基于不对称Nash谈判修正的产学研协同创新战略联盟收益分配研究
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摘要
产学研协同创新战略联盟是建设自主创新国家,打造经济升级版的主要担纲者,科学合理的收益分配机制是提高联盟凝聚力的前提条件。针对以往不对称Nash谈判联盟收益分配的缺陷,综合考虑了联盟中各成员在协作中的重要程度,成员对分配方案的满意程度,成员的风险分担程度以及联盟成员绩效等影响收益分配的要素,给出了各影响因素的测度方法及不对称Nash谈判修正的系数矩阵。有效地规避了传统不对称Nash谈判收益分配平均化的不足,大幅提高联盟成员投入产出的有效性及风险承担能力,提高了联盟的稳定性。
The innovation alliance strategy among industry, university, and research institutes plays a main role in building an innovative country, and making economic progress. The scientific and reasonable mechanisms for the achievement is the precondition of improving alliance cohesion. This is an effective way of reversing synergy of innovation alliance members' interests and risk transfer. This paper investigates asymmetric Nash negotiation and synthetically considers influencing factors, such as the importance of each member in the cooperation, the satisfaction of allocation program, the degree of risk sharing, and the influence of alliance performance. The findings of this study can provide new approaches to measure influential factors and modify coefficient matrix of asymmetric Nash negotiation. Firstly, this paper tries to understand barriers to the formation of production-study-research cooperative innovation strategy alliance. Those barriers may include the pursuit of self-interests by alliance members, and other factors causing the negotiations for unequal income distribution alliance. Secondly, according to Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we were able to calculate the best discount coefficient of alliance benefits after negotiation, all union members' income distribution, and income distribution coefficient matrix. In addition, we were able to identify the league members in the important degree of collaboration, members of allocation of satisfaction, members of the degree of risk sharing, and alliance performance measure of the influence of income distribution elements. We integrate related factors into the income distribution in order to determine innovation strategy alliance income distribution matrix that includes the influential factors for income distribution. Finally, we use the case-based methodology and a case example to explain how an enterprise, a research institution, a science and technology intermediary service, and a financial services institution collaborate with each other in a successful strategic alliance. The findings of this study are able to effectively avoid the shortage of average income distribution of traditional asymmetric Nash negotiation, enhance members' validity of input and output, and improve alliance stability.
The innovation alliance strategy among industry, university, and research institutes plays a main role in building an innovative country, and making economic progress. The scientific and reasonable mechanisms for the achievement is the precondition of improving alliance cohesion. This is an effective way of reversing synergy of innovation alliance members' interests and risk transfer. This paper investigates asymmetric Nash negotiation and synthetically considers influencing factors, such as the importance of each member in the cooperation, the satisfaction of allocation program, the degree of risk sharing, and the influence of alliance performance. The findings of this study can provide new approaches to measure influential factors and modify coefficient matrix of asymmetric Nash negotiation. Firstly, this paper tries to understand barriers to the formation of production-study-research cooperative innovation strategy alliance. Those barriers may include the pursuit of self-interests by alliance members, and other factors causing the negotiations for unequal income distribution alliance. Secondly, according to Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we were able to calculate the best discount coefficient of alliance benefits after negotiation, all union members' income distribution, and income distribution coefficient matrix. In addition, we were able to identify the league members in the important degree of collaboration, members of allocation of satisfaction, members of the degree of risk sharing, and alliance performance measure of the influence of income distribution elements. We integrate related factors into the income distribution in order to determine innovation strategy alliance income distribution matrix that includes the influential factors for income distribution. Finally, we use the case-based methodology and a case example to explain how an enterprise, a research institution, a science and technology intermediary service, and a financial services institution collaborate with each other in a successful strategic alliance. The findings of this study are able to effectively avoid the shortage of average income distribution of traditional asymmetric Nash negotiation, enhance members' validity of input and output, and improve alliance stability.
引文
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[15]李霞,宋素玲,穆喜产.协同创新的风险分摊与利益分配问题研究[J].科技进步与对策,2008,35(02):309-323.
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[18]汪翔,孟卫东,吴国东.基于第三方监督的研发联盟收益分配机制研究[J].软科学,2012,26(6):21-23.
[19]孙东川,叶飞.动态联盟利益分配的Nash谈判模型研究[J].科研管理,2001(3):91-95.
[20]郝艳丽.物流企业动态联盟的构建及收益分配契约设计研究[D].天津:天津大学,2009.
[21]张道武,汤书昆,徐旭初.合作创新联盟成员绩效评估的综合分析机制[J].系统工程理论与方法.2004,13(2):100-105.
[2]李久平,姜大鹏,王涛.产学研协同创新中的知识整合——一个理论框架[J].软科学,2013,27(05)136.
[3]Badaracco J L.The knowledge link:how enterprises compete through strategic al1iances[M].Boston:Harvard Business School Press,1991.
[4]陈劲,阳银娟.协同创新的理论基础与内涵[J].科学学研究,2012(02):161-164.
[5]Borys B,Jemison D.Hybrid arrangements as strategicalliances:theoretical issues and organizational combinations[J].Academy of Management Review,1989,14(2):234-249.
[6]Veugelers R,Cassiman B.R&D Cooperation between firms and universities:some ermpirical evidence from belgian manufacturing[J].International journal of industrial organization,2005(56):355-379.
[7]贾生华,邬爱其,疏礼兵.基于协同创新思想的浙江民营企业发展模式[J].浙江社会科学,2005(02):213-218.
[8]何郁冰.产学研协同创新的理论模式[J].科学学研究,2012,30(2):166-174.
[9]马永坤.协同创新理论模式及区域经济协同机制的构建[J].华东经济管理,2013,27(2):52-55.
[10]Laredo P.Toward a third mission for universities[R].Paper presented at UNESCO workshop(Paris),2007.
[11]Shyu J Z,et al.A cross—national comparative analysis of innovation policy in the integrated circuit industry[J].Technology in Society,2001,23(2):227-240.
[12]黄义,张清华.国家创新体系中产学研协同机制研究[J].科学管理研究,2013,31(5):1-4.
[13]Capello R.Spatial transfer of knowledge in hi-tech milieux:learning versus collective learning progresses[J].Regional Studies,1999,(33):352-365.
[14]蒋石梅,张爱国,孟宪礼,张旭军.产业集群产学研协同创新机制—基于保定市新能源及输变电产业集群的案例研究[J].科学学研究,2012,30(2):207-212.
[15]李霞,宋素玲,穆喜产.协同创新的风险分摊与利益分配问题研究[J].科技进步与对策,2008,35(02):309-323.
[16]Davsten G,Kok G,Vaandrager M.Greating winwin situation:partner selection in strategic technology alliance[R].Avila:Proceedings R&D Management Conference,1998.1-21.
[17]Bierly P E,Coombs E.Equity alliance,stages of product development and alliance instability[J].Journal of Engineering and Technology Management,2004,(12):191-214.
[18]汪翔,孟卫东,吴国东.基于第三方监督的研发联盟收益分配机制研究[J].软科学,2012,26(6):21-23.
[19]孙东川,叶飞.动态联盟利益分配的Nash谈判模型研究[J].科研管理,2001(3):91-95.
[20]郝艳丽.物流企业动态联盟的构建及收益分配契约设计研究[D].天津:天津大学,2009.
[21]张道武,汤书昆,徐旭初.合作创新联盟成员绩效评估的综合分析机制[J].系统工程理论与方法.2004,13(2):100-105.