law”,72 Cornell L.Rev.,1986,pp.1,13-16.关于对这些排除性努力的分析,Gary Minda,Postmodern Legal Movements,1995,pp.208-223;Gary Minda,“The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s”,50 Ohio St.L.J.(1989),pp.599,650-665.
(3)关于批判法学研究抨击法经济学,可参见Mark Kelman,“Choice and Utility”,Wis.L.Rev.769(1979),passim;Duncan Kennedy,“Cost Benefit Analysis of Eminent Problems:A Critique”,33 Stan.L.Rev.387(1981),passim。关于法经济学抨击批判法学研究,可参见Richard Posner,The Problems of Jurisprudence,1990,pp.153-157;Lewis Kornhauser,“The Great Image of Authority”,36 Stan.L.Rev.349(1984),pp.379-387;Linz Audain,“Critical Legal Studies,Feminism,Law and Economics,and the Veil of Intellectual Tolerance:A Tentative Case for Cross-Jurisprudential Dialogue”,20 Hofstra L.Rev(1992),pp.1017,1087-1090(描述了两项运动彼此的对立)。
(4)依Foucault看来,知识实质上是权力的附属品。Michel Foucault,Power/Knowledge:Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977,Colin Gordon ed.,Colin Gordon et al.trans.,1980,pp.78-108.
(5)Hans-Georg Gadamer,Truth and Method,1975,pp.235-274;Jurgen Habermas,“Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States”,1 Eur.J.Phil.128(1993),pp.305-337.
(6)Linz Audain,“Critical Legal Studies,Feminism,Law and Economics,and the Veil of Intellectual Tolerance:ATentative Case for Cross-Jurisprudential Dialogue”,20 Hofstra L.Rev(1992),pp.1093-1104;Martha Minow,Law Turning Outward,73 Telos,1987,pp.79,95-99.
(7)我所持的观点是,法学院通常在法律的理论与实践方法问题上比在学术研究方法这一问题上表现得更为分裂,这一争论可通俗地称之为天神与地球人之争。
(1)Edward L.Rubin,“The Lifeline Banking Controversy:Putting Deregulation to Work for the Low-Income Consumer”,67 Ind.L.J.,1992,pp.1847-1853.
(2)Hans-Georg Gadamer,Truth and Method,1975,pp.5-10;Jurgen Habermas,“Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States”,1 Eur.J.Phil.128(1993),pp.1-7.
(3)Max Weber,Economy and Society,Guenther Roth,Claus Wittich eds.and Ephraim Fischoff et al.trans.,1968,pp.24-26.
(4)Jurgen Habermas,“Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States”,1 Eur.J.Phil.128(1993),pp.273-337.即便社会理论家如同利奥塔和卢曼一样立场多元化,他们也都认同这一立场。Niklas Luhmann,The Self-Reproduction of Law and Its Limits,in Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State,23 Law,Soc’y Rev.727,1989,pp.31-40;Jean-Francois Lyotard,The Inhuman,1991,pp.18-23.
(5)Jurgen Habermas,“Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States”,1 Eur.J.Phil.128(1993),pp.84-101.
(6)Max Weber,Economy and Society,Guenther Roth,Claus Wittich eds.and Ephraim Fischoff et al.trans.,1968,pp.4-12.
(1)Jurgen Habermas,“Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States”,1 Eur.J.Phil.128(1993),passim;Niklas Luhmann,The Self-Reproduction of Law and Its Limits,in Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State,23 Law,Soc’y Rev.727,1989,passim.
(2)Herbert Wechsler,“The Political Safeguards of Federalism:The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government”,54Colum.L.Rev.543(1954),pp.31-34.
(3)Gary Peller,“Neutral Principles in the 1950s”,21 U.Mich.J.L.Ref.6(1988),pp.561,564-566.
(1)William C.Chase,The American Law School and the Rise of Administrative Governmen,1982,pp.23-59;Robert Stevens,Law School:Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s,1983,pp.51-53.
(2)Thomas C.Grey,“Langdell’s Orthodoxy”,45 U.Pitt.L.Rev.1(1983),p.1;Dennis Patterson,“Langdell’s Legacy”,90 Nw.U.L.Rev.196(1995),pp.200-201;John H.Schlegel,“Langdell’s Legacy or,The Case of the Empty Envelope”,36 Stan.L.Rev.(1984),pp.1517-1520;G.Edward White,“The Impact of Legal Science on Tort Law 1880-1910”,78 Colum.L.Rev.(1978),pp.213-220.在最近的文章中,Anthony Sebok建议形式主义者致力于法律实证主义方法。参见Anthony Sebok,“Misunderstanding Positivism”,93 Mich.L.Rev.(1995),pp.2054,2065-2072。虽然形式主义者因为渴望(我们现在称之为自命不凡)法律成为科学的学科而拒绝自然法或神灵启示的法律,但他们似乎相信普遍原则是以远离主权命令的平缓过程的方式嵌入在司法判决体系内的。Paul Carrington还指出形式主义和实证主义的联系,但他认为这种联系是法律独立于政治,而不是法律浮现于可认明的命令这种更具体的断言。Paul Carrington,“HailLangdell”,20 Law &Soc.Inquiry(1995),pp.691,707-710。
(3)John C.Gray,The Nature and Sources of the Law,1909,p.291.(将任何关于实证法的观念引入法律的概念都是法理学的倒退);Oliver W.Holmes,“The Path of the Law”,10 Harv.L.Rev.(1897),pp.457,469-474(讨论了法律与作为向关于法律规则的价值的启迪怀疑论迈出的第一步的历史发展之间的关系);Roscoe Pound,“Mechanical Jurisprudence”,8Colum.L.Rev.(1908),pp.605-606(指出“要牢记法律不能变得过于科学以致人们无法领会其运作或者过于科学而不能服务于正义目的”)。
(4)就像Justice Holmes所称,法律“背后如果没有一定明确的权威便不能存在。就其在一个国家的实施而言,普通法并不是一般意义上的普通法而是依靠国家权威而存在的国家法”。U.S.Supreme Court,Black,White Taxicab,Transfer Co.v.Brown,Yellow Taxicab,Transfer Co.,276U.S.1928,pp.518-533(Holmes对此是有异议的);Jerome Frank,Law and the Modern Mind,1930,pp.32-33(认为普通法并未先存于司法判决,但它是这些判决或者关于这些判决的预言的产物);Felix Cohen,“Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach”,35 Colum.L.Rev.(1935),pp.809,837(“法律值得服从并不是出于其本善,而是由于其背后的权力”)。
(5)Alexander M.Bickel,The Least Dangerous Branch,1962,pp.1-34;Charles L.Black,Jr.,The People and the Court,1960,pp.1-33;Herbert Wechsler,“Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law”,73 Harv.L.Rev.1(1959),p.9.
(6)Lon L.Fuller,The Morality of Law,1964,pp.152-185;Henry M.Hart,Jr.,Albert M.Sacks,The Legal Process,pp.1009-1010,1111,William Eskridge,Jr.,Philip P.Frickey eds.,1994;David Shapiro,“The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy”,78 Harv.L.Rev.921(1965),pp.926-942.哈特和萨克斯论战的资料在1955年至1958年得以发展,并随后广泛流通。William Eskridge,Jr.,Philip P.Frickey,“An Historical and Critical Introduction to the Legal Process”,Henry M.Hart,Jr.,Albert M.Sacks,1994,pp.51,87,206.
(1)Herbert Wechsler,“Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law”,73 Harv.L.Rev.1(1959),p.17;Kent Greenawalt,“The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles”,78 Colum.L.Rev.(1978),pp.982-1021(讨论了“作为对法律过程中完整性和理性的要求的中立原则的价值”)。
(2)Lon L.Fuller,“The Forms and Limits of Adjudication”,92 Harv.L.Rev.353(1978),pp.365-366.尽管这篇文章在1978年发表,但它是法律过程时代的产物,著于1957年且在1959年和1961年加以修改。各种各样的草稿得以广泛传阅,此文在那个时期产生了相当大的影响。Kenneth I.Winston,“Introduction to Fuller”,92 Harv.L.Rev.353(1978),p.353.
(3)Kelsen认为法律全部是由最高统治者的命令所构成,并不体现任何规范性原则。Hans Kelsen,General Theory of Law and State,Anders Wedberg trans.,1945,pp.15-28(在凯尔森之后的一般理论);Hans Kelsen,Pure Theory of Law,Max Knight trans.,2ded.,1967,pp.1-58.
(4)United States Supreme Court:United States v.Carolene Prods.Co.,304U.S.,1938,pp.144,152.在杰西·乔柏《司法审查》和《国家政治进程》的第4-59页(1980年版)及约翰·哈特·伊利《民主与不信任》的第73-179页(1980年版)中,人权本位和政治过程观点的综合首次获得正当理由,但是在整个法律过程立场中一直隐含着将民事权利置于其他宪法保障之上的偏爱,参见Paul Freund,“The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties”,4 Vand.L.Rev.533(1951),pp.545-551;Herbert Wechsler,“The Political Safeguards of Federalism:The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government”,54 Colum.L.Rev.543(1954),p.578(该书认为最高法院没有必要保护联邦制)。
(5)Alexander M.Bickel,The Least Dangerous Branch,1962,pp.29-33;U.S.Supreme Court:Black,White Taxicab,Transfer Co.v.Brown,Yellow Taxicab,Transfer Co.,276 U.S.1928,pp.64-68;Herbert Wechsler,“The Political Safeguards of Federalism:The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government”,54Colum.L.Rev.543(1954),pp.10-20.
(1)不仅是法律的内容(在这种情况下指宪法)综合考虑实证的和规范考虑,法律概念本身也综合了这些因素。这一问题是著名的富勒与哈特论战的基础。Lon L.Fuller,“The Forms and Limits of Adjudication”,92 Harv.L.Rev.353(1978),pp.133-145.
(2)Henry M.Hart,Jr.,Albert M.Sacks,The Legal Process,pp.693-697;Lon L.Fuller,“The Forms and Limits of Adjudication”,92 Harv.L.Rev.353(1978),pp.365-372;David Shapiro,“The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy”,78 Harv.L.Rev.921(1965),pp.942-958.
(3)Alexander M.Bickel,The Least Dangerous Branch,1962,pp.16-23.
(4)Alexander M.Bickel,The Least Dangerous Branch,1962,pp.29-33;U.S.Supreme Court:Black,White Taxicab,Transfer Co.v.Brown,Yellow Taxicab,Transfer Co.,276 U.S.1928,pp.34-55;Paul J.Mishkin,“The Supreme Court,1964Term—Foreword:The High Court,the Great Writ,and the Due Process of Time and Law”,79 Harv.L.Rev56(1965),pp.60-62.
(5)Alexander M.Bickel,The Least Dangerous Branch,1962,pp.49-65,124-133.位于第二位的是James B.Thayer,形式主义批评家和法律过程方法的先驱(参见上书第35-44页)。Bickel的观点再次在法律过程学派的广阔界限内受到回击。参见Gerald Gunther,“The Subtle Vices of the‘Passive Virtues’—A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review”,64 Colum.L.Rev.1(1964),passim。
(1)Richard Posner,“The Economic Analysis of Law”,1st ed.,1972,pp.152-154;Ronald Coase,“The Federal Communications Commission”,2 J.L.&Econ.1(1959),passim;Arthur Devany,Ross Eckert,Charles Meyers,Donald O’Hara and Richard Scott,“A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum—A Legal-EconomicEngineering Study”,21 Stan.L.Rev.1499(1969),pp.1505-1512;Richard Epstein,“A Common Law for Labor Relations:A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation”,92 Yale L.J.(1983),pp.1357,1359;Daniel R.Fischel,“Efficient Capital Market Theory,the Market for Corporate Control,and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers”,57 Tex.L.Rev.1(1978),pp.24-26;Jonathan Macey,“Special Interest Groups and the Judicial Function:The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall”,33 Emory L.J.1(1983),p.2;Kenneth Scott,“In Quest of Reason:The Licensing Decisions of the Federal Banking Agencies”,42 U.Chi.L.Rev.235(1975),pp.283-296.
(2)James M.Buchanan,Gordon Tullock,The Calculus of Consent,1962,pp.3-39;Morris P.Fiorina,Congress:Keystone of the Washington Establishment,1977,pp.39-40;David R.Mayhew,Congress:The Electoral Connection,1974,p.13;Dennis Mueller,Public ChoiceⅡ,1989,pp.1-6.许多法律团体已经适应了这种趋势。参见Peter H.Aranson,Ernest Gellhornand Glen O.Robinson,“A Theory of Legislative Delegation”,68 Cornell L.Rev.1,(1982),pp.41-45;Jonathan R.Macey,Geoffrey P.Miller,“Origin of the Blue Sky Laws”,70 Tex.L.Rev.347(1991),passim.(对蓝天法案的描述是对利益集团施压的回应,而不是致力于保护投资者。)关于这一点的一般讨论,参见Daniel A.Farber,Philip P.Frickey,Law and Public Choice,University of Chicago Press,1991,p.20-23.
(3)Peter H.Aranson,Ernest Gellhornand Glen O.Robinson,“A Theory of Legislative Delegation”,68 Cornell L.Rev.1(1982),p.39.
(4)William A.Niskanen Jr.,Bureaucracy and Representative Government,1971,pp.38-42;Gordon Tullock,The Politics of Bureaucracy,1965,pp.134-136,167-170;Jean-Luc Migue,Gerard Belanger,“Toward a General Theory of Managerial Discretion”,17 Pub.Choice27(1974),passim;Paul Wyckoff,“The Sample Analytics of Slack-Maximizing Bureaucracy”,67 Pub.Choice35(1989),pp.36-38.
(5)关于发展司法行为的公共选择理论的一些努力,参见Rafael Gely,Pablo T.Spiller,“The Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions:The Case of Roosevelt’s Court-Packing Plan”,12Int’l Rev.L.&Econ.45(1992),pp.46-48;William Landes,Richard Posner,“The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective”,18 J.L.&Econ.875(1975),pp.885-887;Richard A.Posner,“What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?(The Same Thing Everybody Else Does)”,3 Sup.Ct.Econ.Rev.1(1993),pp.13-15,31-39。
(1)Frank H.Easterbrook,“Statutes’Domains”,50 U.Chi.L.Rev.533(1983),pp.533,544-551(推荐法官解释策略,基于制定法总是讨价还价且立法机关并没有规划,只有通过立法的事实);Jonathan R.Macey,“Promoting PublicRegarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model”,86 Colum.L.Rev.223(1986),pp.240-250 (推荐法官从公共视角理解权力寻租或私人法令);Richard A.Posner,“Economics,Politics,and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution”,49 U.Chi.L.Rev.263(1982),pp.272-282(此文推荐解释策略基于对立法机关出于多重性目的的认识,牵涉授权给一些有限的利益集团)。
(2)Richard A.Posner,“Economics,Politics,and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution”,49 U.Chi.L.Rev.263(1982),pp.93-104;Richard A.Posner,“Economics,Politics,and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution”,49 U.Chi.L.Rev.263(1982),pp.156-172;Geoffrey P.Miller,“The True Story of Carolene Products”,Sup.Ct.Rev.397(1987),pp.422-428.
(3)相反,政治的经济分析大量聚焦在立法机关上,因为立法活动很容易被定型为最大化再选机会的努力。Morris P.Fiorina,Congress:Keystone of the Washington Establishment,1977,passim;David R.Mayhew,Congress:The Electoral Connection,1974,passim;cf.Mancur Olson,The Logic of Collective Action,355(1403)Harvard University Press,1965,passim(该文讨论了利益集团对选举过程的影响)。
(4)Morton J.Horwitz,The Transformation of American Law,1780-1860,1977,p.30;Roberto M.Unger,The Critical Legal Studies Movement,Harvard Law Review,Vol.96.No.3,1986,pp.5-8;Gerald E.Frug,“The City as a Legal Concept”,93 Harv.L.Rev.(1980),pp.1057,1059-1062(以上这些作者认为,城市的政治定位是权力关系的映射,而不是地方管辖的中立原则);Duncan Kennedy,“The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries”,28 Buff.L.Rev.(1979),pp.205,211-221.
(5)Roberto M.Unger,The Critical Legal Studies Movement,Harvard Law Review,Vol.96.No.3,1986,pp.5-8;Clare Dalton,“An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine”,94 Yale L.J.(1985),pp.997,1002-1003;Gary Peller,“The Metaphysics of American Law”,73 Cal.L.Rev.(1985),pp.1151,1152;Joseph W.Singer,“The Player and the Cards:Nihilism and Legal Theory”,94 Yale L.J.1,(1984),pp.5-7;Mark V.Tushnet,“Following the Rules Laid Down:A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles”,96 Harv.L.Rev.(1983),pp.781,824-827.
(6)Max Horkheimer,Theodor W.Adorno,Dialectic of Enlightenment,John Cumming trans.,1972,pp.20-23.
(1)Jacques Derrida,Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry:An Introduction,John P.Leavey Jr.trans.,1989,pp.66-76;Jacques Derrida,Of Grammatology,Gayatri C.Spivak trans.,1976,pp.11-26;Jacques Derrida,Writing and Differenc,Alan Bass trans.,1978,pp.278-282.
(2)Mark Tushnet,Red,White and Blue,1988,pp.191-199.
(3)关于批判法学研究抨击法经济学,可参见Mark Kelman,“Choice and Utility”,Wis.L.Rev.769(1979),passim;Duncan Kennedy,“Cost Benefit Analysis of Eminent Problems:A Critique”,33 Stan.L.Rev.387(1981),passim。关于法经济学抨击批判法学研究,可参见Richard Posner,The Problems of Jurisprudence,1990,pp.153-157;Lewis Kornhauser,“The Great Image of Authority”,36 Stan.L.Rev.349(1984),pp.379-387;Linz Audain,“Critical Legal Studies,Feminism,Law and Economics,and the Veil of Intellectual Tolerance:ATentative Case for Cross-Jurisprudential Dialogue”,20 Hofstra L.Rev(1992),pp.1017,1087-1090(描述了两项运动彼此的对立)。
(4)Donald N.McCloskey,If You’re So Smart,1990,pp.5-9;Donald N.McCloskey,Knowledge and Persuasion in Economics,1994,pp.3-4;Donald N.McCloskey,The Rhetoric of Economics,1985,pp.5-11.
(1)Jurgen Habermas,Theory and Practice,John Viertel trans.,1973,pp.253-282.;Herbert Marcuse,One Dimensional Man,1964,pp.144-199.
(2)Gary Minda,Postmodern Legal Movements,1995,pp.208-223;Donald N.Gjerdingen,“The Future of Legal Scholarship and the Search for a Modern Theory of Law”,35 Buff.L.Rev.1986,pp.381,386-397;Edward L.Rubin,“The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship”,86 Mich.L.Rev.(1988),pp.1835,1847-1853.
(3)Max Lerner,America as a Civilization,Volume One:The Basic Frame,1957,pp.209-238;Alexis de Tocqueville,Democracy in America,J.P.Mayer ed.,George Lawrence trans.,Doubleday 1969,1835,pp.612-614;Gordon S.Wood,The Radicalism of the American Revolution,1991,pp.189-212.
(1)例如,法律过程方法于对宪法两个最复杂的适用在1980年得以出版。法律和实践理性运动在法律过程运动中汲取了部分灵感。Anthony T.Kronman,“Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of Prudence”,94 Yale L.J.(1985),pp.1567,1567-1573.
(2)Stephen Breyer,Regulation and Its Reform,1982(拜耳之后提到了“规制”),pp.15-35,341-368.关于正义,Breyer的观点有较新的解释,Stephen Breyer,Breaking the Vicious Circle:Toward Effective Risk Regulation,1993,pp.55-81.
(3)Stephen Breyer,Regulation and Its Reform,1982,p.271-284;Robert Dorfman,Nancy S.Dorfman:Economics of the Environment,1977,passim;T.H.Tietenberg,Emissions Trading:An Exercise in Reforming Pollution Policy,1985,passim;Bruce A.Ackerman,Richard B.Stewart,“Reforming Environmental Law”,37 Stan.L.Rev.(1985),pp.1333,1341-1351;Richard B.Stewart,“Regulation,Innovation,and Administrative Law:A Conceptual Framework”,69 Cal.L.Rev.(1981),pp.1256,1263-1277.关于这个问题的对抗性观点不仅强调有关适当管控方法辩论的重要性,而且介绍了法律过程的其他主题,例如政治合法性和在实施这些方法上不同制度的比较能力。Steven Kelman,“What Price Incentives?”Economists and the Environment(1981),pp.27-88;Howard Latin,“Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency:Implementation of Uniform Standards and‘Fine-Tuning’Regulatory Reforms”,37 Stan.L.Rev.(1985),pp.1267,1292-1314.
(4)Ian Ayres,“Fair Driving:Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations”,104 Harv.L.Rev.(1991),pp.817 ,863-871(新车购买);Robert D.Cooter,Edward L.Rubin,“A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Payments”,66Tex.L.Rev.(1987),pp.63,97-123(消费者付费);Michael Klausner,“Market Failure and Community Investment:A Market-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act”,143 U.Pa.L.Rev.(1995),pp.1561,1580-1592(内城区住宅抵押贷款市场)。
(5)Richard A.Posner,“Economics,Politics,and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution”,49 U.Chi.L.Rev.263(1982),pp.98-102;William M.Landes,Richard A.Posner,“Adjudication as a Private Good”,8 J.Legal Stud.(1979),pp.235,236-242;Richard A.Posner,Andrew M.Rosenfield,“Impossibility and Related Doctrine in Contract Law:An Economic Analysis”,6 J.Legal Stud.(1977),pp.83,118;Paul H.Rubin,“Why Is the Common Law Efficient?”6 J.Legal Stud.(1977),pp.51,61.
(6)Paul H.Rubin,“Why Is the Common Law Efficient?”6 J.Legal Stud.(1977),pp.1399,1400.
(1)Robert Cooter,Stephen Marks and Robert Mnookin,“Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior”,11 J.Legal Stud.(1982),pp.225,242-247;Ronald J.Gilson,Robert H.Mnookin,“Disputing Through Agents:Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation”,94Colum.L.Rev.(1994),pp.509,550-557;Louis Kaplow,Steven Shavell,“Legal Advice About Information to Present in Litigation:Its Effects and Social Desirability”,102Harv.L.Rev.(1989),pp.567,606-615.Robert D.Cooter,Daniel L.Rubinfeld,“Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution”,27 J.Econ.Literature(1989),pp.1067,1067-1086(测量研究)。
(2)William N.Eskridge,Jr.,“Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions”,101 Yale L.J.(1991),pp.331 ,353-379;William N.Eskridge,Jr.,John A.Ferejohn,“The Article I,Section 7Game”,80 Geo.L.J.(1992),pp.523 ,528-533;William N.Eskridge,Jr.,Philip P.Frickey,“The Supreme Court,1993 Term—Foreword:Law as Equilibrium”,108 Harv.L.Rev.(1994),pp.27,30-42;John A.Ferejohn,Barry R.Weingast,“A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation”,12 Int’l Rev.L.&Econ.(1992),pp.263,276-279;Daniel B.Rodriguez,“The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform”,72 Wash.U.L.Q.1(1994),pp.42-51;Pablo T.Spiller,“Politicians,Interest Groups,and Regulators:A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation,or‘Let Them Be Bribed’”,33 J.L.&Econ(1990),pp.65,65-72.
(3)关于政治过程中博弈论应用的理论文献综述,参见Herve Moulin,Game Theory for the Social Sciences,1981,passim;Peter C.Ordeshook,Game Theory and Political Theory,1986,pp.222-235;Peter C.Ordeshook,A Political Theory Primer,1992,passim.
(4)Bruce A.Ackerman,Reconstructing American Law,1984,pp.46-71.
(5)Neil K.Komesar,Imperfect Alternatives:Choosing Institutions in Law,Economics,and Public Policy,1994,pp.3-13,53-150.
(1)James Q.Wilson,The Politics of Regulation,in The Politics of Regulation,James Q.Wilson ed.,1980,pp.357,370-372.
(2)Neil K.Komesar,Imperfect Alternatives:Choosing Institutions in Law,Economics,and Public Policy,1994,p.271(“制度分析必须是综合性的。不管多复杂,单一的制度分析是无效的替代品,不能评估相关瑕疵制度替代品的优劣”)。另一个有趣的方法是,Jane Schacter对于民主法律解释的定义,体现了以过程为导向的概念,例如政治活动的保留、反从属化、与政治分支的合作关系,与之更相关的是基于公共选择考虑的司法约束。参见Jane S.Schacter,“Metademocracy:The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation”,108 Harv.L.Rev.(1995),pp.593,613-646。
(3)种族批判理论已强调了这一点,参见Kimberle Crenshaw,Race,“Reform and Retrenchment:Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law”,101 Harv.L.Rev.(1988),pp.1331,1356(作者认为,“尽管种族批判学者声称他们的项目关注支配地位,但少有人对具体解决种族支配做出实质性努力,而且他们的工作似乎并不建立在种族压迫的现实上”);Richard Delgado,“The Ethereal Scholar:Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?”,22 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev.(1987),pp.301,304,307(作者主张,“批判法学研究对权利和规则的批判是其项目最具疑问的方面,没有为少数族裔学者和律师提供什么答案”);Patricia J.Williams,“Alchemical Notes:Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights”,22 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev.(1987),pp.401,405(作者认为,“批判法学研究忽视了权利主张和权利利益已帮助黑人、其他少数族裔和贫困者的程度”)。Mary Joe Frug,“A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto(An Unfinished Draft)”,105 Harv.L.Rev.(1992),pp.1045,1058(该书断言,“激进女权主义者确信女性之所以被定为女性是依靠男性主导的性主从关系,导致她们认为性工作者应该从这种环境中解脱出来而不是支持这种工作”);Martha R.Mahoney,“Legal Images of Battered Women:Redefining the Issue of Separation”,90 Mich.L.Rev.(1991),pp.1,2(该文认为“对女性的严重伤害源自于法律文化扭曲了我们的经历的方式”)。
(4)Derrick Bell,And We Are Not Saved:The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice,1987,pp.3-6;Patricia J.Williams,The Alchemy of Race and Rights,1991,pp.61-63,166-68;Alex M.Johnson,Jr.,“How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent Integration:Destabilizing Race as a Vehicle to Integrate Neighborhoods”,143 U.Pa.L.Rev.(1995),pp.1595,1609-1616;Charles R.LawrenceⅢ,“The Id,the Ego,and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism”,39 Stan.L.Rev.317,(1987),passim.
(1)Derek Bok,“Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Law”,84 Harv.L.Rev.(1971),pp.1394,1417-1420.
(2)Regina Austin,“Sapphire Bound”,Wis.L.Rev.(1989)(讨论了法庭需要少数群体成员的生活现状保持敏感),pp.539 ,563-564;Alex M.Johnson,Jr.,Bid Whist,Tonk,and United States v.Fordice:“Why Integrationism Fails AfricanAmericans Again”,81 Cal.L.Rev.1401(1993),passim(重新评估文中所提及南方黑人大学的综合目标);Mari J.Matsuda,Looking to the Bottom:Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,22 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev.(1987),pp.323,373-388(质疑对赔偿的教条性异议);Patricia J.Williams,“Alchemical Notes:Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights”,22 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev.(1987),pp.432-433(断言需要重构性质和权利的定义以便权利保护真实的个人隐私)。
(3)Edward L.Rubin,“On Beyond Truth:A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship”,80 Cal.L.Rev.(1992),pp.889,953-957.
(4)这个主题影响了种族批判理论如何对待权利。特别明确的表述,参见Patricia J.Williams,“Alchemical Notes:Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights”,22 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev.(1987),pp.151-152,Richard Delgado,“Roderigo’s Ninth Chronicle:Race,Legal Instrumentalism,and the Rule of Law”,143 U.Pa.L.Rev.(1994),pp.379,387-388.
(1)Catharine A.MacKinnon,Toward a Feminist Theory of the State,1989,pp.237-238(在自由国家,法治不仅使超越女性的男性权力制度化,也使男性形式的权力制度化);Lucinda M.Finley,“Transcending Equality Theory:A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate”,86 Colum.L.Rev.(1986),pp.1118,1118-1122(公私范围的传统区分,有助于维持职场中女性的主从属地位);Robin West,“Jurisprudence and Gender”,55 U.Chi.L.Rev.(1988),pp.1,4(父权制实际上是真正非以性别分类的法学的政治前提,因为父权制是认为男性的价值高于女性价值的政治结构);Joan C.Williams,“Deconstructing Gender”,87 Mich.L.Rev.(1989),pp.797,826(“对女性的歧视以及女性所做选择的歧视必须都被视为系统地使女性处于劣势的权力关系的综合系统的元素”)。
(2)Catharine A.MacKinnon,Toward a Feminist Theory of the State,1989,pp.136-141,168-170.
(3)一个著名的例子就是激进女权主义者参与竞选,参见the Self:“Autobiographical Performances in Outsider Scholarship”,81 Va.L.Rev.(1995),pp.1229,1234-1260(识别嵌入外人叙述传统价值体系);Dennis Patterson,“Postmodernism/Feminism/Law”,77 Cornell L.Rev.(1992),pp.254,305-316(讨论了以改革为导向的女权主义学术的现代思想);Edward L.Rubin,“On Beyond Truth:A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship”,80 Cal.L.Rev.(1992),pp.954 -955(突出了建议的务实性质和女权主义学派中理论定位的总体质量之间的对比)。以获得反色情法令的通过。Paul Brest,Ann Vandenberg,“Politics,Feminism,and the Constitution:The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis”,39Stan.L.Rev.607(1987),passim.Anne M.Coughlin,“Regulating the Self:Autobiographical Performances in Outsider Scholarship”,81 Va.L.Rev.1995,pp.1229,1234-1260(以识别外来叙事中的传统价值体系);Dennis,“Patterson,Postmodernism/Feminism/Law”,77 Cornell L.Rev.1992,pp.254,305-16(论女权主义学术改革的现代性);Edward L.Rubin,“On Beyond Truth:A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship”,80 Cal.L.Rev.(1992),pp.954-955(强调实用主义性质与女权主义学术理论的全球品质的对比建议)。
(4)Kathryn Abrams,“Sex Wars Redux:Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory”,95 Colum.L.Rev.304(1995),passim;Anne M.Coughlin,“Excusing Women”,82 Cal.L.Rev.(1994),pp.1,45-48;Martha R.Mahoney,“Legal Images of Battered Women:Redefining the Issue of Separation”,90 Mich.L.Rev.(1991),pp.53-63.
(1)William N.Eskridge,Jr.,“Gaylegal Narratives”,46Stan.L.Rev.607(1994),passim;Nancy D.Polikoff,“This Child Does Have Two Mothers:Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families”,78 Geo.L.J.(1990),pp.459,471(亲子身份的新定义对于适应现代家庭的庞杂是十分必要的);Kendall Thomas,“Beyond the Privacy Principle”,92Colum.L.Rev.(1992),pp.1431,1461-1492.
(2)Neil K.Komesar,Imperfect Alternatives:Choosing Institutions in Law,Economics,and Public Policy,1994,p.5.
(1)关于这个领域发展的讨论,参见Oliver E.Williamson,Markets and Hierarchies:Analysis and Antitrust Implications,1975,pp.1-8。
(2)John R.Commons,Institutional Economics:Its Place in Political Economy,1934,passim;Thorstein Veblen,The Theory of the Leisure Class,1912,passim.
(3)Oliver E.Williamson,The Economic Institutions of Capitalism,1985,pp.85-162;Armen A.Alchian,“Specificity,Specializations,and Coalitions”,140 J.Institutional &Theoretical Econ.34(1984),pp.34,38-40;R.H.Coase,“The Nature of the Firm”,4 Economica(1937),pp.386,390-398;R.H.Coase,“The Problem of Social Cost”,3 J.L.&Econ.1(1960),pp.16-17.
(4)Oliver E.Williamson,The Economic Institutions of Capitalism,1985,pp.15-42.
(5)Douglass C.North,Institutions,Institutional Change and Economic Performance,1990,pp.22-23;Herbert A.Simon,Administrative Behavior,2ded.,1961,pp.24-27;Oliver E.Williamson,The Economic Institutions of Capitalism,1985,pp.45-46;Oliver E.Williamson,The Economic Institutions of Capitalism,1985,pp.21-26.
(1)Douglass C.North,Institutions,Institutional Change and Economic Performance,1990,pp.36-45;Oliver E.Williamson,The Economic Institutions of Capitalism,1985,pp.131-62,206-39,298-325.
(2)Oliver E.Williamson,The Economic Institutions of Capitalism,1985,pp.131-162;Oliver E.Williamson,The Economic Institutions of Capitalism,1985,pp.117-131.
(3)Howard Margolis,Selfishness,Altruism,and Rationality,1982,pp.1-5;Douglass C.North,Structure and Change in Economic History,1981,pp.18,47,205;Robert Sugden,The Economics of Rights,Co-operation and Welfare,1986,pp.6-7;Robert Cooter,“Law and Unified Social Theory”,22 J.L.&Soc’y,1995,pp.50,61-66;Mark Granovetter,“Economic Action and Social Structure:The Problem of Embeddedness”,91 Am.J.Soc.(1985),pp.481,481-483.
(4)Robert C.Ellickson,Order Without Law:How Neighbors Settle Disputes,1991,pp.1-11.
(5)Douglass C.North,Structure and Change in Economic History,1981,pp.54-60;Oliver E.Williamson,The Economic Institutions of Capitalism,1985,pp.163-205.
(6)Douglass C.North,Structure and Change in Economic History,1981,p.54.
(7)Oliver E.Williamson,Chester Barnard and the Incipient Science of Organization,in Organization Theory:From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond,Oliver E.Williamson ed.,1995,pp.172,194-200;Oliver E.Williamson,Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory,in Organization Theory:From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond,1995,p.207,231-238(以下统称为威廉森的交易成本经济学)。
(1)Douglass C.North,Structure and Change in Economic History,1981,pp.46-53;Paul R.Milgrom,Douglass C.North,Barry R.Weingast,“The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade:The Law Merchant,Private Judges,and the Champagne Fairs”,2 Econ.&Pol.1(1990),pp.9-14.
(2)Oliver E.Williamson,Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory,in Organization Theory:From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond,1995,p.217。波斯纳(Richard Posner)认为交易成本经济学不是一个真正的新方法,参见Richard A.Posner,“The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics”,149 J.Institutional &Theoretical Econ.(1993),pp.73,74-76,82-84.作为回应,作者查阅了Kenneth Scott,Comment,“The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics”,149 J.Institutional &Theoretical Econ.(1993),p.92;Oliver E.Williamson,“Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics”,149J.Institutional &Theoretical Econ.99,99n.1(1993),pp.101-105。尽管波斯纳这么认为,但很多经济学家视交易成本经济学为一个重要的创新且相信其可以领导法学进入全新方向。
(3)J.M.Balkin,“Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory”,96 Yale L.J.(1987),pp.743,767-785;J.M.Balkin,“Transcendental Deconstruction,Transcendent Justice”,92 Mich.L.Rev.(1994),pp.1131,1137-1142.Drucilla Cornell,The Philosophy of the Limit:Systems Theory and Feminist Legal Reform,in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice,Drucilla Cornell,Michael Rosenfeld and David G.Carlson eds.,1992,pp.68,69;Jacques Derrida,Force of Law:The‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’,in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice,1992,pp.3,6-8.
(4)John Hasnas,“Back to the Future:From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism,or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument”,45 Duke L.J.(1995),pp.84,103-106;John Stick,“Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?”100 Harv.L.Rev.(1986),pp.332,334;Daniel C.Chow,“Trashing Nihilism”,65 Tul.L.Rev.(1990),pp.221,227-228(提供了批判法学研究关于解构主义适用的一般批评)。
(1)Edward L.Rubin,“On Beyond Truth:A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship”,80 Cal.L.Rev.(1992),pp.1838-1847。
(2)Martin Heidegger,Being and Time,1962;Edmund Husserl,The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,David Carr trans.,1970;Edmund Husserl,Ideas,1962;Ludwig Wittgenstein,Philosophical Investigations,G.E.M.Auscombe trans.,1958.
(3)Richard Rorty ed.,The Linguistic Turn:Recent Essays in Philosophical Method,1967,pp.1-39,43-124.
(4)Niklas Luhmann,The Differentiation of Society,Stephen Holmes,Charles Larmore trans.,1982,pp.238-242(下文简称为卢曼所提出的的“分化”);Niklas Luhmann,Political Theory in the Welfare State,John Bednarz Jr.trans.,1990,pp.232-234(下文简称为卢曼所提出的的政治理论);Claus Offe,Contradictions of the Welfare State,John Keaneed.,1984,pp.162-178,256-258;Gunther Teubner,Law as an Autopoietic System,ZenonBankowski ed.,Anne Bankowska,Ruth Adler trans.,1993,passim;Gunther Teubner,The Transformation of Law in the Welfare State,in Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State Gunther,Teubner ed.,1986,pp.3,3-9.系统理论的早期版本构成了美国组织社会学的一个主题。Ludwig von Bertalanffy,General Systems Theory,1968,passim.卢曼对更普遍的社会理论这一方法的适应表明了他的制度取向。
(5)Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,pp.51-52.
(6)Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,pp.49-61.
(7)Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,p.52.
(8)Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,pp.334-342.
(9)Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,pp.152-154.
(1)Jean L.Cohen,AndrewArato,Civil Society and Political Theory,1992,pp.316-332.
(2)Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,p.187.这个选择的过程不仅把法律纳入了政治体系,也赋予了系统中特定组件或者子系统的重要意义。“实证法通过政治手段更新和变革的渠道涉及将政党政治机制付诸实施,使其变成制度,且不允许其成为缺乏影响力的拙劣门面……”Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,p.189.
(3)Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,pp.77-78.
(4)Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,p.75.
(5)Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,p.109.
(6)Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,pp.167-169.这一立场将卢曼置于与现代法律实证主义创始人凯尔森对立的地位。Hans Kelsen,General Theory of Law and State,Anders Wedberg trans.,1945,pp.58-64.但是Luhmann没有意识到在法律体系中武力或者暴力的角色。Niklas Luhmann,A Sociological Theory of Law,Martin Albrow ed.,Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow trans.,1985,pp.83-90.
(7)Niklas Luhmann,Political Theory in the Welfare State,John Bednarz Jr.trans.,1990,pp.117-154;Niklas Luhmann,The Unity of the Legal System,in Autopoietic Law:A New Approach to Law and Society,Gunther Teubner ed.,1987,pp.12,14-16.
(8)Niklas Luhmann,The Unity of the Legal System,in Autopoietic Law:A New Approach to Law and Society,Gunther Teubner ed.,1987,pp.13-24;Gunther Teubner,Evolution of Autopoietic Law,in Autopoietic Law:A New Appproach to Law and Society,1987,passim;Gunther Teubner,“How the Law Thinks:Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law”,23Law,Soc’y Rev.727,1989,passim.
(9)Gunther Teubner,“How the Law Thinks:Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law”,23 Law,Soc’y Rev.727,1989,p.41.
(10)Jean-Francois Lyotard,The Postmodern Condition:A Report on Knowledge(Geoff Bennington,Brian Massumi trans.,1984),p.24.
(1)Jean Baudrillard,In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities(Paul Foss,John Johnston,Paul Patton trans.),1983;Gilles Deleuze,Felix Guattari,Anti-Oedipus,1983,pp.17-19,362-65;Michel Foucault,The Order of Things,1970,pp.373 -387;Jean-Francois Lyotard,The Postmodern Condition:A Report on Knowledge(Geoff Bennington,Brian Massumi trans.,1984),p.15.
(2)Michel Foucault,The Order of Things,1970,p.387.
(3)Jean-Francois Lyotard,The Postmodern Condition:A Report on Knowledge(Geoff Bennington,Brian Massumi trans.,1984),pp.3-6.
(4)Jean-Francois Lyotard,The Postmodern Condition:A Report on Knowledge,Geoff Bennington,Brian Massumi trans.,1984,p.15;Jean-Francois Lyotard,The Inhuman,1991,pp.62-65(该书认为全球范围内知识的计算机化正在用后现代制度结构取代人类记忆和传统文化)。
(5)Jean Baudrillard,Fatal Strategies,Jim Fleming ed.,amp Philip Beitchman,and W.G.J.Niesluchowski trans.,1983,pp.81-99,166-179.
(6)Gilles Deleuze,Felix Guattari,A Thousand Plateaus:Capitalism and Schizophrenia,1987,pp.3-25,351-423.
(7)Steven Best,Douglas Kellner,Postmodern Theory:Critical Interrogations,1991,pp.34-75.
(1)Michel Foucault,The Archaeology of Knowledge,1972,pp.199-211;Michel Foucault,The Archaeology of Knowledge,1972,passim.
(2)Michel Foucault,Discipline and Punish:The Birth of the Prison,Alan Sheridan trans.,1975.
(3)Michel Foucault,Discipline and Punish:The Birth of the Prison,Alan Sheridan trans.,1975,pp.73-75,114-126.这个时期的改革者寻求一种公平且具有象征意义的惩罚机制。
(4)Michel Foucault,Discipline and Punish:The Birth of the Prison,Alan Sheridan trans.,1975,pp.139-141.
(5)Michel Foucault,Discipline and Punish:The Birth of the Prison,Alan Sheridan trans.,1975,pp.135-138.
(6)Michel Foucault,Discipline and Punish:The Birth of the Prison,Alan Sheridan trans.,1975,pp.209-228,307-308.
(7)Nancy Fraser,Unruly Practices:Power,Discourse,and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory,1989,pp.28-30.
(8)Foucault关于性的作品也可能会被解读为提倡这个主张。Michel Foucault,The History of Sexuality,Robert Hurley trans.,Vintage Books 1990,1976,pp.92-102.Foucault关于性的社会结构的评论与激进女权主义和同性恋研究中的一些实质性问题有密切关系。然而,《规训与惩罚》一书中的制度分析与之更相关,也更直接地指向了新法律综合。
(9)Jurgen Habermas,The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence trans.,MIT Press 1989,1962.
(10)Jurgen Habermas,The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence trans.,MIT Press 1989,1962,pp.27-31,181-189,222-235.
(11)Jurgen Habermas,The Theory of Communicative Action:Reason and Rationalization of Society,Thomas McCarthy trans.,Beacon Press 1984,1981,passim.
(12)Jurgen Habermas,The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence trans.,MIT Press 1989,1962.pp.339-344.
(1)Jurgen Habermas,The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence trans.,MIT Press 1989,1962,p.13(将生活世界定义为“社会成员预设为知识背景的解释整体性的限制”);Jurgen Habermas,The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence trans.,MIT Press1989,1962,pp.119-152,Thomas McCarthy trans.,Beacon Press 1987.
(2)哈贝马斯认为,法律变成了这一进程的工具。他声明:法律充当了组织媒介控制的子系统的工具,而这些子系统不管怎样已经在涉及由共同理解主导的行为的规范语境上变得自治。经济、商业、企业和行政法的大部分领域都适用于此:法律以承担操控媒体自身的角色与权力和金钱的媒介结合起来(参见上书第365页)。将法律用作操控机制扭曲了其规范性功能。见上书第365-367页。
(3)Jurgen Habermas,Between Facts and Norms:Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy,William Rehg trans.,1996,pp.40,23-25;James Bohman,“Complexity,Pluralism and the Constitutional State:On Habermas’s Faktizitat und Geltung”,28 Law &Soc’y Rev.(1994),pp.897,912-920;Michael Rosenfeld,“Law as Discourse:Bridging the Gap Between Democracy and Rights”,108 Harv.L.Rev.(1995),p.1163(reviewing Between Facts and Norms)。哈贝马斯作品的制度化途径,尤其是其最近的作品,较之其更加抽象的对话语伦理的认识论导向的讨论,似乎与批判种族理论和激进女权主义理论的联系更加紧密。女权主义者阅读了哈贝马斯的大量作品(约翰娜米汉主编于1995年)。
(4)Jurgen Habermas,Between Facts and Norms:Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy,William Rehg trans.,1996,pp.287-328.他因此挑战了某些独立领域(例如国家与公民社会)为准自治的系统理论分析。Niklas Luhmann,The Differentiation of Society,Stephen Holmes,Charles Larmore trans.,1982,pp.76-82;Gunther Teubner,“How the Law Thinks:Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law”,23 Law,Soc’y Rev.727,1989,pp.100-122。
(5)Jurgen Habermas,Between Facts and Norms:Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy,William Rehg trans.,1996,pp.341-359.上书提出了哈贝马斯依赖美国公民共和主义学派。关于这一学派思想的综述,Frank Michelman,“Law’s Republic”,97 Yale L.J.1988,pp.1493,1494-1507;Cass R.Sunstein,“Interest Groups in American Public Law”,38 Stan.L.Rev.1985,pp.29,31-48。当然,这项运动表现了法学的另一重要主题,且亦需成为话语综合分析的部分。尽管公民共和主义具有特定的抽象特色,在这一领域的学术,例如以上引用的作品,揭示了在制度设置上的共同关注。
(6)Thomas McCarthy,Practical Discourse:On the Relation of Morality to Politics,inHabermas and the Public Sphere,Craig Calhoun ed.,1992,pp.51,52-57.
(7)Jurgen Habermas,“Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States”,1 Eur.J.Phil.128(1993),passim.
(8)Jean L.Cohen,AndrewArato,Civil Society and Political Theory,1992,pp.210-231;Claus Offe,Contradictions of the Welfare State,John Keaneed.,1984,pp.37-46;Alain Touraine,The Voice and the Eye:An Analysis of Social Movements,Alan Duff trans.,Cambridge University Press,1981,pp.102-109.
(1)Alexis de Tocqueville,Democracy in America,J.P.Mayer ed.,George Lawrence trans.,Doubleday 1969,1835,pp.513-517.
(2)Jean L.Cohen,AndrewArato,Civil Society and Political Theory,1992,pp.492-604.
(3)Roberto M.Unger,False Necessity:Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy,1987,pp.395-441.
(4)Roberto M.Unger,False Necessity:Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy,1987.pp.172-176.
(5)当代学术中的其他趋势可能为此方法论提供更多支持。一个著名的例子就是美国社会学“新制度主义”运动。James G.March,Johan P.Olsen,Rediscovering Institutions,1989,pp.1-2,16-19;Paul J.DiMaggio,Walter W.Powell,Introduction to The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis,Walter W.Powell,Paul J.DiMaggio eds.,1991,pp.1,11 -15.对于这一趋势与批判种族理论的连接关系的标示,参见Paul J.DiMaggio,Francie Ostrower,Race,Ethnicity,and Participation in the Arts,1992,passim。
(6)这一趋势在近来摆脱行政法继承的传统并发展管控问题的更加综合、多层次的分析的努力中尤其显著。Christopher F.Edley,Jr.,Administrative Law:Rethinking Judicial Control of Bureaucracy,1990,pp.9-12;Thomas O.McGarity,Reinventing Rationality:The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy,1991,pp.9-17(此书分析了联邦机构决策模型);Susan Rose-Ackerman,Rethinking the Progressive Agenda:The Reform of the American Regulatory State,1992,p.13(该书为通过一系列学科综合而创建行政改革议程辩称);Cass R.Sunstein,After the Rights Revolution:Reconceiving the Regulatory State,1990,pp.8-10(书中考虑了管理规则与历史参照、偏爱法定解释原则和宪法性原则)。
(1)Douwe W.Fokkema,Literary History,Modernism and Postmodernism,1984,pp.41,45;Clifford Geertz,Local Knowledge:Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology,1983,p.4(并未记录“一般”社会理论的近代抑制);Jean-Francois Lyotard,The Inhuman,1991,pp.23-24(定义了作为“元叙事”所抑制的“后现代”思想)。
(2)事实上,作为所建议的综合的理论是相当普遍的;交易成本经济学立志于确认经济行为的普遍性原则,然而哈贝马斯凭借其多箱式网格和对世界历史的迅速调查例证了显著的现代主义理论化。
(3)Gunther Teubner,“How the Law Thinks:Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law”,23 Law,Soc’y Rev.727,1989,pp.100-122;Niklas Luhmann,The Self-Reproduction of Law and Its Limits,in Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State,23 Law,Soc’y Rev.727,1989,pp.111-112;Gunther Teubner,Introduction to Autopoietic Law,in Autopoietic Law:A New Approach to Law and Society,23 Law,Soc’y Rev.727,1989,pp.1-11.
(1)Oliver E.Williamson,“Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics”,149J.Institutional &Theoretical Econ.99,99n.1(1993),pp.215-223.
(2)Edward L.Rubin,“Beyond Public Choice:Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes”,66N.Y.U.L.Rev.1,1991,pp.45-63.
(1)George P.Fletcher,“Two Modes of Legal Thought”,90 Yale L.J.,1981,pp.970,995-1003;Pierre J.Schlag,“Normativity and the Politics of Form”,139 U.Pa.L.Rev.,1991,pp.801,808-852;Mark Tushnet,“Legal Scholarship:Its Causes and Cure”,90 Yale L.J.,1981,pp.1205,1208-1215.以上这些著作倾向于批判法学的规约性,但普遍集中于未经检验的或自反性规定。正如这些学者所评论的那样,这一现象普遍存在且是事实,这是法律作为独立学科所固有的。Edward L.Rubin,“Beyond Public Choice:Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes”,66 N.Y.U.L.Rev.1,1991,pp.1847-1859.
(2)Edward L.Rubin,“The Concept of Law and the New Public Law Scholarship”,89 Mich.L.Rev.,1991,pp.792,792-793.
(1)Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of1994’s,12U.S.C.s 1831r-1(d),1994,p.106.这一法令规定,当州际银行建议在低收入或中等收入区域关闭分支机构时,这些区域的居民将发起社区领导与监管机构之间针对“考察获得充足替代设施和服务的可行性”的会议。
(2)几个州政府已经以不同形式制定这一建议,但不包括联邦政府。例如,Ⅲ.Comp.Stat.ch.205,1993,p.605;Mass.Ann.Laws ch.167D,Law.Co-op.1987,p.2;Minn.Stat.Ann.,West 1988 &Supp.1996,pp.48-512.其基本观点是银行必须对低收入者和年长者的活期存款账户提供低市场利率。John P.Caskey,Fringe Banking,1994,pp.128-133(提出一个“适度的、联邦的生命线银行法”,使低收入家庭受益);Glenn B.Canner,Ellen Maland,Basic Banking,73Fed.Reserve Bull.,1987,pp.255,256-269.(对一般银行评估的建议,即保证一项最低金融服务标准应当适用于所有居民,不论其收入如何。)
(3)Community Reinvestment Act of1977,12U.S.C.,1994,pp.2901-2907。这一法案要求联邦监管者对银行进行评估,以确定银行是否符合其所经营的区域的信用要求。当决定是否通过银行兼并、分支机构收购、分支机构开业及分支机构重置时,监管机构需要考察这些被公开发布的评估报告。“For a comprehensive survey”,see Roland E.Brandel,DavidE.Teitelbaum,The Community Reinvestment Act:Policies and Compliance,1991.
(4)A.Brooke Overby,“The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered”,143 U.Pa.L.Rev.1995,pp.1431,1446-53 ,1497-1505;Anthony D.Taibi,“Banking,Finance,and Community Economic Empowerment:Structural Economic Theory,Procedural Civil Rights,and Substantive Racial Justice”,107 Harv.L.Rev.,1994,pp.1463,1469-1470.
(5)Jonathan R.Macey,Geoffrey P.Miller,“The Community Reinvestment Act:An Economic Analysis”,79 Va.L.Rev.,1993,pp.291,295-297.
(1)Michael Klausner,“Market Failure and Community Investment:A Market-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act”,143 U.Pa.L.Rev.,1995,pp.1561,1564-1565;Edward L.Rubin,“The Lifeline Banking Controversy:Putting Deregulation to Work for the Low-Income Consumer”,67 Ind.L.J.,1992,pp.213,224-229;Peter P.Swire,“Safe Harbors and a Proposal to Improve the Community Reinvestment Act”,79 Va.L.Rev.,1993,pp.349,351-357.
(2)Lon L.Fuller,“The Forms and Limits of Adjudication”,92 Harv.L.Rev.353(1978),pp.95-151.
(1)Lon L.Fuller,“The Forms and Limits of Adjudication”,92 Harv.L.Rev.353(1978),pp.95-151.
(2)Alexander M.Bickel,The Least Dangerous Branch,1962,pp.23-28;U.S.Supreme Court:Black,White Taxicab,Transfer Co.v.Brown,Yellow Taxicab,Transfer Co.,276U.S.1928,pp.156-182.
(3)ImreLakatos,The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,John Worrall,Gregory Currie eds.,1978,pp.47-52.
(1)Paul D.Carrington,“Of Law and the River”,34 J.Legal Educ.,1984,pp.222,227-228.
(2)Owen M.Fiss,“The Death of the Law”,72 Cornell L.Rev.,1986,pp.1,13-16.关于对这些排除性努力的分析,Gary Minda,Postmodern Legal Movements,1995,pp.208-223;Gary Minda,“The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s”,50 Ohio St.L.J.(1989),pp.599,650-665.
(3)关于批判法学研究抨击法经济学,可参见Mark Kelman,“Choice and Utility”,Wis.L.Rev.769(1979),passim;Duncan Kennedy,“Cost Benefit Analysis of Eminent Problems:A Critique”,33 Stan.L.Rev.387(1981),passim。关于法经济学抨击批判法学研究,可参见Richard Posner,The Problems of Jurisprudence,1990,pp.153-157;Lewis Kornhauser,“The Great Image of Authority”,36 Stan.L.Rev.349(1984),pp.379-387;Linz Audain,“Critical Legal Studies,Feminism,Law and Economics,and the Veil of Intellectual Tolerance:A Tentative Case for Cross-Jurisprudential Dialogue”,20 Hofstra L.Rev(1992),pp.1017,1087-1090(描述了两项运动彼此的对立)。
(4)依Foucault看来,知识实质上是权力的附属品。Michel Foucault,Power/Knowledge:Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977,Colin Gordon ed.,Colin Gordon et al.trans.,1980,pp.78-108.
(5)Hans-Georg Gadamer,Truth and Method,1975,pp.235-274;Jurgen Habermas,“Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States”,1 Eur.J.Phil.128(1993),pp.305-337.
(6)Linz Audain,“Critical Legal Studies,Feminism,Law and Economics,and the Veil of Intellectual Tolerance:ATentative Case for Cross-Jurisprudential Dialogue”,20 Hofstra L.Rev(1992),pp.1093-1104;Martha Minow,Law Turning Outward,73 Telos,1987,pp.79,95-99.
(7)我所持的观点是,法学院通常在法律的理论与实践方法问题上比在学术研究方法这一问题上表现得更为分裂,这一争论可通俗地称之为天神与地球人之争。
(1)Edward L.Rubin,“The Lifeline Banking Controversy:Putting Deregulation to Work for the Low-Income Consumer”,67 Ind.L.J.,1992,pp.1847-1853.
(2)Hans-Georg Gadamer,Truth and Method,1975,pp.5-10;Jurgen Habermas,“Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States”,1 Eur.J.Phil.128(1993),pp.1-7.
(3)Max Weber,Economy and Society,Guenther Roth,Claus Wittich eds.and Ephraim Fischoff et al.trans.,1968,pp.24-26.
(4)Jurgen Habermas,“Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States”,1 Eur.J.Phil.128(1993),pp.273-337.即便社会理论家如同利奥塔和卢曼一样立场多元化,他们也都认同这一立场。Niklas Luhmann,The Self-Reproduction of Law and Its Limits,in Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State,23 Law,Soc’y Rev.727,1989,pp.31-40;Jean-Francois Lyotard,The Inhuman,1991,pp.18-23.
(5)Jurgen Habermas,“Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States”,1 Eur.J.Phil.128(1993),pp.84-101.
(6)Max Weber,Economy and Society,Guenther Roth,Claus Wittich eds.and Ephraim Fischoff et al.trans.,1968,pp.4-12.
(1)Jurgen Habermas,“Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States”,1 Eur.J.Phil.128(1993),passim;Niklas Luhmann,The Self-Reproduction of Law and Its Limits,in Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State,23 Law,Soc’y Rev.727,1989,passim.
(2)Herbert Wechsler,“The Political Safeguards of Federalism:The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government”,54Colum.L.Rev.543(1954),pp.31-34.
(3)Gary Peller,“Neutral Principles in the 1950s”,21 U.Mich.J.L.Ref.6(1988),pp.561,564-566.