假定垄断者测试在竞争法中的应用研究
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摘要
SSNIP测试也被称为"假定垄断者测试",是依据芝加哥学派的观点从市场势力的角度来界定反垄断市场的一种方法。在近年来,该测试方法在国内外被越来越广泛地施诸司法实践,然而,在法律经济学得令当道的大背景下,研究者的言说大多从经济学而非法学本身的角度立论,本文通过法律文本的分析解读SSNIP测试方法的源起,揭示该方法在美国和欧盟竞争法实践中的应用异同以及可能面临的困境,并以奇虎诉腾讯滥用市场支配地位案为典型案例,对中国司法实践在这方面涉足伊始的得失经验从学理上加以客观评论。本文的结论是,经济学的论证也难免利益之累,对于技术主义的取向应保持清醒的认识。
SSNIP test is also called "hypothetical monopolist test",which is based on the Chicago School view from the perspective of market forces to define an antitrust market.In recent years,the test method at home and abroad has been more and more widely applied to judicial practice.However,under the background of the economic imperialism in contemporary,the most of the arguments is provided by economics rather than from the perspective of law itself.Through the interpreting of the legal text,the present article explores the origins of the SSNIP test methods,reveals similarities and differences of its application in the United States and EU competition law practice,as well as the difficulties which it is likely to face in reality,especially the objective comments from an academic perspective are made on the pros and cons of experience China's judicial practice in availing this test in Tencent v.Qihoo case.According to the present article,the argument of economics is often inevitably tired interests,then it is important and useful for us to keeping a cool head towards the technology-oriented doctrine.
SSNIP test is also called "hypothetical monopolist test",which is based on the Chicago School view from the perspective of market forces to define an antitrust market.In recent years,the test method at home and abroad has been more and more widely applied to judicial practice.However,under the background of the economic imperialism in contemporary,the most of the arguments is provided by economics rather than from the perspective of law itself.Through the interpreting of the legal text,the present article explores the origins of the SSNIP test methods,reveals similarities and differences of its application in the United States and EU competition law practice,as well as the difficulties which it is likely to face in reality,especially the objective comments from an academic perspective are made on the pros and cons of experience China's judicial practice in availing this test in Tencent v.Qihoo case.According to the present article,the argument of economics is often inevitably tired interests,then it is important and useful for us to keeping a cool head towards the technology-oriented doctrine.
引文
[1]Robert H.Bork.The Antitrust Paradox:A Policy at War with Itself[M].New York:Free Press,1978.
[2]Richard A.Posner.Antitrust Law[M].Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,2001.
[3]George J.Stigler,Ward S.Bowman,Ronald H.Coase,Kenneth W.Dam.Report of the Task Force on Productivity and Competition[J].Antitrust Law&Economics Review,Vol.13,No.2,1969.
[4]Robert J.Larner and James W.Meehan.Economics and Antitrust Policy[M].New York:Quorum Books,1989.
[5]M.A.Adelman.Economic Aspects of the Bethlehem Opinion[J].Virginia Law Review,1959,Vol.45,No.5.
[6]G.J.Werden.T he 1982 Merger Guidelines and the Ascent of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm[J].Antitrust Law Journal,2003,Vol.71,No.1.
[7]Phillip Areeda and Donald F.Turner.Antitrust Law:An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application[M].vol.2,Boston;Little:Brown and Company,1978.
[8]F.M.Scherer.IndustrialMarketStructureandEconomic Performance[M].Chicago:Rand McNally Press,1980.
[9]Joe Sims and William Blumenthal.The New Era in Antitrust[J].Regulation,1982,Vol.6,No.4.
[10]George W.Stocking and Willard F.Mueller.The Cellophane Case and the New Competition[J].The American Economic Review,1955,Vol.45,No.1.
[11]Christian A.Melischek.The Relevant Market in International Economic Law:A Comparative Antitrust and GATT Analysis[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2012.
[12]P.Crocioni.The Hypothetical Monopolist Test:What it Can and Cannot Tell You[J].European Competition Law Review,2002,Vol.23,No.7.
[13]Luke M.Froeb,Gregory I.Werden.The Reverse Cellophane Fallacy in Market Delineation[J].Review of Industrial Organization,1992,Vol.7,Iss.2.
[14]Robert G.Harris and Thomas M.Jorde.Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines:Implications for Antitrust Enforcement[J].California Law Review,1983,Vol.71,No.3.
[15]G.Stigler and R.Sherwin.The Extent of the Market[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1985,Vol.28,No.3.
[16]Richard Wish.Competition Law[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2003.
[17]J.Pearce Azevedo and M.Walker.Dominance:Meaning and Measurement[J].European Competition Policy Review,2002,Vol.23,No.7.
[18]David S.Evans and Michael D.Noel.The Analysis of Mergers that Involve Multi-Sided Platform Businesses[J].Journal of Competition Law and Economics,2008,Vol.4,Iss.3.
[19]E.Emch and T.S.Thompson.Market Definition and Market Power in Payment Card Industries[J].Review of Network Economics,2006,Vol.5,No.1.
[20]Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole.Cooperation among Competitors:Some Economics of Payment Card Association[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,2002,Vol.33,No.4.
[21]Franklin M.Fisher.Horizontal Mergers:Triage and Treatment[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,1987,Vol.1,No.2.
[22]Steven C.Salop.The First Principles Approach to Antitrust,Kodak,and Antitrust at the Millenium[J].Antitrust Law Journal,2000,Vol.68,No.2.
[23]Stephen W.Salant,Sheldon Switzer and Robert J.Reynolds.Losses from hori zontal merger:the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1983,Vol.98,Iss.2.
[24]Peter D.Camesasca and Roger J.van den Bergh.Achilles Uncovered:Revisiting the European Commission's 1997 Market Definition Notice[J].Antitrust Bulletin,2002,Vol.47,Iss.1.
[25]James F.Rill.Merger Enforcement at the Department of Justice[J].Antitrust Law Journal,1990,Vol.59,Iss.2.
[26]Michael A.Utton.Market Dominance and Antitrust Policy[M].Cheltenham:Edward Elgar,2003.
[27]Valentine Korah.An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice[M].Oxford:Hart Publishing,2004.
[28]Michael L.Katz;Carl Shapiro.Network Externalities,Competition,and Compatibility[J].The American Economic Review,1985,Vol.75,No.3.
[29]蒋岩波.互联网产业中相关市场界定的司法困境与出路——基于双边市场条件[J].法学家,2012(6).
[30]Raymond Hartman,David Teece,Will Mitchell&Thomas Jorde.Assessing Market Power in Regimes of Rapid Technological Change[J].Industrial and Corporate Change,1993,Vol.2,Iss.3.
[31]Andrew I.Gavil.After Daubert:Discerning the Increasingly Fine Line between the Admissibility and Sufficiency of Expert Testimony in Antitrust Litigation[J].Antitrust Law Review,1997,Vol.65,No.3.
[32]Aleksandra Gebicka&Andreas Heinemann.Social Media&Competition Law[J].World Competition,2014,Vol.37,Iss.2.
[33]袁超.互联网语境下相关市场界定之困境与出路探析——以“360诉腾讯垄断案”为例[J].科技与法律,2013(6).
[34]桑斯坦.权利革命之后:重塑规制国[M].钟瑞华,译,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2008.
[35]Oliver Wendell Holmes.The Common Law[M].Boston:Little,Brown and Company,1881.
(1)United States v.Columbia Steel Co.-334 U.S.495(1948).
(2)United States v.Von’s Grocery Co.,384 U.S.270,301(1966)(dissenting opinion).原话为:The sole consistency that I can find is that under Section 7,the Government always wins.
(3)F.M.Scherer.On the Paternity of a Market Delineation Approach,AAI Working Paper#09-01,资料来源:http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/AAI%20Working%20Paper%2001-09_011220091948.pdf,访问时间:2014年7月1日。
(4)United States v.E.I.du Pont de Nemours&Co.-351U.S.377(1956).
(5)Decision of the Director General of Fair Trading Predation by Aberdeen Journals Limited Case No.CA98/14/2002,16September 25002.
(6)Commission Decision,1999/781/EC,British Interactive Broadcasting/Open(Case IV/36.539),[1999]OJL312/1[2000]4CMLR 901.
(7)Case No COMP/M.2706-Carnival Corporation/P&OPrincess(OJL 248,30.9.2003).
(8)Lapo Filistrucchi.A SSNIP Test for Two-sided Markets:The Case of Media.http://www.netinst.org/Filistrucchi-08-34.pdf.2013-06-15.
(9)OECD,Application of Competition Policy to High Tech Markets[2012-03-25].http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/24/1920091.pdf.
(10)Case No IV/JV.11-@Home Benelux-15September1998.
(11)Case IV/M 190Nestlé/Perrier[1992]OJ L 356/1.
(12)http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/joint-venture-hearings-antitrust-guidelines-collaboration-among-competitors/ftcdojguidelines-2.pdf,访问时间:2014年7月23日。
(13)Berkey Photo Inc.v.Eastman Kodak Co.,603F.2d263(2dCir.1979).
(14)Charles A.James.Rediscovering Coordinated Effects(Aug.13,2002),资料来源:https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/rediscovering-coordinated-effects,访问时间:2014年3月27日。
(15)Case COMP/39.596-British Airways/American Airlines/Iberia Decision rejecting Virgin Atlantic's complaint of 30January 2009.
(16)Case No COMP/M.4781-Norddeutsche Affinerie/Cumerio.
(17)Case No COMP/M.4734-Ineos/Kerling,Commission Decision of 30/01/2008.
(18)Case COMP/M.5658-Unilever/Sara Lee Body Care,Commission decision of 17November 2010.
(19)Case No IV/M.166-Torras/Sarrio(1992).
(20)Case T-128/98,Aéroports de Paris v Commission,[2000]ECR II-03929.
(21)《国务院反垄断委员会关于相关市场界定的指南》(2009年5月24日),资料来源:http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/9610600.html,访问时间:2014年10月17日。
(22)上海市高级人民法院民事判决书(2012)沪高民三(知)终字第63号,资料来源:http://ciplawyer.com/article1.asparticleid=11242,访问时间:2014年10月17日。
(23)《360诉腾讯垄断案引发“垄断者测试”争议》,资料来源:http://wwwi.prchn.com/Index-NewsContent.aspxnewsId=66687,访问时间:2014年10月12日。
(24)《奇虎公司与腾讯公司垄断纠纷上诉案判决书》,资料来源:http://www.court.gov.cn/xwzx/yw/201410/t20141016_198470.htm,访问时间:2014年11月8日。
(25)See Roundtable on the Role and Measurement of Quality in Competition Analysis:Note by the BIAC,DAF/COMP/WD(2013)57.
(26)这方面的文献主要包括:Georg Franck,Oe konomie der Aufmerksamkeit-Ein Entwurf,Munich:Carl Hanser,1998.David S.Evans,Attention Rivalry among Online Platforms,Journal of Competition Law&E-conomics,2013,Vol.9,Iss.2。
(27)United States v.Microsoft Corp.,No.98-1232(D.D.C.May 18,1998)(Direct Testimony of Richard Schmalen.see at pp.66,179-180,188-189).
(28)广东省高级人民法院(2011)粤高法民三初字第2号民事判决,资料来源:http://www.antimonopolylaw.org/article/default.aspid=4163,访问时间:2014年10月17日。
(29)United States v.E.I.du Pont de Nemours&Co.-351U.S.377(1956).
(30)《最高人民法院院里的火药味》,资料来源:http://www.legalweekly.cn/index.php/Index/article/id/4048,访问时间:2014年9月5日。
(31)Case C-333/94P Tetra Pak v.Commission[1996]ECR I-5951,para.16;Case T-30/89Hilti v.Commission[1991]ECR II-1439,n.56;Case T-427/08CEAHR v.Commission[2010]ECR II-5865,n.69.
(32)Case T-427/08CEAHR v.Commission[2010]ECRII-5865,para.66.
(33)FTC v.Indiana Fed'n of Dentists,476U.S.447,460-61(1986).
[2]Richard A.Posner.Antitrust Law[M].Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,2001.
[3]George J.Stigler,Ward S.Bowman,Ronald H.Coase,Kenneth W.Dam.Report of the Task Force on Productivity and Competition[J].Antitrust Law&Economics Review,Vol.13,No.2,1969.
[4]Robert J.Larner and James W.Meehan.Economics and Antitrust Policy[M].New York:Quorum Books,1989.
[5]M.A.Adelman.Economic Aspects of the Bethlehem Opinion[J].Virginia Law Review,1959,Vol.45,No.5.
[6]G.J.Werden.T he 1982 Merger Guidelines and the Ascent of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm[J].Antitrust Law Journal,2003,Vol.71,No.1.
[7]Phillip Areeda and Donald F.Turner.Antitrust Law:An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application[M].vol.2,Boston;Little:Brown and Company,1978.
[8]F.M.Scherer.IndustrialMarketStructureandEconomic Performance[M].Chicago:Rand McNally Press,1980.
[9]Joe Sims and William Blumenthal.The New Era in Antitrust[J].Regulation,1982,Vol.6,No.4.
[10]George W.Stocking and Willard F.Mueller.The Cellophane Case and the New Competition[J].The American Economic Review,1955,Vol.45,No.1.
[11]Christian A.Melischek.The Relevant Market in International Economic Law:A Comparative Antitrust and GATT Analysis[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2012.
[12]P.Crocioni.The Hypothetical Monopolist Test:What it Can and Cannot Tell You[J].European Competition Law Review,2002,Vol.23,No.7.
[13]Luke M.Froeb,Gregory I.Werden.The Reverse Cellophane Fallacy in Market Delineation[J].Review of Industrial Organization,1992,Vol.7,Iss.2.
[14]Robert G.Harris and Thomas M.Jorde.Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines:Implications for Antitrust Enforcement[J].California Law Review,1983,Vol.71,No.3.
[15]G.Stigler and R.Sherwin.The Extent of the Market[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1985,Vol.28,No.3.
[16]Richard Wish.Competition Law[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2003.
[17]J.Pearce Azevedo and M.Walker.Dominance:Meaning and Measurement[J].European Competition Policy Review,2002,Vol.23,No.7.
[18]David S.Evans and Michael D.Noel.The Analysis of Mergers that Involve Multi-Sided Platform Businesses[J].Journal of Competition Law and Economics,2008,Vol.4,Iss.3.
[19]E.Emch and T.S.Thompson.Market Definition and Market Power in Payment Card Industries[J].Review of Network Economics,2006,Vol.5,No.1.
[20]Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole.Cooperation among Competitors:Some Economics of Payment Card Association[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,2002,Vol.33,No.4.
[21]Franklin M.Fisher.Horizontal Mergers:Triage and Treatment[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,1987,Vol.1,No.2.
[22]Steven C.Salop.The First Principles Approach to Antitrust,Kodak,and Antitrust at the Millenium[J].Antitrust Law Journal,2000,Vol.68,No.2.
[23]Stephen W.Salant,Sheldon Switzer and Robert J.Reynolds.Losses from hori zontal merger:the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1983,Vol.98,Iss.2.
[24]Peter D.Camesasca and Roger J.van den Bergh.Achilles Uncovered:Revisiting the European Commission's 1997 Market Definition Notice[J].Antitrust Bulletin,2002,Vol.47,Iss.1.
[25]James F.Rill.Merger Enforcement at the Department of Justice[J].Antitrust Law Journal,1990,Vol.59,Iss.2.
[26]Michael A.Utton.Market Dominance and Antitrust Policy[M].Cheltenham:Edward Elgar,2003.
[27]Valentine Korah.An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice[M].Oxford:Hart Publishing,2004.
[28]Michael L.Katz;Carl Shapiro.Network Externalities,Competition,and Compatibility[J].The American Economic Review,1985,Vol.75,No.3.
[29]蒋岩波.互联网产业中相关市场界定的司法困境与出路——基于双边市场条件[J].法学家,2012(6).
[30]Raymond Hartman,David Teece,Will Mitchell&Thomas Jorde.Assessing Market Power in Regimes of Rapid Technological Change[J].Industrial and Corporate Change,1993,Vol.2,Iss.3.
[31]Andrew I.Gavil.After Daubert:Discerning the Increasingly Fine Line between the Admissibility and Sufficiency of Expert Testimony in Antitrust Litigation[J].Antitrust Law Review,1997,Vol.65,No.3.
[32]Aleksandra Gebicka&Andreas Heinemann.Social Media&Competition Law[J].World Competition,2014,Vol.37,Iss.2.
[33]袁超.互联网语境下相关市场界定之困境与出路探析——以“360诉腾讯垄断案”为例[J].科技与法律,2013(6).
[34]桑斯坦.权利革命之后:重塑规制国[M].钟瑞华,译,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2008.
[35]Oliver Wendell Holmes.The Common Law[M].Boston:Little,Brown and Company,1881.
(1)United States v.Columbia Steel Co.-334 U.S.495(1948).
(2)United States v.Von’s Grocery Co.,384 U.S.270,301(1966)(dissenting opinion).原话为:The sole consistency that I can find is that under Section 7,the Government always wins.
(3)F.M.Scherer.On the Paternity of a Market Delineation Approach,AAI Working Paper#09-01,资料来源:http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/AAI%20Working%20Paper%2001-09_011220091948.pdf,访问时间:2014年7月1日。
(4)United States v.E.I.du Pont de Nemours&Co.-351U.S.377(1956).
(5)Decision of the Director General of Fair Trading Predation by Aberdeen Journals Limited Case No.CA98/14/2002,16September 25002.
(6)Commission Decision,1999/781/EC,British Interactive Broadcasting/Open(Case IV/36.539),[1999]OJL312/1[2000]4CMLR 901.
(7)Case No COMP/M.2706-Carnival Corporation/P&OPrincess(OJL 248,30.9.2003).
(8)Lapo Filistrucchi.A SSNIP Test for Two-sided Markets:The Case of Media.http://www.netinst.org/Filistrucchi-08-34.pdf.2013-06-15.
(9)OECD,Application of Competition Policy to High Tech Markets[2012-03-25].http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/24/1920091.pdf.
(10)Case No IV/JV.11-@Home Benelux-15September1998.
(11)Case IV/M 190Nestlé/Perrier[1992]OJ L 356/1.
(12)http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/joint-venture-hearings-antitrust-guidelines-collaboration-among-competitors/ftcdojguidelines-2.pdf,访问时间:2014年7月23日。
(13)Berkey Photo Inc.v.Eastman Kodak Co.,603F.2d263(2dCir.1979).
(14)Charles A.James.Rediscovering Coordinated Effects(Aug.13,2002),资料来源:https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/rediscovering-coordinated-effects,访问时间:2014年3月27日。
(15)Case COMP/39.596-British Airways/American Airlines/Iberia Decision rejecting Virgin Atlantic's complaint of 30January 2009.
(16)Case No COMP/M.4781-Norddeutsche Affinerie/Cumerio.
(17)Case No COMP/M.4734-Ineos/Kerling,Commission Decision of 30/01/2008.
(18)Case COMP/M.5658-Unilever/Sara Lee Body Care,Commission decision of 17November 2010.
(19)Case No IV/M.166-Torras/Sarrio(1992).
(20)Case T-128/98,Aéroports de Paris v Commission,[2000]ECR II-03929.
(21)《国务院反垄断委员会关于相关市场界定的指南》(2009年5月24日),资料来源:http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/9610600.html,访问时间:2014年10月17日。
(22)上海市高级人民法院民事判决书(2012)沪高民三(知)终字第63号,资料来源:http://ciplawyer.com/article1.asparticleid=11242,访问时间:2014年10月17日。
(23)《360诉腾讯垄断案引发“垄断者测试”争议》,资料来源:http://wwwi.prchn.com/Index-NewsContent.aspxnewsId=66687,访问时间:2014年10月12日。
(24)《奇虎公司与腾讯公司垄断纠纷上诉案判决书》,资料来源:http://www.court.gov.cn/xwzx/yw/201410/t20141016_198470.htm,访问时间:2014年11月8日。
(25)See Roundtable on the Role and Measurement of Quality in Competition Analysis:Note by the BIAC,DAF/COMP/WD(2013)57.
(26)这方面的文献主要包括:Georg Franck,Oe konomie der Aufmerksamkeit-Ein Entwurf,Munich:Carl Hanser,1998.David S.Evans,Attention Rivalry among Online Platforms,Journal of Competition Law&E-conomics,2013,Vol.9,Iss.2。
(27)United States v.Microsoft Corp.,No.98-1232(D.D.C.May 18,1998)(Direct Testimony of Richard Schmalen.see at pp.66,179-180,188-189).
(28)广东省高级人民法院(2011)粤高法民三初字第2号民事判决,资料来源:http://www.antimonopolylaw.org/article/default.aspid=4163,访问时间:2014年10月17日。
(29)United States v.E.I.du Pont de Nemours&Co.-351U.S.377(1956).
(30)《最高人民法院院里的火药味》,资料来源:http://www.legalweekly.cn/index.php/Index/article/id/4048,访问时间:2014年9月5日。
(31)Case C-333/94P Tetra Pak v.Commission[1996]ECR I-5951,para.16;Case T-30/89Hilti v.Commission[1991]ECR II-1439,n.56;Case T-427/08CEAHR v.Commission[2010]ECR II-5865,n.69.
(32)Case T-427/08CEAHR v.Commission[2010]ECRII-5865,para.66.
(33)FTC v.Indiana Fed'n of Dentists,476U.S.447,460-61(1986).