非CEO高管的内部治理效应研究——基于真实盈余管理视角
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摘要
公司治理结构对企业财务报告质量的影响作用是现代管理学关注的重要课题。将研究视角定位于高层管理团队内部,以非CEO高管在公司决策中的制衡作用测度内部治理水平,研究发现基于高管间行为的内部治理机制能够有效抑制真实盈余管理。但进一步研究发现,非CEO高管也存在机会主义,当真实盈余管理能够降低资本成本时,非CEO高管的内部治理效应减弱。在揭示上市公司高层管理团队成员如何协同工作以达成特定会计信息信号作用的同时,提供了公司内部治理研究由下而上的新思路。
The effect of corporate governance on the quality of financial reporting is an important issue concerned by modern management. Based on the perspective of the interior of the management team,using the checks and balances driven by non-CEO managers in company's decision-making to measure the internal management level,this paper finds that the internal governance mechanism based on the behavior between managers can effectively inhibit real earnings management. But further research finds that non-CEO managers also have opportunism.When the real earnings management can create higher capital market returns,non-CEO managers' internal governance effect weakened. This paper not only reveals how the members of the management team work together to achieve particular accounting information signal role,but also provides new ideas for the internal governance research from bottom to top.
The effect of corporate governance on the quality of financial reporting is an important issue concerned by modern management. Based on the perspective of the interior of the management team,using the checks and balances driven by non-CEO managers in company's decision-making to measure the internal management level,this paper finds that the internal governance mechanism based on the behavior between managers can effectively inhibit real earnings management. But further research finds that non-CEO managers also have opportunism.When the real earnings management can create higher capital market returns,non-CEO managers' internal governance effect weakened. This paper not only reveals how the members of the management team work together to achieve particular accounting information signal role,but also provides new ideas for the internal governance research from bottom to top.
引文
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[2]Mizik N,Jacobson R. Myopic marketing management:Evidence of the phenomenon and its long-term perform-ance consequences in the SEO context[J]. Marketing Science,2007,26(3):361-379.
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[7]邵剑兵,陈永恒.公司战略、避税行为与盈余管理[J].经济与管理评论,2018,(06):60-72.
[8]黄海杰,吕长江,丁慧.独立董事声誉与盈余质量———会计专业独董的视角[J].管理世界,2016,(03):128-143.
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[13]王克敏,王志超.高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理———基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007,(07):111-119.
[14]Fama E F. Agency problems and the theory of the firm[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1980,88(2):288-307.
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[16]Ali A,Zhang W. CEO tenure and earnings management[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2015,59(1):60-79.
[17]Barker V L,Mueller G C. CEO characteristics and firm R&D spending[J]. Management Science,2002,48(6):782-801.
[18]Dechow P M,Sloan R. Executive incentives and the horizon problem:An empirical investigation[J]. Journal ofAccounting and Economics,1991,141(1):51-89.
[19]Davidson W,Xie B,Xu W,et al. The influence of executive age,career horizon and incentives on pre-turnoverearnings management[J]. Journal of Management and Governance,2007,11(1):45-60.
[20]Cheng Q,Lee J,Shevlin T. Internal governance and real earnings management[J]. The Accounting Review,2016,91(4):1051-1085.
[21]Martijn Cremers K J,Grinstein Y. Does the market for CEO talent explain controversial CEO pay practices?[J]. Review of Finance,2014,18(3):921-960.
[22]Kasznik R,Mc Nichols M F. Does meeting earnings expectations matter? Evidence from analyst forecast revisionsand ahare prices[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40(3):723-759.
[23]Badertscher B A. Overvaluation and the choice of alternative earnings management mechanisms[J]. The Ac-counting Review,2011,86(5):1491-1518.
[24]Cohen D A,Zarowin P. Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,50(1):2-19.
[25]罗琦,王悦歌.真实盈余管理与权益资本成本———基于公司成长性差异的分析[J].金融研究,2015,(05):178-191.
[26]Kim J,Sohn B C. Real earnings management and cost of capital[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2013,32(6):518-543.
[27]Taylor G K,Xu R Z,Previts G. Consequences of real earnings management on subsequent operating perform-ance[J]. Research in Accounting Regulation,2010,22(2):128-132.
[28]汪炜,袁东任.盈余质量对自愿性信息披露的影响及作用机理[J].统计研究,2014,(04):89-96.
[29]Roychowdhury S. Earnings management through real activities manipulation[J]. Journal of Accounting and Eco-nomics,2006,42(3):335-370.
[30]Zang A Y. Evidence on the trade-off between real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings manage-ment[J]. The Accounting Review,2012,87(2):675-703.
[31]沈红波.市场分割、跨境上市与预期资金成本:来自Ohlson-Juettner模型的经验证据[J].金融研究,2007,(02):146-155.
(1)6.0%、5.8%、7.5%分别为REM_1、REM_2、REM_3的回归系数与Int_Governance标准差的乘积。
[2]Mizik N,Jacobson R. Myopic marketing management:Evidence of the phenomenon and its long-term perform-ance consequences in the SEO context[J]. Marketing Science,2007,26(3):361-379.
[3]顾鸣润,杨继伟,余怒涛.产权性质、公司治理与真实盈余管理[J].中国会计评论,2012,(03):255-274.
[4]王亮亮.真实活动盈余管理与权益资本成本[J].管理科学,2013,(05):87-99.
[5]高雷,张杰.公司治理、机构投资者与盈余管理[J].会计研究,2008,(09):64-72.
[6]薄仙慧,吴联生.国有控股与机构投资者的治理效应:盈余管理视角[J].经济研究,2009,(02):81-91.
[7]邵剑兵,陈永恒.公司战略、避税行为与盈余管理[J].经济与管理评论,2018,(06):60-72.
[8]黄海杰,吕长江,丁慧.独立董事声誉与盈余质量———会计专业独董的视角[J].管理世界,2016,(03):128-143.
[9]苏冬蔚,林大庞.股权激励、盈余管理与公司治理[J].经济研究,2010,(11):88-100.
[10]张兴亮,夏成才.非CEO高管患寡还是患不均[J].中国工业经济,2016,(09):144-160.
[11]Kouaib A,Jarbouib A. Real earnings management in innovative firms:Does CEO profile make a difference?[J]. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance,2016,(12):40-54.
[12]Feng M,Ge W,Luo S,et al. Why do CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations?[J]. Jour-nal of Accounting and Economics,2011,51(1-2):21-36.
[13]王克敏,王志超.高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理———基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007,(07):111-119.
[14]Fama E F. Agency problems and the theory of the firm[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1980,88(2):288-307.
[15]Hazarika S,Karpoff J M,Nahata R. Internal corporate governance,CEO turnover,and earnings management[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2012,104(1):44-69.
[16]Ali A,Zhang W. CEO tenure and earnings management[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2015,59(1):60-79.
[17]Barker V L,Mueller G C. CEO characteristics and firm R&D spending[J]. Management Science,2002,48(6):782-801.
[18]Dechow P M,Sloan R. Executive incentives and the horizon problem:An empirical investigation[J]. Journal ofAccounting and Economics,1991,141(1):51-89.
[19]Davidson W,Xie B,Xu W,et al. The influence of executive age,career horizon and incentives on pre-turnoverearnings management[J]. Journal of Management and Governance,2007,11(1):45-60.
[20]Cheng Q,Lee J,Shevlin T. Internal governance and real earnings management[J]. The Accounting Review,2016,91(4):1051-1085.
[21]Martijn Cremers K J,Grinstein Y. Does the market for CEO talent explain controversial CEO pay practices?[J]. Review of Finance,2014,18(3):921-960.
[22]Kasznik R,Mc Nichols M F. Does meeting earnings expectations matter? Evidence from analyst forecast revisionsand ahare prices[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40(3):723-759.
[23]Badertscher B A. Overvaluation and the choice of alternative earnings management mechanisms[J]. The Ac-counting Review,2011,86(5):1491-1518.
[24]Cohen D A,Zarowin P. Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,50(1):2-19.
[25]罗琦,王悦歌.真实盈余管理与权益资本成本———基于公司成长性差异的分析[J].金融研究,2015,(05):178-191.
[26]Kim J,Sohn B C. Real earnings management and cost of capital[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2013,32(6):518-543.
[27]Taylor G K,Xu R Z,Previts G. Consequences of real earnings management on subsequent operating perform-ance[J]. Research in Accounting Regulation,2010,22(2):128-132.
[28]汪炜,袁东任.盈余质量对自愿性信息披露的影响及作用机理[J].统计研究,2014,(04):89-96.
[29]Roychowdhury S. Earnings management through real activities manipulation[J]. Journal of Accounting and Eco-nomics,2006,42(3):335-370.
[30]Zang A Y. Evidence on the trade-off between real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings manage-ment[J]. The Accounting Review,2012,87(2):675-703.
[31]沈红波.市场分割、跨境上市与预期资金成本:来自Ohlson-Juettner模型的经验证据[J].金融研究,2007,(02):146-155.
(1)6.0%、5.8%、7.5%分别为REM_1、REM_2、REM_3的回归系数与Int_Governance标准差的乘积。