不对称信息下热电联产供热政府定价决策研究
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摘要
热电联产是目前已商业化、效率最高的科学用能方式,由于信息的不对称性,政府针对供热企业申报成本做出误判的情景是广泛存在的。在政府热价定价存在不对称信息的情况下,通过构建政府、供热企业和热用户之间的信号博弈模型,兼顾供热企业和热用户的双方利益,发现政府供热定价的决策机制以及影响因素。研究表明:政府与供热企业的博弈将达到三种均衡状态:市场部分成功的混合均衡、市场完全成功的分离均衡、市场完全失灵的分离均衡。市场完全成功的分离均衡状态是政府热价决策的最优状态,通过实际案例研究发现该均衡的关键条件是提高伪装风险成本和期望风险成本,同时从多个角度提出对策建议,进一步规范热电联产行业热价的制定,确保供热企业和热用户的合法权益,以促进热电联产的积极推广。
Heating-electricity union is a commercially effective way in using energy. Limited by the asymmetric information, government may misunderstand the costs submitted by heating companies. This Paper establishes an information gambling model among government, heating companies and users, which is used to study governmental pricing decision and factors balancing heating suppliers and users' benefits. Three balanced situations may be reached between government and heating companies, a mixed balance by partially marketing, separated balance by totally marketing, and separated balance out of marketing. The second one is the premier status in governmental heating pricing decision, which needs to increase fake risk costs and expected rick costs. This paper presents suggestions on regulating heating-electricity united pricing mechanism to ensure the rights of heating suppliers and users and to promote the expansion of heating-electricity union.
Heating-electricity union is a commercially effective way in using energy. Limited by the asymmetric information, government may misunderstand the costs submitted by heating companies. This Paper establishes an information gambling model among government, heating companies and users, which is used to study governmental pricing decision and factors balancing heating suppliers and users' benefits. Three balanced situations may be reached between government and heating companies, a mixed balance by partially marketing, separated balance by totally marketing, and separated balance out of marketing. The second one is the premier status in governmental heating pricing decision, which needs to increase fake risk costs and expected rick costs. This paper presents suggestions on regulating heating-electricity united pricing mechanism to ensure the rights of heating suppliers and users and to promote the expansion of heating-electricity union.
引文
安海忠,李华姣,2016.资源环境承载力研究框架体系综述[J].资源与产业,18(6):21-26.
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国务院,2017.“十三五”节能减排综合工作方案[J].中国建材,15(3):10.
胡亚丽,2007.关于热电联产机组供热价格的研究[D].北京:华北电力大学.
李怀,2009.政府定价原则和定价策略[J].学习与实践(5):45-50.
罗超良,2007.信号博弈理论的研究与应用[D].长沙:中南大学.
吕太,王正,2014.热电厂供热范围的研究[J].沈阳工程学院学报,4(4):306-309.
聂光华,2013.基于市场取向的我国天然气定价机制研究[D].天津:天津大学.
祁光华,2007.借鉴西方经验完善政府定价行为[J].中国行政管理(8):59-62.
苏喜庆,2010.热电厂余热梯度利用模式[D].武汉:武汉理工大学.
吴东武,朱帮助,2017.基于HAR-RV-CJ模型的天然气价格预测[J].统计与决策(23):83-87.
闫志闯,袁艳红,2017.供给侧视角下天然气供应链网络问题研究[J].统计与决策(10):58-62.
赵婷婷,2010.关于热电联产适用范围问题的研究[D].哈尔滨:哈尔滨工业大学.
周璞,刘天科,王昊,2017.我国资源型城市经济转型升级路径思考[J].资源与产业,19(5):9-14.
BRUGMANN J,1996.Planning for sustainability at the local government level[J].Environmental Impact Assessment Review,16:363-379.
CARLSSON H,DASGUPTA S,1997.Noise-Proof equilibria in twoaction signaling games[J].Journal of Economic Theory,77:432-460.
KAYA A,2009.Repeated signaling games[J].Games&Economic Behavior,66:841-854.
NIKNAM T,AZIZIPANAH A R,ROOSTA A,et al,2012.A new multiobjective reserve constrained combined heat and power dynamic economic emission dispatch[J].Energy,42(1):530-545.
RONG A,HAKONEN H,LAHDELMA R,2009.A dynamic regrouping based sequential dynamic programming algorithm for unit commitment of combined heat and power systems[J].Energy Conversion&Management,50(4):1108-1115.
SADEGHIAN H R,ARDEHALI M M,SADEGHIAN H R,2016.Anovel approach for optimal economic dispatch scheduling of integrated combined heat and power systems for maximum economic profit and minimum environmental emissions based on Benders decomposition[J].Energy,102:10-23.
TOOKANLOU M B,ARDEHALI M M,NAZARI M E,2015.Combined cooling,heating,and power system optimal pricing for electricity and natural gas using particle swarm optimization based on bi-level programming approach:case study of Canadian energy sector[J].Journal of Natural Gas Science&Engineering,23:417-430.
白让让,2014.电煤价格产业政策与火力发电产业的技术结构升级[J].财经研究,40(12):76-88.
国务院,2017.“十三五”节能减排综合工作方案[J].中国建材,15(3):10.
胡亚丽,2007.关于热电联产机组供热价格的研究[D].北京:华北电力大学.
李怀,2009.政府定价原则和定价策略[J].学习与实践(5):45-50.
罗超良,2007.信号博弈理论的研究与应用[D].长沙:中南大学.
吕太,王正,2014.热电厂供热范围的研究[J].沈阳工程学院学报,4(4):306-309.
聂光华,2013.基于市场取向的我国天然气定价机制研究[D].天津:天津大学.
祁光华,2007.借鉴西方经验完善政府定价行为[J].中国行政管理(8):59-62.
苏喜庆,2010.热电厂余热梯度利用模式[D].武汉:武汉理工大学.
吴东武,朱帮助,2017.基于HAR-RV-CJ模型的天然气价格预测[J].统计与决策(23):83-87.
闫志闯,袁艳红,2017.供给侧视角下天然气供应链网络问题研究[J].统计与决策(10):58-62.
赵婷婷,2010.关于热电联产适用范围问题的研究[D].哈尔滨:哈尔滨工业大学.
周璞,刘天科,王昊,2017.我国资源型城市经济转型升级路径思考[J].资源与产业,19(5):9-14.
BRUGMANN J,1996.Planning for sustainability at the local government level[J].Environmental Impact Assessment Review,16:363-379.
CARLSSON H,DASGUPTA S,1997.Noise-Proof equilibria in twoaction signaling games[J].Journal of Economic Theory,77:432-460.
KAYA A,2009.Repeated signaling games[J].Games&Economic Behavior,66:841-854.
NIKNAM T,AZIZIPANAH A R,ROOSTA A,et al,2012.A new multiobjective reserve constrained combined heat and power dynamic economic emission dispatch[J].Energy,42(1):530-545.
RONG A,HAKONEN H,LAHDELMA R,2009.A dynamic regrouping based sequential dynamic programming algorithm for unit commitment of combined heat and power systems[J].Energy Conversion&Management,50(4):1108-1115.
SADEGHIAN H R,ARDEHALI M M,SADEGHIAN H R,2016.Anovel approach for optimal economic dispatch scheduling of integrated combined heat and power systems for maximum economic profit and minimum environmental emissions based on Benders decomposition[J].Energy,102:10-23.
TOOKANLOU M B,ARDEHALI M M,NAZARI M E,2015.Combined cooling,heating,and power system optimal pricing for electricity and natural gas using particle swarm optimization based on bi-level programming approach:case study of Canadian energy sector[J].Journal of Natural Gas Science&Engineering,23:417-430.