BT项目合同风险分担研究
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摘要
合理的风险分担有利于促进BT项目双方的合作,保证BT项目的顺利实施。首先,探讨了Shapley值是否可应用在BT项目共担风险分担中,结论为合适。其次,遵循风险分担的基本原则,将影响BT项目风险分担的五个因素:风险成因、承担风险能力、参与项目程度及收益、控制风险能力及经济地位与修正的Shapley值进行结合,构建了BT项目风险分担模型,以期在BT发起人和主办人之间进行合理的风险分担。最后,运用构建的风险分担模型分析了某围海造陆BT项目的合同风险,并与合同风险分担结果进行了比较,得出的结论是合同风险分担基本合理,但不可抗力风险可适当让BT主办人承担工程损失风险,通货膨胀引起的材料价格上涨风险,应加大BT主办人承担比例。
Proper risk allocation can promote the cooperation of BT sponsor and BT organizer, and guarantee the implementation of BT projects. Firstly, Shapley value being able to allocate risk of BT projects is discussed,and the conclusion is fitting. Secondly, according to the basic principles of risk allocation, a model for risk allocation in BT projects is set up using the revised Shapley value, combined the Shapley value with the five influence factors of risk allocation, i. e. risk causes, the ability to assume risk, participation and benefits of the project, the ability to control risk and economic status, and proper risk allocation between BT sponsor and BT organizer is expected. Finally, risk allocation of a Land Reclamation BT Project is analyzed by the model, and is compared with the contract risk analysis. The conclusion is that the contract risk allocation is basically proper, but a part of engineering risk of the force majeure risk should allocated to the BT organizer, and the risk of material price flowing causing by inflation should be increase the allocation proportion of the BT organizer.
Proper risk allocation can promote the cooperation of BT sponsor and BT organizer, and guarantee the implementation of BT projects. Firstly, Shapley value being able to allocate risk of BT projects is discussed,and the conclusion is fitting. Secondly, according to the basic principles of risk allocation, a model for risk allocation in BT projects is set up using the revised Shapley value, combined the Shapley value with the five influence factors of risk allocation, i. e. risk causes, the ability to assume risk, participation and benefits of the project, the ability to control risk and economic status, and proper risk allocation between BT sponsor and BT organizer is expected. Finally, risk allocation of a Land Reclamation BT Project is analyzed by the model, and is compared with the contract risk analysis. The conclusion is that the contract risk allocation is basically proper, but a part of engineering risk of the force majeure risk should allocated to the BT organizer, and the risk of material price flowing causing by inflation should be increase the allocation proportion of the BT organizer.
引文
[1]WANG M T,CHOU H Y.Risk allocation and risk handling of highway projects in Taiwan[J].Journal of management in Engineering,2003,19(2):60-68.
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[5]JIN X H.Model for efficient risk allocation in privately financed public infrastructure projects using neuro-fuzzy techniques[J].Journal of Construction Engineering and Management,2011,137(11):1003-1014.
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[7]何涛,赵国杰.基于随机合作博弈模型的PPP项目风险分担[J].系统工程,2011,29(4):88-92.
[8]巴希,乌云娜,胡新亮,等.基于粗糙集理论的555项目风险分担研究[J].技术经济与管理研究,2013(5):10-14.
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[13]江辉,彭建春,欧亚平,等.基于Shapley值的输电网损分配[J].电力自动化设备,2003(2):18-21.
[14]郑士源.基于动态稳定性的运输联盟成本分摊规则[J].上海交通大学学报,2013(3):500-504.
[15]孔维莎,张强.基于Hukuhara-Shapley值的共同配送成本分摊策略[J].物流技术,2007(10):49-52.
[16]DUBEY P.The Shapley value as aircraft landing fees-revisited[J].Management Science,1982,28(8):869-874.
[17]PETROSJAN L,ZACCOUR G.Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction[J].Journal of Economic Dynamics&Control,2003,27(3):381-398.
[18]DEHEZ P.Allocation of fixed costs:Characterization of the(dual)weighted Shapley value[J].International Game Theory Review,2011,13(2):141-157.
[19]汪翔,孟卫东,吴国东.不确定性条件下研发联盟的风险分担设计[J].管理工程学报,2013(3):189-196.
[20]Mc GINTY M.A risk-dominant allocation:Maximizing coalition stability[J].Journal of Public Economic Theory,2011,13(2):311-325.
[21]POWERS M R.Using Aumann-Shapley value to allocate insurance risk:The case of inhomogeneous losses[J].North American Actuarial Journal,2007(3):113-127.
[22]TSANAKAS A.To split or not to split:Capital allocation with convex risk measures[J].Insurance:Mathematics&Economics,2009,44(2):268-277.
[23]MAYORDOMO S,RODRIGUEZ-MORENO M,PEA J I.Derivatives holdings and systemic risk in the U.S.banking sector[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2014,45:84-104.
[24]NIGRO G L,ABBATE L.Risk assessment and profit sharing in business networks[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2011,131(1):234-241.
[25]崔东红,姚莉,杨榕.基于Shapley值的多交叉事件延误索赔责任研究[J].沈阳工业大学学报(社会科学版),2011(3):234-238.
[26]王辉,何伯森.BOT模式项目融资的风险研究[J].中国软科学,1999(5):113-121.
[27]张水波,何伯森.工程项目合同双方风险分担问题的探讨[J].天津大学学报(社会科学版),2003,5(3):257-261.
[28]刘新平,王守清.试论PPP项目的风险分配原则和框架[J].建筑经济,2006,280(2):59-63.
[29]柯永建,王守清,陈炳泉.英法海峡隧道的失败对PPP项目风险分担的启示[J].土木工程学报,2008,41(12):97-102.
[30]LOOSEMORE M,RAFTERY J,REILLY C,et al.Risk management in projects[M].London:Taylor&Francis,2005.
[31]高华.我国BT模式投资建设合同研究[D].天津:天津大学,2009.
[32]陈勇强.基于现代信息技术的超大型工程建设项目集成管理研究[D].天津:天津大学,2004.
[33]邓小鹏,李启明,汪文雄,等.PPP模式风险分担原则综述及运用[J].建筑经济,2008(9):32-35.
[34]RAHMAN M M,KUMARSWAMY M M.Risk management trends in the construction industry:Moving towards joint risk management[J].Engineering,Construction and Architectural Management,2002,9(2):131-151.
[35]赵华,尹贻林.基于ISM工程项目合理风险分担影响因素分析[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2011,13(6):15-19.
[36]高华,齐浩,朱俊文.轨道交通BT项目风险分担研究[J].土木工程学报,2015,48(3):128-136.
1Shapley认为,合作博弈者的分配应遵循效率公理、虚拟公理、对称公理和加总公理,这四个公理是确定合理分配方法的前提条件。
[2]杜亚灵,尹贻林.不完全契约视角下的工程项目风险分担框架研究[J].重庆大学学报(社会科学版),2012,18(1):65-70.
[3]LI B,AKINTOYE A,EDWARDS P J,et al.The allocation of risk in PPP/PFI construction project in the UK[J].International Journal of Project Management,2005,23:25-35.
[4]LAM K C,WANG D,PATRICIA T K,et al.Modeling risk allocation decision in construction contracts[J].International Journal of Project Management,2007,25:485-493.
[5]JIN X H.Model for efficient risk allocation in privately financed public infrastructure projects using neuro-fuzzy techniques[J].Journal of Construction Engineering and Management,2011,137(11):1003-1014.
[6]姜早龙,王东雁,刘晓君.BT工程项目风险分析与效益共享研究[J].湖南大学学报(自然科学版),2012,39(7):89-92.
[7]何涛,赵国杰.基于随机合作博弈模型的PPP项目风险分担[J].系统工程,2011,29(4):88-92.
[8]巴希,乌云娜,胡新亮,等.基于粗糙集理论的555项目风险分担研究[J].技术经济与管理研究,2013(5):10-14.
[9]胡丽,张卫国,叶晓甦.基于SHAPELY修正的PPP项目利益分配模型研究[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(2):149-154.
[10]魏学成,李文涛.基于改进Shapley值法的供应链联盟利益分配研究[J].统计与决策,2010,23:53-55.
[11]HSUEH S L,YAN M R.Contribution-based profit-sharing scheme for joint ventures[J].Technological&Economic Development of Economy,2011,17(3):445-458.
[12]谢俊,白兴忠,魏建详,等.西北电网调峰成本补偿研究[J].浙江大学学报(自然科学版),2009,43(3):584-588.
[13]江辉,彭建春,欧亚平,等.基于Shapley值的输电网损分配[J].电力自动化设备,2003(2):18-21.
[14]郑士源.基于动态稳定性的运输联盟成本分摊规则[J].上海交通大学学报,2013(3):500-504.
[15]孔维莎,张强.基于Hukuhara-Shapley值的共同配送成本分摊策略[J].物流技术,2007(10):49-52.
[16]DUBEY P.The Shapley value as aircraft landing fees-revisited[J].Management Science,1982,28(8):869-874.
[17]PETROSJAN L,ZACCOUR G.Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction[J].Journal of Economic Dynamics&Control,2003,27(3):381-398.
[18]DEHEZ P.Allocation of fixed costs:Characterization of the(dual)weighted Shapley value[J].International Game Theory Review,2011,13(2):141-157.
[19]汪翔,孟卫东,吴国东.不确定性条件下研发联盟的风险分担设计[J].管理工程学报,2013(3):189-196.
[20]Mc GINTY M.A risk-dominant allocation:Maximizing coalition stability[J].Journal of Public Economic Theory,2011,13(2):311-325.
[21]POWERS M R.Using Aumann-Shapley value to allocate insurance risk:The case of inhomogeneous losses[J].North American Actuarial Journal,2007(3):113-127.
[22]TSANAKAS A.To split or not to split:Capital allocation with convex risk measures[J].Insurance:Mathematics&Economics,2009,44(2):268-277.
[23]MAYORDOMO S,RODRIGUEZ-MORENO M,PEA J I.Derivatives holdings and systemic risk in the U.S.banking sector[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2014,45:84-104.
[24]NIGRO G L,ABBATE L.Risk assessment and profit sharing in business networks[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2011,131(1):234-241.
[25]崔东红,姚莉,杨榕.基于Shapley值的多交叉事件延误索赔责任研究[J].沈阳工业大学学报(社会科学版),2011(3):234-238.
[26]王辉,何伯森.BOT模式项目融资的风险研究[J].中国软科学,1999(5):113-121.
[27]张水波,何伯森.工程项目合同双方风险分担问题的探讨[J].天津大学学报(社会科学版),2003,5(3):257-261.
[28]刘新平,王守清.试论PPP项目的风险分配原则和框架[J].建筑经济,2006,280(2):59-63.
[29]柯永建,王守清,陈炳泉.英法海峡隧道的失败对PPP项目风险分担的启示[J].土木工程学报,2008,41(12):97-102.
[30]LOOSEMORE M,RAFTERY J,REILLY C,et al.Risk management in projects[M].London:Taylor&Francis,2005.
[31]高华.我国BT模式投资建设合同研究[D].天津:天津大学,2009.
[32]陈勇强.基于现代信息技术的超大型工程建设项目集成管理研究[D].天津:天津大学,2004.
[33]邓小鹏,李启明,汪文雄,等.PPP模式风险分担原则综述及运用[J].建筑经济,2008(9):32-35.
[34]RAHMAN M M,KUMARSWAMY M M.Risk management trends in the construction industry:Moving towards joint risk management[J].Engineering,Construction and Architectural Management,2002,9(2):131-151.
[35]赵华,尹贻林.基于ISM工程项目合理风险分担影响因素分析[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2011,13(6):15-19.
[36]高华,齐浩,朱俊文.轨道交通BT项目风险分担研究[J].土木工程学报,2015,48(3):128-136.
1Shapley认为,合作博弈者的分配应遵循效率公理、虚拟公理、对称公理和加总公理,这四个公理是确定合理分配方法的前提条件。