美国《反海外腐败法》的和解方案、内部结构及合规文化
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摘要
实践中,美国《反海外腐败法》(FCPA)的大多数执法行动均是通过暂缓起诉协议(DPAs)或不起诉协议(NPAs)和解结案的。但是,在联邦监管机构考虑使用缓起诉协议(DPAs)或不起诉协议(NPA)进行协商之前,通常会权衡企业是否愿意与执法机关潜在的调查进行合作,以及是否促进并提升了企业的合规文化。正如本文展示的,合作与合规并不总是与遭受FCPA审查风险企业的最佳利益相融合。合作往往意味着要求企业律师确定实施违法行为的个人。如果这些个人在单独的行动中受到纪律处分或被起诉,由此造成的后果可能导致企业内部的个人和律师之间的互不信任,企业内部沟通的崩溃,造成不公平待遇的感觉以及不适当的风险规避举措,而所有这些从企业的角度来看均是不利的,并且可能阻碍企业维护守法文化的努力。事实上,这些并不是新问题,但由于监管机构经常以扩张方式解释FCPA,使得它们在FCPA背景下具有了特别意义。由于监管机构频繁地解释FCPA,而FCPA的复杂性与潜在行为的跨国性质,使得在允许的竞争性活动和不允许行贿之间经常出现模糊的界限。尽管许多企业最终可能认为合作带来的潜在负面影响是可以解决的,但在设计企业内部的合规计划时,企业和企业内部的律师仍然认识到这些问题至关重要,监管机构也需要意识到,他们的执法政策可能会阻碍企业自我监管的努力。
Most enforcement actions brought against firms under the U. S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act( FCPA) are resolved via a deferred prosecution agreement( DPA) or non-prosecution agreement( NPA). But before federal regulators will consider negotiating over these types of settlement vehicles,they typically weigh a firm's willingness to cooperate with the underlying investigation and whether it promoted a " culture of compliance. " As this paper shows,these two factors do not always intersect in ways that serve the best interests of firms at risk for FCPA scrutiny. Cooperation often means asking company counsel to identify individual agents responsible for the alleged wrongdoing. If these agents are then disciplined or prosecuted in separate actions,the resulting dynamic can lead to distrust between agents and counsel,a breakdown in internal communications,feelings of unfair treatment,and inappropriate levels of risk aversion-all of which are undesirable from a firm's perspective and can hinder efforts to maintain a law-abiding culture. These issues are not all new,but they take on particular significance in the FCPA context due to the often expansive way regulators interpret the FCPA,the complexities associated with the transnational nature of the underlying conduct,and the frequently blurry lines between permissible competitive activity and impermissible bribery. Though many firms may ultimately decide that the potentially negative effects of cooperation are worth the upside of settlement,it is essential that they and their counsel remain cognizant of these issues when designing internal compliance programs. Regulators,too,need to be aware of how their enforcement policies could hinder efforts at corporate self-policing.
Most enforcement actions brought against firms under the U. S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act( FCPA) are resolved via a deferred prosecution agreement( DPA) or non-prosecution agreement( NPA). But before federal regulators will consider negotiating over these types of settlement vehicles,they typically weigh a firm's willingness to cooperate with the underlying investigation and whether it promoted a " culture of compliance. " As this paper shows,these two factors do not always intersect in ways that serve the best interests of firms at risk for FCPA scrutiny. Cooperation often means asking company counsel to identify individual agents responsible for the alleged wrongdoing. If these agents are then disciplined or prosecuted in separate actions,the resulting dynamic can lead to distrust between agents and counsel,a breakdown in internal communications,feelings of unfair treatment,and inappropriate levels of risk aversion-all of which are undesirable from a firm's perspective and can hinder efforts to maintain a law-abiding culture. These issues are not all new,but they take on particular significance in the FCPA context due to the often expansive way regulators interpret the FCPA,the complexities associated with the transnational nature of the underlying conduct,and the frequently blurry lines between permissible competitive activity and impermissible bribery. Though many firms may ultimately decide that the potentially negative effects of cooperation are worth the upside of settlement,it is essential that they and their counsel remain cognizant of these issues when designing internal compliance programs. Regulators,too,need to be aware of how their enforcement policies could hinder efforts at corporate self-policing.
引文
(1)暂缓起诉协议,United States v.ABB Ltd.,No.10-CR-00665(S.D.Tex.Sept.29,2010).
(2)同上。
(1)Plea Agreement at 13,United States v.ABB Inc.,No.10-CR-00664(S.D.Tex.Sept.29,2010).
(2)见infra第二部分。
(3)关于在企业犯罪中因合作而提出的治理问题的概括性讨论,见Miriam Hechler Baer,Governing Corporate Compliance,50 B.C.L.REV.949(2009);Lisa Kern Griffin,Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure,82 N.Y.U.L.REV.311(2007).
(4)15 U.S.C.§§78 dd-1 to-3(2006).
(5)Full Regime'of Cooperation Emergingin Anti-Corruption Arena,DOJ Official Says,SEC.L.DAILY(BNA,Inc.),Aug.18,2011[以下简称Full Regime].
(1)SHEARMAN&STERLING LLP,FCPA DIGEST:CASES AND REVIEW RELEASES RELATING TO BRIBES TO FOR-EIGN OFFICIALS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977,at ii(2011),参见http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/c32b8fla-0523-41ae-bee5-7bfbe5a4O6a7/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/234fcOaa-34a9-4490-96b6-52945477184c/Final%20January%202011%20FCPA%20Digest.pdf;Greg Andres,Acting Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.,Statement before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs(Nov.30,2010),参见http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/testimony/2010/crm-testimony-101130.html.如2010年美国SEC和DOJ与荷兰建筑企业Snamprogetti荷兰B.V.达成和解,金额为3.65亿美元;瑞士船运企业Panalpina为1.56亿美元;法国建筑企业Technip S.A.为3.38亿美元;英国国防承包商BAE系统企业提供4亿美元;以及德国汽车制造商戴姆勒企业的1.85亿美元。参见新闻稿:美国司法部,戴姆勒企业和三家子企业解决外国腐败行为调查并同意支付9360万美元刑事处罚(2010年4月1日);新闻发布:美国司法部,石油服务企业和货运企业同意解决外国贿赂调查,并支付超过1.56亿美元的刑事处罚(2010年11月4日);新闻发布:美国司法部,Snamprogetti荷兰B.V.解决了外国腐败行为调查,并同意支付2.4亿美元的刑事处罚(2010年7月7日)(讨论了2.4亿美元的刑事处罚和价值1.25亿美元的利润);新闻发布:美国司法部,技术人员组织解决外国腐败行为调查,并同意支付2.4亿美元的刑事处罚(2010年6月28日)(讨论了2.4亿美元的刑事处罚和价值9800万美元的利润);另见丹尼尔·迈克尔斯和卡斯尔·布里安,负责解决行贿案件,金额超过4亿美元。2010年2月6日,在B1;新闻发布:美国证券交易委员会。通讯企业,SEC指控戴姆勒企业全球贿赂(2010年4月1日)。
(2)SHEARMAN&STERLING LLP,FCPA DIGEST:RECENT TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THEFOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 4(2011),参见http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/12c8fD77-57d6-44b7-99fd-deb0b7el6d01/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ffcdl2l4-7ldb-4cab-a507-926e866ef4de/FCPA-071511-July%202011-Trends-Patterns.pdf.
(3)OECD,UNITED STATES:PHASE 3:REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIB-ERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS ININTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 11(2010)[以下简称OECD PHASE3 REPORT].
(4)GIBSON DUNN,2010 YEAR-END FCPA UPDATE 1(2011)(引自Assistant Attorney General Lanny A.Breuer)(内部引号省略),参见http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/?2010YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf.
(5)参见,如SHEARMAN&STERLING LLP,supranote 8,at 1.
(6)Peggy Aulino,Authorities Seen Casting Wide Net in Effort to Stem Bribery,Corruption,6 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP.1001(2011).
(7)OECD PHASE 3 REPORT.
(1)OECD,CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESSTRANSACTIONS(2011),参见http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf(在1997年谈判会议上被38个签约国采用)。经合组织反贿赂公约密切跟踪《反贿赂法》,要求签署国通过国内立法,禁止在国际商业交易中贿赂外国公职人员。它还包括旨在提高其有效性的条款,包括对多边调查合作的措施,以及对贿赂犯罪的引渡。
(2)Che Odom,UndercoverAgents,Wiretaps Becoming the Norm in White-CollarCases,ExpertsSay,CORP.ACCOUNTABILITYREP.(BNA,Inc),Oct.7,2011.
(3)Diana B.Henriques,F.B.I Snares Weapons Executives in BriberySting,N.Y.TIMES,Jan.21,2010,at A3.
(4)见2010 Mid-Year FCPA Update,GIBSON DUNN(July 8,2010),http://www.gibsondunn.com/Publications/Pages/201OMid-YearFCPAUpdate.aspx.
(5)SHEARMAN&STERLING LLP,at viii.
(6)参见2010 Mid-Year FCPA Update,(7)同上。
(8)如Edward C.O'Callaghan et al.,WiretapEvidence Raises the Bar for?Insider Trading Cases following Rajaratnam,6 WHITECOLLAR CRIME REP.854(2011).
(9)同上。应该指出的是,司法部在起诉“第22条军规”被告时遭受了重大挫折。三名被告承认有罪,但其余的人接受了四个小组的审判。这些审判都以无罪或无效的形式结束,而美国司法部最终选择不重审任何被告。见Robert Wilhelm,Government Throws in the Towel in Massive FCPA Sting Investigation,7 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP.(2012).
(10)Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,Pub.L.No.111-203,§922,124 Stat.1376,1841-42(2010).
(11)Full Regime。
(1)如SHEARMAN&STERLING LLP,A NEW TOOL AND A TWIST?THE SEC's FIRST DEFERRED PROSECUTION A-GREEMENT AND A NOVEL PUNITIVE MEASURE 1(2011),见http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/2Ob76673-2736-4a55-840f-1f75d518ca93/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/71ecb942-9eab-4482-b786-41522a71af75/LT-052411-A-New-Tool-and-a-Twist.pdf.
(2)Baer,973.But cf Darryl K.Brown,The Problematic and Faintly Promising Dynamics of Corporate Crime Enforcement,1 O-HIO ST.J.CRIM.L.521(2004)(描述企业在为刑事指控辩护时所拥有的各种优势,包括拥有与政府诉讼相匹配的资源)。正如布朗教授所指出的,“对于大企业来说,政府压迫问题已经大大减少了”。
(3)Larry E.Ribstein,Agents Prosecuting Agents 10(Ill.Program in Law,Behavior and Social Sci.,Research Paper No.LB-SS1 1-01 2011),见http://ssrn.com/abstract=1737915.But cf Jonathan M.Karpoff,D.Scott Lee&Gerald S.Martin,The Impact of Anti-Bribery Enforcement Actions on Targeted Firms(Feb.27,2012)(未出版手稿),见http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1573222(发现企业因受贿罪而被起诉时,其名誉损失较小,它们因受贿和谎报财务报表而被起诉时名誉损失较大).
(4)Baer,at 973.
(5)OECD PHASE 3REPORT,at 31.
(6)Griffin,at 321.
(7)同上,at 322.
(8)Mike Koehler,The Fapade of FCPA Enforcement,41 GEo.J.INT'L L.907,934(2010).
(9)OECD PHASE 3 REPORT,at 32.
(10)同上。
(11)同上。DOJ和SEC都被授权进入DPAs,2011年5月,美国证券交易委员会第一次使用DPA。新任命的SEC执法部门主管Rob Khuzami称他的机构使用DPAs作为“潜在的游戏规则改变者”。SHEARMAN&STERLING LLP,supra note 26,at 1-2(内部引号省略).
(12)Koehler,at 933(引言Henning on the White Collar Watch,CORP.CRIME REP.,Feb.7,2010(Henning教授是前司法部检察官和SEC执法人员)(内部引号省略).
(13)值得注意的是,一些评论人士表达了他们的担忧,即企业没有得到它们应得的利益,因为它们必须支付高额罚款,并同意承担繁重的、有争议的治理改革。David Hess&Cristie L.Ford,Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings:A New Approach to an OldProblem,41 CORNELL INT'L L.J.307,309(2008).
(1)Griffin,at 330(“当DOJ宣布DPA与AOL时,它声明该协议是为了使股东和雇员的附带损害最小化,同时实施适当的惩罚和保护受害者的权利。”(援引新闻稿,司法部,America Online Charged with Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud;Prosecution Deferred for Two Years(Dec.15,2004))监管机构也从DPAs和NPAs中受益,避免了与被告企业一起起诉的费用和复杂性。私人企业,尤其是大型企业,通常有多个部门、不同层次的层级和复杂的内部计算和通信系统。正如布埃尔教授所指出的,“对国家来说,所有这些加起来比‘普通’的刑事案件要复杂得多”。现代的组织案例很容易涉及数百个目击者,数百万的文件,以及多年的调查,需要几十个国家的参与者的劳动。Samuel W.Buell,Criminal Procedure within the Firm,59STAN.L.REv.1613,1625(2007).通过DPA或NPA来解决FCPA的行动,使得监管者能够达成一项不依赖于如此繁重的过程和财政支出的决议。
(2)U.S.SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§8C2.5(g)(1)(2009).
(3)同上§8C2.5 cmt.n.12
(4)美国司法部,U.S.ATTORNEY'S MANUAL 9-28.300(A)(4)(2008),见http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foiareadingroom/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm.
(5)Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a)of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions,Exchange Act Release Nos.34-44969;AAER-1470,76 SECDocket 220,222(Oct.23,2001).
(6)这些选项并不是相互排斥的。在随后的刑事诉讼中,一名被终止的代理人也可能被起诉。
(7)Deferred Prosecution Agreement 5-10,United States v.Willbros Group,Inc.,No.H-08-287(S.D.Tex.May 14,2008).
(1)新闻发布,美国司法部,Willbros Group Inc.Enters Deferred Prosecution Agreement and Agrees to Pay$22 Million Penalty for FCPA Violations(May 14,2008).
(2)在这个DPA被签署之后,Willbros企业的员工Paul Novak和James Tillery被指控。诺瓦克随后认罪,目前在尼日利亚被当局拘留,等待引渡到美国。http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-6.
(3)Andres.
(4)Michael Connor,US Likely to Broaden Anti-Bribery and Corruption Efforts,Bus.ETHICS(Feb.24,2010),http://business-ethics.com/2010/02/24/1317-u-s-likely-to-broaden-efforts-to-curb-international-bribery-and-corruption/.
(5)Aulino(内部引号省略).
(6)Mike Koehler,Individual DOJ Prosecutions by the Numbers,FCPA(Sept.20,2011),http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/individual-doj-prosecutions-by-the-numbers.
(7)Mike Koehler,FCPA教授,DOJ Prosecution of Individuals-Are Other Factors at Play?,(Sept.22,2011),http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-prosecution-of-individuals-are-other-factors-at-play(原文强调部分删除).
(8)Koehler,at 939-40.
(9)Koehler.
(10)见Nathan Vardi,How Federal Crackdown on Bribery Hurts Business?and Enriches Insiders,FORBES.COM(May 24,2010),http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0524/business-weatherford-kbr-corruption-bribery-racket.html.
(11)OECD PHASE 3 REPORT,at 32.
(1)Taking Depositions in a Foreign Country,CAL.LITIG.REP.(White&Case LLP,L.A.,Cal.),Sept.22,2006.
(2)Ako S.Williams,BarristersTips:Taking Depositions Abroad,Los ANGELES LAW.,Dec.2005,at 10,10.
(3)Memorandum of Law in Support of Bourke's Motion In Limine to Exclude the Testimony of Rajan Menon at 2,United States v.Kozeny,No.05 Crim.518(S.D.N.Y.May 18,2009).
(4)同上。
(5)同上。
(6)United States v.Esquenazi,No.09-21010(S.D.Fla.Dec.4,2009),展现了这一情况的一个例子。Mike Koehler,Stunning Haiti Teleco Development,FCPA PROFESSOR(Aug.29,2011),http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/stunning-haititeleco-development(政府让其专家证人加里·利萨德为海地法律和他对海地电信是海地共和国的国有公共机构,以及其雇员是否为政府官员的意见作了证词。尽管利萨德先生无法审查海地电信的规章制度或股票证书,也无法找到任何将海地电信作为“SAM”的文件,他认为,由于海地中央银行拥有97%的股票,加上他对“顾客和实践”的观察,以及“电信的信笺”,他认为,电信是一个海地政府工具。他进一步指出这一点,因为他得出的结论是,电信是一个公共实体,所有的电信员工都是政府官员或雇员,即使没有法律指定政府雇员在类似电信企业这样的地点是政府雇员或代理商。
(7)Ribstein教授举了一个鲜明的例子,在他引用杰米·奥里斯的例子时,他倾向于为个别企业的被告认罪。见Ribstein,at 11。奥里斯一直坚持自己的清白,但最终无法支付10万美元打印和审查1200万页的文件,联邦检察官能够通过使用他们自己的电脑程序来分析这些文件。同上。奥里斯最终被定罪并被判处24年监禁。同上。
(8)想想Broadcom企业创始人、前首席技术官亨利·萨穆利的期权回溯案。萨穆利在认罪协议中承认犯有刑事指控,要求他对另一名Broadcom执行官员作证。见Koehler,at 940.在萨穆埃尔的证词被提出后,联邦地区法官在案件中,法官卡尼,撤销了萨穆埃尔先前的认罪答辩,并驳回了对他的指控,因为他认为没有证据表明萨穆埃尔博士做了错事,更不要说犯罪了。同上,at 941(引用Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 5197-98,United States v.Ruehle,No.SACR 08-00139-CJC(C.D.Cal.Dec.15,2009))。卡尼继续说,政府发起了一场恐吓和其他不当行为的运动,让他难堪,并将他打倒,包括按照萨穆埃尔(Samueli)博士所说为他没有犯下的罪行认罪,以避免“被判长期监禁”的罪行认罪。同上。(引自John R.Emshwiller&Nathan Koppel,PleaBargainsGet Renewed Scrutiny,WALL ST.J.,Dec.19,2009,at A4).
(9)事实是,企业愿意在内部约束代理人,这可能是在实体级别的和解之后,个人FCPA起诉比例相对较低的原因之一。监管机构可能会在某些情况下为决定内部企业制裁提供足够的威慑价值,从而避免对个人违法者进行昂贵后续诉讼的必要性。
(10)Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 4,United States v.Willbros Group Inc.,Crim.No.H-08-287(S.D.Tex.May 14,2008).
(1)装甲控股企业通过NPA解决了FCPA的指控,该企业被要求终止涉嫌不当行为的员工。Non-Prosecution Agreement between Denis J.McInerney,Deputy Chief,Fraud Section,Dep't of Justice,and Roger M.Whitten&Kimberly A.Parker,Attorney,Armor Holdings,Inc.(July 13,2011).欧米茄顾问企业NPA要求该企业“如实和完全披露所有关于欧米茄企业的活动,及其管理者和雇员,和其他所有关于这些问题的询问,该信息可用于任何目的,除了本协议第二款的限制。Non-Prosecution Agreement between Michael J.Garcia,U.S.Attorney and Robert J.Anello,Attorney,Omega Advisors,Inc.(June 19,2007).NPA还要求欧米茄“应使这些办事处注意到欧米茄或其高级管理人员的所有刑事行为,以及任何行政诉讼或民事诉讼。
(2)Non-Prosecution Agreement between Denis J.McInerney,Deputy Chief,Fraud Section,Dep't of Justice,and Edward J.Fuhr,Attorney,Alliance One Int'l(Aug.6,2010).同样,Alcatel-Lucent DPA要求该企业与司法部合作,调查涉嫌违犯《反海外腐败法》(FCPA)的所有人的行为,并向这些人提供采访或作证。Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 2-5,United States v.Alcatel-Lucent,S.A.,No.10-20907(S.D.Fla.Dec.20,2010).
(3)Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 4,United States v.Schnitzer Steel Indus.,Inc.at 4,No.06-CR-398,(D.Or.Oct.16,2006).
(4)同上。
(5)还有一种可能性是,一名员工将被指控违反政府最初的调查。正如格里芬教授所指出的,“这越来越多地是在调查过程中作出的陈述。而不是引发调查的所谓不当行为,构成了刑事责任的基础”。见Griffin,at 333-34.如果一个代理商害怕未来的不法行为指控,决定隐瞒可疑行为的证据,或者试图妨碍调查,他可能会发现自己面临妨碍司法公正的指控。即使在他试图掩盖罪行之前,他是无辜的,这也是事实。见同上。
(6)见Aulino,(quoting the unofficial statement of Charles E.Cain,Assistant Director of the FCPA Unit in the SEC's Enforcement Division).
(7)U.S.SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§8B2.1(a)(1)-(2)(2006).
(1)见Baer,at 985.
(2)见Hess&Ford,at 310-11.
(3)Griffin,at 335-36.(企业对特权的放弃,延伸到员工和企业律师之间的对话,这些谈话发生在涉嫌不当行为发生之前。因此,回答企业律师问题的员工,无论如何,都能有效地为不可预测的未来刑事案件提供证据;豁免的范围如此之广,以至于员工每次向检察官寻求建议的时候,都是在“与检察官交谈”。);也见Baer,at 986-87(讨论其他结构性问题使“合规文化”的建立变得相当有挑战性)。
(4)见Baer,at 985-86;也见Griffin,at 334.
(5)Koehler,supra note 33,at 998-99;Amy Deen Westbrook,Enthusiastic Enforcement,Informal Legislation:The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct,45GA.L.REv.489,503(2010).
(6)见Westbrook.
(7)长官负责制下,只要员工的行为在雇佣范围内,并被激励为其企业的利益服务,该企业将为员工的不当行为承担相应的责任。见Frank C.Razzano&Travis P.Nelson,The Expanding Criminalization of Transnational Bribery:Global Prosecution Necessitates Global Compliance,INT'L LAW.,Winter 2008,at 1259,1275-76.
(8)15 U.S.C.§78dd(2006).
(9)见Lanny A.Breuer,Assistant U.S.Attorney General,Prepared Keynote?Address to the Tenth Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory and Compliance Congress and Best Practices Forum(Nov.12,2009),见http://www.ehcca.com/presentations/pharmacongressl0/breuer 2.pdf.
(10)见Westbrook,at 531-33.
(1)ALEXANDRA ADDISON WRAGE,BRIBERY AND EXTORTION:UNDERMINING BUSINESS,GOVERNMENTS,ANDSECURITY 12(2009).
(2)UnitedStates v.Aguilar,783 F.Supp.2d 1108,1115(C.D.Cal 2011).
(3)在UnitedStates v.ControlComponents,No.09-00162(C.D.Cal.2009)中,法院采用了类似于阿吉拉尔的多因素测试,但也包括陪审团指示,要求检察官证明被告的高管知道被控受贿的人是政府官员。SHEARMAN&STERLING LLP,at12.
(4)见Joseph W.Yockey,Solicitation,Extortion,andthe FCPA,87 NOTRE DAME L.REv.781,821(2011).DOJ和SEC的立场是,即使少数国家有企业也将其引入到工具的意义上,但FCPA在这个问题上保持沉默。同上。
(5)HEARMAN&STERLING LLP,at 8.
(6)同上,at 22-23。(注意到DOJ和SEC人员的立场,即“外国官员”的定义必须灵活,以适应世界各地不同形式的政府。)
(7)15 U.S.C.§§78dd-1(a),78dd-2(a),78dd-3(a)(2006).
(8)UhitedStates v.Kay,359 F.3d 738,749 n.40(5th Cir.2004).
(9)同上,at 740.
(10)见Yockey,at 818-19.
(11)S.REP.No.95-114,at 10-11(1977),reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.4098,4108.
(12)见Yockey,at 814.
(13)例如,2010年,SEC指控前雇员乔·萨默斯在他向委内瑞拉国有石油企业(PDVSA)支付了3万美元后,他就违反FC-PA。SEC v.Summers,Exchange Act Litigation Release No.21617,Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No.3169(Aug.5,2010).在PDVSA的一名中层员工要求它作为交换资金后,萨默斯支付了这笔钱,以换取那些已经提供的服务的基金。同上。
(1)Kay,359 F.3d at 759-60.
(2)长期以来,“同一个装满了现金的信封里,可以是在不公平的负面待遇的威胁下,以及在不公平的正面待遇下获得的贿赂”。James Lindgren,The Theory,History,'and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction,141 U.PA.L.REv.1695,1700(1993).
(3)见Ribstein,at 10。
(4)见F.Joseph Warin et al.,FCPA Compliance in China and the Gifts and Hospitality Challenge,5 VA.L.&Bus.REv.34(2010);Yockey,at 816.这也不足以证明FCPA将在这些情况下保护支付者。联邦监管机构把这种例外的理由解释得如此狭隘,以至于大多数企业都觉得它没有什么实际价值。
(5)15 U.S.C.§78dd-3(a)(2006).
(6)SHEARMAN&STERLING LLP,at 9.
(7)同上。
(8)同上。
(9)同上。
(10)同上。
(11)15 U.S.C.§78dd-2(b)(2006).
(12)§78dd-2(h)(4)(A).
(13)同上。
(1)尽管在美国可以理解用支付来保证或加速外国官员职责的履行,委员会知道这不一定在其他国家也可以被理解。对美国来说,单方面根除也是不可能的。H.R.REP.No.95-640,at 8(1977).
(2)同上。
(3)同上。
(4)见Yockey,at 818-19.
(5)2009年10月的一项关于促进支付的国际调查显示,约35%的受访企业有禁止支付便利的政策。Warin et al,supranote 100,at 64-65。(还注意到,国际组织也曾迫于压力,禁止它们以“腐蚀性”的法律和整体经济发展为理由,来禁止便利支付)。
(6)Philip Urofsky,Extortionate Demands under the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct,WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP.(BNA,Inc),Dec.19,2008,at 1,3(注意到这种报复可能包括“拖延甚至拒绝……为真实或虚构的技术申请许可证和许可”。)
(7)Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure,28 C.F.R.pt.80(2011).
(8)见Griffin,supranote 5,at 347-48.
(9)见Ian B.Lee,Corporate Criminal Responsibility as Team-Member Responsibility,31 OXFORD J.LEG.STUD.755(2011).
(10)见Hess&Ford,at 313-14.
(1)同上,at 313。(Control Risks Group Limited的一项调查显示,32%的美国企业的受访者认为,他们的竞争对手使用的是试图规避反贿赂法的代理人。)
(2)同上。
(1)Plea Agreement at 13,United States v.ABB Inc.,No.10-CR-00664(S.D.Tex.Sept.29,2010).
(2)见infra第二部分。
(3)关于在企业犯罪中因合作而提出的治理问题的概括性讨论,见Miriam Hechler Baer,Governing Corporate Compliance,50 B.C.L.REV.949(2009);Lisa Kern Griffin,Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure,82 N.Y.U.L.REV.311(2007).
(4)15 U.S.C.§§78 dd-1 to-3(2006).
(5)Full Regime'of Cooperation Emergingin Anti-Corruption Arena,DOJ Official Says,SEC.L.DAILY(BNA,Inc.),Aug.18,2011[以下简称Full Regime].
(1)SHEARMAN&STERLING LLP,FCPA DIGEST:CASES AND REVIEW RELEASES RELATING TO BRIBES TO FOR-EIGN OFFICIALS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977,at ii(2011),参见http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/c32b8fla-0523-41ae-bee5-7bfbe5a4O6a7/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/234fcOaa-34a9-4490-96b6-52945477184c/Final%20January%202011%20FCPA%20Digest.pdf;Greg Andres,Acting Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.,Statement before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs(Nov.30,2010),参见http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/testimony/2010/crm-testimony-101130.html.如2010年美国SEC和DOJ与荷兰建筑企业Snamprogetti荷兰B.V.达成和解,金额为3.65亿美元;瑞士船运企业Panalpina为1.56亿美元;法国建筑企业Technip S.A.为3.38亿美元;英国国防承包商BAE系统企业提供4亿美元;以及德国汽车制造商戴姆勒企业的1.85亿美元。参见新闻稿:美国司法部,戴姆勒企业和三家子企业解决外国腐败行为调查并同意支付9360万美元刑事处罚(2010年4月1日);新闻发布:美国司法部,石油服务企业和货运企业同意解决外国贿赂调查,并支付超过1.56亿美元的刑事处罚(2010年11月4日);新闻发布:美国司法部,Snamprogetti荷兰B.V.解决了外国腐败行为调查,并同意支付2.4亿美元的刑事处罚(2010年7月7日)(讨论了2.4亿美元的刑事处罚和价值1.25亿美元的利润);新闻发布:美国司法部,技术人员组织解决外国腐败行为调查,并同意支付2.4亿美元的刑事处罚(2010年6月28日)(讨论了2.4亿美元的刑事处罚和价值9800万美元的利润);另见丹尼尔·迈克尔斯和卡斯尔·布里安,负责解决行贿案件,金额超过4亿美元。2010年2月6日,在B1;新闻发布:美国证券交易委员会。通讯企业,SEC指控戴姆勒企业全球贿赂(2010年4月1日)。
(2)SHEARMAN&STERLING LLP,FCPA DIGEST:RECENT TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THEFOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 4(2011),参见http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/12c8fD77-57d6-44b7-99fd-deb0b7el6d01/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ffcdl2l4-7ldb-4cab-a507-926e866ef4de/FCPA-071511-July%202011-Trends-Patterns.pdf.
(3)OECD,UNITED STATES:PHASE 3:REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIB-ERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS ININTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 11(2010)[以下简称OECD PHASE3 REPORT].
(4)GIBSON DUNN,2010 YEAR-END FCPA UPDATE 1(2011)(引自Assistant Attorney General Lanny A.Breuer)(内部引号省略),参见http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/?2010YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf.
(5)参见,如SHEARMAN&STERLING LLP,supranote 8,at 1.
(6)Peggy Aulino,Authorities Seen Casting Wide Net in Effort to Stem Bribery,Corruption,6 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP.1001(2011).
(7)OECD PHASE 3 REPORT.
(1)OECD,CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESSTRANSACTIONS(2011),参见http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf(在1997年谈判会议上被38个签约国采用)。经合组织反贿赂公约密切跟踪《反贿赂法》,要求签署国通过国内立法,禁止在国际商业交易中贿赂外国公职人员。它还包括旨在提高其有效性的条款,包括对多边调查合作的措施,以及对贿赂犯罪的引渡。
(2)Che Odom,UndercoverAgents,Wiretaps Becoming the Norm in White-CollarCases,ExpertsSay,CORP.ACCOUNTABILITYREP.(BNA,Inc),Oct.7,2011.
(3)Diana B.Henriques,F.B.I Snares Weapons Executives in BriberySting,N.Y.TIMES,Jan.21,2010,at A3.
(4)见2010 Mid-Year FCPA Update,GIBSON DUNN(July 8,2010),http://www.gibsondunn.com/Publications/Pages/201OMid-YearFCPAUpdate.aspx.
(5)SHEARMAN&STERLING LLP,at viii.
(6)参见2010 Mid-Year FCPA Update,(7)同上。
(8)如Edward C.O'Callaghan et al.,WiretapEvidence Raises the Bar for?Insider Trading Cases following Rajaratnam,6 WHITECOLLAR CRIME REP.854(2011).
(9)同上。应该指出的是,司法部在起诉“第22条军规”被告时遭受了重大挫折。三名被告承认有罪,但其余的人接受了四个小组的审判。这些审判都以无罪或无效的形式结束,而美国司法部最终选择不重审任何被告。见Robert Wilhelm,Government Throws in the Towel in Massive FCPA Sting Investigation,7 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP.(2012).
(10)Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,Pub.L.No.111-203,§922,124 Stat.1376,1841-42(2010).
(11)Full Regime。
(1)如SHEARMAN&STERLING LLP,A NEW TOOL AND A TWIST?THE SEC's FIRST DEFERRED PROSECUTION A-GREEMENT AND A NOVEL PUNITIVE MEASURE 1(2011),见http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/2Ob76673-2736-4a55-840f-1f75d518ca93/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/71ecb942-9eab-4482-b786-41522a71af75/LT-052411-A-New-Tool-and-a-Twist.pdf.
(2)Baer,973.But cf Darryl K.Brown,The Problematic and Faintly Promising Dynamics of Corporate Crime Enforcement,1 O-HIO ST.J.CRIM.L.521(2004)(描述企业在为刑事指控辩护时所拥有的各种优势,包括拥有与政府诉讼相匹配的资源)。正如布朗教授所指出的,“对于大企业来说,政府压迫问题已经大大减少了”。
(3)Larry E.Ribstein,Agents Prosecuting Agents 10(Ill.Program in Law,Behavior and Social Sci.,Research Paper No.LB-SS1 1-01 2011),见http://ssrn.com/abstract=1737915.But cf Jonathan M.Karpoff,D.Scott Lee&Gerald S.Martin,The Impact of Anti-Bribery Enforcement Actions on Targeted Firms(Feb.27,2012)(未出版手稿),见http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1573222(发现企业因受贿罪而被起诉时,其名誉损失较小,它们因受贿和谎报财务报表而被起诉时名誉损失较大).
(4)Baer,at 973.
(5)OECD PHASE 3REPORT,at 31.
(6)Griffin,at 321.
(7)同上,at 322.
(8)Mike Koehler,The Fapade of FCPA Enforcement,41 GEo.J.INT'L L.907,934(2010).
(9)OECD PHASE 3 REPORT,at 32.
(10)同上。
(11)同上。DOJ和SEC都被授权进入DPAs,2011年5月,美国证券交易委员会第一次使用DPA。新任命的SEC执法部门主管Rob Khuzami称他的机构使用DPAs作为“潜在的游戏规则改变者”。SHEARMAN&STERLING LLP,supra note 26,at 1-2(内部引号省略).
(12)Koehler,at 933(引言Henning on the White Collar Watch,CORP.CRIME REP.,Feb.7,2010(Henning教授是前司法部检察官和SEC执法人员)(内部引号省略).
(13)值得注意的是,一些评论人士表达了他们的担忧,即企业没有得到它们应得的利益,因为它们必须支付高额罚款,并同意承担繁重的、有争议的治理改革。David Hess&Cristie L.Ford,Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings:A New Approach to an OldProblem,41 CORNELL INT'L L.J.307,309(2008).
(1)Griffin,at 330(“当DOJ宣布DPA与AOL时,它声明该协议是为了使股东和雇员的附带损害最小化,同时实施适当的惩罚和保护受害者的权利。”(援引新闻稿,司法部,America Online Charged with Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud;Prosecution Deferred for Two Years(Dec.15,2004))监管机构也从DPAs和NPAs中受益,避免了与被告企业一起起诉的费用和复杂性。私人企业,尤其是大型企业,通常有多个部门、不同层次的层级和复杂的内部计算和通信系统。正如布埃尔教授所指出的,“对国家来说,所有这些加起来比‘普通’的刑事案件要复杂得多”。现代的组织案例很容易涉及数百个目击者,数百万的文件,以及多年的调查,需要几十个国家的参与者的劳动。Samuel W.Buell,Criminal Procedure within the Firm,59STAN.L.REv.1613,1625(2007).通过DPA或NPA来解决FCPA的行动,使得监管者能够达成一项不依赖于如此繁重的过程和财政支出的决议。
(2)U.S.SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§8C2.5(g)(1)(2009).
(3)同上§8C2.5 cmt.n.12
(4)美国司法部,U.S.ATTORNEY'S MANUAL 9-28.300(A)(4)(2008),见http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foiareadingroom/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm.
(5)Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a)of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions,Exchange Act Release Nos.34-44969;AAER-1470,76 SECDocket 220,222(Oct.23,2001).
(6)这些选项并不是相互排斥的。在随后的刑事诉讼中,一名被终止的代理人也可能被起诉。
(7)Deferred Prosecution Agreement 5-10,United States v.Willbros Group,Inc.,No.H-08-287(S.D.Tex.May 14,2008).
(1)新闻发布,美国司法部,Willbros Group Inc.Enters Deferred Prosecution Agreement and Agrees to Pay$22 Million Penalty for FCPA Violations(May 14,2008).
(2)在这个DPA被签署之后,Willbros企业的员工Paul Novak和James Tillery被指控。诺瓦克随后认罪,目前在尼日利亚被当局拘留,等待引渡到美国。http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-6.
(3)Andres.
(4)Michael Connor,US Likely to Broaden Anti-Bribery and Corruption Efforts,Bus.ETHICS(Feb.24,2010),http://business-ethics.com/2010/02/24/1317-u-s-likely-to-broaden-efforts-to-curb-international-bribery-and-corruption/.
(5)Aulino(内部引号省略).
(6)Mike Koehler,Individual DOJ Prosecutions by the Numbers,FCPA(Sept.20,2011),http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/individual-doj-prosecutions-by-the-numbers.
(7)Mike Koehler,FCPA教授,DOJ Prosecution of Individuals-Are Other Factors at Play?,(Sept.22,2011),http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-prosecution-of-individuals-are-other-factors-at-play(原文强调部分删除).
(8)Koehler,at 939-40.
(9)Koehler.
(10)见Nathan Vardi,How Federal Crackdown on Bribery Hurts Business?and Enriches Insiders,FORBES.COM(May 24,2010),http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0524/business-weatherford-kbr-corruption-bribery-racket.html.
(11)OECD PHASE 3 REPORT,at 32.
(1)Taking Depositions in a Foreign Country,CAL.LITIG.REP.(White&Case LLP,L.A.,Cal.),Sept.22,2006.
(2)Ako S.Williams,BarristersTips:Taking Depositions Abroad,Los ANGELES LAW.,Dec.2005,at 10,10.
(3)Memorandum of Law in Support of Bourke's Motion In Limine to Exclude the Testimony of Rajan Menon at 2,United States v.Kozeny,No.05 Crim.518(S.D.N.Y.May 18,2009).
(4)同上。
(5)同上。
(6)United States v.Esquenazi,No.09-21010(S.D.Fla.Dec.4,2009),展现了这一情况的一个例子。Mike Koehler,Stunning Haiti Teleco Development,FCPA PROFESSOR(Aug.29,2011),http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/stunning-haititeleco-development(政府让其专家证人加里·利萨德为海地法律和他对海地电信是海地共和国的国有公共机构,以及其雇员是否为政府官员的意见作了证词。尽管利萨德先生无法审查海地电信的规章制度或股票证书,也无法找到任何将海地电信作为“SAM”的文件,他认为,由于海地中央银行拥有97%的股票,加上他对“顾客和实践”的观察,以及“电信的信笺”,他认为,电信是一个海地政府工具。他进一步指出这一点,因为他得出的结论是,电信是一个公共实体,所有的电信员工都是政府官员或雇员,即使没有法律指定政府雇员在类似电信企业这样的地点是政府雇员或代理商。
(7)Ribstein教授举了一个鲜明的例子,在他引用杰米·奥里斯的例子时,他倾向于为个别企业的被告认罪。见Ribstein,at 11。奥里斯一直坚持自己的清白,但最终无法支付10万美元打印和审查1200万页的文件,联邦检察官能够通过使用他们自己的电脑程序来分析这些文件。同上。奥里斯最终被定罪并被判处24年监禁。同上。
(8)想想Broadcom企业创始人、前首席技术官亨利·萨穆利的期权回溯案。萨穆利在认罪协议中承认犯有刑事指控,要求他对另一名Broadcom执行官员作证。见Koehler,at 940.在萨穆埃尔的证词被提出后,联邦地区法官在案件中,法官卡尼,撤销了萨穆埃尔先前的认罪答辩,并驳回了对他的指控,因为他认为没有证据表明萨穆埃尔博士做了错事,更不要说犯罪了。同上,at 941(引用Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 5197-98,United States v.Ruehle,No.SACR 08-00139-CJC(C.D.Cal.Dec.15,2009))。卡尼继续说,政府发起了一场恐吓和其他不当行为的运动,让他难堪,并将他打倒,包括按照萨穆埃尔(Samueli)博士所说为他没有犯下的罪行认罪,以避免“被判长期监禁”的罪行认罪。同上。(引自John R.Emshwiller&Nathan Koppel,PleaBargainsGet Renewed Scrutiny,WALL ST.J.,Dec.19,2009,at A4).
(9)事实是,企业愿意在内部约束代理人,这可能是在实体级别的和解之后,个人FCPA起诉比例相对较低的原因之一。监管机构可能会在某些情况下为决定内部企业制裁提供足够的威慑价值,从而避免对个人违法者进行昂贵后续诉讼的必要性。
(10)Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 4,United States v.Willbros Group Inc.,Crim.No.H-08-287(S.D.Tex.May 14,2008).
(1)装甲控股企业通过NPA解决了FCPA的指控,该企业被要求终止涉嫌不当行为的员工。Non-Prosecution Agreement between Denis J.McInerney,Deputy Chief,Fraud Section,Dep't of Justice,and Roger M.Whitten&Kimberly A.Parker,Attorney,Armor Holdings,Inc.(July 13,2011).欧米茄顾问企业NPA要求该企业“如实和完全披露所有关于欧米茄企业的活动,及其管理者和雇员,和其他所有关于这些问题的询问,该信息可用于任何目的,除了本协议第二款的限制。Non-Prosecution Agreement between Michael J.Garcia,U.S.Attorney and Robert J.Anello,Attorney,Omega Advisors,Inc.(June 19,2007).NPA还要求欧米茄“应使这些办事处注意到欧米茄或其高级管理人员的所有刑事行为,以及任何行政诉讼或民事诉讼。
(2)Non-Prosecution Agreement between Denis J.McInerney,Deputy Chief,Fraud Section,Dep't of Justice,and Edward J.Fuhr,Attorney,Alliance One Int'l(Aug.6,2010).同样,Alcatel-Lucent DPA要求该企业与司法部合作,调查涉嫌违犯《反海外腐败法》(FCPA)的所有人的行为,并向这些人提供采访或作证。Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 2-5,United States v.Alcatel-Lucent,S.A.,No.10-20907(S.D.Fla.Dec.20,2010).
(3)Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 4,United States v.Schnitzer Steel Indus.,Inc.at 4,No.06-CR-398,(D.Or.Oct.16,2006).
(4)同上。
(5)还有一种可能性是,一名员工将被指控违反政府最初的调查。正如格里芬教授所指出的,“这越来越多地是在调查过程中作出的陈述。而不是引发调查的所谓不当行为,构成了刑事责任的基础”。见Griffin,at 333-34.如果一个代理商害怕未来的不法行为指控,决定隐瞒可疑行为的证据,或者试图妨碍调查,他可能会发现自己面临妨碍司法公正的指控。即使在他试图掩盖罪行之前,他是无辜的,这也是事实。见同上。
(6)见Aulino,(quoting the unofficial statement of Charles E.Cain,Assistant Director of the FCPA Unit in the SEC's Enforcement Division).
(7)U.S.SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§8B2.1(a)(1)-(2)(2006).
(1)见Baer,at 985.
(2)见Hess&Ford,at 310-11.
(3)Griffin,at 335-36.(企业对特权的放弃,延伸到员工和企业律师之间的对话,这些谈话发生在涉嫌不当行为发生之前。因此,回答企业律师问题的员工,无论如何,都能有效地为不可预测的未来刑事案件提供证据;豁免的范围如此之广,以至于员工每次向检察官寻求建议的时候,都是在“与检察官交谈”。);也见Baer,at 986-87(讨论其他结构性问题使“合规文化”的建立变得相当有挑战性)。
(4)见Baer,at 985-86;也见Griffin,at 334.
(5)Koehler,supra note 33,at 998-99;Amy Deen Westbrook,Enthusiastic Enforcement,Informal Legislation:The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct,45GA.L.REv.489,503(2010).
(6)见Westbrook.
(7)长官负责制下,只要员工的行为在雇佣范围内,并被激励为其企业的利益服务,该企业将为员工的不当行为承担相应的责任。见Frank C.Razzano&Travis P.Nelson,The Expanding Criminalization of Transnational Bribery:Global Prosecution Necessitates Global Compliance,INT'L LAW.,Winter 2008,at 1259,1275-76.
(8)15 U.S.C.§78dd(2006).
(9)见Lanny A.Breuer,Assistant U.S.Attorney General,Prepared Keynote?Address to the Tenth Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory and Compliance Congress and Best Practices Forum(Nov.12,2009),见http://www.ehcca.com/presentations/pharmacongressl0/breuer 2.pdf.
(10)见Westbrook,at 531-33.
(1)ALEXANDRA ADDISON WRAGE,BRIBERY AND EXTORTION:UNDERMINING BUSINESS,GOVERNMENTS,ANDSECURITY 12(2009).
(2)UnitedStates v.Aguilar,783 F.Supp.2d 1108,1115(C.D.Cal 2011).
(3)在UnitedStates v.ControlComponents,No.09-00162(C.D.Cal.2009)中,法院采用了类似于阿吉拉尔的多因素测试,但也包括陪审团指示,要求检察官证明被告的高管知道被控受贿的人是政府官员。SHEARMAN&STERLING LLP,at12.
(4)见Joseph W.Yockey,Solicitation,Extortion,andthe FCPA,87 NOTRE DAME L.REv.781,821(2011).DOJ和SEC的立场是,即使少数国家有企业也将其引入到工具的意义上,但FCPA在这个问题上保持沉默。同上。
(5)HEARMAN&STERLING LLP,at 8.
(6)同上,at 22-23。(注意到DOJ和SEC人员的立场,即“外国官员”的定义必须灵活,以适应世界各地不同形式的政府。)
(7)15 U.S.C.§§78dd-1(a),78dd-2(a),78dd-3(a)(2006).
(8)UhitedStates v.Kay,359 F.3d 738,749 n.40(5th Cir.2004).
(9)同上,at 740.
(10)见Yockey,at 818-19.
(11)S.REP.No.95-114,at 10-11(1977),reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.4098,4108.
(12)见Yockey,at 814.
(13)例如,2010年,SEC指控前雇员乔·萨默斯在他向委内瑞拉国有石油企业(PDVSA)支付了3万美元后,他就违反FC-PA。SEC v.Summers,Exchange Act Litigation Release No.21617,Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No.3169(Aug.5,2010).在PDVSA的一名中层员工要求它作为交换资金后,萨默斯支付了这笔钱,以换取那些已经提供的服务的基金。同上。
(1)Kay,359 F.3d at 759-60.
(2)长期以来,“同一个装满了现金的信封里,可以是在不公平的负面待遇的威胁下,以及在不公平的正面待遇下获得的贿赂”。James Lindgren,The Theory,History,'and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction,141 U.PA.L.REv.1695,1700(1993).
(3)见Ribstein,at 10。
(4)见F.Joseph Warin et al.,FCPA Compliance in China and the Gifts and Hospitality Challenge,5 VA.L.&Bus.REv.34(2010);Yockey,at 816.这也不足以证明FCPA将在这些情况下保护支付者。联邦监管机构把这种例外的理由解释得如此狭隘,以至于大多数企业都觉得它没有什么实际价值。
(5)15 U.S.C.§78dd-3(a)(2006).
(6)SHEARMAN&STERLING LLP,at 9.
(7)同上。
(8)同上。
(9)同上。
(10)同上。
(11)15 U.S.C.§78dd-2(b)(2006).
(12)§78dd-2(h)(4)(A).
(13)同上。
(1)尽管在美国可以理解用支付来保证或加速外国官员职责的履行,委员会知道这不一定在其他国家也可以被理解。对美国来说,单方面根除也是不可能的。H.R.REP.No.95-640,at 8(1977).
(2)同上。
(3)同上。
(4)见Yockey,at 818-19.
(5)2009年10月的一项关于促进支付的国际调查显示,约35%的受访企业有禁止支付便利的政策。Warin et al,supranote 100,at 64-65。(还注意到,国际组织也曾迫于压力,禁止它们以“腐蚀性”的法律和整体经济发展为理由,来禁止便利支付)。
(6)Philip Urofsky,Extortionate Demands under the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct,WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP.(BNA,Inc),Dec.19,2008,at 1,3(注意到这种报复可能包括“拖延甚至拒绝……为真实或虚构的技术申请许可证和许可”。)
(7)Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure,28 C.F.R.pt.80(2011).
(8)见Griffin,supranote 5,at 347-48.
(9)见Ian B.Lee,Corporate Criminal Responsibility as Team-Member Responsibility,31 OXFORD J.LEG.STUD.755(2011).
(10)见Hess&Ford,at 313-14.
(1)同上,at 313。(Control Risks Group Limited的一项调查显示,32%的美国企业的受访者认为,他们的竞争对手使用的是试图规避反贿赂法的代理人。)