基于Shapley值修正的跨区域水电项目收益分配研究
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摘要
跨区域水利水电建设项目因涉及众多利益主体,在各自区域内难以通过行政、经济等手段协调,导致项目长期搁置。依据公平兼顾效率、收益与风险对称等原则,运用修正的Shapley值模型来分析跨区域多个主体之间的合作对策问题,对各参与方最终分配到的收益比例进行修正协调,解决跨区域水电项目建设过程中收益分配不均的问题,达到收益公平化的结果。
Due to the large number of stakeholders involved in the construction of inter-regional hydropower projects,it is difficult to coordinate through administrative and economic measures in their respective regions,resulting in the long-term suspension of the projects. Based on the principles of fairness and efficiency,return and risk,the modified Shapley value model is used to analyze the cooperation strategies among multiple subjects in inter-regions. The proportion of revenue ultimately allocated to each participant is corrected. The uneven distribution of income during the construction of inter-regional hydropower projects is solved,and a fair return is achieved
Due to the large number of stakeholders involved in the construction of inter-regional hydropower projects,it is difficult to coordinate through administrative and economic measures in their respective regions,resulting in the long-term suspension of the projects. Based on the principles of fairness and efficiency,return and risk,the modified Shapley value model is used to analyze the cooperation strategies among multiple subjects in inter-regions. The proportion of revenue ultimately allocated to each participant is corrected. The uneven distribution of income during the construction of inter-regional hydropower projects is solved,and a fair return is achieved
引文
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[3]李巍,花冰倩.合作博弈框架下产学研协同创新的利益分配策略研究:社会网络分析视角[J].商业研究,2016,62(9):39-45.
[4]张根明,杨思涵.技术入股型产学研合作创新的利益分配研究:基于技术价值不确定性的新视角[J].软科学,2017(10):1-5.
[5]陶丹,朱德全.产学研协同创新中产出分享利益分配方式的优化路径[J].统计与决策,2017(7):36-40.
[6]GIANNOCCARO I,PONTRANDOLFO P.Supply chain coordination by revenue sharing contracts[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2004,89(2):131-139.
[7]范德成,胡钰.造船供应链利益分配问题的Shapley值法分析[J].哈尔滨工程大学学报,2014(5):649-653.
[8]房进军,刘玲.基于Shapley值法的旅游供应链利益分配[J].物流技术,2015,34(16):114-117.
[9]黄勇.基于Shapley值法的猪肉供应链利益分配机制研究[J].农业技术经济,2017(2):122-128.
[10]常宏远,邓蕾,涂志刚.基于合作对策的三级逆向供应链利益分配[EB/OL].北京:中国科技论文在线[2017-04-07].http://www.paper.edu.cn/releasepaper/content/201704-71.
[11]王愚,陈冬梅,张小敏.基于和谐度的虚拟企业利益分配策略研究[J].江苏科技大学学报(自然科学版),2010,24(3):294-297.
[12]包国宪,王学军,柴国荣.虚拟企业的利益分配与协调研究[J].科技进步与对策,2012,29(24):123-126.
[13]白红飞,王刚.PPP收益分配模型研究[J].合作经济与科技,2015(10):72-74.
[14]方茜,陈菁,代小平,等.基于合作收益的跨区域水源保护补偿额测算方法研究[J].水利经济,2011,29(2):38-40.
[15]樊亮.基于Shapley值修正的PPP项目利益相关者收益分配研究[D].天津:天津大学,2014.
[16]朱军.中国水力发电史:1904-2000第3册[M].北京:中国电力出版社,2007.