中美实力对比变化对国际秩序的影响——权力转移论和新自由制度主义的比较研究
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摘要
中美实力对比的变化将对现存国际秩序造成怎样的影响,权力转移论和新自由制度主义对此给出了不同的预测。权力转移论认为,国际秩序是国家间实力对比的反映,当实力对比发生变化后,崛起国会推翻既有国际秩序。权力转移论者判定,伴随着中美实力差距的缩小,中国将会重塑美国主导的国际秩序,而这将引发与美国的冲突;权力转移论者将中国最近的一些外交行动视作其重塑国际秩序的表现。新自由制度主义则认为,国际秩序中的制度不仅能为各国创造共同利益,还能通过调整,消化实力对比变化给自身带来的震动。新自由制度主义者认为,随着中美实力对比发生变化,既有国际秩序也能适应中国崛起,中国近期的外交创新是在弥补既有秩序的不足,中美也能继续保持关系稳定。中美需理性认识彼此相对实力的变化,为讨论既有国际秩序的走向奠定坚实的基础;中国也应该从自身正当的国家利益出发,理性对待现存国际秩序;学界也需尝试提炼一个研究一国在国际秩序中角色的新框架,为准确描述新时代中国国际秩序实践打下理论基础。
Two competing theories, namely, power transition vs. neoliberal institutionalism, have made different predictions about the net effects of changes in Sino-U.S. power balance on international order. Power transition theory maintains that as a reflection of the distribution of material power among nation-states, the current international order will be overturned after China, the leading emerging power, exceeded the United States, the hegemon. Advocates of this theory point to Beijing's recent assertiveness as evidence of the emerging power's attempt to rewrite international rules in its favor. Neoliberal institutionalists insist that the current rules-based order is resilient enough to accommodate and absorb the shock waves attendant upon a new great power's rise and justify China's behavior as necessary reforms to build a more robust and sustainable world order. Beijing as the ascendant power should try its best to stabilize the Sino-U.S. relationship and advance a new framework to explore the proper role of a rising power in international order.
Two competing theories, namely, power transition vs. neoliberal institutionalism, have made different predictions about the net effects of changes in Sino-U.S. power balance on international order. Power transition theory maintains that as a reflection of the distribution of material power among nation-states, the current international order will be overturned after China, the leading emerging power, exceeded the United States, the hegemon. Advocates of this theory point to Beijing's recent assertiveness as evidence of the emerging power's attempt to rewrite international rules in its favor. Neoliberal institutionalists insist that the current rules-based order is resilient enough to accommodate and absorb the shock waves attendant upon a new great power's rise and justify China's behavior as necessary reforms to build a more robust and sustainable world order. Beijing as the ascendant power should try its best to stabilize the Sino-U.S. relationship and advance a new framework to explore the proper role of a rising power in international order.
引文
(1)《国际地位稳步提高国际影响持续扩大》,中国网,2011年3月24日,http://www.stats.gov.cn/ztjc/ztfx/sywcj/201103/t20110324_71329.html。
(2)The Economist Intelligence Unit,Long-term Macroeconomic Forecasts Key Trends to2050,July 16,2017,p.5.http://www.wtcphila.org/news/long-term-macroeconomic-forecastskey-trends-to-2050.
(3)《2030年中国成为“全球第一”》,新华网,2012年12月12日,http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-12/12/c_124081343.html。
(4)笔者依据斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所官方网站的数据统计所得。https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-constant-2015-USD.pdf。
(5)Allen R.Carlson,“China and International Institutions:Alternate Paths to Global Power,”China:A Journal,Vol.20,No.2,2007,p.245.
(1)[美]亨利·基辛格:《大外交》,顾淑馨等译,海南出版社2012年版,第779页。
(2)[美]约翰·伊肯伯里:《大战胜利之后》,门洪华译,北京大学出版社2008年版,第20页。
(1)[美]罗伯特·吉尔平:《世界政治中的战争与变革》,宋新宁等译、乔娅校,上海人民出版社2008年版,第32页。
(2)[英]赫德利·布尔:《无政府社会》,张小明译,上海人民出版社2015年版,第5页。
(1)Barry Buzan,“From International System to International Society:Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School,”International Organization,Vol.47,No.3,1993,pp.327-352.
(2)[加]阿米塔·阿查亚:《美国世界秩序的终结》,袁正清译,上海人民出版社2017年版,第19-53页。
(1)[美]约翰·伊肯伯里:《自由主义利维坦》,赵明昊译,上海人民出版社2013年版,第147页。
(2)Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth,“The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century,”International Security,Vol.15,No.3,2015,p.21.
(3)Andrew Hurrell,“Beyond the BRICS:Power,Pluralism,and the Future of Global Order,”Ethics&International Affairs,Vol.32,No.1,2018,pp.89-101.
(1)A.F.K.Organski,World Politics,New York:Alfred A.Knopf,1958,pp.313-330.
(1)George Modelski,“The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State,”Comparative Studies in Society&History,Vol.20,No.2,1978,pp.227-228.
(2)[美]罗伯特·吉尔平:《世界政治中的战争与变革》,第200页。
(3)George Modelski,“Historical Experience:Long Cycles and U.S.Strategic Policy,”Policy Studies Journal,Vol.8,No.1,2010,p.11.
(4)George Modelski and Patrick Morgan,“Understanding Global War,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.29,No.3,1985,pp.391-347.
(5)[美]约翰·伊肯伯里:《自由主义利维坦》,第297页。
(1)Douglas Lemke,“The Continuation of History:Power Transition Theory and the End of the Cold War,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.34,No.1,1997,p.26.
(2)[美]罗伯特·吉尔平:《世界政治中的战争与变革》,第216-221页。
(3)Stephen D.Krasner,“Regimes and the Limits of Realism:Regimes as Autonomous Variables,”International Organization,Vol.36,No.2,1982,pp.497-510.
(4)[美]约翰·伊肯伯里:《民主、制度与美国的自我克制》,载[美]约翰.伊肯伯里主编:《美国无敌》,韩召颖译,北京大学出版社2005年版,第228页。
(1)[美]约翰·伊肯伯里:《自由主义利维坦》,第244-292页。
(2)[美]肯尼思·奥耶编:《无政府状态下的合作》,田野译,上海人民出版社2010年版,第3-25页。
(3)[美]罗伯特·基欧汉、约瑟夫·奈:《权利与相互依赖》,门洪华译,北京大学出版社2012年版,第46页。
(4)[美]约翰·伊肯伯里:《大战胜利之后》,门洪华译,北京大学出版社2008年版,第15-17页。
(5)Robert Jervis,“Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace”American Political Science Review,Vol.96,No.1,2002,pp.1-14.
(1)[加]阿米塔·阿查亚:《美国世界秩序的终结》,中文版序第3页。
(1)李巍:《制衡美元的政治基础--经济崛起国应对美国货币霸权》,《世界经济与政治》2012年第5期,第97-119页。
(2)[美]罗伯特·卡根:《历史的回归和梦想的终结》,陈小鼎译,社会科学文献出版社2013年版,第41页。
(3)Charles A.Kupchan,“The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and The Coming Challenge to Pax Americana,”Security Studies,Vol.23,No.2,2014,pp.219-257.
(4)[加]阿米塔·阿查亚:《美国世界秩序的终结》,第73页。
(1)White House,National Security Strategy,December 2017,pp.17-22;pp.45-52.
(2)Robert Kagan,“Backing into World War III,”The Brookings Institution,February 6,2017,https://www.brookings.edu/research/backing-into-world-war-iii/.
(3)Nick Bisley,“The Real China Challenge:Beijing's Blueprint for Asia Revealed,”The National Interest,October 27,2014,http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-china-challenge-beijings-blueprint-asia-revealed-11550.
(4)Peter Ferdinand,“Westward ho-The China Dream and‘One Belt,One Road’:Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping,”International Affairs,Vol.92,No.4,2016,pp.941-957.
(5)Simon Denyer,“China Promotes‘Asia-Pacific Dream’to Counter U.S.‘pivot,’”The Washington Post,November 11,2014,https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinas-promotes-asia-pacific-dream-to-counter-us-pivot/2014/11/11/1d9e05a4-1e8e-4026-ad5a-5919f8c0de8a_stor y.html?utm_term=.5e244aa63881.
(6)Xenia Wickett,John Nilsson-Wright,and Tim Summers,The Asia-Pacifc Power Balance:Beyond the US-China Narrative,Research Paper,Chatham House,September 2015,https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/20150924AsiaPacifi c WickettNilssonWrightSummersFinal.pdf.
(7)Randall L.Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu,“After Unipolarity:China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S.Decline,”International Security,Vol.36,No.1,2011,p.279.
(1)John Mearsheimer,“China's Unpeaceful Rise,”Current History A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs,Vol.105,No.690,2006,pp.160-162.
(2)John Mearsheimer,“The Gathering Storm:China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,”The Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.3,No.4,2010,pp.381-396.
(3)Aaron Friedberg,Contest for Supremacy:China,American,and the Struggle for Master in Asia,New York:W.W.Norton&Company,2011,pp.1-9.
(4)Graham Allison:Destined for War:Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?New York:Houghton Mifflin Harcourt,2017,pp.154-186.
(5)笔者根据中国人民银行官网的数据统计所得,参见http://www.pbc.gov.cn/diaochatongjisi/116219/index.html。
(6)笔者根据中国国家统计局官网的数据统计所得,参见http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/。
(1)G.John Ikenberry,“The Liberal International Order and Its Discontents,”MillenniumJournal of International Studies,Vol.8,No.3,2010,pp.509-521.
(2)[美]约翰·伊肯伯里:《民主、制度与美国的自我克制》,第213-235页。
(3)Robin Niblett,“Liberalism in Retreat,”Foreign Affairs,Vol.96,No.1,2017,p.18.
(4)Timothy J.Farrell,The Rise of China and the Future of International Political Systerm,Political Science Student Scholarship Paper,College of the Holy Corss,May 2015,http://crossworks.holycross.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=political_science_stude nt_scholarshi-p.
(5)[美]理查德·哈斯:《失序时代》,黄锦桂译,中信出版社2017年版,第7-11页。
(1)G.John Ikenberry and Darren Lim,China’s Emerging Institutional Statecraft,The Brookings,Institution,April 2017,https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/chinas-emerging-institutional-statecraft.pdf.
(2)David Dollar,“China’s Rise as a Regional and Global Power:The AIIB and the‘One Belt,One Road,’”The Brookings Institution,July 15,2015,https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/China-rise-as-regional-and-global-power.pdf.
(3)刘海方:《跨越术与道--〈创造性介入〉评析》,《世界经济与政治》2011年第12期,第147-151页。
(4)Evan A.Feigenbaum,“China and the World,”Foreign Affairs,Vol.96,No.1,2017,p.38.
(1)G.John Ikenberry,“The Rise of China and the Future of the West:Can the Liberal System Survive?”Foreign Affairs,Vol.87,No.1,2008,pp.23-37.
(2)G.John Ikenberry,“The Future of the Liberal World Order:Internationalism after America,”Foreign Affairs,Vol.90,No.3,2011,p.58.
(1)White House,National Security Strategy,December 2017,pp.1-7.
(1)可以假设,规则结构体现了一定时期内的资源分配格局,如实力对比、威望和利益分配等;规范结构则体现了国家间共识,并赋予规则结构以意义,如主权规范、多边主义规范等。鉴于不可能出现一国在反对秩序的规范结构的同时,还接受了规则结构的情况,如一国不可能在寻求推翻IMF中的大国特权和多边主义规范的同时,还接受IMF中已有的投票权分配份额,因此,一国国际秩序角色的类型只有三种类型。当然,上面只是提供了一种理论化的猜想,其有效性还有待实践检验,但这也不妨碍从抽象层面进行设想。
(2)The Economist Intelligence Unit,Long-term Macroeconomic Forecasts Key Trends to2050,July 16,2017,p.5.http://www.wtcphila.org/news/long-term-macroeconomic-forecastskey-trends-to-2050.
(3)《2030年中国成为“全球第一”》,新华网,2012年12月12日,http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-12/12/c_124081343.html。
(4)笔者依据斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所官方网站的数据统计所得。https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-constant-2015-USD.pdf。
(5)Allen R.Carlson,“China and International Institutions:Alternate Paths to Global Power,”China:A Journal,Vol.20,No.2,2007,p.245.
(1)[美]亨利·基辛格:《大外交》,顾淑馨等译,海南出版社2012年版,第779页。
(2)[美]约翰·伊肯伯里:《大战胜利之后》,门洪华译,北京大学出版社2008年版,第20页。
(1)[美]罗伯特·吉尔平:《世界政治中的战争与变革》,宋新宁等译、乔娅校,上海人民出版社2008年版,第32页。
(2)[英]赫德利·布尔:《无政府社会》,张小明译,上海人民出版社2015年版,第5页。
(1)Barry Buzan,“From International System to International Society:Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School,”International Organization,Vol.47,No.3,1993,pp.327-352.
(2)[加]阿米塔·阿查亚:《美国世界秩序的终结》,袁正清译,上海人民出版社2017年版,第19-53页。
(1)[美]约翰·伊肯伯里:《自由主义利维坦》,赵明昊译,上海人民出版社2013年版,第147页。
(2)Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth,“The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century,”International Security,Vol.15,No.3,2015,p.21.
(3)Andrew Hurrell,“Beyond the BRICS:Power,Pluralism,and the Future of Global Order,”Ethics&International Affairs,Vol.32,No.1,2018,pp.89-101.
(1)A.F.K.Organski,World Politics,New York:Alfred A.Knopf,1958,pp.313-330.
(1)George Modelski,“The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State,”Comparative Studies in Society&History,Vol.20,No.2,1978,pp.227-228.
(2)[美]罗伯特·吉尔平:《世界政治中的战争与变革》,第200页。
(3)George Modelski,“Historical Experience:Long Cycles and U.S.Strategic Policy,”Policy Studies Journal,Vol.8,No.1,2010,p.11.
(4)George Modelski and Patrick Morgan,“Understanding Global War,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.29,No.3,1985,pp.391-347.
(5)[美]约翰·伊肯伯里:《自由主义利维坦》,第297页。
(1)Douglas Lemke,“The Continuation of History:Power Transition Theory and the End of the Cold War,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.34,No.1,1997,p.26.
(2)[美]罗伯特·吉尔平:《世界政治中的战争与变革》,第216-221页。
(3)Stephen D.Krasner,“Regimes and the Limits of Realism:Regimes as Autonomous Variables,”International Organization,Vol.36,No.2,1982,pp.497-510.
(4)[美]约翰·伊肯伯里:《民主、制度与美国的自我克制》,载[美]约翰.伊肯伯里主编:《美国无敌》,韩召颖译,北京大学出版社2005年版,第228页。
(1)[美]约翰·伊肯伯里:《自由主义利维坦》,第244-292页。
(2)[美]肯尼思·奥耶编:《无政府状态下的合作》,田野译,上海人民出版社2010年版,第3-25页。
(3)[美]罗伯特·基欧汉、约瑟夫·奈:《权利与相互依赖》,门洪华译,北京大学出版社2012年版,第46页。
(4)[美]约翰·伊肯伯里:《大战胜利之后》,门洪华译,北京大学出版社2008年版,第15-17页。
(5)Robert Jervis,“Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace”American Political Science Review,Vol.96,No.1,2002,pp.1-14.
(1)[加]阿米塔·阿查亚:《美国世界秩序的终结》,中文版序第3页。
(1)李巍:《制衡美元的政治基础--经济崛起国应对美国货币霸权》,《世界经济与政治》2012年第5期,第97-119页。
(2)[美]罗伯特·卡根:《历史的回归和梦想的终结》,陈小鼎译,社会科学文献出版社2013年版,第41页。
(3)Charles A.Kupchan,“The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and The Coming Challenge to Pax Americana,”Security Studies,Vol.23,No.2,2014,pp.219-257.
(4)[加]阿米塔·阿查亚:《美国世界秩序的终结》,第73页。
(1)White House,National Security Strategy,December 2017,pp.17-22;pp.45-52.
(2)Robert Kagan,“Backing into World War III,”The Brookings Institution,February 6,2017,https://www.brookings.edu/research/backing-into-world-war-iii/.
(3)Nick Bisley,“The Real China Challenge:Beijing's Blueprint for Asia Revealed,”The National Interest,October 27,2014,http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-china-challenge-beijings-blueprint-asia-revealed-11550.
(4)Peter Ferdinand,“Westward ho-The China Dream and‘One Belt,One Road’:Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping,”International Affairs,Vol.92,No.4,2016,pp.941-957.
(5)Simon Denyer,“China Promotes‘Asia-Pacific Dream’to Counter U.S.‘pivot,’”The Washington Post,November 11,2014,https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinas-promotes-asia-pacific-dream-to-counter-us-pivot/2014/11/11/1d9e05a4-1e8e-4026-ad5a-5919f8c0de8a_stor y.html?utm_term=.5e244aa63881.
(6)Xenia Wickett,John Nilsson-Wright,and Tim Summers,The Asia-Pacifc Power Balance:Beyond the US-China Narrative,Research Paper,Chatham House,September 2015,https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/20150924AsiaPacifi c WickettNilssonWrightSummersFinal.pdf.
(7)Randall L.Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu,“After Unipolarity:China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S.Decline,”International Security,Vol.36,No.1,2011,p.279.
(1)John Mearsheimer,“China's Unpeaceful Rise,”Current History A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs,Vol.105,No.690,2006,pp.160-162.
(2)John Mearsheimer,“The Gathering Storm:China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,”The Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.3,No.4,2010,pp.381-396.
(3)Aaron Friedberg,Contest for Supremacy:China,American,and the Struggle for Master in Asia,New York:W.W.Norton&Company,2011,pp.1-9.
(4)Graham Allison:Destined for War:Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?New York:Houghton Mifflin Harcourt,2017,pp.154-186.
(5)笔者根据中国人民银行官网的数据统计所得,参见http://www.pbc.gov.cn/diaochatongjisi/116219/index.html。
(6)笔者根据中国国家统计局官网的数据统计所得,参见http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/。
(1)G.John Ikenberry,“The Liberal International Order and Its Discontents,”MillenniumJournal of International Studies,Vol.8,No.3,2010,pp.509-521.
(2)[美]约翰·伊肯伯里:《民主、制度与美国的自我克制》,第213-235页。
(3)Robin Niblett,“Liberalism in Retreat,”Foreign Affairs,Vol.96,No.1,2017,p.18.
(4)Timothy J.Farrell,The Rise of China and the Future of International Political Systerm,Political Science Student Scholarship Paper,College of the Holy Corss,May 2015,http://crossworks.holycross.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=political_science_stude nt_scholarshi-p.
(5)[美]理查德·哈斯:《失序时代》,黄锦桂译,中信出版社2017年版,第7-11页。
(1)G.John Ikenberry and Darren Lim,China’s Emerging Institutional Statecraft,The Brookings,Institution,April 2017,https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/chinas-emerging-institutional-statecraft.pdf.
(2)David Dollar,“China’s Rise as a Regional and Global Power:The AIIB and the‘One Belt,One Road,’”The Brookings Institution,July 15,2015,https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/China-rise-as-regional-and-global-power.pdf.
(3)刘海方:《跨越术与道--〈创造性介入〉评析》,《世界经济与政治》2011年第12期,第147-151页。
(4)Evan A.Feigenbaum,“China and the World,”Foreign Affairs,Vol.96,No.1,2017,p.38.
(1)G.John Ikenberry,“The Rise of China and the Future of the West:Can the Liberal System Survive?”Foreign Affairs,Vol.87,No.1,2008,pp.23-37.
(2)G.John Ikenberry,“The Future of the Liberal World Order:Internationalism after America,”Foreign Affairs,Vol.90,No.3,2011,p.58.
(1)White House,National Security Strategy,December 2017,pp.1-7.
(1)可以假设,规则结构体现了一定时期内的资源分配格局,如实力对比、威望和利益分配等;规范结构则体现了国家间共识,并赋予规则结构以意义,如主权规范、多边主义规范等。鉴于不可能出现一国在反对秩序的规范结构的同时,还接受了规则结构的情况,如一国不可能在寻求推翻IMF中的大国特权和多边主义规范的同时,还接受IMF中已有的投票权分配份额,因此,一国国际秩序角色的类型只有三种类型。当然,上面只是提供了一种理论化的猜想,其有效性还有待实践检验,但这也不妨碍从抽象层面进行设想。