基于FDI收益分成视角的FTA网络演化
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  • 英文篇名:Evolution of FTA Networks Based on Split of FDI Revenue
  • 作者:崔志伟 ; 高丽君 ; 曾庆超
  • 英文作者:CUI Zhi-wei;GAO Li-jun;ZENG Qing-chao;School of Economics and Management, Beihang University;Beijing E-town Experimental Primary School;
  • 关键词:网络博弈论 ; 两两稳定性 ; 福利改善路径 ; 国家福利不对称性
  • 英文关键词:network game theory;;pairwise stability;;social welfare improving path;;asymmetry between individual countries in social welfare
  • 中文刊名:YCGL
  • 英文刊名:Operations Research and Management Science
  • 机构:北京航空航天大学经济管理学院;北京亦庄实验小学;
  • 出版日期:2019-03-25
  • 出版单位:运筹与管理
  • 年:2019
  • 期:v.28;No.156
  • 基金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71671010,71690245)
  • 语种:中文;
  • 页:YCGL201903002
  • 页数:6
  • CN:03
  • ISSN:34-1133/G3
  • 分类号:5-10
摘要
本文假定双边自由贸易协定(bilateral free trade agreement,简称FTA)包含着无限制对外直接投资(foreign direct investment,简称FDI),并且通过FDI销售到非FTA伙伴国的收益按照一定比例在母国和东道国之间进行分配。基于Goyal和Joshi~([1]),本文构建了FTA网络形成博弈模型。本文发现,FTA网络演化过程分为两个阶段:第一阶段,从空FTA网络到星状FTA网络,存在一条路径使得个体国家福利、世界总福利均改善,在此过程中,国家福利存在不对称性;第二阶段,从星状FTA网络到全连接FTA网络,存在一条路径使得个体国家福利改善,在此过程中,世界总福利不变,国家福利不对称性逐步消除。
        As an extension of Goyal and Joshi, this paper provides a model of bilateral free trade agreement(FTA)network formation where FTA implies unrestricted FDI(foreign direct investment)and the revenue from non-FTA partner countries via FDI is distributed between home country and host country according to a certain proportion. The main results show that the evolution of FTA networks can be divided into two stages. In the first stage, there exists a path from empty FTA network to star FTA network where both individual country social welfare and world social welfare are improving and an asymmetry between individual countries in social welfare exists. In the second stage, there exists an individual country social welfare improving path from star FTA network to complete FTA network while the world social welfare remains the same, in which an asymmetry between individual countries in social welfare comes to be eliminated.
引文
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