互联网背景下类保险互助平台收费模式探讨:会员视角
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摘要
信息不对称问题导致信息优势方为获取自身更大的利益损害信息劣势方的利益,产生道德风险或逆向选择,双方偏离了效用最大化的状态。互联网背景下,类保险互助平台兴起,随着平台规模的扩大,费用的增加,收费的趋势愈加明显。本文在信息不对称的条件下,从类保险互助平台会员的角度考虑了一种激励模式的费用机制,使平台和会员双方实现效用最大化,并应用委托代理理论,定量研究了类保险互助平台和平台会员之间的收费机制,再对模型中的参数进行数值模拟分析。最终得出的结论是:在会员和平台双方实现效用最大化,其他条件不变的情况下,平台的收入与其管理能力成正比;当平台相对于会员的风险厌恶水平越高时,线性激励合同中固定收入越高,激励强度越低,而会员相对于平台的风险厌恶水平的高低对线性激励合同的影响不大。
Information symmetry will cause damage to the benefit of information advantage side,causing moral risk or adverse selection and deviation from the state of ultimate effect.Under the background of internet,mutual platforms of the insurance category products are growing up,with the rise of size and cost of platform,the trend of fee charging is becoming obvious.This paper considers an encouraging mechanism of charging from the perspective of member of mutual platforms of the insurance category,to maximize the utilization of both the platform and the member.By means of principal-agent theory,aquantitative study is made about the charge mechanism between the mutual platform and member of the like-insurance products,then a simulation analysis is made to the parameters of the model.The final conclusion is:under the maximizing utilization of both members and the platform,with other conditions unchanged,the income of the platform is directly proportional to the management ability.The greater risk aversion of the members to the platform,the higher fixed income in the lineal encouragement contract,and lower incentive intensity.While the risk aversion level of the members to the platform has little influence on the lineal incentive contract.
Information symmetry will cause damage to the benefit of information advantage side,causing moral risk or adverse selection and deviation from the state of ultimate effect.Under the background of internet,mutual platforms of the insurance category products are growing up,with the rise of size and cost of platform,the trend of fee charging is becoming obvious.This paper considers an encouraging mechanism of charging from the perspective of member of mutual platforms of the insurance category,to maximize the utilization of both the platform and the member.By means of principal-agent theory,aquantitative study is made about the charge mechanism between the mutual platform and member of the like-insurance products,then a simulation analysis is made to the parameters of the model.The final conclusion is:under the maximizing utilization of both members and the platform,with other conditions unchanged,the income of the platform is directly proportional to the management ability.The greater risk aversion of the members to the platform,the higher fixed income in the lineal encouragement contract,and lower incentive intensity.While the risk aversion level of the members to the platform has little influence on the lineal incentive contract.
引文
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[2]胡祁.网络互助平台运行模式及未来发展路径分析[J].上海保险,2016,(05):43-45.
[3]李林蔚.网络互保平台的可持续性研究[D].浙江工商大学,2016.
[4]RAO R S,Narasimhan O,John G.Understanding the role of trade-ins in durable goods markets:Theory and evidence[J].Marketing Science,2009,28(5):950-967.
[5]Atasu A,Sarvary M,Van Wassenhove L N.Remanufacturing as a marketing strategy[J].Mangement Science,2008,54(10):1731-1746.
[6]Holmstorm B,Milgrom P.Multitask principal-agent analyses:Incentive contracts,asset ownership,and job design[J].Journal of Law,Economics&Organization,1991,7:24-52.
[7]曹柬,杨春节,李平.不对称信息下供应链线性分成制契约设计研究[J].管理科学学报,2009,(02):19-30.
[8]华冬冬,沙凯逊,亓霞.参与人不同风险态度组合下的委托代理模型[J].系统工程,2011,(03):
[9]刘晖,文旭,吴秀珍.罕见病网络互助信息平台构建及模式探析[J].医学信息学杂志,2013,(03):35-38.
[10]池水明.基于ASP.NET施乐会爱心互助平台的设计与实现[D].电子科技大学,2012.
[11]成媛,赵郝锐.论网络环境下大学生“心理互助”平台的建构[J].北方民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2013,(02):81-85.
[12]罗云峰.博弈论教程[M].北京:清华大学出版社,北京交通大学出版社,2007.