金融安全视角下不良资产形成机理研究——经济转型还是企业骗贷
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摘要
本文通过整理2009—2016年银行对上市公司贷款数据库,以每家借款企业形成的不良贷款金额为研究主体,分别从经济结构转型的宏观视角和企业债务违约的微观视角出发,结合供给侧结构性改革的经济背景,研究新一轮不良资产的形成机理。本文的研究结论包括:第一,经济结构转型使得产业间协调程度和耦合度提高,对不良资产的产生起到抑制的作用,在"去产能"的供给侧改革背景下,企业资金链条绷紧,债务违约是不良资产形成的重要因素。第二,东部地区产业结构合理化和高度化对不良资产的抑制作用比中、西部更加显著,而企业债务违约指标对不良资产的促进作用在中、西部地区更加显著。第三,房地产和工业行业受到产能过剩的影响,企业债务违约指标显著性更加强烈。第四,国有企业得到地方政府的隐性担保,运营资本充足,国有企业债务违约的显著性弱于民营企业。第五,信用贷款不需提供担保物和抵押物,债务违约指标显著性要强于担保贷款和其他授信贷款。第六,固定资产贷款、科技研发贷款能及时地将更新改造和科技研发的成果转化为企业生产率,提升"造血"能力,债务违约指标的显著性弱于流动资金贷款。
This article used the 2009—2016 listed companies loan database, to study the formation mechanism of the new round of non-performing assets. The main research conclusions are: Firstly, the transformation of economic structure increased the degree of coordination and coupling of inter-industry, which could curb non-performing assets. Secondly, the rationalization and heightening of the industrial structure in the eastern region had more significant influence on curbing the production of non-performing assets, while the effect of corporate debt default on the promotion of non-performing assets was even less significant. Thirdly, the real estate and industrial sectors were affected by excess capacity, so corporate debt default indicators had become more significant. Fourth, state-owned enterprises had implicit guarantees from local governments,therefore their debt defaults were significantly weaker than private enterprises. Fifth, credit loans did not need to provide guarantee and collateral, so the significance of debt default indicators was stronger than those of secured loans and other credit grants. Sixth, fixed assets loans, science and technology R&D loans could transform their achievement into enterprise productivity on a timely basis, therefore the debt default indicators were significantly weaker than liquidity loans.
This article used the 2009—2016 listed companies loan database, to study the formation mechanism of the new round of non-performing assets. The main research conclusions are: Firstly, the transformation of economic structure increased the degree of coordination and coupling of inter-industry, which could curb non-performing assets. Secondly, the rationalization and heightening of the industrial structure in the eastern region had more significant influence on curbing the production of non-performing assets, while the effect of corporate debt default on the promotion of non-performing assets was even less significant. Thirdly, the real estate and industrial sectors were affected by excess capacity, so corporate debt default indicators had become more significant. Fourth, state-owned enterprises had implicit guarantees from local governments,therefore their debt defaults were significantly weaker than private enterprises. Fifth, credit loans did not need to provide guarantee and collateral, so the significance of debt default indicators was stronger than those of secured loans and other credit grants. Sixth, fixed assets loans, science and technology R&D loans could transform their achievement into enterprise productivity on a timely basis, therefore the debt default indicators were significantly weaker than liquidity loans.
引文
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[2]侯亚景.我国金融业不良资产处置策略研究[J].上海经济研究,2017(1):24-31
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[6]施华强.中国国有商业银行不良贷款内生性:一个基于双重软预算约束的分析框架[J].金融研究,2004(6):1-16
[7]王一江,田国强.不良资产处理、股份制改造与外资战略---中日韩银行业经验比较[J].经济研究,2004(11):28-36
[8]张雪兰,陈百助.宏观经济要素、银行特征与不良贷款---基于公司与零售贷款组合的比较研究[J].财贸经济,2012(8):46-55
[9]Beck R,Jakubik P,Piloiu A.Non-Performing Loans:What Matters in Addition to the Economic Cycle?[J].Open Economies Review,2015,26(3):407-445
[10]Berger A N,Deyoung R.Problem Loans and Cost Efficiency in Commercial Banks[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,1997,21(6):849-870
[11]Bernanke B,Gertler M.Agency Costs,Net Worth and Business Fluctuations[J].American Economic Review,1989,79(1):14-31
[12]Chenery H.B,S.Robinson&M.Syrquin,Industrialization and Growth:a Comparative Study[M].London:Oxford University Press,1986
[13]Iannotta G,Nocera G,Sironi A.Ownership Structure,Risk and Performance in the European Banking Industry[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2007,31(7):2127-2149
[14]Jin-Li H U,Yang L I,Chiu Y H.Ownership and Nonperforming Loans:Evidence from Taiwan's Banks[J].Developing Economies,2004,42(3):405-420
[15]Makri V,Tsaganos A,Bellas A.Determinants of Non-Performing Loans:The Case of Eurozone[J].Panoeconomicus,2014,61(2):193-206
[16]Stern G H,Feldman R J.Too Big to Fail:The Hazards of Bank Bailouts[M].Brookings Institution Press,2004
[17]Vithessonthi C.Deflation,Bank Credit Growth,and Non-Performing Loans:Evidence from Japan[J].International Review of Financial Analysis,2016,45:295-305
(1)因为篇幅有限,有需要的读者可向作者索取估算步骤和参数设定。
[2]侯亚景.我国金融业不良资产处置策略研究[J].上海经济研究,2017(1):24-31
[3]刘伟,张辉,黄泽华.中国产业结构高度与工业化进程和地区差异的考察[J].经济学动态,2008(11):4-8
[4]陆正飞,何捷,窦欢.谁更过度负债:国有还是非国有企业?[J].经济研究,2015(12):54-67
[5]茅锐.产业集聚和企业的融资约束[J].管理世界,2015(2):58-71
[6]施华强.中国国有商业银行不良贷款内生性:一个基于双重软预算约束的分析框架[J].金融研究,2004(6):1-16
[7]王一江,田国强.不良资产处理、股份制改造与外资战略---中日韩银行业经验比较[J].经济研究,2004(11):28-36
[8]张雪兰,陈百助.宏观经济要素、银行特征与不良贷款---基于公司与零售贷款组合的比较研究[J].财贸经济,2012(8):46-55
[9]Beck R,Jakubik P,Piloiu A.Non-Performing Loans:What Matters in Addition to the Economic Cycle?[J].Open Economies Review,2015,26(3):407-445
[10]Berger A N,Deyoung R.Problem Loans and Cost Efficiency in Commercial Banks[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,1997,21(6):849-870
[11]Bernanke B,Gertler M.Agency Costs,Net Worth and Business Fluctuations[J].American Economic Review,1989,79(1):14-31
[12]Chenery H.B,S.Robinson&M.Syrquin,Industrialization and Growth:a Comparative Study[M].London:Oxford University Press,1986
[13]Iannotta G,Nocera G,Sironi A.Ownership Structure,Risk and Performance in the European Banking Industry[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2007,31(7):2127-2149
[14]Jin-Li H U,Yang L I,Chiu Y H.Ownership and Nonperforming Loans:Evidence from Taiwan's Banks[J].Developing Economies,2004,42(3):405-420
[15]Makri V,Tsaganos A,Bellas A.Determinants of Non-Performing Loans:The Case of Eurozone[J].Panoeconomicus,2014,61(2):193-206
[16]Stern G H,Feldman R J.Too Big to Fail:The Hazards of Bank Bailouts[M].Brookings Institution Press,2004
[17]Vithessonthi C.Deflation,Bank Credit Growth,and Non-Performing Loans:Evidence from Japan[J].International Review of Financial Analysis,2016,45:295-305
(1)因为篇幅有限,有需要的读者可向作者索取估算步骤和参数设定。