产品责任、企业社会责任偏好与供应链中的质量-数量协调
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摘要
在产品质量和产品数量(订货量)内生化的情形下,同时实现其质量和数量的协调将成为供应链管理的一个重要问题。进一步,在产品低质量对消费者造成伤害的情形下,制造商将面临着产品责任(表征制造商对消费者产品伤害的补偿),从而导致"产品责任如何影响供应链中的质量-数量协调"这一问题。最后,如果核心企业具有对消费者的企业社会责任(CSR)偏好,则这种CSR偏好又如何影响供应链中的质量-数量协调?针对这三个问题,首先,利用批发价合同构建了一个由上游制造商和下游零售商组成的两级供应链运作博弈模型;其次考察了制造商产品责任、CSR偏好程度和质量改进效率对其产品质量决策、批发价合同和相应的供应链节点企业利润的影响;最后,研究了供应链质量-数量协调问题。结果表明:(1)产品责任不影响产品质量、订货量、供应链节点企业经济利润和消费者剩余,但制造商批发价随产品责任的增加而增加;(2)随着CSR偏好程度的增加,产品质量、订货量、零售商经济利润、供应链系统经济利润和消费者剩余随之增加,而制造商经济利润随之减小;(3)质量改进效率的提高,有利于产品质量、订货量、零售商经济利润、供应链系统经济利润和消费者剩余的增加;(4)一个由数量折扣契约和质量改进成本分担契约共同构成的协调机制,可以有效的实现供应链系统的协调,其中,产品责任将促使数量折扣契约中产品批发价的增加和质量改进成本分担比例的减小,而CSR偏好程度的增加将促使数量折扣契约中产品批发价的减小,但不影响质量改进成本分担比例。
When product quality and product quantity(ordering quantity)are endogenous,how to achieve the quality-quantity coordination becomes an important question in supply chain management.Further,given that low-quality products usually cause harm to consumers and product liability regulations often require the manufacturer to compensate for consumers' losses,there arises another question of how product liability affects the quality-quantity coordination mechanism for supply chain members.Finally,if the focal firm in a supply chain is equipped with a corporate social responsibility(CSR)preference on consumer surplus,then how does the CSR preference affect the quality-quantity coordination?Focusing on these three questions,a two-stage game model is built to describe the operations of a supply chain where an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer conduct their product transaction via a wholesale price contract.In this model,it is assumed that the product is an experience good and may be in two different ex ante(before sales)quality states:high and low.The true quality level can not be observed by the consumers before sales,but after sales the consumers can learn.A low-quality product may cause harm to consumers.If the quality state is ex post(after sales)realized as low,the manufacturer chooses to recall(and remedy)the low-quality product or compensate for the consumers' losses according to some product liability regulations.On the other hand,the manufacturer can also choose to improve the quality level ex ante to reduce the probability for the low quality state to occur.Finally,it is assumed that the manufacturer,as the focal firm,is equipped with a CSR preference which is represented by the degree to which the manufacturer cares about consumer surplus.The decision sequence is as follows.Firstly,the manufacturer decides its product quality level and offers a wholesale price contract to the retailer.Secondly,the retailer decides its ordering quantity.Finally,the retailer sells the product to consumers in the final market.With this model,how the product liability,the CSR preference and the quality improvement efficiency affect the manufacturer's product quality choice,the contract relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer,the supply chain members' profitability and the consumer surplus are investigated.A quality-quantity coordination contract is also developed and the impacts of the product liability and the CSR preference on the quality-quantity coordination contract are discussed.The main results are as follows.(1)Product liability does not affect the manufacturer's quality choice,the ordering quantity,the supply chain members' economic profits and the consumer surplus,but raises the wholesale price.(2)A higher level of the manufacturer's CSR preference leads to a higher level of product quality,a higher ordering quantity,a higher economic profit for the retailer and a higher level of consumer surplus,but a lower economic profit for the manufacturer.(3)The quality improvement efficiency helps to enhance the product quality level,the ordering quantity,the retailer's economic profit,the supply chain total economic profit and the consumer surplus.(4)A proper combination of a quality improvement cost sharing contract and a quantity discount contract can effectively coordinate the operations of the supply chain.(5)Product liability raises the quantity discount,but decreases the retailer's share of the quality-improvement cost;on the other hand,the degree of the manufacturer's CSR preference has anegative impact on the quantity discount,but has no impact on the retailer's share of the quality-improvement cost.In this research,firstly,a theoretical rationale is furnished to understand the effects of product liability,the manufacturer'CSR preference and the quality improvement efficiency on the product quality decision,the product-transacting contract and the corresponding supply chain members' profitability.Secondly,the quality-quantity coordination contract provides a benchmark to coordinate supply chains operated under different product liabilities.Finally,the theoretical rationale and the coordination contract framework can provide practitioners with useful insight to deal with product-harm crises.
When product quality and product quantity(ordering quantity)are endogenous,how to achieve the quality-quantity coordination becomes an important question in supply chain management.Further,given that low-quality products usually cause harm to consumers and product liability regulations often require the manufacturer to compensate for consumers' losses,there arises another question of how product liability affects the quality-quantity coordination mechanism for supply chain members.Finally,if the focal firm in a supply chain is equipped with a corporate social responsibility(CSR)preference on consumer surplus,then how does the CSR preference affect the quality-quantity coordination?Focusing on these three questions,a two-stage game model is built to describe the operations of a supply chain where an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer conduct their product transaction via a wholesale price contract.In this model,it is assumed that the product is an experience good and may be in two different ex ante(before sales)quality states:high and low.The true quality level can not be observed by the consumers before sales,but after sales the consumers can learn.A low-quality product may cause harm to consumers.If the quality state is ex post(after sales)realized as low,the manufacturer chooses to recall(and remedy)the low-quality product or compensate for the consumers' losses according to some product liability regulations.On the other hand,the manufacturer can also choose to improve the quality level ex ante to reduce the probability for the low quality state to occur.Finally,it is assumed that the manufacturer,as the focal firm,is equipped with a CSR preference which is represented by the degree to which the manufacturer cares about consumer surplus.The decision sequence is as follows.Firstly,the manufacturer decides its product quality level and offers a wholesale price contract to the retailer.Secondly,the retailer decides its ordering quantity.Finally,the retailer sells the product to consumers in the final market.With this model,how the product liability,the CSR preference and the quality improvement efficiency affect the manufacturer's product quality choice,the contract relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer,the supply chain members' profitability and the consumer surplus are investigated.A quality-quantity coordination contract is also developed and the impacts of the product liability and the CSR preference on the quality-quantity coordination contract are discussed.The main results are as follows.(1)Product liability does not affect the manufacturer's quality choice,the ordering quantity,the supply chain members' economic profits and the consumer surplus,but raises the wholesale price.(2)A higher level of the manufacturer's CSR preference leads to a higher level of product quality,a higher ordering quantity,a higher economic profit for the retailer and a higher level of consumer surplus,but a lower economic profit for the manufacturer.(3)The quality improvement efficiency helps to enhance the product quality level,the ordering quantity,the retailer's economic profit,the supply chain total economic profit and the consumer surplus.(4)A proper combination of a quality improvement cost sharing contract and a quantity discount contract can effectively coordinate the operations of the supply chain.(5)Product liability raises the quantity discount,but decreases the retailer's share of the quality-improvement cost;on the other hand,the degree of the manufacturer's CSR preference has anegative impact on the quantity discount,but has no impact on the retailer's share of the quality-improvement cost.In this research,firstly,a theoretical rationale is furnished to understand the effects of product liability,the manufacturer'CSR preference and the quality improvement efficiency on the product quality decision,the product-transacting contract and the corresponding supply chain members' profitability.Secondly,the quality-quantity coordination contract provides a benchmark to coordinate supply chains operated under different product liabilities.Finally,the theoretical rationale and the coordination contract framework can provide practitioners with useful insight to deal with product-harm crises.
引文
[1]潘佳,刘益,王良.企业产品伤害危机响应策略对股票市场的影响[J].管理学报,2014,11(11):1696-1702.
[2]Gokhale J,Brooks R M,Tremblay V J.The effect on stockholder wealth of product recalls and government action:The case of Toyota’s accelerator pedal recall[J].The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance,2014,54(4):521-528.
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[4]Loureiro M L.Liability and food safety provision:Empirical evidence from the US[J].International Review of Law and Economics,2008,28(3):204-211.
[5]Takaoka S.The effects of product liability costs on R&D with asymmetric information[J].Japan and the World Economy,2005,17(1):59-81.
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[9]田敏,李纯青,萧庆龙.企业社会责任行为对消费者品牌评价的影响[J].南开管理评论,2014,17(6):19-29.
[10]晁罡,石杜丽,申传泉,石磊.新传媒时代企业社会责任对声誉修复的影响研究[J].管理学报,2015,12(11):1678-1686.
[11]于洪彦,曹晓治,曹鑫.企业社会责任与企业绩效关系中企业社会资本的调节作用[J].管理评论,2015,27(1):169-180.
[12]纪建悦,李坤.利益相关者关系与企业财务绩效的实证研究-基于中国房地产上市公司的面板数据分析[J].管理评论,2011,23(7):143-148.
[13]吴定玉.供应链企业社会责任管理研究[J].中国软科学,2013,(2):55-63.
[14]Panda S.Coordination of a socially responsible supply chain using revenue sharing contract[J].Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review,2014,67(7):92-104.
[15]Liu C C,Wang L F S,Lee S H.Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a differentiated duopoly market[J].Economics Letters,2015,129(4):108-111.
[16]Goering G E.Welfare impacts of a non-profit firm in mixed commercial markets[J].Ecomomic Systems,2008,32(4):326-334.
[17]Hino Y,Zennyo Y.Corporate social responsibility and strategic relationship[J].International Review of Economics,2015,64(3):231-244.
[18]梁佑山,倪得兵,唐小我.基于企业社会责任的供应链双渠道竞争模型[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(S1):453-460.
[19]倪得兵,李璇,唐小我.供应链中CSR运作:相互激励、CSR配置与合作[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(9):97-105.
[20]Ni Debing,Li K W,Tang Xiaowo.Social responsibility allocation in two-echelon supply chains:Insights from wholesale price contracts[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2010,207(3):1269-1279.
[21]Ni Debing,Li K W.A game-theoretic analysis of social responsibility conduct in two-echelon supply chains[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2012,138(2):303-313.
[22]Lee C H,Rhee B D,Cheng T C E.Quality uncertainty and quality-compensation contract for supply chain coordination[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2013,228(3):582-591.
[23]Seifbarghy M,Nouhi K,Mahmoudi A.Contract design in a supply chain considering price and quality dependent demand with customer segmentation[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2015,167(9):108-118.
[24]刘云志,樊治平.考虑损失规避与产品质量水平的供应链协调契约模型[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(1):65-77.
[25]郭春香,李旭升,郭耀煌.社会责任环境下供应链的协作与利润分享策略研究[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(2):103-108.
[26]Modak N M,Panda S,Sana S,et al.Corporate social responsibility,coordination and profit distribution in a dual-channel supply chain[J].Pacific Science Review,2014,16(4):235-249.
[27]Panda S,Modak N M,Basu M,et al.Channel coordination and profit distribution in a social responsible three-layer supply chain[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2015,168(10):224-233.
[28]朱立龙,于涛,夏同水.创新驱动下三级供应链分销渠道产品质量控制策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(8):1986-1997.
[29]Ma Peng,Wang Haiyan,Shang J.Contract design for two-stage supply chain coordination:Integrating manufacturer-quality and retailer-marketing efforts[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2013,146(2):745-755.
[30]Tirole J.The theory of industrial organization[M].Cambridge:MIT Press,1988.
[31]Zeng Jing,Phan C A,Matsui Y.The impact of hard and soft quality management on quality and innovation performance:An empirical study[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2015,162(4):216-226.
[32]O’Neill P,Sohal A,Teng C W.Quality management approaches and their impact on firms’financial performance-An Australian study[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2016,171(1):381-393.
[33]Fan Jianchang,Ni Debing,Tang Xiaowo.Product quality choice in two-echelon supply chains under post-sale liability:Insights from wholesale price contracts[J].International Journal of Production Research,2017,55(9):2556-2574.
[2]Gokhale J,Brooks R M,Tremblay V J.The effect on stockholder wealth of product recalls and government action:The case of Toyota’s accelerator pedal recall[J].The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance,2014,54(4):521-528.
[3]Buzby J C,Frenzen P D.Food safety and product liability[J].Food Policy,1999,24(6):637-651.
[4]Loureiro M L.Liability and food safety provision:Empirical evidence from the US[J].International Review of Law and Economics,2008,28(3):204-211.
[5]Takaoka S.The effects of product liability costs on R&D with asymmetric information[J].Japan and the World Economy,2005,17(1):59-81.
[6]Vassilikopoulou A,Siomkos G,Chatzipanagiotou K,et al.Product-harm crisis management:Time heals all wounds?[J].Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services,2009,16(3):174-180.
[7]Cruz J M,Liu Zugang.Modeling and analysis of the multi-period effects of social relationship on supply chain networks[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2011,214(1):39-52.
[8]后锐,姬广玉,韩小花,等.考虑环保责任的双寡头厂商新产品推出时机与定价策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(2):335-346.
[9]田敏,李纯青,萧庆龙.企业社会责任行为对消费者品牌评价的影响[J].南开管理评论,2014,17(6):19-29.
[10]晁罡,石杜丽,申传泉,石磊.新传媒时代企业社会责任对声誉修复的影响研究[J].管理学报,2015,12(11):1678-1686.
[11]于洪彦,曹晓治,曹鑫.企业社会责任与企业绩效关系中企业社会资本的调节作用[J].管理评论,2015,27(1):169-180.
[12]纪建悦,李坤.利益相关者关系与企业财务绩效的实证研究-基于中国房地产上市公司的面板数据分析[J].管理评论,2011,23(7):143-148.
[13]吴定玉.供应链企业社会责任管理研究[J].中国软科学,2013,(2):55-63.
[14]Panda S.Coordination of a socially responsible supply chain using revenue sharing contract[J].Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review,2014,67(7):92-104.
[15]Liu C C,Wang L F S,Lee S H.Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a differentiated duopoly market[J].Economics Letters,2015,129(4):108-111.
[16]Goering G E.Welfare impacts of a non-profit firm in mixed commercial markets[J].Ecomomic Systems,2008,32(4):326-334.
[17]Hino Y,Zennyo Y.Corporate social responsibility and strategic relationship[J].International Review of Economics,2015,64(3):231-244.
[18]梁佑山,倪得兵,唐小我.基于企业社会责任的供应链双渠道竞争模型[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(S1):453-460.
[19]倪得兵,李璇,唐小我.供应链中CSR运作:相互激励、CSR配置与合作[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(9):97-105.
[20]Ni Debing,Li K W,Tang Xiaowo.Social responsibility allocation in two-echelon supply chains:Insights from wholesale price contracts[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2010,207(3):1269-1279.
[21]Ni Debing,Li K W.A game-theoretic analysis of social responsibility conduct in two-echelon supply chains[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2012,138(2):303-313.
[22]Lee C H,Rhee B D,Cheng T C E.Quality uncertainty and quality-compensation contract for supply chain coordination[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2013,228(3):582-591.
[23]Seifbarghy M,Nouhi K,Mahmoudi A.Contract design in a supply chain considering price and quality dependent demand with customer segmentation[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2015,167(9):108-118.
[24]刘云志,樊治平.考虑损失规避与产品质量水平的供应链协调契约模型[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(1):65-77.
[25]郭春香,李旭升,郭耀煌.社会责任环境下供应链的协作与利润分享策略研究[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(2):103-108.
[26]Modak N M,Panda S,Sana S,et al.Corporate social responsibility,coordination and profit distribution in a dual-channel supply chain[J].Pacific Science Review,2014,16(4):235-249.
[27]Panda S,Modak N M,Basu M,et al.Channel coordination and profit distribution in a social responsible three-layer supply chain[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2015,168(10):224-233.
[28]朱立龙,于涛,夏同水.创新驱动下三级供应链分销渠道产品质量控制策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(8):1986-1997.
[29]Ma Peng,Wang Haiyan,Shang J.Contract design for two-stage supply chain coordination:Integrating manufacturer-quality and retailer-marketing efforts[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2013,146(2):745-755.
[30]Tirole J.The theory of industrial organization[M].Cambridge:MIT Press,1988.
[31]Zeng Jing,Phan C A,Matsui Y.The impact of hard and soft quality management on quality and innovation performance:An empirical study[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2015,162(4):216-226.
[32]O’Neill P,Sohal A,Teng C W.Quality management approaches and their impact on firms’financial performance-An Australian study[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2016,171(1):381-393.
[33]Fan Jianchang,Ni Debing,Tang Xiaowo.Product quality choice in two-echelon supply chains under post-sale liability:Insights from wholesale price contracts[J].International Journal of Production Research,2017,55(9):2556-2574.